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ABSTRACT
Arbitration is a system for settling disputes and a substitute for litigation in court. This system
has been used throughout the ages. It has, however, evolved over time in to the current system
of arbitration, which has been shaped by changes in the world. Because of the growth of
international commercial interaction, the number of disputes has increased. A faster way than
litigation to resolve disputes is through the use of arbitration. Different nations, however, have
different customs, language, culture and religion, and these may result in some conflicts and
disagreements in applying foreign arbitral awards. This is exactly the case with Saudi Arabia.
The country has been mistaken in discouraging arbitration of foreign awards, without much
understanding of their culture, and the laws that regulate foreign arbitration. There is no country
that would willingly discourage arbitration if it is an important source of economic
development. This research is a comparative study between Saudi Arabia and Australia, to show
that Saudi Arabia, indeed implements foreign arbitral awards, and that it is the difference in
culture, laws, and practice that lead to different negative perceptions about the country’s
arbitration system. This has been achieved through the examination of the legal provisions
regulating foreign arbitration in Australia, and of the Grievances Board in Saudi Arabia in
dealing with a foreign arbitral award. The examination focused on comparing experiences, case
studies in approving foreign arbitral awards, and literature about implementation of foreign
arbitral awards in Australia and Saudi Arabia. The comparison is based on efficiency, justice to
the parties in the individual case, and societal values.
One of the most important finding is that there is a higher level of efficiency in regard to
Australia, and equal maintenance by both jurisdictions of societal values and justice to the
parties concerned, although some judgments appeared to discourage arbitration in both
countries. These findings and analysis show that it is important to understand different
countries’ legal systems, cultures, customs, language and religion, in order to improve
understanding of foreign legal regulations related to arbitration. This will also help increase
efficiency in implementing foreign arbitral awards in the respective countries.
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1. 1

INTRODUCTION

General Background

Arbitration has been known since the initial stages of the formation of legal thinking in humans
and evolved with the development of societies throughout the ages.1 The Sumerians knew of
arbitration, as did the Greeks, Romans and the Arabs before Islam, and it has been given
legitimacy as a system by Islamic law.2 Simply put, this system is a method for settling disputes
that is at the same time binding on the parties, and it is a substitute for litigation in court.3
It is clear that the increase in international commercial transactions has contributed to the
globalisation of the legal community. It has also led to increased recourse to arbitration as a
peaceful means of resolving disputes, (and of avoiding generally costly and time-consuming
court action). This in turn has led to a realisation by the legal community of the importance of
understanding arbitration. Arbitration offers a number of advantages: it preserves the ongoing
relationship between the parties where ‘doing business during or after litigation is rarely
feasible.’4 Additionally, it gives the parties multiple options to guarantee the application of the
law which they themselves have chosen.

See Kahtan Al-Doari, ‘Alth}ki>m fy Alfqh u> Alqanwn Alwad}‘y [Arbitration Contract in the Fiqh and the
Law]’ (Dar Al-Furqan, 2003) 38.
2
For more information about arbitration from the pre-Islamic era to the emergence of the four Islamic
schools of thought, see Abdulrahman Yahya Baamir, Shari’a Law in Commercial and Banking
Arbitration: Law and Practice in Saudi Arabia (Ashgate Publishing, 2010) 45; also see Mona Rafeeq,
‘Rethinking Islamic Law Arbitration Tribunals: Are They Compatible with Traditional American
Notions of Justice?’ (2010) 28(1) Wisconsin International Law Journal 108, 113, 118. In fact,
‘international arbitration has survived and prospered for hundreds of years despite the emergence of
strong national legal and political systems in the 19th century’: at 2. For more information, see Richard
Garnett, ‘International Arbitration Law: Progress towards Harmonisation’ (2002) 3(2) Melbourne
Journal of International Law 400, 401–402.
3
However, this binding nature might be affected by some theories which characterise the nature of
commercial arbitration. One of them is that the arbitration has a contractual theory where it depends on
the parties’ selection of or ‘will’ in regard to arbitration. For more information, see Hong-Lin Yu, ‘A
Theoretical Overview of the Foundations of International Commercial Arbitration’ (2008) 1(2)
Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 255, 265.
4
See Thomas W Walde, ‘Efficient Management of Transnational Disputes: Mutual Gain by Mediation or
Joint Loss in Litigation’ (2006) 22(2) Arbitration International 205, 205.
1

1

It should be noted that arbitration is considered a legal means of resolving disputes outside the
courts with the agreement of the parties, who refer disputes that cover the full gamut of legal
problems to the process. Individuals called ‘arbitrators’ are assigned to determine the outcome
of listed disputes instead of the parties otherwise resorting to the competent court.5
The possibility of resorting to arbitration is often created in a clause which is a condition in the
contract of the main transaction between the parties.6 This feature records the prior desire of the
parties to resort to arbitration as a means for settling future disputes between the parties. Where
there is no reference in the contract between the parties to resort to arbitration to resolve any
potential conflicts of the future, arbitration may also be derived from a separate agreement.7
These types of agreements have been provided by a number of international conventions
(namely, the New York Convention of 1958 and the Geneva Convention of 21 April 1961
(which also include the details of such agreements)).
Arbitration also provides multiple choices in terms of the selection of the tribunal, the law
applicable to the dispute, times of meetings, and period for resolving the dispute. It is possible
to say that the increased resort to arbitration is due to the fact that arbitration is cheaper and
faster than the litigation, which makes arbitration the perfect and practical means for solving
any disputes,8 and with the confidentiality offered by a non-litigious settlement where the

5

6

7

8

There are several definitions for this means in Arabic and in the Western culture and these definitions
revolve around that meaning. For more information, see Sulaiman Ibrahim Al-Eyari, ‘Alth}ki>m Alwat}ny
u> Aldawli> [National and International Commercial Arbitration]’ (1st ed, 2007) 22; Gary Born,
International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary and Materials (Kluwer Law International, 2nd ed,
2001) 1.
See John Humphrey Carlile Morris, John David McLean and Kisch Beevers, The Conflict of Law
(Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed, 2005) 176–7.
See Symposium on Commercial Arbitration and University of Adelaide, Corporate and Business Law
Centre, Current Issues in Domestic and International Commercial Arbitration’: Papers Presented at
the Second Symposium on Commercial Arbitration Held at the University of Adelaide on Saturday
August 11 1990 (University of Adelaide, Corporate Law Centre, 1990) 31.
For more information, see Edward Sykes and Michael Pryles, Australian Private International Law
(Law Book, 1991) 141; Rafeeq, above n 2, 115. For more details, see Marei Bin Mahfouz, ‘ Alth}ki>m
Altjari> Aldawli> u> Qwa‘d Alshri‘h Alislami>h [International Commercial Arbitration and the Rules of
Islamic Law]’ (Bin Mahfouz, 2002) 101–103.

2

investors are able to keep the dispute as much as possible private.9 The best example of this is
the case of Government of Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Co (Aramco) in the 1970s,
which was solved by arbitration and away from the national courts. Hence the facts of this case
were not fully declared to the public as would occur in public issues related to the Saudi
government.10 Such outcome will help protect trade reputation and also the possibility of
continued relations and future transactions between the parties, where litigation in national court
jurisdictions does not offer such guarantees. Furthermore, the willingness of the parties to apply
the rules and norms of international transactions makes them prefer arbitration because the
arbitrator will apply the law chosen by the parties and which may not comply with all
provisions of the law of the state where the arbitration is conducted or where it is to be applied.
Unlike the litigation conducted before the judiciary, arbitration is more liberal and broader in
terms of the accepted rules and international norms.
That is because the arbitrator is not restricted objectively by the law of a state unless it is the
choice of the parties, nor is he/she restricted by the formalities followed in the courts, such as
the dates and locations of meetings to consider the case.11
Consequently, the increasing recourse to arbitration generates an increased interest in arbitration
by legislators and governments around the world, who seek to organise the laws that govern its
procedures. Thus, the United Nations held some international seminars and conferences and
issued several conventions to organise the resort to the arbitration, including, for example, the
See Ashraf Al-Refai, ‘Etfaq Alth}ki>m u> Almshklat Al‘mli>ah u> Alqanwnyah fy Al‘laqat Alkhas}ah
Aldawli>h [Arbitration Agreement and Legal and Practical Problems of International Private
Relationship]’ (Dar-Alfeker, 3002) 4.
10
Aramco is the Saudi Arabia Oil Company and this case was resolved in the 1970s. For more
information on this case, see Walaa Refat, ‘Alth{ki>m Altjari> Alwt{ni> u> Aldwli> fy Almmlaka Al‘rbiah
Als‘wdiah [International and National Commercial Arbitration in Saudi Arabia]’ (Chamber of
Commerce and Industry in Jeddah, 1999); Yahya Al-Samaan, ‘Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia’ in
Eugene Cotran (ed), Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law vol 7 (2000–2001) 71, 79; Mary B
Ayad, ‘Harmonisation of International Commercial Arbitration Law and Sharia: The Case of Pacta
Sunt Servanda v Ordre Public: The Use of Ijtihad to Achieve Higher Award Enforcement’ (2009) 6
Macquarie Journal of Business Law 93, 114; Jalal El-Ahdab and Abd Al-Hamid El-Ahdab, Arbitration
with the Arab Countries (Kluwer Law International, 3rd ed, 2011) 605.
11
See Jaber Nassar, ‘Alth}ki>m fy Al ‘qwd Aledari>h [The Arbitration in Administrative Contracts]’ (DarAlnahda, 1997) 5.
9
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New York Convention of 1958 (‘the Convention’)12 (which concerns the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards) and the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985.13 Additionally,
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States [that] Host Arab
Investments and the Citizens of Other Arab Countries was signed on 10 June 197414 and, also
within the Arab States, the Convention on the Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards
was concluded and approved by the Council of the League of Arab States on 14 September
1952.15
This international attention highlights the importance of arbitration as a quick and effective
method in resolving disputes in the area of world trade and contributes to making arbitration the
primary and most rapid means of pacific settlement of disputes for many participants in
international trade.16 However, this resource raises several problems, especially in the
implementation phase. Thus, it is important to describe such problems precisely and adopt a
clear method to reach the best results, especially in regard to a comparative study.

12

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature 10 June
1958, 330 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 June 1959) (‘New York Convention’ or herein ‘the
Convention’).
13
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UN GAOR, 40th sess, Supp No 17,
UN Doc A/40/17, (21 June 1985) annex 1 (UNCITRAL Model Law).
14
Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Syria, Kuwait, Egypt and Yemen were the initial signatories of the Arab
Convention, with Libya and UAE later adhering to it: Hamid G Gharavi, The International
Effectiveness of the Annulment of an Arbitral Award (Kluwer, 2002) 182–3.
15
Convention of the Arab League on the Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards, 14 September
1952 (entered into force in 10 November 1952).
16
Recognising the importance of arbitration and on the principle of cooperation between states in the
implementation of the provisions of international commercial arbitration, the Arab Gulf Countries
ratified the Convention for the Execution of Judgments, Delegations and Judicial Notifications, opened
for signature 29 Shawwal 1414 AH corresponding to 10 April, 1994 (entered into force 14 Rajab 1416
AH corresponding to 4 December 1995) and established a special arbitration centre under the Gulf
Cooperation Council on 19 March 1995). For more information about this centre, see Brian W
Totterdill, ‘Arbitration Rules: The GCC Commercial Arbitration Rules’ (Paper presented at the
Arbitration Workshop for Contracts and Procurement Engineering under the GCC, Abu Dhabi, United
Arab Emirates, 23–25 October 2000); the Unified Bill of arbitration for the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) which is not yet approved; Ahmed Sheta, ‘The Enforcement of Arbitral Award in the Unified
Bill of Arbitration for the Gulf Cooperation Council’ (Paper presented at the New York Convention 50
Years: Practical Perspectives on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Cairo,
10–11 November 2008).

4

1. 2

The Problem

The rapid recourse to arbitration raises many questions and problems about the laws that govern
the resort to arbitration, and laws governing the conduct of its procedures. One such problem is
the misunderstanding or different interpretations of the legal system of different countries by the
various parties, particularly those foreign to any of the countries involved, leading to wrong
public and international perceptions about those countries. Such is the case with Saudi Arabia.
This is evident from a number of previous studies conducted by various researchers or in
opinions expressed by influential professionals.17 Additionally, questions of effectiveness,
application and jurisdictional coverage of the arbitration system continue to demand more
attention and work. This research will, therefore, critically analyse the role of the competent
court, and the principles guiding the implementation of foreign arbitration in both Saudi Arabia
and Australia to show that Saudi Arabia implements foreign arbitral awards, while examining
how differences in culture, laws, and practice can lead to various negative perceptions about the
country’s arbitration system. This means that the analysis of such provisions is urgently needed
in order to discover the practical application before the competent courts in the implementation
of the provisions of Foreign Arbitral Awards. This method necessarily involves an examination
and analysis of the role of the national judge in the implementation of national rules,
international conventions and the international norms that govern the operation of commercial
arbitration. Unfortunately, there are some studies that have provided inaccurate material and
reached inaccurate conclusions about the role of Saudi courts in implementing the provisions of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (as we shall see in section 1.6.2 Implementation in Saudi Arabia). This
in turn requires an analysis of the provisions in order to know the real role of the Saudi judge
compared to the role played by the Australian judge in performing the same task in order to find
out how flexible and efficient the Saudi judge in implementing the provisions of foreign arbitral
awards.

17

See section 1.6.2 Implementation in Saudi Arabia (B) ‘Previous Studies’which discusses these studies.
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It should be noted that the competent court in Saudi Arabia is the Grievances Board.18 In
Australia it is the Supreme Court of each State and the Federal Court at Commonwealth level.
The role of these courts will be explained in more detail later in this thesis.

1. 3

Research Questions

This research will address the following questions in order to identify and evaluate the
respective roles of the Saudi and Australian courts in approving or rejecting the implementation
of foreign arbitral awards:
(1)

Why is arbitration so commonly used in the resolution of commercial disputes? What
advantages does it have over litigation? In particular, what is the advantage of arbitration
in disputes in the area of international commercial trade?

(2)

What particular legal obstacles exist to the enforcement or recognition of an arbitral
award made in one country within the territory of another country?

(3)

What international or regional conventions have been entered into to overcome the
difficulties identified in (2)? Why is the New York Convention the most important of
these?

(4)

How have the provisions of the New York Convention been adopted in Saudi Arabia and
Australia respectively? Are there any significant textual differences in the way the
Convention has been adopted in these countries? Are there any constitutional issues
governing the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards?

(5)

From a review of the decisions of the Saudi Grievances Board that have been obtained,
have there been any distinctive interpretations or applications of the New York
Convention under Saudi law, particularly having regard to the following legal issues: (a)
the constitutionality of laws implementing the provisions of foreign arbitral awards, (b)

18

Saudi Grievances Board System 2007 s 13(G).

6

public policy, (c) the principle of reciprocity, (d) the extent of the judge’s authority to
consider the subject matter of the case, (e) and the possible severability of the ruling if it
includes one part which is considered contrary to public policy (and that provision is
severable)?
(6)

From a review of the decisions of the Australian superior courts (the Federal Court and
the State Supreme Courts), have there been any distinctive interpretations or applications
of the New York Convention under Australian law, particularly having regard to the
following legal issues: (a) the constitutionality of laws implementing the provisions of
foreign arbitral awards, (b) public policy, (c) the principle of reciprocity, (d) the extent of
the judge’s authority to consider the subject matter of the case, (e) and the possible
severability of the ruling if it includes one part which is considered contrary to public
policy (and that provision is severable)?

(7)

What conclusions can be drawn from the similarities and differences of the Saudi and
Australian approaches? If there are significant differences, can they be explained in terms
of differing emphasis being given to the competing ideals of: (a) efficiency, (b) justice to
the parties in the individual case, and (c) societal values?

1. 4
1.4.1

Scope and Methodology
The Scope

This thesis will focus on the approval of foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia and Australia
only. Consequently, domestic arbitral awards will not be examined.
In order to compare these laws, this study will be specific and focused on the following aspects:
A. The constitutionality of laws that govern the implementation of foreign arbitral awards in
both countries.
B. The formal and substantive requirements in applying foreign awards in both jurisdictions.
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C. The legal nature of the decision of the competent court with regard to the implementation
of foreign judgments.
D. The principles of the court in the adoption of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards,
which are:
i.

Judicial precedents (with analysis of some important issues which may clarify the
position of the court).

ii.

Public policy and its impact.

iii.

The principle of reciprocity.

iv.

The role of international and regional conventions in the adoption of the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards.

Consequently, the thesis structure will comprise six chapters, where the first chapter is the
introduction, and the second will be about foreign arbitration and the competent courts. The
third covers the foundations for the implementation of the foreign arbitral awards and will
discuss the role and the effects of legislation and international/regional conventions on the
judge’s work in the recognition of foreign arbitral awards. The fourth chapter will discuss
generally the conditions of implementation and the judicial role in implementing foreign arbitral
award, and will address the formal requirements and the role of the national judge in approving
foreign arbitral awards. The fifth chapter will be more specific and will discuss the most
important defence in refusing the implementation, that is, ‘the substantive defence’, which is the
public policy defence. Finally the sixth chapter will comprise the conclusion, findings and
recommendations of this research.
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1.4.2

Dimensions of the Comparison

This study is a comparative study of the role of the competent courts in Saudi Arabia and
Australia in the implementation of foreign arbitral awards; thus, the dimensions of this
comparison are based on:
1. Comparisons of various aspects of English and Egyptian laws as needed. This is because
English law is the basis of the law in Australia and Egyptian law is very close to the Saudi
law. In addition, the Egyptian law emanates from the Islamic rules which are the basic rules
that the Saudi law relies on. English and Egyptian laws are also considered because of the
ready availability of adequate references in this discipline. It should be also noted that the
Supreme Court of New South Wales will be taken as a model for the State Supreme Courts
in Australia, while reference to and use of other Supreme Court decisions/rulings will be
made as needed. This is due to the fact that this research is conducted in NSW and this State
was the first State in Australia to enact relevant legislation, that is, the Commercial
Arbitration Act 1974, which was last amended in 2010.
2. Analysis of legal texts used and related to the approval of foreign arbitral awards. These
comprise the Saudi Arbitration System, No M / 46 issued in 1983,19 and its Implementing
Regulations issued by the decision of the Council of Ministers 7 / 2021 issued in 1985;20
and the Australian International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). As the efficient resolution of
disputes is the primary goal of arbitration, this comparison will explore which legal system
is more suited to achieving that end.

19

Saudi Arbitration System, issued by Royal Decree No M / 46 of 12/7/1403 AH 24 April 1983. It is
important to mention that there is a new Saudi Arbitration law that has been issued recently after I
finished conducting this research and had largely completed writing this thesis. It was issued by the
Royal Decree No M /34 of 24/5/1433 AH (16/4/2012) Umm Al-Qura Gazette No 4413, 18/7/1433 AH
(8/6/2012). This new Saudi arbitration law will not be assessed in this research.
20
Saudi Implementing Regulations to the 1983 Arbitration Act, issued by Royal Decree No M / 7 / 2021
of 8/9/1405 AH 1985.
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3.

Analysis will be undertaken of and explanation given for the principles contained in the
decisions of the competent courts (Saudi Grievances Board and the Federal Court of
Australia and the State Supreme courts). The trend of the court in regard to the application
of the principles of international conventions will be extracted. In addition, relevant cases
will be analysed and evaluated to provide a real test and to explore the limits of public
policy and its impact on the implementation of the provisions of foreign awards.

1.4.3

Research Methodology

The methodology in this study will be descriptive, analytical and comparative and will examine
the legal provisions that regulate the verdicts of the NSW Supreme Court and the Federal Court
of Australia and the Grievances Board in Saudi Arabia in dealing with a foreign arbitral award.
A. Comparative Law as a Research Method
The comparative method of research has been used in much research and is of importance for
various reasons. In fact, comparisons are essential and useful in law studies to establish
systematic similarities and differences between observed laws and, possibly, to develop and test
hypotheses and theories about their causal relationships.21 Thus, the comparative method is a
unique, systematic, jurisprudential method, which can be applied to advance new knowledge
about the legal systems in respect of what we apply and how we apply it.22 This can be done by
taking cognisance of the similarities and differences of the legal systems being compared.23 This
exactly explains the reason for the selection of the comparative method for this research. It will
provide similarities and differences between the role of the Australian and the Saudi courts in
21

See Esin Örücü, ‘Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law’ (2007) 8(1) Methodological Aspects of
Comparative Law 29, 30–1; also see D Berg-Schlosser, Comparative Studies: Method and Design,
(2001) International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 24, 27.
22
Mónika Ambrus, Comparative Law Method in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights in the Light of the Rule of Law (2009) 2(3) Erasmus Law Review 353; Edward J Eberle, ‘The
Method And Role of Comparative Law (2009) 8(3) Washington University Global Studies Law Review
451; T J Scott, the Comparative Method of Legal Research, University of Pretoria
<http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/J%20Scott%20%20Comparative%20research%20perspectives%20_Private%20law_.pdf> 1–2.
23
Scott, n 22 above; Eberle, n 22 above; Ambrus, n 22 above.
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enforcing foreign arbitral awards, and can be used to deduce the best way to implement the
provisions of foreign arbitral awards. Most especially important to this process is an
understanding of the Saudi system and recognition of the source of its difference to other
systems. Comparative law as a methodology has various aims. Some of these are:
a. To promote mutual understanding and acquisition of knowledge of foreign legal
systems. With statesmen and jurists’ greater knowledge and understanding of foreign
attitudes to law, the risk such attitudes as bad faith is reduced or completely eliminated.
b. As a way of moving towards internationalisation, which is itself due to the realisation of
the importance of unification of legal rules across different countries.
c. To promote national law development. There are several examples of how borrowings
from the law of other nations have helped to develop national laws. For example, the
United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and India, have all borrowed from the
English common law that they inherited from the colonial era and developed their
national laws. The results of this study could produce information beneficial to both
Australia and Saudi Arabia in the development of their national laws.
d. To enhance a broad understanding of methodology. It explains the reasons why certain
laws were developed, that is, the social functions of specific laws. It also encourages a
closer examination of specific legal principles.24
Since the research aims to prove that Saudi Arabia does implement foreign arbitral awards and
is not hostile to such awards, a comparative method is the best way of meeting the above stated
aims. Additionally, Australia is considered ‘pro-arbitration’;25 hence it is very useful to adopt
the comparative method to examine laws and regulations regarding arbitration as it could be
24

25

Holger Spamann, Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for Comparative Law?,
Harvard John M Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business Fellows’ Discussion Paper Series
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Spamann_32.pdf>.
For more information, see Gregory Nell SC, ‘Recent Developments in the Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards in Australia’ (2012) 26 Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 24, 37.
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seen as a relevant benchmark. In fact, the policy of supporting arbitration in Australia makes it
fertile ground for comparison with a system that is unknown to several Eastern and Western
researchers — or about which little is known or what is known may well be inaccurate — as we
shall see in the literature review (1.6.2 Implementation in Saudi Arabia ((B) Previous Studies).
Thus comparison can provide an effective means of explaining the arbitration process in Saudi
Arabia by providing a recognised ‘pro-arbitration’ model, which will show whether the Saudi
laws and courts are supportive of arbitration. The use of a comparative method will provide
more information for understanding the Saudi attitude towards foreign arbitration as compared
to the Australian laws. It will provide more information on why certain laws exist in Saudi
Arabia and the purpose of such laws, and it will also promote the development of the respective
national laws through increased mutual exposure to accurate information and greater
understanding.
This comparison will be useful as it will be based on the actual role of the court by analysing the
provisions of the courts in both countries regarding foreign arbitration. This makes the use of
such comparative methodology of high value especially with regard to the interpretation of
international norms and conventions that are related to international arbitration where the two
countries are currently parties to the New York Convention.
In fact, comparative study as a method has gained universal acceptance and use and its
application has revealed several advantages.26 This is the same as saying that this method has
provided information that enables differentiation of legal systems on both a general and specific
basis. The general laws that apply to most countries are known through the comparative law

26

For more information, see Djalil Kiekbaev, ‘Comparative Law: Method, Science or Educational
Discipline?’ 2003) 7(3) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, <http://www.ejcl.org/73/art732.html> (the researcher was discussing the different approaches of comparative law); Aqeel Hussein
Aqeel, Toroq wa Manahij Albahth Al‘lmi [Rules and Methods of Scientific Research] (Dar Ibn Katheer,
1434 / 2010).
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method. Application of this methodology is revealed by Kiekbaev, who also indicates that it is
perceived as a science as well as an educational discipline.27
Palmer gives examples of comparative law methodology based on an argument that comparative
law research cannot have one exclusive method.28 This is because research and teaching of
historical investigation and law reforms are too varied to have a specific methodology.29 An
analysis from one single perspective, or treatment of matters with the same depth and detail, or
even preparation of matters to the same degree would not produce accurate results. This is
because different research studies have different and specific purposes.
Comparisons can therefore be carried out for historical, functional, evolutionary, thematic,
structural, statistical, and empirical reasons. All these can be done at either macro of micro
points of view with an endless range of possibilities.30 The above information has provided
guidance and confidence in the use of comparative law methodology for this research.
B. Case Studies
Court cases will be included in this study to determine the position of the judiciary in both
countries in regard to the foreign arbitral award; and all the relevant cases that are publicly
available in Saudi Arabia and Australia will be collected for the period from 1983 to 2012 for
both countries. Saudi Arabia became a party to the New York Convention in 1994, so it is
important to know the court’s position before joining the Convention and after that event. These
materials will help in the analysis of the real position of the courts in Saudi Arabia over that
span as well as for the same period in Australia. The choice of the two countries will be clear
from the reasons outlined immediately below.

27

Kiekbaev, above n 26; see also Valentina Vadi, ‘Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law
in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2010) 39(1) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 67,
67–77.
28
Vernon Valentine Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law
Methodology’ (2004) 4(2) Global Jurist Frontiers, Article 1, 1.
29
Ibid 29.
30
Ibid 2.
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Australia was among the first countries to join the Convention, which represents the largest
international effort in regard to the approval of foreign arbitral awards; whilst, on the other
hand, Saudi Arabia is a relatively recent signatory and might be able to benefit from considering
how the provisions of the Convention have been applied in Australia. It is therefore important to
examine the Saudi and Australian judicial authorities on the implementation of the Convention.
Additionally, the comparison may enrich both Saudi and Australia by providing their respective
judges with an illustration of the experience of their counterparts in another jurisdiction. Also it
is important to compare the experiences of an Islamic country like Saudi Arabia with those of a
Western country like Australia to find the similarities and differences, with the possibility of
facilitating the implementation of the provision of arbitration between those countries,
especially with the proliferation of arbitration and with the increasing economic importance of
the Middle East, Saudi Arabia in particular. Additionally, it is important to study the
experiences of developed countries such as Australia to locate strengths and weaknesses in their
laws and their application, and also with regard to the judiciary, so as to be able to try to benefit
from their experiences and transfer the knowledge obtained from these experiences to
developing countries. Accordingly, case studies on the approval of foreign arbitral awards will
be extensively used in this research.
It should be noted that in accordance with the Saudi Grievances Board System 2007 Chapter III
Part III Article 13(g), the Saudi Grievances Board deals with the decisions of foreign courts and
foreign arbitral awards in the same manner, and the number of foreign court rulings before the
Grievances Board is far higher than the number of foreign arbitral awards; thus, there are
several decisions unrelated to trade issues (such as family cases) that will be analysed in this
research because this shall show the Grievances Board’s trend in the implementation of the
formal and substantive requirements in applying foreign arbitral awards.
Finally, this research will also present and analyse some Western research findings on Saudi
courts regarding their implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards, where some
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researchers have a significant misunderstanding of the role of the Saudi courts in this regard.
This step is to determine the real role of the Saudi courts in the implementation of the provisions
of foreign arbitral awards and also to discern the reasons for these errors and the shortcomings
in these research efforts.
C. Data Collection
As explained above, this project required the analysis of judicial decisions issued by courts in
Saudi Arabia and Australia on enforcement of foreign arbitral awards between 1983 and 2012.
Unfortunately, there were no judicial publication series available from the Saudi Grievances
Board. Due to the lack of official published decisions, I found myself compelled to procure the
Saudi judicial orders using other sources. Fortunately, I obtained a number of judicial decisions
from the old Grievances Board’s library and others from the judges themselves. I also used an
Unpublished Provisions Set 1407 AH that was found in the archives of the Library of the
Grievances Board (Unpublished Commercial Audit-Circuit Principles: Guideline Principles and
Case Law, from 1407 AH (1987) to 1419 AH (1999)). Moreover, there were not many Saudi
rulings in this area of law, which is the reason that I also have chosen to use decisions from
other jurisdictions whose legal systems are similar to that of Saudi Arabia.
The case of Australian court decisions was very different in terms of access and availability.
Electronic libraries such as LexisNexus AU, Westlaw AU and Australasian Legal Information
Institute (AustLII) were used to review decisions on enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
made by the High Court of Australia, Federal courts and the NSW Supreme Court between
1983 and 2012. There were not significant difficulties such as those encountered in the process
of collecting Saudi provisions.
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D. Method of Comparison
The methods which will be adopted in this comparison between the two countries (Saudi Arabia
and Australia) will be selected to measure (1) efficiency; (2) justice to the parties in the
individual case; and (3) societal values.

1. Efficiency
a. Background
‘Efficiency’ literally means the good use of time and energy without any waste.31 This may
mean the optimal use of the available information with a desired speed achieved. Thus,
efficiency in general could involve the presence of all the elements that help to achieve the goal
or end without negative effects or obstacles preventing the achievement of those objectives.
In fact, ‘the dominant economic theory, neoclassical economics, employs a single economic
evaluative criterion: efficiency.’32 This shows that the efficiency as a criterion is an economic
measure more than a legal standard; it analyses the profit and loss and the true amount of
compensation.33 Thus, it could be said that in the economic field the power of efficiency analysis
stems primarily from a single assumption which is that of the reduction of ‘value’ to money. In
this research, the power of efficiency analysis is reveald primarily only when the court
implements the foreign arbitral award in a speedy manner without reconsidering the merits of
the case (except in instances of a clear violation of the public policy of the state or the presence
of an explicit violation of any of the implementation’s formal requirements).

31

Cambridge Learner’s Dictionary (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2007) 255.
See Irene van Staveren, ‘Efficiency’ in Jan Peil and Irene van Staveren (eds), ‘Handbook of Economics
and Ethics’ (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009) 107.
33
See Alfred C Yen, ‘When Authors Won’t Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law’
(1991) 62 University of Colorado Law Review 79. For more information on the efficiency criterion as
an economic standard, see van Staveren, above n 32, 107; Max F Millikan, ‘Criteria for Decisionmaking in Economic Planing’ in Howe Martyn, Multinational Business Management (Ardent Media,
1972) 124; additionally see Russell Hardin, ‘The Morality of Law and Economics’ (1992) 11(4) Law
and Philosophy 331.
32
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Posner in his book ‘The Economics of Justice’ discusses the notions of ‘justice and efficiency’.34
Generally, and in the debate around the philosophical foundations of economic analysis of law,
Posner made two claims: ‘(I) Common law legal rules are, in fact, efficient; and (II) Legal rules
ought to be efficient. In both claims, “efficient” means maximization of the social willingnessto-pay.’35 He also argues that the particular form of efficiency that the law should promote is
wealth maximisation, which ‘provides the soundest ethical basis for the organization and
operation of social institutions.’36
On the other hand, Bromley has used efficiency as an objective truth rule where he believes that
the efficiency ‘survives as a mere value judgment of the economist who recommends it.’37
However, there are some law researchers who have used efficiency as a criterion. For example,
Fisch in her paper ‘Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy’
discussed regulatory efficiency.38 Efficiency in this paper is given a broad definition that is far
from the norm. The norm is that regulatory efficiency is defined in terms of shareholder wealth.
Fisch argues against this giving as the main reason that other stakeholder interests are also
important. Shareholder wealth is frequently used as the basis to determine efficient regulatory
policy. Accordingly, ‘many empirical scholars measure the efficiency of legal rules in terms of
their effect on shareholder wealth.’39 Fisch argues that it is not necessary to maximise
shareholder wealth at the expense of other stakeholders; and that this is demonstrated by
existing legal doctrine. The main idea obtained here is that the concept of efficiency is more
than wealth creation or a focus on wealth as a measure of efficiency. It entails other aspects
34

See Richard Posner, ‘The Economics of Justice’ (President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1981,
1983) 13.
35
See Lewis Kornhauser, ‘The Economic Analysis of Law’ 2011 (Fall) The Stanford Encyclopedia of
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36
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which are specific to the objective of analysis to determine whether a law/policy is efficient.
The paper reveals the questionable assumptions of the economic analysis that influences the use
of shareholder primacy to determine efficient regulatory policy. It concludes that there should
be clear justifications to the reliance on shareholder wealth and why it should dominate
regulatory policy.
Others also criticise the unquestioning adoption of economic efficiency as the sole criterion and
query its traditional measurement in ‘money’ alone. Yen in his article ‘When Authors Won’t
Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law’ discussed copyright law in regard to
fair use treatment parody and issues of economic efficiency replacing the judicial intuition
exercised in regard copyright laws and the again largely intuitive balance struck between public
benefit and artists’ rights and how such benefits are best measured, and without an evaluation of
‘whether social welfare is best measured in money’.40 Yen provides a good illustration of ‘how
the failure of economists’ assumptions prevents efficiency theorists from completely explaining
the results of traditional copyright intuition.’41 From what is described in this article, economists
assume that efficiency is best calculated using money, so that if one suffers losses,
compensation is calculated in terms of money.42 The challenge here is that in copyright law,
authors suffer damages that cannot be compensated by use of money. 43 They value their works
and that value cannot be equated to money. The damage caused by parodists to their works
therefore, cannot be fully compensated. Examples of such losses are: emotional attachment to
works, public ridicule and so on.
The author gives the idea that economists define efficiency differently from efficiency theorists.
They use the cost benefit analysis procedure. Efficiency theorists consider more than just
money. They consider all sorts of gains: public welfare, gains to the parodist, and the author of

40

See Yen, above n 33, 79.
Ibid 80.
42
Ibid 101.
43
Ibid 105.
41

18

the book, or work. Several aspects are considered depending on who is using the author’s work,
and for what purpose, and its consequences to all parties. According to Yen,
Efficiency theory provides both a definition of the public welfare and an unambiguous
method for improving it. As an initial matter, the efficiency theorist defines the public
welfare in terms of a single variable, usually money. This leads quickly to a method for
improving and maximizing public welfare. Since dollars are quantifiable and
measurable, the optimal copyright regime may be expressed as that regime which
maximizes the amount by which copyright's benefits exceed its costs. 44 [But] In
copyright, authors often form emotional attachments to their works which are nonpecuniary in nature. Expressing these interests in money terms would seem, at the very
least, to raise the risk that efficiency will mischaracterize the social value of these
interests and may therefore prove hostile to copyright doctrines which enjoy wide
45
support.

Accordingly, the idea that the author tries to put across is that the construct of efficiency
explanations (formulated on an economic basis without regard to broader issues also in play)
cannot be used for copyright doctrine, especially in cases where authors value their copyright
rights for non-monetary reasons.
This is not to say that economic efficiency can be disregarded. In relation to arbitration studies,
Kovacs in his article ‘Efficiency in International Arbitration: An Economic Approach’ examines
efficiency in international arbitration from a broader, economic perspective within the arbitral
process and also what might be suggested for improving efficiency within the arbitral
procedures.46 Kovacs also discusses the market failures and barriers that may affect the
efficiency of the arbitration procedure.
Kovacs believes that ‘for at least two decades concerns have been voiced that international
arbitration is becoming too slow, too formalized and too expensive.’47 Kovacs believes:
Procedural efficiency in arbitration must be considered in the context of what the
process is trying to achieve, and what is realistic … [and] most users of international
arbitration want a dispute resolution process that enables them to present their case, to
have their respective positions considered in a fair and impartial manner, and have the

44
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law applied to the facts presented.What is efficient will depend on the context in each
48
case.

Thus it is important to be aware of the differing interests of each group of actors where the
analysis of such differing interests from an economic perspective may help to improve the
efficiency of arbitral proceedings.49
Additionally, Kovacs argues:
From an economic view, a legal dispute is resolved efficiently when legal entitlements
are allocated to the parties who value them the most, legal liabilities are allocated to the
parties who can bear them at the least cost and the transaction costs of dispute
resolution are minimized.50

Indeed the most important factors to contribute to the enhancing of efficiency are making the
proceedings less time-consuming and cheaper51 (and without sacrificing fairness or a just
outcome or societal values broader (as will be further discussed below)). Additionally,
efficiency is served by dispute resolution mechanisms that not only reduce the costs of disputes
but facilitate economic activity. However, drafting detailed arbitration agreements with specific
procedural devices is highly problematic.52
It is also true that the procedural efficiency in arbitration has been affected by the efficiency of
the market, which in turn was affected by the structural barriers inherent in international
arbitration.53 Thus, the link between the efficiency of the international arbitration and the
procedural efficiency of arbitration helps to explain any perceived efficiency deficit.54
Consequently, the presentation of efficiency as a measurement in this thesis should not be
perceived as a purely legal standard in arbitration or law more generally. Instead, efficiency is
presented here in order to test its ability to explain the flexibility of the law and court’s role in
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implementing foreign arbitral awards. In fact, efficiency is the dominant principle used to
choose among legal rules and lawmaking institutions.55
In the economic field the power of efficiency analysis stemmed primarily from a single
assumption which is the reduction of ‘value’ to ‘money’. This assumption is important because
it gave a single scale by which to measure the consequences of changing any status. In this
research the power of efficiency analysis is revealed primarily only when the court implements
the foreign arbitral award in a speedy manner without reconsidering the merits of the case
(except in instances of a clear violation of the public policy of the state or the presence of an
explicit violation of any of the formal requirements for implementation of foreign arbitral
awards). The foregoing suggests a method by which a court could speed up the implementation
process to promote efficiency. However, efficiency in the court role should not replace clarity in
laws until we are certain that efficiency will support clarity in enforcing foreign awards.
Therefore, in this thesis the efficiency of laws, as we shall see, will be examined beside the
efficiency of the court’s role.
b. Definition of the Efficiency of Law
Clark defines efficiency as making the courts easily operable and more productive to a specific
degree.56 This definition is similar to ‘good use of time and energy without any waste’. Greater
productivity means less time is required and less waste (of personnel and resources) generated;
and ‘ease of operation’ encompasses not only making good use of available time and energy to
produce the desired results but to do so without needless complexity and difficulty. A ‘good use
of time’, for example, reduces delay in court processes and time required for decision making.
Delays involved in court processes and complex litigation involving lengthy judicial
consideration and/or shortage of appropriate personnel are contributing factors to inefficiency in
courts. Studies previously conducted have shown that there are a number of factors that are to
55
56
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be considered when dealing with efficiency of the courts. These factors include: the time spent
to make a decision, the nature of the decision, the use of unpublished decisions by the courts to
make decisions, the number of judges, judges sitting by designation, use of oral arguments,
ideological diversity, treatment of the lower court, processing times, length of opinion,57 and

the degree of competency of the judges and court staff.58 These, however, are dependent on
the type of courts and the laws guiding the judicial process involved in a case. ‘Efficiency’ in
various studies has a variety of different meanings when considering the above mentioned
factors. If a study focused on time spent to make a decision and the nature of decisions as
measures of efficiency, efficiency would be defined based on these two factors.59 Efficiency
also depends on the objectives of the courts in handling the cases.
In regard to this research, efficiency is based on the court’s role in the implementation process
to achieve the objectives of arbitration (that being to secure a speedy resolution of conflict).
Efficiency is, therefore, focused on the role of the courts, legislation and any other arbitration
process in both countries, in achieving the aims of arbitration. Measures of efficiency in this
research will therefore focus on factors that affect the achievement of the aims of recognition
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in both countries. Based on the aims of arbitration,
processing and decision making times, the structure of the court, the number of judges involved,
the type of decisions made, any lack of authority of the judges and court staff, and the law, are
important factors to consider. Judgment of efficiency will, therefore, be based on these factors.
In the context of recognising foreign arbitral awards, a concern for efficiency would necessarily
involve consideration of a limited range of grounds for non-recognition because to do otherwise
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would detract from the certainty of the arbitral process, which may cause ambiguity in the
arbitration process which in turn would prevent investors resorting to it as a peaceful means of
resolving conflicts. A limited range of grounds also requires a less time-consuming process of
the court re-trying the facts of the case. For example, according to Mayer and Sheppard the
European Court of Justice in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV (1999)
stressed that ‘it is in the interest of efficient arbitration proceedings that review of arbitration
awards should be limited in scope and that annulment of or refusal to recognise an award should
be possible only in exceptional circumstances’.60 This means that refusal should be exceptional
and the reasons for rejection must be determined precisely if possible to achieve efficiency in
both arbitration itself and the courts role in the implementation of foreign awards.
Efficiency here will focus on the role of the judge in applying the non-defective awards and
enumerating, precisely if possible, the reasons for refusing recognition or enforcement of
foreign awards. Therefore, it can be said that if the judiciary is not efficient in approving foreign
arbitral award where it does not achieve the objectives of the resort to arbitration (that is, the
need for a rapid decision and non-intervention in the merits of the case), people will not resort
to arbitration as a means of solving disputes.61 These are the most important motivations for the
resort to arbitration that may conflict, certainly, with the court’s desire to get the correct result,
where the court’s goals are to get a result within a reasonable timeframe and at reasonable cost.
However, getting a perfectly just outcome may not always be efficient.62 Gelander believes that
‘review systems designed to protect the accuracy of an arbitration award and ensure legal
precision may impede the attainment of “justice” through delay by eroding “confidence in the
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efficiency and fairness of the system”.’63 This could mean that the availability of such a
mechanism, ‘the judicial review’, may be considered a delay and inefficiency in the judiciary,
where justice delayed may mean justice denied.64 However, it is a necessary step as judicial
review protects the rule of law and also a State’s public policy. This requires the existence of a
restricted process for reviewing foreign awards; and, if the review mechanism is to protect
public policy, this review is an important element required to achieve justice. In fact, a clear
example of the importance of the judicial review is Soleimany v Soleimany, where the efficient
role of the court lies in the protection of public policy by examining the merits of the case. In
this case the English Court of Appeal refused to enforce the foreign award due to the fact that
the original contract involved smuggling carpets out of Iran and such a contract is contrary to
British public policy.65
However, it could be said that not every efficient process is just to the parties. For example, in
regard to the formal requirements, it is efficient for the implementation process not to limit the
documents that prove the availability of the reciprocity principle where the party who seeks
implementation can prove the principle of ‘reciprocity’ by providing any document; however,
the ambiguity of the required documents may not provide certainty for the parties since such a
course renders the parties ignorant of what should be presented to demonstrate reciprocity
where the court still has the authority to evaluate any documents that are presented.66
Therefore, courts should work to provide full effective protection to the principle of justice as
well as implement the arbitral award. This will contribute to the consolidation of the principles
of justice in society and achieve the goal or purpose of the existence of courts.
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Finally, it is important to know the difference between the ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ in
judicial work in order to find out the limits of the efficiency of the judge’s role in implementing
foreign arbitral awards. It could be simply said that ‘efficiency is the best use of resources;
effectiveness is the achievement of goals.’67 This means that efficiency is reflected in the method
adopted or the manner of execution of the award (which should be effective). Effectiveness is
the ultimate goal and to be achieved by rapid enforcement. This means that the court shall
implement the foreign award in a speedy manner without reconsidering the merits of the case
except in instances of a clear violation of the public policy of the state or the presence of an
explicit violation of any of the formal requirements for implementation of foreign arbitral
awards (as we shall see). Hence, the court aims to protect the general principles and at the same
time it applies the conditions set forth in the law as to the basis of the powers given to the judge.
Therefore, the procedural system rules and their features are very important in achieving
efficiency in the carrying out of the court’s functions in society and reducing the costs of
commencing and maintaining the dispute process (that is, the costs of judges and the duration of
litigation).68 Legal efficiency therefore, also means ‘the extent to which a law and the way it is
used provide the benefit that it was intended to achieve’.69 Thus, the legal efficiency of
arbitration involves a consideration of the need to achieve all the advantages of arbitration. The
extent to which arbitration achieves its goals (that is, manifests its advantages) is an indication
of its efficiency.
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In addition to the efficiency of the judge’s role in the implementation of foreign arbitral awards,
it is important, as explained above, to examine the efficiency of the laws that govern this
implementation. This will contribute to a greater understanding of the role of the judge in the
legal texts and also to a knowledge of the limits of the judge’s role that exist in accordance with
his general discretion in implementing foreign arbitration. In fact, efficient law in this research
is the law that provides the greatest legal benefit for the arbitration system in general and gives
more support to the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards in particular.
c. Efficiency Application
Efficiency in this research for the purposes of comparison between the Saudi and Australian
courts focused on:
i.

The examination of the efficiency of the competent courts role in the implementation of the
provisions of foreign arbitral awards. This examination could be done by:
1)

The examination of the court’s role in applying the legal texts where the courts are
obliged to implement the legal texts without any expansion by adding new conditions
to implement the arbitral awards where any new expansion may be considered as an
obstacle to the implementation. For example, when the law requires the existence of
reciprocity to implement any foreign award and simultaneously does not specify the
documents that must be submitted to prove the existence of reciprocity, the court has
the discretion to assess the documents but it has no power to limit the required
documents. Thus, any attempt to limit these documents may be considered as adding a
restriction to the legal text.

2) The examination of the court’s role in hearing the parties. In fact, the courts are obliged
not to hear any substantive defences except the public policy defence, as the parties
have been given full opportunity to make any substantive arguments before the
arbitrators. Thus, the courts are obliged not to intervene in regard to the merits of the
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case or re-consider the subject matter of the case. This may mean that any intervention
or re-consideration of the merits of the case is contrary to efficiency.
3) The examination of the accuracy of the court’s decision, which means whether the
decision is more or less likely to be challenged in order to examine the accuracy of the
first instance court’s judgment.70 According to Kaplow, ‘[a]ccuracy is a central
concern with regard to a wide range of legal rules.’71 Thus, accuracy was also
considered a major determinant of the efficiency of the courts in general and in the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards in particular as it helps to accelerate
implementation.
ii.

The examination of the efficiency of the laws. This could be done through the
examination of:
1)

Which law is clearer — since ambiguity or a lack of the legal texts in some critical
areas (that is, the limits of public policy or the required documents for the
reciprocity) are considered to be an obstacle to implementation. Also it needs to be
determined whether a uniform law is present to assist the judge in the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitration (for example, the
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth)).

2)

Which law eases implementation and achieves the greatest degree of freedom for
the parties to resort to arbitration and give a larger circle of freedoms in the area of
arbitration as quicker than litigation. This could be evaluated through an
examination of the available legal texts and their consistency with relevant
international conventions such as the New York Convention and the Arab
Convention and with fewer reservations entered in regard to those conventions.
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Additionally, consideration must be given to the number of formal requirements in
both laws. The law that limits the number of formal requirements may be more
efficient in the implementation of foreign arbitration.
This final criterion will be examined in this research by analysing the legal text of the Saudi
Arbitration System (Royal Decree No M / 46 issued in 1983), and the Implementing Regulations
issued by the Decision of the Council of Ministers 7 / 2021 issued in 1985, and the Australian
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (‘IAA 1974’), as well as the Commercial Arbitration
Act 1984 (NSW) where required. Accordingly, the question in terms of this criterion is whether
these laws provide adequate support for the implementation of the provisions of foreign
arbitration.

2. Justice to the Parties in the Individual Case
The recourse to arbitration by the parties is a search for justice and also a search for an easier
and faster means to resolve the dispute. This encourages the implementation court to abide by
these goals (especially that of achieving justice), for the duty of the court is to secure justice in
each case. Justice assessment is difficult in itself as it is difficult to determine absolute justice.
In fact, ‘equity’ as an element of justice means ‘fairness’, which may mean treating people
fairly and equally.72 This equity is ‘the power to vary application of the norm; it is the justice of
the individual case.’73 Accordingly, determining that a law or judicial ruling is more just than
the other is very difficult task, but it is not impossible. Thus, this requires identifying the
meaning of the word ‘justice’.
In fact, justice has often been identified as the ‘oldest virtue in the history of mankind’.74 The
Oxford Dictionary defines justice as ‘just behaviour or treatment’.75 It could be said that the
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proper sense of justice is ‘giving one his or her due’.76 Obioha believes that ‘the fundamental
human right’ can determine this due where the natural right is ‘the ultimate basis of justice’.77 In
the judicial process the judge is the means of ensuring the implementation of this natural
justice.78 In this regard, justice to the parties in individual cases can be perceived as the
treatment of these individuals in a just manner. Justice is often associated with fairness and
equality. This concept is very important in the international arbitral award. This could mean that
justice as fairness has a substantive nature rather than procedural.79 However, according to
Rawls the strength of the claims of procedural justice always depends on the substantive
justice.80 Therefore, it could be said that procedural and substantive justice are connected.
However, procedural justice — from a legal perspective — is perceived to be fairer for the
individual when affected individuals have a chance to influence the decision process or offer
input.81 On the other hand, judicial equality regarding individual rights could mean that all
individuals should have an equal chance of receiving the court’s protection, regardless of
differentiating characteristics. Therefore, justice to the parties here means what the law provides
equal rights to the parties in the litigation proceedings and to objection on any provision in an
award.
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In fact, most commentators have pointed to the fact that justice to the parties in the individual
cases is fundamental in any international arbitral award.82 This fact is supported by Lalive, who
determined that justice in arbitration ought not only to be done but it ought to be seen manifestly
and undoubtedly to be done.83 This highlights the need for the judges to have a comprehensive
knowledge about the goals of arbitration so as to be able to issue a judgment that encourages the
enforcement process.
Thus, it is imperative to note that the majority of arbitral awards, both domestically and
internationally, are voluntarily conformed to and thus do not necessitate judicial enforcement.84
However, it is only if an arbitral award can be sufficiently enforced that successful claimants
can be certain that they will essentially recover the damages awarded them.85
From the above there are three probabilities concerning justice to the parties in the individual
case. First, there is a possible clash between the efficiency of the court role and justice, which
was discussed under the efficiency criterion. Secondly, there is the possible clash between the
rights of the parties and public policy. This raises the question of the judge’s judgment in such
situation — that is, whether the judge is going to prioritise the rights of the parties based on the
consensual nature of the arbitration process (which results in a binding arbitral award), or
prioritise public policy and the rule of law and refuse to implement the foreign arbitration.
Indeed Zekos believes that this ‘public policy’ defence exists to protect ‘the fundamental legal
and other precepts of national legal order’.86 This means that the court will respond to achieve
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justice by protecting the ‘fundamental economic, legal, moral, religious, political and social
standards of every country’,87 which includes a people’s basic beliefs about how they are to live
in that country. This also requires a balance between public and private rights, which raises the
question about the judge’s role and which area he will favour.
The third possibility concerns the role of the parties in implementation, namely whether the
parties can, as they resorted freely to arbitration as a parallel to the judiciary, determine the
scope of the judicial review in accordance with their decision to enter arbitration and the
determination freely achieved in the arbitration.
In fact, parties cannot interfere with the judicial process by dictating how the competent courts
operate. Indeed, Moses believes that the ‘parties simply do not have the power to tell courts
what to do.’88 This is due to the fact that the parties cannot contractually expand judicial review,
because ‘federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.’89 Therefore, there must be a legal
ground for the parties to interfere in such jurisdiction.
For instance, in Saudi Arabia in regard to justice being accorded to the parties in individual
cases, a foreign award can be implemented through the Grievances Board if that award does not
contravene the laws and regulations of the country or the tenets of the Shari’a law.90
Additionally, the party who seeks the enforcement should prove to the court that the courts of
the area that granted the judgment will eventually enforce the judgment of the Saudi Arabian
courts in a reciprocal manner.91 This could show the equality between the parties regarding the
enforcement requirements, but the question remains, as we shall see, about the clarity in the
formal and substantive requirements.
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In Australia, Digby determined that the country to a large extent embraces international
arbitration. This is best exemplified by the fact that it has in the recent years revitalised its
commitment to the Convention through the modernisation of the provisions as outlined in the
IAA 1974.92
Finally, it is imperative to explore why it is unfair to the parties if the courts engage in the
discussions of the merits in specific cases which have been decided by arbitrators. According to
the National Arbitration Forum (a major international Alternative Dispute Resolution service
provider), there is extensive rigidity in the traditional litigation process based on the fact that the
judge is bound to ‘follow applicable law and the constraining deliberations of appellate
courts’.93 Nonetheless, the arbitration process is endowed with greater flexibility, based on the
fact that the parties involved agree beforehand on the procedures and thus this process to
‘reopen the case by the national judge’ is considered as a trespass on the parties rights in
relation to the dispute. Thus, if the court discusses the merits of a case in specific cases which
have been decided by arbitrators, it would be unfair to the parties because the court may
overlook some of these factors and this would then culminate in injustice.
Secondly, some of the cases decided by arbitrators are endowed with extensive privacy
provisions due to their confidential nature. This fact is supported by Ligeti, who determined
that, in the recent decades, confidentiality has evolved to become one of the most important
subjects in international commercial arbitration.94 This is chiefly embedded in the Article 26(3)
of the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) which clearly
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states that unless there is a prior agreement by the parties and the arbitrators, persons who have
no involvement in the arbitration process shall not be admitted.95
Nonetheless, if the courts discuss the merits of cases which had been decided by arbitrators,
generally those endowed with extensive confidentiality, the privacy of the disputes is bound to
be compromised since litigation does not prohibit participation and involvement of third
parties.96 This is bound to be extremely unfair to the parties and might result in the course of
justice being compromised. However, it is crucial to note that the national courts play a
profound role in the implementation of arbitral awards in regard to confidentiality. 97
Thirdly, the eventual discussion by the courts on the merits in specific cases which were
decided by arbitrators will result in added cost to both parties involved in the dispute which also
will not be fair. This is based on the fact that court processes like litigation entail high costs,
which in many cases make no allowance for the financial capacity of the disputing parties.98 In
this regard, court proceedings after deliberations by arbitrators will incur additional legal costs
which one or both parties might not be able to bear, which is bound to affect the course of
justice.99
Indeed the discussion by the courts on the merits in specific cases which have been decided by
arbitrators is bound to culminate in time wastage in the final delivery of justice to the parties, as
the courts will spend more time discussing issues which had already been deliberated upon by
the arbitrators. The delay involved has not only a financial cost. According to Krishnan and
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Kumar, a delay in justice to the parties involves an inherent injustice: justice delayed is always
justice denied, they maintain.100
The eventual referral of specific cases that have previously been decided by arbitrators to the
courts is bound to create a backlog of cases which would gradually reduce the efficiency of the
legal systems. In the long run, this would culminate in an enormous number of unresolved cases
which would not only be unfair to the parties involved but would also impose detrimental
impacts on the credibility of the judicial system.
Therefore, those framing the Convention and national laws (Saudi and Australian) have decided
that the judge has no right to reconsider the merits of the case; instead the role is limited to
ensuring the availability of certain formal conditions, as we shall see in Chapter 4. The only
substantive exception, which authorises the judge to re-open the case, is the breach of public
policy. Thus, the judge must not consider the merits of the case except in some situations that
directly affect the public policy of the state. Therefore, this research will discuss some points in
regard to the criterion ‘Justice to the parties in the individual cases’. These can be summarised
as follows:
1.

Which law provides greater justice to the parties by giving them what they ask for as
provided in their defences; and which law ensures all individual rights in the arbitration
dispute (regarding the procedural law that governs the formalities used in litigation). This
is done by examining:
a.

The clarity of the legal texts (procedural laws) which is a key demand of all parties
to enable them to provide files and documents required for the implementation of
foreign arbitral award. For example, the specification of certain documents as a
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requirement to prove the principle of reciprocity is one of the procedural justice
elements for both parties where they equally aware of what needs to be submitted
as a document in such cases. If, on the other hand, the law does not specify any
documents that are necessary to prove the principle of reciprocity, the court is
obliged to accept any legal evidence that proves the existence of reciprocity
without any intervention or imposition of any other conditions not included in the
law.
b.

The clarity in the role of the judge in considering the case is a very important
aspect of justice, where he/she should not reconsider the merits of the case again
out of respect to the will of the parties that have chosen arbitration to resolve the
dispute and where judges are also required to hold parties to their original bargain.
Finally, judges are obliged to respect the arbitration system in general as a system
approved by the national laws and international conventions, where they supposed
to support the implementation of any valid arbitration regardless of the place of
issue as long as it is not contrary to the public policy.

2.

Proof of right to sue in the implementation of foreign arbitral award: this requires
research on the competent court which has jurisdiction over the implementation of
foreign arbitral awards. Additionally, it is important to know the degree and extent of
these courts’ competence, and the compatibility of those jurisdictions in terms of
international rules and norms as well as their compatibility with international conventions
for the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards.

Therefore, this research will determine the competent court in the implementation of foreign
arbitral awards in both Saudi Arabia and Australia. Additionally, it will examine the limits of
the courts in considering the subject matter of the provisions of the foreign arbitral awards
through the analysis of the legal provisions that give the court the jurisdiction to consider the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards. Moreover, this will also be achieved by analysing
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and the extrapolating from the decisions of those courts to find out what are the judicial
principles in the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards. The analysis of
these judgments will facilitate the comparison between the judicial systems in the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards, and makes it easy to know the limits of the courts
and judicial principles that have been settled in that regard.

3. Societal Values
It is important to define values in a societal arrangement in order to gain a comprehensive
understanding of the role of the courts in protecting the society from any foreign arbitral award
that violates the public policy of a state, most notably (in this research) in Saudi Arabia and
Australia. Thus, this criterion is more relevant and more applicable to the final chapter, which
covers the defence of ‘public policy’. In fact, the public policy defence is one of the major
grounds for setting aside foreign arbitral awards, and many countries have interpreted this
concept in accordance with domestic legislation rather than international laws and values.101
Consequently, it is essential to understand this concept ‘societal values’ in order to define its
aspects, which will help in the comparison between Saudi Arabia and Australia. In fact, there is
no specific or precise definition of the principle of the ‘public policy’ defence. However, most
researchers agree that this defence includes the social values on which society depends.102
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According to Park, ‘Judges bear direct obligations to the appointing citizenry, and thus respond
to significant societal values that may trump private choices.’103 This makes the criterion of
societal values relevant to the public policy defence more than any other formal requirements.
What supports that is the fact that several judicial decisions identified the public policy in
morals and social values. For example, Joseph Smith J stated in regard to the public policy
defence that the ‘enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only where
enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.’104 This
is a clear, logical and natural vision where the formal requirements, for example, do not strongly
express the societal values as the public policy defence.
However, the concept ‘societal values’ has to be defined and it must be determined whether it is
restricted to certain acts.
According to Shuchman, ‘“Values” [are] defined as a normative standard of the desirable,
functioning as an operational force in human behavior.’105 This indicates that these values are
essential principles that cannot be waived and their role is one directed towards influencing
human behaviours. Nevertheless, the majority of commentators have determined that the
definition of the concept of values is endowed with ambiguity despite extensive efforts to define
it.106 However, in a generic sense, values have been perceived as trans-situational goals which
are desirable in nature.107 Additionally, these values have variance in importance and serve as
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See Hedvah L Shuchman, ‘Research Note: The Influence of Social Values on Public Policy
Determination’ (1962) 6(2) Journal of Conflict Resolution 175, 175.
See Meg J Rohan, ‘A Rose by Any Name? The Values Construct’ (2000) 4(3) Personality and Social
Psychology Review 255, 256; see also Maria Miceli and Cristiano Castelfranchi, ‘A Cognitive
Approach to Values’ (1989) 19(2) Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 169.
Generally, see Shalom H Schwartz, ‘Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical
Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries’ (1992) 25 Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology 1, 4.
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the guiding principles in the life of an individual or the wider societal entity.108 Furthermore,
Preston-Shoot, Roberts and Vernon believe that values are ‘the moral statements or beliefs held
to be true, with rights as an operational response to ... or visible and tangible expression of value
positions.’109
Societal values can thus be viewed as the principles, assumptions and beliefs which guide the
decision-making process among people, and the society’s actions. But the question however
remains whether all societal values are related to the implementation of the provisions of foreign
arbitral awards, and the societal values that the judge intends to protect in this regard.
In fact, the public interest that is served by the public litigation system regarding the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards could be limited to the protection of the rule of law.110
This may mean that the litigation system shall ‘ensure predictable, fair, and consistent
interpretation of the society’s law’.111 Therefore, judges shall protect the community values that
are related to moral, religious and social customs. Therefore, foreign arbitral awards must not be
contrary to these values in addition to those expressed as jus cogens, and which represent the
rule of law.
The societal values in Saudi Arabia are a strong intertwining of the cultural orientation of the
people and the country’s predominant religion of Islam.112 This is evident in the first and
seventh articles of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance, which state that the Qur’ān and Sunnah
are the nation’s Constitution and govern all laws and regulations (as noted earlier). Additionally,
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it is clear in the two decisions of the President of the Saudi Grievances Board where public
policy is linked with Shari’a tenets.113
In Australia, the values of respect of individual worth, self-determination of individuals, dignity,
democracy, freedom, equality, wellbeing, responsibility, ethical culture and respect and care of
the land are some of the often cited values embedded in this particular country, and play a major
role in guiding actions in the society.114 In addition, every individual in Australia is expected to
respect and uphold these principles and share these values.115
In both countries, societal values play a fundamental role in determining the role of the
competent courts in protecting the society from any foreign arbitral award that violates public
policy by using the public policy defence. This is based on the fact that in order for any sense of
civilisation to endure, the shared factors which define it ought to be safeguarded.116 This can
only be achieved through the declaration of laws that conserve the rudimentary nature of the
society, its institutions and values.117
In fact, the legal system in Saudi Arabia is a unique one as it is based on the Holy Qur’ān and
Sunnah being the primary representation of the principles for judgments and the legal system. 118
In regard to the protection of the societal values in regard to foreign arbitral awards, the Saudi
Grievances Board has limited the public policy defence to public morals and the tenets of
Shari’a in addition to the jus cogens. For example, the Fourth Audit-Circuit in Ruling No 92 / T
/ 4 of 1424 AH 2004 states that the award that was required to be implemented is ‘not contrary
to Islamic law or public morals and public policy in Saudi Arabia and it meets the requirements
113
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specified in the agreement’.119 This shows the court’s obligation to refuse an award if it is
contrary to these principles. Thus, it could be said that the Saudi judicial system is founded on
the societal values in the country where the court is obliged to protect the public interest of
members of the Saudi population. Thus, if the court fails to consider these principles in
enforcing foreign arbitral awards, societal values would be harmed and the court would not
achieve the required protection.
Just like Saudi Arabia, Australia is a signatory to the Convention but has advanced further in
regard to its arbitral regime by also adopting the Model Law, both of which have been
exclusively entrenched in Australian domestic law. This is primarily through the provisions of
the IAA 1974.120
Monichino noted that Australia has been in the extensive process of initiating substantial
reforms in its arbitral legislative regime which is the key to the regulation of both domestic and
international arbitrations.121 This reform in the arbitration law has been perceived by diverse
commentators as the first step aimed at elevating the utility of arbitration in Australia122.
Australia is a common law country with a profound hybrid of statute law and case law and is
bound to experience extensive internationalisation.123 This is anticipated to impose complex
effects on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the country both now and in the future.
Therefore, it is apparent from the above discourse that the enforcement of international arbitral
awards in both countries usually considers the societal values which guide the nature of actions
119
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in their respective societies. This is because profound consideration to the nature of specific
societies is fundamental in the successful enforcement of these awards.124
This criterion requires study and an exploration of the relevant laws to determine the law and
court role that would efficiently provide the following two important elements at the same time.
First, the court shall provide justice and fairness for both parties and achieve their interests and
maintain their rights. Secondly, the court shall simultaneously maintain the society’s social
values and public policy.
A court that would bring these two elements together is the court that is relatively better and
more worthy of being followed as a model because it maintains public and private rights at the
same time, and facilitates and encourages people to resort to arbitration.
Therefore, it could be said that social values are not utopian or simply stating an ideal because
they are an integral part of reality; they guide practical conduct and inspire people to determine
their options. Therefore, values are the ideals that guide individuals and groups in all of their
everyday actions. Public policy, which contains these values, is divided into two aspects,
namely domestic and international public policy. In that regard, the Convention in Article
V(2)(b) gives the national judge the right to refuse to implement any foreign arbitral award if
the ‘recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country’. This means that the public policy here referred to is the domestic public policy, though
scholars differ on that;125 and this definition is still wide, undisciplined, and loosely rather than
precisely defined.
Considering that such general definitions are non-specific and undisciplined, and also in view of
the Convention which gives national courts the right to refuse the implementation of foreign
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arbitral awards within the country, if that ruling or award constitutes a violation and a threat to
public policy and public values, this opens the door for judges — on the basis of this exception
— to reject any foreign arbitral awards. Hence there is a need to determine a standard comprised
of those social values that can be the basis of refusing to implement the rule of foreign
arbitration in the event of their violation. This research will try to determine the standard of this
concept by:
1.

Attempting to explain and provide a definition of the public policy concept as a purely
academic scientific principle.

2.

Analysis of provisions that have been rejected by courts in regard to the implementation
of foreign arbitral awards (in both countries) in order to determine the legal standards in
defining the concept of public policy and attempting to express them in a specific rule or
principle.

It should be noted that the use of these criteria as a method of scientific enquiry does not mean
that all of these criteria will be used at each point of the research or in all chapters. That is
because all criteria are not suitable for all chapters; in some a single criteria is sufficient where
some chapters cannot afford all of these criteria, so only one of these criteria is utilised where
that will suffice. However, these factors will be used in regard to this research ‘as a whole’ to
ensure a rational analysis of all the points at the end, where such an analysis produces scientific
results that help to make a decision on the material.
From the above discourse, it is apparent that courts in diverse states play a fundamental role in
protecting their societies from any arbitral award that violates the respective state’s public
policy, in which is chiefly embedded the societal values. Nonetheless, there is some intrinsic
variance in regard to the role of the courts in fulfilling this mandate based on the legal
orientation of different countries. This role will be discussed in regard to the Saudi and
Australian courts.

42

In addition, it should be noted that justice within the judicial processes — which is directly
related to the equality of the individuals and collectives in receiving the protection of the court
despite the diversity of their characteristics — is paramount in both countries. Nonetheless, the
above analysis has evidenced the tendency towards permitting the courts to discuss the merits of
specific cases which had been decided by arbitrators and is bound to inflict negative impacts on
the course of justice in terms of time wastage and other detrimental impacts on the disputing
parties.
1.5 Significance of the Study
The importance of this research stems from the importance of arbitration as a less expensive and
peaceful means to settle disputes in the field of international trade. In fact, the application of
foreign arbitration raises several problems affecting the freedom of parties which may prevent
them in some cases from resorting to arbitration, and that may lead to parties incurring heavy
economic losses. Additionally, different dates of accession to the Convention, which is
considered the most important international effort in the recognition and enforcement of the
foreign arbitral awards (Australia: 1974 and Saudi Arabia: 1994), is an important factor which
will benefit consideration as to how the provisions of the Convention have been applied in
Australia. Moreover, the significant differences between Australia and Saudi Arabia in their
legal basis and traditions makes such a comparative study very worthy, as it shows the
differences and highlights areas of strengths and weaknesses of the law prevailing in each
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the absence of comparative studies in international commercial arbitration in
Saudi Arabia and the gap in Saudi legal literature in general make such a study very important,
as it enriches the legal library with a contemporary comparative study. On the other hand, in the
Australian literature, there are a number of examples of research in this area that deal with the
theory of arbitration and discuss the substantive requirements, such as the requirement of public
policy; however, it could be said that there is no comprehensive and detailed analysis of all of
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the formal and substantive requirements for the implementation of the provisions of foreign
arbitral awards. There are also no studies comparing the role of the courts regarding the
implementation of foreign arbitration between Saudi Arabia and Australia.
In addition, the lack of texts and papers in English on the implementation of the Convention in
Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and the importance of the Middle East in international
commerce will make such a study useful for the development of domestic laws to encourage
and attract foreign investment.
Finally, one of the significant factors that demonstrate the importance of this research is that it
will highlight the reasons for the shortcomings in some Western research on the Saudi regime
and clarify the Saudi Arbitration System 1983 where there is a fundamental misunderstanding
on the part of Western and Eastern scholars about the implementation of foreign arbitral awards
under the Saudi Arbitration System, as we shall see in the literature review.

1.6 Literature Review
1.6.1

Background

There is a distinction between recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.126 Thus,
the differences between the recognition and implementation of arbitration should be taken into
account because the arbitral award could be recognised by a national jurisdiction but it is
possible from the court to reject the application of the provision within the state for a particular
reason (that is, the arbitral award is contrary to public policy). On the other hand, the arbitral
award which is given enforceability by the national jurisdiction certainly has recognition, so the
award has then both recognition and implementation, which is not the case if the court refuses to
recognise the award. Therefore, ‘recognition’ means that the decision is correct and binding on
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the parties, and ‘implementation’ means that the arbitral award can be enforced and also
includes the possibility of execution by force if a party refuses to comply with the award.
The importance of arbitration in international trade motivates countries to build a system to
recognise and implement foreign arbitral awards. The procedures which govern the recognition
and implementation of arbitral awards are established by collective international conventions,
bilateral and regional agreements and national laws.
Generally, the rules for the international convention govern the methods of recognition and
implementation of foreign arbitral awards and limit a judge’s control. This limit ‘to the judge’s
authority’ is to a review of the formal requirements and the procedural rules that were applied
by the arbitral tribunal and to make sure that the parties have met all of the official requirements
(that is, have provided the official documents which are required for the implementation of any
foreign arbitral award).
Therefore, these Rules have excluded consideration of the subject matter of the dispute from the
authority of the judge. However, they have left to the national laws the freedom of determining
the competent court and the procedural rules of pleading to request the implementation of the
foreign arbitral award.
This shows that international conventions have left room for national laws to determine the
competent court to consider such provisions, as well as the conditions to be followed, and for
the formal procedural requirements to be established in the litigation laws. These conventions
have also left the door open for the national authority to refuse the foreign arbitral award if it
contrary to public policy and public morals.
It should be noted that the method of the analysis and discussion of the previous studies in both
countries will be separate, which means that the analysis of the previous studies on the role of
Saudi judge will be first undertaken and then the analysis of the role of the Australian judge.
Comparisons between these two judiciaries will be in the conclusion of this chapter. This is due
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to the fact that there are fundamental differences between the court systems in both countries,
which entail the difference in the manner of dealing with all the studies and research work.
1.6.2

Implementation of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia

A. Background
Due to the importance of arbitration in the international context, which is increasing every day,
many Arab countries are involved in it in various fields, whether concluding regional
international agreements, joining standing ones or creating national legislation. In addition, the
requirements of international trade involve establishing Arabic arbitration centres and/or
holding conferences and seminars about arbitration. The New York Convention is the most
important of the international agreements, and has effectively become a global law. Saudi
Arabia ratified this convention in 1994.
There are also several agreements between Arab states that are relevant to this research. These
agreements can be divided into two groups. The first contains agreements which include the
settlement of conflicts through arbitration, namely:
1.

The Convention Establishing the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation
(1971).127 This includes reference in Articles 34(2) and 35 of an annex on dispute
settlement. The annex covers disputes that may emerge as to the Convention’s
interpretation or application that may arise after the cessation of the Corporation or where
a dispute arises in regard to a party that has withdrawn from the Convention or whose
membership otherwise is interrupted. It also specifically covers conflicts emerging
between any of the member states of the Agreement, or between such states and the
establishing organisation regarding any investment which is insured under this
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convention. The settlement can be carried out through negotiations, reconciliation or
arbitration (Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Annex respectively), depending on the
circumstances. The Annex is an integral part of the Convention and is not open to any
reservation.128
2.

The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States [that] Host Arab
Investments and the Citizens of Other Arab Countries 1974.129 This convention is
specifically for settling the conflicts that directly emerge from an investment between the
hosting Arab countries or one of their staff or public organisations and the citizens of
other Arab countries. Settlement can be undertaken through reconciliation and arbitration
(Article 2).

3.

The Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States (1980).130
This League of Arab States agreement also includes an annex covering the settlement of
conflicts by reconciliation and arbitration.

4.

The Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration (1987) (the ‘Amman Convention’),131
which is considered the most important Arab agreement in the field of commercial
arbitration, as it is the only one that organises arbitration in an integrated institutional
framework with respect to the different trade conflicts. It starts with the formation of a
permanent unified Arab centre to resolve conflicts through arbitration, then establishes
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Convention also provides for appointment of an arbitrator by the Arab Court of Justice should an
arbitrator not be agreed upon within the period set: art 4(1)(b).
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States [that] Host Arab Investments and
the Citizens of Other Arab Countries 1974, opened for signature 10 June 1974 (entered into force 12
August 1976).
This League of Arab States Agreement was signed 26 November 1980 (entered into force 7
September 1981). For text see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, vol II Regional Instruments (1996) UN Doc No
UNCTAD/DTCI/30(Vol.II) 211 et seq <http://unctad.org/en/docs/dtci30vol2_en.pdf>.
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arbitration procedures, and concludes with the issuance, correction and challenging of
arbitration decisions, and even their execution.
The second group comprises some conventions that concern the execution of arbitration
decisions. The most two prominent of these agreements are:
1.

The Convention on the Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards 1952 (League of
Arab States),132 which is concerned with the execution in one Arab country of decisions
made in another Arab country, whether those decisions were judicial or arbitral.

2.

Riyadh Convention on Judicial Cooperation 1983 (League of Arab States)133 which
contains provisions related to the execution of arbitration decisions that are issued in one
of the contracting countries by other countries.

As for the national laws, Saudi Arabia has adopted a special law (Saudi Arbitration System
1983) relating to commercial arbitration and including but not comprehensive in regard to the
international type. This law governs the implementation of arbitration and was issued by Royal
Decree No M / 46.134
In fact, several researchers135 rely upon the conditions contained in the dissemination of the
Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No 7 of 15/8/1405 (1985),136 which was
provided for in the Arab Convention.137
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Convention of the Arab League on the Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards, 14 September
1952 (entered into force in 10 November 1952).
Convention of the Arab League on Judicial Cooperation between the League of Arab States, opened
for signature 6 April 1983 (entered into force October 1985) (‘Riyadh Convention’).
This Royal Decree was issued on 12/7/1403 AH 24 April 1983, Umm Al-Qura Gazette No 3292,
22/8/1403 AH 1983.
For more information, see Mohammed Al-Mqswdi, ‘Alshru>t} Alshkli>h u> Almwd}u>ih ltnfi>th h}km
Alth}ki>m Alajnby fy Almmlakh [Substantive and Procedural Requirements to Implement the
Provisions of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia]’ (Al-Dar Alhndsih, 2000) 19.
This decision is quite longstanding (1985). However, there is a more recent decision (No 116
1428/2008) that has not been dealt with by the researchers. Nonetheless, the constitutionality of the
older decision has not been fully analysed (by measuring the legal authority of the President of the
Grievances Board in issuing such decision and also measuring such a decision in the light of the
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These conditions include the objective conditions for the implementation of the foreign arbitral
award. Briefly this includes ‘arbitrability’ and finality, the latter requiring that the arbitral
award must be final and have acquired peremptory status. That is because finality gives the
arbitral award a legal power to be enforceable.138
Al-Foraian in his book ‘National and International Arbitration and Ways of Implementing the
Provisions’ affirms that139 the finality condition is commensurate with the non-examination of
the case by the competent implementing authority because such examination has already
occurred in the country where the arbitral award was made; however, he did not detail what
examination had occurred. Therefore, it is not clear that Al-Foraian here was referring to the
examination of the merits of the case or to the examination of the formal and procedural
conditions of the arbitration. Additionally, these conditions include that the verdict must be
issued on the basis of correct and proper procedures, which exist in the interest of the parties;
and the verdict must be issued within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.
The ‘Public Policy’ defence is one of these conditions as is the requirement that the arbitral
award not be inconsistent with any court judgment to be implemented based on the same dispute
or any case list.140
On the other hand, these conditions of the arbitration (which are present in the international
conventions, the Saudi Arbitration System 1983 and in the decisions of the President of the
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Constitution principles). Thus, the question is whether the President of the Grievances Board has the
legal right to address such a decision or not.
See Abdulaziz Al-Foraian, ‘Alth}ki>m Alwat}any u> Aldwly u> T{rq Tanfi>dhh [National and International
Arbitration and Ways of Implementing the Provisions]’ (Almiman, 2007) 140.
However, in practice France has violated this requirement by accepting an arbitral award which had
been set aside in the country where it was issued. So what is the legal justification in such a case, and
what is also the position of the French courts under the New York Convention (1958) which provides
for acceptance of any arbitral award only if that award is final (and accepted as peremptory) in the
country where this award was issued? For more information, see Mohammed Aboul-Enein, ‘Tnfi>th
Itfaqi>at New York fy Aldwl Al‘rbiah [Application of the New York Convention 1958 on the
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Implementation in the Arab World]’ (Paper presented at
the New York Convention 50 Years: Practical Perspectives on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, Cairo, 10–11 November 2008)10.
Al-Foraian, above n 137, 144.
These formal and substantive conditions will be discussed and analysed in more details in Chapters 4
and 5.
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Grievances Board) must be seen in the context of their practical application. This is achieved by
analysing court judgments to determine the operation of these conditions in practice. In fact
most of the previous studies are not that significant for this research because they only present
some of the provisions and some of the decisions that have been issued by the Grievances
Board, and without any real analysis to establish and develop the principles on which the court
implements foreign arbitral awards. For example, Al-Foraian presents some judgments in
applying foreign arbitral awards with a brief explanation on the facts; but fails to demonstrate
the deep analysis necessary to reveal the true practice of the Grievances Board in the
implementation of such awards.141

B. Previous Studies
The implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia has not been
fully researched to represent an academic view or establish a basis that helps in understanding
the process of implementation. This may be one of the reasons for the misunderstanding and
wrong perceptions of several researchers about the role of the Saudi courts in the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards.
Baamir, a Saudi lawyer and the author of the most important book on arbitration in terms of the
discussion of methods and formal and substantive conditions for the implementation of foreign
arbitral awards, in his book ‘Shari’a Law in Commercial and Banking Arbitration: Law and
Practice in Saudi Arabia’142 is mistaken in some of his assertions about the application of
foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia where he had recourse to some fatwa,143 as well as a
number of court decisions released by the Shari’a Supreme Courts in different cities concerning
141
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some commercial matters, and he also dealt with a number of rulings issued by the Saudi
Grievances Board concerning domestic arbitration. Finally, he used some international arbitral
awards released by some international arbitration centres as examples of international
arbitration.
Unfortunately, he did not consider any decision from the Saudi Grievances Board concerning
the implementation of international arbitral awards and that in turn has affected his final result
where he reached some conclusions without any real evidence. For example, he assumed that a
musical instruments contract would be refused on public policy grounds by the Grievances
Board because musical songs are forbidden in Islam. This statement is obviously wrong as the
Grievances Board considered that musical songs is a matter of controversy between scholars;
thus, it is unrelated to the public policy defence which is limited to the Islamic assets (or
certainties).144 Hence such an award will be enforced in Saudi Arabia. Thus, he did not discuss
what could be considered as material governed by Shari’a law.145 He was also wrong about the
role of the Saudi judges in interpreting public policy when he stated that ‘the judges decide on
the basis of their personal opinions and are not obliged to adhere to any precedent, even if a
decision of review Committee [Audit-Circuit or court of appeal] of the Diwan [the Grievances
Board] exists on particular matter.’146 This contradicts Ruling No 189 / T / 4 in 1427 AH 2007 as
we shall see in Chapter 5 (5.4.1 (B) Scope of ‘Violation of Islamic Law’ in the View of the
Saudi Grievances Board).
Furthermore, Baamir believes that the implementation of foreign arbitral awards was a
theoretical possibility prior to the enactment of the Saudi Arbitration System 1983 but was not
practically possible in regard to any court. Thus, according to Baamir the Saudi courts did not
accept any arbitration clause before the issuance of that law because of the absence of a legal
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text that obliged the court to accept such process.147 In fact, such a view ignores the arbitration
process under Shari’a in general and also ignores the text of the Saudi Commercial Court
System 1350 AH (1930), where arbitration is addressed in five Articles (Articles 493–497).
These Articles had organised the resort to arbitration, and required that the agreement shall be in
writing and ratified by the Commercial Court. It also left full freedom for the parties to create
arbitration clauses. In addition, the parties can outline the role of arbitrators and to choose the
arbitration process. Finally these articles had organised the Court’s role in the implementation
of the arbitral award (which shall not violate public policy).
It is true that the Grievances Board was not the competent court to consider the application of
the arbitral awards at that time, but the domestic arbitration as a process existed under the Saudi
Commercial Court System 1930. This shows the seriousness of this understanding which
ignores the role of arbitration in settling disputes before the issuance of that law and also
ignores the role of the Saudi judiciary in implementing arbitral awards.
In fact, Baamir cites Dr Al-bjad, who believed that the resort to the arbitration was limited at
that time (prior to the Saudi Arbitration System 1983) because of the absence of an independent
legal framework to define the limits of arbitration.148 Therefore, the enactment of that law helps
in the understanding of the limits of arbitration in Saudi Arabia. Baamir also argued that the
Convention has a limited application in Saudi Arabia.149 It is obvious that the Grievances Board
is applying the relevant Arab League conventions in any case that concerns the provisions of an
award issued in any Arab country. The Grievances Board also applies the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) Convention for the Execution of Judgments, Delegations and Judicial
Notifications150 (‘GCC Convention’) in applying any arbitral provision issued in any GCC
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country. Thus, the limited use of the Convention is explained by the existence of the Arab
League and the GCC conventions whereas the Convention would be applied in any provision
issued in non-Arab countries as long as that country is a party to that convention. Otherwise the
Saudi courts will apply the reciprocity principle and will apply the decisions released by the
President of the Grievances Board.151
On the other hand, a number of Western researchers have a fundamental misunderstanding
about the process of the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards within Saudi Arabia; they
believed that the Saudi Arbitration System 1983 always ‘unfairly’ favours the Saudi party. For
example, Wakim believes that in Saudi Arabia the public policy standard, which will be
invoked upon review during enforcement proceedings, remains unclear and undetermined.152
This ignores the fact that the principle of public policy is still a general principle and is not
defined precisely in theory or in any judicial system. Such a view also ignores the first and the
second decisions that have been released by the President of the Saudi Grievances Board which
have been mentioned earlier. Wakim also states that ‘Saudi Arabia has been described as
“traditionally hostile” to the recognition and enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards,
finding such awards contrary to Saudi Arabian law and public policy.’153 Despite the fact that he
did not review or explore any court decision, or give a direct textual reference supporting that
view, he asked, whether the question remained how an award can be contrary to Saudi public
policy or, he asked was an award rejected simply because it was foreign award. It is not even
logical to say that without a real exploration of any court decision.
In fact, Wakim cites Kent Benedict Gravelle,154 when he (Wakim) states that Saudi Arabia has
refused to enforce some foreign arbitral awards; however, Gravelle was saying,
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Saudi Arabia refuses to enforce arbitrated awards if they are found to be contrary to Shari’a
law. Thus, if an arbitrated award includes interest, part of, or all of, the award will not be
155
enforced.

It is obvious that Gravelle was just giving a general explanation of the situation that might be
applied in Saudi Arabia and he did not give an example of any real case that shows such result;
also, he did not explain the possibility of partial application of the rule in any consideration
(although he admitted partial enforcement as a possibility). Again, it not simply because the
hypothetical award is ‘foreign’, it is because all or part of it is contrary to Shari’a. Gravelle said
as much in the quote above, but in a general manner without citing actual cases. Hence, it is
clear that both Wakim and Gravelle were just giving general statements without real cases to
support their argument, which makes their analysis limited at best, and inaccurate and
misleading at worst.
Another misunderstanding is that of Carbonneau about arbitration in Saudi Arabia and it is also
noticeable, as he states that:
Saudi Arabia appears to be the country that has taken the most negative position on ICA
[International Court of Arbitration], questioning its value, origins, and legitimacy. For
example, although the Saudi government has ratified the New York Arbitration Convention,
Saudi law makes the enforcement of an international arbitral award difficult and time
consuming. Such an award is enforceable only if it is accompanied by a court judgment
from the state of rendition [the finality]. The award must be authenticated by the Saudi
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Saudi Ministry of Justice, and the Saudi consulate in the
state of rendition [dually authenticated award as required by Article IV of the New York
Convention and what has been addressed in s.9(2) in the IAA in Australia]. Moreover, an
award not rendered in Arabic must be translated by a sworn [licensed] translator before it
can be submitted to the Saudi government through proper diplomatic channels. 156

Basically, any foreign award that has been written in another language must be translated into
Arabic because it is the language of the country; it must also be translated by a certified
translation office that has a licence to do so. However, there is no requirement for the
performance of a certain section of the translation; it requires the presence of seals of the officebased translation, which show the licence number. Thus, it is clear that Carbonneau just
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addressed some formal requirements that have been set by the Convention (see, for example,
Article IV) and cited them as an obstacle to implementation in Saudi Arabia. However, he did
not give real cases as example or give a law text that supports his view. Additionally, the
submission of the provisions of the arbitration is to be directed to the competent court in Saudi
Arabia (that is, the Grievances Board) and not to any government department or not by any
diplomatic procedures. This was stated in the Saudi arbitration regime and also the Saudi
Grievances Board regime.
Furthermore, Thomas Carbonneau has misunderstood the implementation of foreign arbitral
awards in Saudi Arabia where he states: ‘The Saudi government reserves the right to refuse
enforcement of an award. Awards rendered by default against a Saudi party are automatically
unenforceable.’157 Such a provision is not even logical and in any case, any foreign award
cannot be automatically unenforceable. There is no defence or law ground under which that can
occur. He did not supply any supporting material directly from a legal text or at least a court
case that expresses such provision. It appears that he has grossly misunderstood Article 2 of the
Saudi Arbitration System 1983 where it states:
Government departments may not resort to arbitration to settle their disputes with third
parties except after approval of the president of the Council of Ministers. This ruling [the
requirement of prior approval before recourse to arbitration] may be amended by a
resolution from the Council of Ministers.

That means all government departments are not allowed to resort to or accept the arbitration
clause in any contract without the prior approval of the President of the Council of Ministers.
But when any government department has obtained approval to include the arbitration clause in
any contract or has to obtain approval to resort to arbitration after conflict has arisen, the
arbitration becomes binding on this department and the court will apply the conditions set by the
Saudi laws. So there is no right at all for the Saudi government to ‘automatically’ refuse any
arbitral award. The prohibition is about inclusion of a clause facilitating the resort to arbitration
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at the outset of the contract process or the referral of conflict to arbitration without the approval
of the President of the Saudi Council of Ministers.
Additionally, Carbonneau states: ‘Enforcement of awards from countries that are not members
of the Arab League Convention is based on reciprocity.’158 This ignores a number of treaties and
conventions that Saudi Arabia is a party to, which was explained above. Moreover, he seems to
ignore the two decisions that have been released by the President of the Grievances Board,
which clarify the enforcement of foreign judgments and foreign arbitral awards.159 These
decisions take account of the application of the rules of international and regional conventions
signed by the Kingdom, and so include all Arab and non-Arab agreements. Carbonneau is thus
incorrect when he states that reciprocity is always required before an award from a non-Arab
League state can be enforced.
Surprisingly, Carbonneau maintains: ‘If an award is not enforceable, the party holding the
award may file an action before the Saudi Grievances Board to obtain a determination of the
dispute under Saudi law.’160 There is no principle of law or article in the Saudi Arbitration
System 1983 that includes such a provision in dealing with any foreign awards. The situation is
that the Grievances Board (as explained above) is the competent court for the approval of
national and foreign awards; and, if the award is not enforceable, that means the parties can
resort to any other alternative dispute resolution services or simply go to the competent court
that originally had the authority to consider the dispute to start a new case (while ignoring the
arbitral award).161 This last situation is nearly impossible as the defendant will claim that the
court has no jurisdiction to consider the case due to the existence of an arbitral award. The
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defendant will do this in order to avoid the powers of the court in the new case. Such cases are
rare, but possible, which raises the question about possible practical solutions.
Noticeably, Carbonneau has also misunderstood the requirement of prior permission for any
government agencies before resort to or acceptance of any arbitration clause, as he states: ‘An
award rendered against the Saudi government or its agents is not enforceable. If the Saudi
government or its agencies are a party to a contract, arbitration is prohibited unless the President
of the Council of Ministers consents to the provision.’162 Again, the consent is to the resort to
the arbitration process, as explained above, so it is not to the enforcement of the arbitral award.
This prior consent requirement is clearly stated in Article 3 in the Saudi Arbitration System. It is
obvious that arbitration is not permissible for the government’s agencies; however, there is an
exception if that department obtains prior permission either for the inclusion of the arbitration
clause in the original contract, or the entering into a specific arbitration agreement once a
dispute has arisen.163 Hence, Carbonneau is simply predicting what might happen without any
evidence that could support this observation or he has misunderstood the real role of the Saudi
Grievances Board.
Thomas Childs also believes that the application of foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia in
practice appears to be ‘almost impossible’.164 Obviously, he made such a statement without any
evidence or examining any real cases. He openly laments that while he himself does not know
of a single example of where a foreign award has been implemented, it is difficult to ascertain
the true position as the Board does not publish its decisions.165 Thus, access to materials has
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clearly been a problem for many researchers. The 2007 amendments to the Grievances Board
System will, it is hoped, help remedy this situation for domestic and overseas researchers as,
over time, a ‘technical affairs bureau’ is expected to collect and publish at least some decisions
of the Board.166
Apparently, there are many researchers who have tried to explain the process of the application
of foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia; however, they did not deal directly with the
Grievances Board’s decisions and thus were unable to give a clear view of the enforcement of
foreign arbitration within Saudi Arabia.167
Consequently, there is not much written about the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in
Saudi Arabia — as compared to that which occurs in Australia (as we shall see in the next few
lines) — which is able to represent the academic view or provide a basis for the Saudi legal
library to help create an understanding of the process of implementation. Additionally, the role
of the judiciary is not discussed in arbitration, which in turn makes the research at this point
very important in order to cover this shortfall. This requires a discussion of formal and
substantive requirements as we shall see in chapters 4 and 5, where such research will show the
foundations and methods of implementation.
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Contrary to the impression gained from the writers above, in fact (as we shall see) Saudi courts
have applied several foreign arbitral awards as long as they were not contrary to public policy
and fulfilled the formal requirements. On the other hand, the Grievances Board will partly
enforce the foreign arbitral award if it partly contrary to public policy, so the court will try to
divide the award and apply the part that is correct by refusing the offending or the contrary part
if possible.168 The Saudi court, as we shall see, has implemented several arbitral awards before
and after the ratification of the Convention. This application (before and after the ratification)
was based on the Saudi Arbitration System, two decisions released by the President of the Saudi
Grievances Board and some international conventions.
The analysis of foreign arbitral provisions will greatly increase understanding of the direction of
the court dealing with such provisions. For example, it is important to know the extent of
application of the formal requirements, such as the provision of specific documents (that is, the
documents required to prove the reciprocity principle), and the extent of the obligation not to
consider the subject matter of the case, the standard (and the violation) of public policy (or of
the rules of Islamic law), and the extent of compliance with the terms of international
conventions. This will also help to contribute to the identification of the parameters (or borders)
of the implementation of foreign arbitral awards, which will make their application in Saudi
Arabia clear and easy. Consequently, this research is undertaken to cover the shortfalls in this
area, and it is based on an analysis of the decisions of the Saudi Grievances Board and
conducted as a comparison with the situation in Australia.
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1.6.3

Implementation of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Australia

A. Background
The main area of focus is the role of the Australian courts in approving foreign arbitral awards
and the applicable legal principles of applying these awards within Australia. In fact, the
application of foreign arbitral awards in Australia is governed by a set of legal instruments: the
Convention, UNCITRAL Model Law, Common Law, and Federal and State legislation.169
Consequently, arbitration in Australia, which is performed as an event of litigation, is regulated
by separate regimes: the Commonwealth International Arbitration Act 1974 (‘IAA’), a federal
law, and the commercial arbitration Acts enacted by the various Australian states and
territories.170 In addition, an international commercial arbitration held in Australia is subject to
both the UNCITRAL Model Law and the Convention, which are incorporated in the IAA.171
Under the IAA there are a number of formal requirements involved in the recognition and
implementation of the foreign arbitration and, if the applicant satisfies these requirements, the
court must recognise and enforce the award, and ‘substantially more onerous conditions or
higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards…’172 shall not be
imposed.
Broadly speaking, the UNCITRAL Model Law leaves the parties with substantial autonomy in
deciding whether or not their dispute is ‘international’.173 One consequence of this autonomy is
that the parties can transform an otherwise ‘domestic’ agreement into an ‘international’ one
169
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simply by choosing a place of arbitration outside Australia or by agreeing that the subject matter
of the arbitration relates to more than one country. In addition, the parties to arbitration may
agree to apply law other than Australian law to their dispute. They may also allow the
arbitration panel to base the award on considerations of general justice and fairness.174
Australia has adopted the Convention enacted in 1974 through the International Arbitration Act
1974 (Cth) (hereafter referred to as the IAA) to give effect to the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (‘New York Convention’ or ‘the Convention’).175
Accordingly, the IAA adopted the Convention and all of its provisions in Schedule 1.176 Notably,
questions remain as to whether it will include any future changes to the Convention. The arbitral
regimes for international and domestic arbitrations are not mutually exclusive. Under the IAA,
the parties to an international arbitration may agree to exclude the UNCITRAL Model Law. If
the Model Law is excluded, the procedural law of the arbitration will be determined by the
applicable State or Territory Commercial Arbitration Acts.177
The definition of the arbitration agreement in the IAA is an agreement in writing of the kind
referred to in Article II(1) of the Convention, which is ‘[t]he term “agreement in writing” shall
include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.’ Consequently, the Federal Court of Australia
formulated a definition of arbitration which is consistent with the IAA.178 However, this can lead
to different interpretations in foreign jurisdictions. Thus, the UNCITRAL Model Law in 2006
broadly recommended interpretation by recognising that Article II(2) of the Convention
provides a non-exhaustive list of ways in which an arbitration agreement may be made ‘in
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writing’.179 The purpose of a written agreement is to give the contracting parties certainty with
regards to their rights and obligations both in performance and in the event of a dispute.180
The Convention gives the signatory state the right to refuse the application as a matter of
reciprocity. On the other hand, Garnett believes that a party, who wants to defeat an arbitration
clause which falls within the scope of the Convention can argue that the arbitration clause does
not cover this matter as a public policy.181
The arbitrator or arbitration panel can be empowered to make an interim award, which is
normally available to the court.182 However, according to section 19 of the IAA, an interim
measure or award conflicts with Australian public policy if: ‘(a) The making of the interim
measure or award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption; or (b) A breach of the rules of
natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the interim measure or award.’183
Furthermore, if the wording of the arbitration clause is narrow or narrowly construed, then
perhaps only the breach of contract claim will be referred to arbitration, with the result that the
parties may have to contest claims in two different forums which is expensive and inconvenient.
This issue has burdened the Australian courts on a number of occasions in recent years with
divergent attitudes taken as to the proper scope of an arbitration clause.184
It should be noted that the Convention (Article 5) places the burden on the defendant to prove
that the award is invalid on at least one of the seven grounds enumerated in the Convention.
However, it is necessary to find out the role of the Australian court in instances where there is
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no proof of the invalidity of the award or where the defendant does not know about the
invalidity of the award or even when the parties want to apply that invalid award.
The Australian court’s action should be understood in cases where there is an invalid arbitration
agreement or, in other words, where the arbitration agreement is invalid because the underlying
contract is invalid.185 Additionally, the court’s actions should be understood in terms of the
application of the principal of independence of the arbitration clause or arbitration agreement
from the original contract. One also needs to know the response of parties to situations where
the arbitral tribunal violates the terms of the arbitration agreement and based the arbitral award
on a foreign law.
Article 5186 of the Convention states that ‘[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award may be
refused... [If] (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of
the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case.’187 There should be away in which the Australian courts could examine the
procedures and standards to assess minimum procedures required for the purpose of defence.188
On the other hand, ‘[e]xcept in limited statutorily defined circumstances, there is no right of
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appeal against an arbitral award, and arbitration does not have a supporting judicial hierarchy,
while adjudication does.’189 Accordingly, this raises the question of whether an appeal against
the court decision in enforcing or non-enforcing the award would be accepted in Australia, and
(if so) the competent court that is authorised to consider such appeal.
Arbitrators can make minor procedural defects in the award, and there is the purpose of
international arbitration to be considered. Information from previous studies will establish if the
Australian courts refuse such arbitrators’ decisions and if the purpose of international arbitration
based on the rights extended under the Convention in which a party may assert one or more of
the five procedural defences to oppose enforcement of the arbitral award will be undermined.
One obstacle is that the Convention does not specify which law applies when determining
whether procedures were violated.190
Finally, it should be noted that there were some drafting inconsistencies in some Articles in the
IAA where greater clarity would assist all parties — see section 23–27 and particularly sections
25–27 before the new amendment in 2010.191 However, the International Arbitration
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Amendment Act 2010 did not adopt the suggestion made by the Commonwealth AttorneyGeneral in regard to this matter. The question, therefore, remains whether these drafting
inconsistencies in Part III, Division 3 of the IAA need to be remedied. These are very important
questions about the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitration in Australia. But
what is the Court’s interpretation of these texts and what is the position of the Australian
jurisprudence?

B. Previous Studies
There are several important studies in the field of arbitration in Australia which cannot be
ignored. These studies have enriched the field of arbitration in general. Also, the great debate
between researchers about the public policy exception and the role of the Australian courts
cannot be ignored where it provides a wonderful example for discussion and constructive
criticism.
Richard Garnett, who has undertaken a very important research on national and international
arbitration in Australia, in his article ‘The Legal Framework for International Arbitration in
Australia’192 provides an explanation of the importance of arbitration and laws related to the
implementation of arbitration agreements in Australia. These laws are the Convention, the
internal laws of the states and territories, and the UNCITRAL Model Law. He provides a review
of the scope of application of these laws and also gives a brief explanation for the application of
the arbitration clause under the federal law, the IAA. He supplies some examples of cases where
the court refused to implement the foreign arbitral award on the basis of the public policy
defence. Garnett also explains the execution of interim measures under the UNCITRAL Model
Law and the confidentiality of arbitration. Finally, he addresses the investment agreement as one
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of the most important agreements that stimulate private investment between nation states and
private investors.
However, Garnett does not address the legal texts that establish the competent courts for the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards. In addition, he did not discuss the
formal requirements that must be met in any foreign arbitral award (besides meeting the public
policy requirement) nor present a detailed explanation of the possibility of implementing
interim orders issued by arbitrators under the Convention where such discussion will explain the
real role of the national judge in the enforcement process.
Despite all these points, this article cannot be ignored because it contributes to determining the
framework of international commercial arbitration in Australia and the methods of
implementation. Therefore, it is essential article, contributing to an understanding of the legal
framework for international commercial arbitration in Australia.193
Furthermore, Ma in her doctoral research thesis, ‘Public Policy in the Judicial Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards: Lessons for and from Australia’, presents very important research where she
discusses the Western definition of public policy, its types, limits, its application, and cases of
refusal to implement the arbitral award if it is contrary to public policy.194 In fact, this research
is very precise and specific about public policy and it provides many suggestions on the
arbitration process regarding public policy which will increase confidence in arbitration and
speed the implementation of foreign arbitral awards as well as preserve national public policy.
This study will contribute to the understanding of several terms related to the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards in Australia, terms such as ‘public policy’ and ‘foreign arbitral award’ as
understood in Australia. This understanding will help in writing Chapter 5 of this thesis which
will be about the public policy defence.
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In addition, Rana and Sanson in their volume, ‘International Commercial Arbitration’—
particularly in Chapter 12 which deals with the enforcement and challenges of the foreign
awards — discuss some formal and substantive requirements.195 In regard to the formal
requirements they focused on the conditions contained in the Convention. The authors also
presented and discussed a number of judicial decisions in several countries, which served to
illustrate many important points, such as the finality of the arbitral award and the validity of that
award where the original contract was contrary to public policy.
However, Rana and Sanson did not compare these judicial authorities. In fact, the end of
Chapter 12 shows that the New South Wales Act 2010 (CAA) balances the rights of the parties to
a fair hearing and the potential for unwarranted appeal by the losing party. 196 It represents a
unique piece of research of its kind, as it asks practical questions and details possible scenarios
on the implementation of foreign arbitral award in Australia as an exercise. However, there is no
specific and clear standard for the choice between these judiciaries or the decisions that have
been examined. Hence, we can say that this chapter made a general attempt to clarify the
implementation process and to link the cases that have been presented with what can be applied
in Australia.
On the other hand, Skinner and Simpkins believe that the field of the enforcement of foreign
awards is not well developed and needs more research.197 They discussed the statutory
framework for the enforcement particularly in regard to the IAA’s new amendments in 2010.198
However, they did not discuss in detail all the formal requirements or the limits of the judge’s
authority, rather they just addressed the conditions set forth in the Convention and stressed that
an Australian court will not review the merits of the case. In fact, the role of judge in the
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application of formal requirements cannot be overlooked where the court’s interpretation of
certain terms, such as ‘agreement in writing’, is very important in order to clarify and facilitate
the information for the foreign investor about the orientation of the court in regard to
implementation.
Additionally, Skinner and Simpkins present a very important point, namely that Australian
arbitral enforcement of foreign awards jurisprudence ‘is not well developed’ when compared to
the Singaporean level of experience.199 This explains the shortage of legal research regarding
the implementation of foreign arbitral awards in Australia. I believe that this thesis will try to
enrich the details of this aspect (the enforcement of foreign award in Australia) where it
discusses the formal and substantive requirements and the role of the judge in the enforcement
process. Skinner and Simpkins note that ‘the Australian courts still take a relatively narrow view
of who the parties to the agreement [are] and the scope of the arbitration clause.’ 200 This
requires more discussion on the existence of the arbitration agreement to determine the court
trend in regard to the interpretation of the arbitration clause, as we shall see in Chapter 4 (which
covers written agreement). In a brief discussion and utilising numerous recent cases, Skinner
and Simpkins discussed the public policy defence, which will be the focus of Chapter 5 of this
research. However, they could not enumerate or limit the cases where the court will use this
defence and when the parties have the right to raise this defence.
On the other hand, there are several international studies on the implementation of foreign
arbitration, which deal with the analysis of the relevant international conventions and undertake
some study on a number of jurisdictions. There are also a few examples of research involving a
comparison between two different jurisdictions with different standards that are worthy of
mention.
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For example, Lu in her article analyses in detail the manner in which the Convention has been
dealt with in the legal systems in the United States and in United Kingdom and the seven
defences that have been used to oppose the enforcement of the foreign arbitral award.201 Lu has
broken down these seven defences into procedural and substantial defences. The article seeks to
analyse the history and the rationale behind the formulation and the implementation of the
Convention. She discusses the formal requirements that have been set by the Convention and
mentions the accession to the Convention by the United States (1970) and the United Kingdom
(1975). Lu presents five formal and two substantive requirements. Regarding enforcement, Lu’s
work presents the practice before the US and the UK courts more than comparing the two laws.
She found that the application of public policy is construed narrowly in both countries. In the
United States, ‘various U.S. cases have indicated some parameters for the defence.’202 However,
she did not explain these parameters in greater detail. Generally, the party who seeks the refusal
of the implementation on the ground of the public policy defence before a US court needs to
prove that an implementation of the award would be in violation of and would affect negatively
American notions of what is considered moral and justified under the nuances of the person’s
standard. On the other hand, in England in order to vacate an arbitral award on the basis of the
public policy defence, the claimant party must show that there is
some element of illegality or that the enforcement of the award would be clearly injurious
to the public good or, possibly, that enforcement would be wholly offensive to the ordinary
reasonable and fully informed member of the public on whose behalf the powers of the
State are exercised.203

In fact, Lu found that ‘[a]lthough this standard is less ambiguous than the U.S. standard, it still
does not define what “clearly injurious” or “wholly offensive” means.’204 Additionally, while
the language of both standards is different, US and English courts construe the public policy
defence narrowly.
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Moreover, Lu has made great efforts to explain the status quo in both the United States and
Britain. She supported the observations made in her article with examples and related cases.
However, Lu did not use a clear standard for the comparison (like the efficiency criterion) to
show which judicial system is more supportive of the implementation of foreign awards. That is
due to the fact that the ‘parties have no less interest in correct decisions than in efficient
proceedings’,205 which shows the importance of studying the judge’s role in the enforcement
process. In fact, Lu provides a direct comparison between the two laws and shows what should
be submitted for the implementation of a foreign arbitral award in both countries.
On the other hand, Randall Peerenboom in his article ‘Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical
Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC’ found that ‘many of the most extreme
claims about the hazards of enforcing arbitral awards in China were based largely on a single
widely reported case.’206 Therefore, his article is based on a survey of 89 foreign and China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) arbitral award
enforcement cases. The writer used different research methods than that which is used in this
research. He obtained 66 cases through interviews and relied on written sources for a further 18
cases. Additionally, he combined a written source and interviews for 5 cases.207 His research
sought to determine upon what basis some awards were enforced and others were not.
In order to answer this question, the research meant to test four hypotheses regarding the
enforcement or refusal (as follows). The first hypothesis was that the Chinese applicants are
much more likely to succeed than foreign applicants before the national courts. This brings in
the question of the role of nationality in arbitration, and that of the courts in big cities. It should
be established if the courts provide less protection to the local parties where these courts are
more professional, and whether the role of the fact that foreign investment plays a large role in
the local economy.
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Secondly, the research tried to tease out any possible effect of China’s progress in rebuilding the
legal system and implementing the rule of law. He sought to examine whether there were
weaknesses in the law or whether the courts lacked sufficient authority to enforce the award.
The third hypothesis argued that China had remained a place of attraction for investments, but
with many obstacles to arbitration, essentially operating a ‘second economy’. In fact, investors
in China, according to Peerenboom, rely on the rule of relationships as efficient (faster, cheaper)
more than the rule of law.208 Fourthly, the article is an examination of China as a New York
Convention country, where ‘the survey measures China’s willingness and ability to honour its
international commitments, particularly in the commercial area.’209 This is measured by the
possibility of implementing foreign arbitral awards in China through the implementation of
WTO requirements.
Peerenboom came up with several important findings; and the most important is that the WTO
will not help the approval system where the fate of foreign investors is ‘in the hands of
administrative officials who have considerable discretion whether to approve the transaction’.210
Unfortunately, with the importance of judicial review, arbitration remains weak. This is due to
the fact that the courts and their dependents are weak. Additionally, the ‘courts are often
reluctant to challenge administrative officials.’211
Therefore, it can be said that Peerenboom had taken up legal aspects and other social and
commercial practices imposed by the relations in the field of international trade. However, he
did not examine in particular the effectiveness of the role of the judiciary (efficiency) or what
the court can provide to the parties (justice in the individual cases) or what the court can provide
to protect the community (protecting the societal values).
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Finally, it should be noted that there are several examples of research and articles that have dealt
with the efficiency of arbitration and the public policy defence.212 However, less attention has
been paid to the court’s role with respect to national and international legal norms.
Nevertheless, it is important and worthwhile noting that these studies provide valuable
information and represent great efforts that cannot be ignored. Consequently, their lack of
discussion on the effectiveness of the court’s role, on justice to parties at the individual level,
and on the court’s role in the protection of public policy do not mean that that research is
useless. However, it does show that this research — in its comparison between two different
laws (in this instance the Saudi and Australian laws) — is trying to explore areas that have not
been addressed previously. These standards are very important and effective for revealing the
court’s role. This is clear from the reasons that show the importance of the selected criteria
which have been discussed in the criteria section of this research (namely, efficiency, justice in
the individual cases and the protection of societal values). In addition, it is true that the courts
shall support implementation as ‘justice delayed can mean justice denied’213 with delays
disrupting the advantages of the arbitration process.
Therefore, it is important to know the main features of the implementation process of the
provisions of foreign arbitral awards in Australia, which will guide the analysis of this research.
Such features can be explained as follows: in 1.6.3.C.
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C. Rules Guiding the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award in Australia
As explained above, there are two main statutory sources that regulate international arbitration
in Australia: the uniform state legislation and the IAA, which is the most significant. In NSW, it
is the IAA and the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW).214 The IAA was endorsed to ‘give
effect to the 1958 New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of arbitration
awards’.215 Section 8 of the IAA provides regulations for enforcement for, and for refusal to
enforce, foreign arbitral awards.216 Australia’s obligations under the Convention have been
implemented through the IAA. The IAA underwent amendment in 2010.
Section 8(2) reads: ‘Subject to this Part, a foreign award may be enforced in a court of a State or
Territory as if the award were a judgment or order of that court.’217 The Federal Court has also
been given jurisdiction to enforce an award to the same effect as section 8(2). This is under the
new Section 8(3). Some scholars and Australian judges may have expressed doubt as to
judgments made by Australian courts due to the omission of the word ‘only’ in Section 8, giving
the courts discretion in enforcing foreign awards.218 An example of such a case is the Resort
Condominiums International Inc Case.219 The new amendment for this section provides that
‘[t]he court may only refuse to enforce the foreign award in the circumstances mentioned in
subsections (5) and (7).’220 Whether the change made by adding the word ‘only’ excludes the
court’s residual discretion requires reading and the development of deep analysis of the recent
amendments and of the rest of this law, especially Subsections 5 and 7 which include reference
to corruption, fraud and breach of natural justice. Additionally, it is important to analyse the
214
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Australian courts’ judgments to determine the judicial interpretation of this amendment and to
extract the Australian courts’ interpretations of these terms. This will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 5. Hence, it should be noted that sections 9(1) and 10(1) have made the process of
looking for enforcement easy. Section 9(1) provides that a person seeking enforcement should
produce an original arbitration agreement and the award, or duly certified copies of both to the
courts. Section 10(1) permits the production of a certificate showing that the country specified
was a Convention country at the relevant time. These are documents to be supplied to the courts
as prima facie evidence. The position of the court from these documents, or the court’s
interpretation of the articles concerning the formal requirements, should however be
determined; as well as whether there are any other conditions placed by the court regarding
these documents that need to be met in order to satisfy the court — such as the interpretation of
any required documents to provide proof of the reciprocity principle.
Another important feature of the IAA is that the courts are not permitted to review the award;
they are only allowed to refuse to enforce an award under sections 8(5) or (7).221 Thus, in the
case of a breach of the arbitral award on the basis of those subsections, the position of the court
matters, considering what it will do if the matter violates public policy.
Australian courts support a pro-enforcement bias as can be seen in the case of Uganda Telecom
Ltd v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd.222 In this case, a Ugandan arbitral award was enforced under the
IAA without consideration being given to the fact that not all the parties participated in the
arbitration.223 According to Herzfeld, the Australian corporate respondent did not participate in
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the arbitration.224 There are two important factores considered by the court that led to its final
decisions, essentially demonstrating a pro-enforcement bias.225 These two considerations are;
1.

That the dispute was not outside its scope, the arbitration clause (which provided that
‘any lawsuit, disagreement, or complaint with regards to a disagreement, must be
submitted to a compulsory arbitration’) was not void due to uncertainty, and the dispute
was in agreement with the two parties’ consented procedure.

2.

That the arbitration was not against public policy. The respondent had submitted that
there were errors in law and fact made by the arbitrator when determining the award for
general damages and this was against public policy. The court indicated that it is not
against public policy for a foreign arbitral award to be enforced by the court without
examining the result reflected in the award or the correctness of reasoning in the award.
This opens the door for the question about the existence of the reasons, that is, the action
of the courts if the foreign award for any reason did not contain any reasons. An
additional argument was that the justification for Australian public policy was to ensure
enforcements of such awards to support international arbitration that in turn supports
finality and certainty in international dispute resolution. Enforcement of the award also
meets the objects specified in section 2D of the IAA.

Additionally, the Convention is enforceable in Australia according to section 8 of the IAA. This
section also has justifications for refusal to implement a foreign award (subsections (5), (7) and
(8)). Recent Australian court decisions, however, provide an insight into the approaches taken in
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In a case involving a Chinese and an
Australian corporation (China Sichuan Changhong Electric Co Ltd v CTA International Pty Ltd
[2009] FCA 397), the Chinese corporation applied for an enforcement application, and the
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Australian corporation, as the defendant, did not appear before the courts when they considered
the matter of the enforcement of the application. The court made a decision based on the
plaintiff’s evidence and based on whether the defendant had been properly notified. The
conclusion was that the award, which was issued by the Mianyang Arbitration Commission in
the People’s Republic of China, satisfied the foreign award requirements as provided for in the
IAA. It was established that the agreement between the two parties had the relevant arbitration
clause. These facts plus the consideration that the defendant had been properly notified of the
enforcement application are the basis of the decision making which resulted in the Chinese
corporation being granted the award. This was a decision made by the Federal Court of
Australia. There are similar instances in the New South Wales Supreme Court. One such case is
Transpac Capital PTE Limited v Buntoro,226 involving an Australian company and a
Singaporean company. In this case too, the Australian company was the defendant and did not
appear at the hearing.
The NSW Supreme Court made a decision based on the evidence that the Singapore arbitration
was qualified for enforcement under the IAA, and had been in accordance with the agreement
between the parties. Considering the absence of the defendant, the court used the defendant’s
own agreement to determine any grounds that applied for the court to refuse enforcement
(considering section 8 of the Act) and found none. Accordingly, the court granted the
enforcement of the award.227
Another example is the Xiaodong Yang v S&L Consulting Pty Ltd case.228 The defendants did
not appear before the court, and the court used the plaintiff’s evidence to find out if it met the
decisive factor of enforcement under section 8 of the IAA. The court also determined whether
the defendant had been properly notified before granting leave for the award to be enforced. The
226
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conclusion of the court was that there was no reason for refusal to enforce the award. It met the
criteria for enforcement and the defendants were properly notified of the enforcement
application.
These three decisions show the approach taken by Australian courts (exercising discretion under
the IAA) where the defendants do not appear. They reflect clear practice in enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards.
Another case was handled by Victorian Court of Appeal (Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc)
where the foreign arbitral award that was intended to be enforced in Victoria was against a party
that was not named in the arbitration agreement. This decision was overturned by the Court of
Appeal which cited the above issues in resisting enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under
the IAA.229
In brief, in this case there was an operations management agreement (OMA) between Altain
Khuder and IMC Mining relating to a Mongolian iron ore mine. Within the OMA, there was an
arbitration agreement. After a disagreement about the provision of services under the OMA
occurred, Altain Khuder started the arbitration under Mongolian National Arbitration Centre
rules. The award, which constituted an arbitration fee of USD 50,257 and the real award of USD
5,903,098, was in favour of Altain Khuder. The arbitration tribunal also ordered a different
entity (IMC Mining Solutions Pty Ltd) to pay the sum above on behalf of IMC Mining.
IMC Solutions applied to have the order set aside arguing that it was not an associate to the
arbitration accord. This application was refused by the judge and indemnity costs were ordered
against IMC on 28 January 2011. IMC then wanted an extension of stays which was still refused
by the judge. The judge ordered them to pay indemnity costs of the application they made. IMC
Solutions then appealed and Court of Appeal took different approaches and provided the
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following issues to be considered when enforcing foreign arbitral awards. The applicant has to
establish a prima facie that the creditor and the debtor are parties to the arbitration agreement in
any application for award enforcement.
This is like a burden of proof on the applicant where, if the parties are not named in the
agreement, additional evidence will be required to show involvement of an agreement between
the parties. Application of enforcement should also be made inter parties rather than ex parte.
Here the judge discussed the ‘appropriateness of ex parte application.’230
In considering the jurisdiction, the courts given the responsibility of enforcing an award have
the authority to find out the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the parties and are not restricted by
tribunal findings. Respondents do not have a heavy onus in establishing defences in sections
8(5) and (7) of the IAA; it is, in fact, just a ‘balance of probabilities’ standard.
Hence, resisting enforcement may be on the basis that a person is not a party to the arbitration
agreement even if the party does not apply to set aside the award at the seat of arbitration or
even if he/she did not participate in the arbitration.
These cases show the court’s support and discretion regarding the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards under the IAA. There are, however, practical points that create difficulties in
their implementation.
In conclusion, it is clear that there are many studies and jurisprudential opinions with regard to
the Australian side and this represents a solid platform for the establishment of a clear vision for
arbitration in general. In contrast, there are some deficiencies regarding the role of the court in
the examination of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards regarding the formal and
substantive requirements. While the Saudi side suffers from a lack of research in this area and
this is one of the major reasons which creates misconceptions among some Saudi and Western
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researchers on arbitration in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Australian literature has been affected
by some foreign researchers’ work which contributes to the development of an international
standard and a vision of the court’s role in the implementation process.
It is unfortunate that there are some Saudi researchers who have some misconceptions, as
explained above, about the Court’s role in the implementation of the provisions of foreign
arbitral awards. This may be due to the fact that there is also a lack of adequate research
primarily due to the lack of publication of judicial decisions. The availability of such decisions
facilitates the work of any researcher or judge and ensure a clearer vision of the implementation
process. On the other hand, the e-libraries and the publications of judicial decisions in Australia
contribute to facilitating the researchers and judges’ role in understanding the process of
implementation, which in turn helps to develop the discussion on the court’s role on the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.

1.7 Conclusion
At the end of this chapter it is clear that arbitration is important as a peaceful means to resolve a
dispute. However, this method raises many questions for which clear answers need to be found,
especially for those raised by the application of foreign arbitral awards. Otherwise difficulties
may lead to a problematic burial of this peaceful means and make it devoid of any practical use.
Research on this issue may contribute to the resolution of disputes arising between the parties in
international business relationships.
This importance of arbitration, particularly with respect to arbitration in the international trade
area, has led many laws (including those of Saudi Arabia, Australia, the countries the subject of
this study) to pay attention and to legalise, regulate and issue their own laws in regard to
arbitration. However, some of this legislation is deficient in a number of areas, such as the
precise definition of the concept of public policy. Thus, the task of explaining such matters is
left to the competent court. Thus, the judiciary in many cases refuses to implement certain
provisions of arbitration under the pretext of its violating public policy. Giving such authority to
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the national courts may eliminate the benefits of arbitration and produce a situation where
recourse to it becomes a waste of time, effort and money.
In fact, the adoption by the Australian Parliament of the Convention within the IAA and annexed
in the framework of national law is a great step in understanding and facilitating the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards. Comparing this with the situation in
Saudi Arabia, where there is no special law to implement the provisions of foreign arbitral
awards (such as the IAA in Australia), I believe that the Saudi judges have to consider several
laws and conventions regarding to the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral
awards.
It was clear that there is major academic activity and scientific rigour in relation to arbitration in
Western studies, and on the contrary, there are limited empirical studies that deal with the
provisions of the courts in the Saudi studies. These Western studies contributed greatly to
crystallise the idea of implementing the provisions of foreign arbitration in Australia where
there have been many discussions and opinions given regarding the role of the courts and the
role of international agreements in the implementation process. On the other hand, the lack of
the empirical studies in Saudi Arabia regarding the arbitration process makes a lot of Western
and Arab researchers and even the Saudis fall into many errors in the results of their research
and their expectations of what is applied by the Saudi judges in regard to the implementation of
foreign arbitration.
Additionally, these Western studies helped in the discussion of several ideas and principles such
as the idea of public policy. Yet there is no clear definition of such a principle. This is due to the
ambiguity and lack of specific and disciplined ideas on this principle; however, researchers have
helped to clarify some of the foundations and principles that underpin this principle, as we shall
see in Chapter 5. Besides, these Western studies provide an analysis of the most important
provisions, such as the case of Soleimany v Soleimany, which showed the most important
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principle regarding the implementation of the provisions of a foreign arbitration, namely ‘public
policy’. Moreover, these Western studies are analytical and discuss the theoretical principles.
On the Saudi side it is noticeable that most of the Arabic studies were theoretical, where there
are no real deliberations on the provisions of the courts regarding the implementation of foreign
arbitration. This in turn led to ambiguity as to the idea of implementation among many Western
scholars and Saudis, particularly in regard to Saudi practice.
As a result, there is a significant misunderstanding about the real role of the Saudi Grievances
Board and the process of enforcing foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia. This shows the
importance of any study that explores the enforcement of foreign arbitration in Saudi Arabia,
and the importance of its clarification of any ambiguity and revelation of any shortcomings of
the legal texts. Therefore, any study on these areas shall consider the court’s judgments to find
out the real position of judicial system and to clarify the principles that have been followed in
this regard. Additionally, the apparent lack of scientific material in relation to arbitration and the
lack of an adequate quantity of research on the theoretical side make the task look difficult.
Thus, it is important to include some of the theoretical aspects in this research to complete the
picture of the theoretical side and the empirical side, and also to standardise the definitions of
the theory with the appropriate application.
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2

FOREIGN ARBITRATION AND THE COMPETANT COURTS

2.1 Introduction
It was clear that the previous chapter describes arbitration and is the chapter that forms the basis
of the study, particularly in regard to the problems arising from the implementation of foreign
arbitration. Additionally, it discusses the previous studies in Saudi Arabia and Australia. It also
describes the scope of the research and the methodology which will be used in this research.
Moreover, it shows the significance of this research in studies related to international
commercial arbitration. Finally, it refers to the role of the competent court in the implementation
of the rule of foreign arbitration.
This chapter will review the competent courts in approving foreign arbitral awards in both Saudi
Arabia and Australia where the discussion of the competent court — and the legal rules that will
be applied to the implementation process — will facilitate the process of measuring and
extrapolating the court’s role in implementation. It will contribute to having an accurate picture
of the role of the court in the implementation of foreign arbitral awards. Thus, the chapter will
discuss the competent court in Saudi Arabia (Saudi Grievances Board) and explain its judicial
role within the judiciary in Saudi Arabia, and the competent court in Australia and its judicial
role.
In fact, it is necessary to know the competent court in implementing the provisions of foreign
arbitral awards in order to provide direct information to the foreign investor or those who wish
to enforce an award in one of the two countries. In addition, knowing the true role of the
competent court within the judicial system helps researchers to discern the direction of the court
in the implementation process and also the procedures which makes the implementation process
easier.
Indeed the practice of the courts in both countries plays a very important role in making the
arbitration process efficient. Judges and the courts have a role to play in achieving the aims of
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arbitration. For that reason, it is important to assess the role of the courts in both countries and
identify the differences, and/or similarities. Reforming the arbitration system in Saudi Arabia
needs facts, and this assessment contributes to the state having the necessary information for
making the appropriate changes to the system. Knowledge of the role of the competent courts in
approving foreign arbitral awards in both Saudi Arabia and Australia will provide information
that forms the basis for comparison and help in achieving the aim of this research. This
information will be compared based on the criteria chosen for the research. It will provide more
information on what role the courts play in encouraging arbitration.

2.2 Competent Courts
First of all, attention to arbitration in international trade disputes in the world is relatively new.
There have been efforts made towards the creation of a system that would facilitate the
application of international commercial arbitration. The basic reason for this is that most states
want to work towards the development of cooperation in international trade.
The overall empowerment of the courts might be a result of the need to promote the principle of
reciprocity, the respect of the other states, and good faith in the implementation of international
conventions. It may also be to ensure justice in general. These types of courts generally do not
consider the matter of the case, but they do make sure such cases do not breach public policy.1
The idea of a competent court, therefore, would involve the appointment of a national court that
would have expertise in dealing with the more peculiar nature that defines an international
arbitral award, and in ensuring the preservation of the rights of the victorious party in the
arbitration to ensure the application of justice. Also, the competent court is to facilitate and

1

It should be noted that there are some grounds that give the national courts the right to refuse the
implementation of the arbitration awards stated in Article V of the Convention. However, there is no
defence or ground that gives the national court the right to consider the subject matter unless there is a
strong signal of breach of public policy, in which case the court can consider the matter of the case and
evaluate the arbitration agreement in order to preserve public policy; however, it is not wide open (as
we shall see in the Chapter 4 - 4.2 Role of the Judge) for the court to go in more detail about the matter
of the case.
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encourage foreign investment by ensuring the acceptance of foreign arbitration and its
implementation within the state. The competent court would also demonstrate the application of
a just and fair method of law. This is due to the fact that the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards is an international moral and legal obligation of the state, meaning that states (for all
intents and purposes) would have to implement international conventions and also to apply the
principle of reciprocity as a matter of a good will between nations.2 Therefore, competent courts
are formed because states are aiming to show good faith in international transactions (and
maintain thereby their reputation at an international level), because when any country ratifies a
convention, then it will have the obligation to implement this agreement in good faith. States
have also always sought to attract international investment in several ways, and among the most
important is the recognition of foreign arbitration. Therefore, the international conventions
relating to arbitration require signatory states to appoint a national court to recognise and
implement foreign arbitration.
The duty to appoint a national court, therefore, is a duty, an imperative demanded by
international conventions (for example, Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on the
appointment of a national court). Also the determination by the national court regarding
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards may involve a type of justice where
the parties agree to go to arbitration as a means to resolve the conflict, so the laws should
respect that wish. The appointment of a state court also ensures that the respective national
courts implements arbitral provisions in the context of reciprocity in international law, which
guarantees that each state will implement the provisions made by others. For a country to
protect its reputation in terms of it having a viable arbitration judicial system, it would
automatically become essential for it to have competent national courts that could deal with

2

See United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969,
1155 UNTS 331 (entry into force 27 January 1980) art 26. For text, see refworld.org
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html>.
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arbitral awards. Domestic courts, however, will follow the procedure in accordance to the
domestic laws.
In Saudi Arabia, the Grievances Board is the competent court in enforcing foreign arbitral
awards. According to Article 13 of Chapter III ‘Jurisdiction of Courts’ in the current law, the
Saudi Grievances Board System 2007: ‘Administrative courts shall have jurisdiction to decide
the following: ... (g) Requests for execution of foreign judgments and arbitral awards.’
Therefore, the Administrative Court in the Grievances Board is the competent court in this
regard.
In Australia, a court cannot deal with every legal dispute; thus, each court has its limited
jurisdiction. Such limitation is imposed by the laws which are made by either State or Federal
Parliament.3 Accordingly, to clarify this situation, we have to understand the Australian judicial
system, where Australia has a federal system with Commonwealth courts and state courts and
the Australian courts have jurisdiction according to two elements or criteria, which can be
summarised as follows:
1.

The value of the award and the procedural rules of the court.

2.

The subject matter of the case, very important in determining the courts jurisdictions.4

Division II of the IAA gives the Federal Court of Australia and the State/Territory Supreme
Courts the jurisdiction to implement the Convention where the implementation of the
UNCITRAL Model Law and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between

3

See Christine Miles and Warwick Dowler, A Guide to Business Law (Thomson Reuters, 19th ed, 2011)
49.
4
This will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2 (2.2.2 Competent Court in Australia) when explaining
the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the implementation of foreign arbitral awards.
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States and Nationals of Other States (‘ICSID Convention’) in a State/Territory Supreme Court is
under Parts III and IV of the IAA.5
This means that in New South Wales (NSW) the NSW Supreme Court is the competent court to
consider the implementation of foreign arbitration.6 Therefore, it is important to understand this
aspect of the Australian competent courts in approving foreign arbitral awards (that is, the role
of the NSW Supreme Court and the Federal Court of Australia).
Below is an in-depth description of the role of the respective competent courts and an
explanation of the judicial system in the two countries. Included will be a discussion on the
general jurisdiction of the courts, including jurisdiction over the provisions of arbitration and
the process of foreign arbitral award implementation. This will help in the development of an
understanding of the powers of the competent court and will facilitate a greater knowledge of
the role of the judge and a greater comprehension of the status and duties of the court in the
5

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States,
opened for signature 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) (‘ICSID
Convention’). See Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Office of International Law,
‘Review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth)’ (Discussion Paper, November 2008) section
H. It should be mentioned that the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia exists in the Federal
legislation, the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (‘the IAA’), where in section 3(1) ‘“court”
means any court in Australia, including, but not limited to, the Federal Court of Australia ...’. This
shows the direct authority of the Federal Court in this regard. Regarding the ICSID Convention, which
is a Schedule of the IAA. IAA sch 3, art 54(2) states:
A party seeking recognition or enforcement in the territories of a Contracting State shall furnish to
a competent court or other authority which such State shall have designated for this purpose a copy
of the award certified by the Secretary-general. Each Contracting State shall notify the Secretarygeneral of the designation of the competent court or other authority for this purpose and of any
subsequent change in such designation.
Thus, section 35 (‘Recognition of Awards’) in the IAA came as an application of Article 54(2) of the
ICSID Convention, where it states: ‘(1) The Supreme Court of each state and territory is designated
for the purposes of Article 54. [And] (3) The Federal Court of Australia is designated for the purposes
of Article 54.’ Accordingly, the competent courts in Australia in the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards under the ICSID Convention are, according to the IAA, the state Supreme
Courts and the Federal Court of Australia.
6
The Supreme Court of NSW has been chosen to be the model for the Australian Courts as mentioned in
the methodology of this research. Thus, this chapter deals with the Supreme Court of New South Wales
as an example of the Australian state Supreme Courts. In addition, it should be noted that most of the
cases concerning the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitration are brought before the state
Supreme Courts. For more information, see International Chamber of Commerce, Country Answers:
Australia (Law as at 18 July 2008) [Material Reproduced from: ICC, Special Supplement 2008: Guide
to National Rules of Procedure for Recognition and Enforcement of New York Convention Awards
(2009) 29 <http://www.iccdrl.com/CODE/LevelThree.asp?page=Country%20Answers&Locator=
32.2&L1=Country%20Answers&tocxml=ltoc_CountryAnswersAll.xml&contentxsl=arbSingle.xsl&toc
xsl=toc.xsl&contentxml=CA_SUPP_0021_3.xml&AUTH=&nb=0>.
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judicial system in general. This in turn will help understand the role of the judge in dealing with
the provisions of foreign arbitral awards.
2.2.1

The Saudi Competent Court

In this section it is important to explain the Saudi legal system in general to further
understanding of the position of the competent court in implementing foreign arbitration in
Saudi Arabia. Additionally, such discussion is important to explain the effects of Shari’a on the
court’s decisions.
A.

Saudi Legal System: Background

In fact, Saudi Arabia has a comprehensive Islamic legal system in which the law of the land is
Shari’a and judges (trained under Shari’a jurisprudence) exercise general jurisdiction. It is
important to mention that Article 44 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance (‘the Basic Law’)
states that
the authorities of the state consist of: the judicial authority, the executive authority and
the regulatory authority. These Authorities will cooperate in the performance of their
functions, according to this law or other laws. The King is the ultimate arbiter for these
authorities.

Article 67 states that ‘the regulatory authority shall be concerned with the making of laws and
regulations which will safeguard all interests, and remove evil from the state’s affairs, according
to Shari’a. Its powers shall be exercised according to provisions of this law and the law of the
Council of Ministers and the law of the Shura Council.’ This means that this authority is the
Council of Ministers and the Shura Council.7 Nevertheless, the King has the power to issue
decrees after the vote of both councils to adopt laws. Article 46 states that ‘the Judiciary is an
independent authority. The decisions of judges shall not be subject to any authority other than

7

This is also stated in Article 20 of the Saudi Law of the Council of Ministers which states ‘While
deferring to Majlis Ash-Shura Law, laws, treaties, international agreements and ‘concessions’ shall be
issued and amended by Royal Decrees after deliberations by the Council of Ministers..
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the authority of the Islamic Shari’a.’ Thus, the Basic Law grants independence to the judiciary
in Saudi Arabia.
On the other hand, the Australian legal system, as we shall see (2.2.2 Competent Court in
Australia), is based on a federal and state jurisdictions where the federal jurisdiction is derived
from the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (‘Commonwealth Constitution’) and
laws passed by both houses of the Federal Parliament and given Royal Assent by the Governor
General, while state jurisdiction is derived from State constitutions and laws (in matters not
controlled by or reserved to the Federal Parliament under section 51 of the Constitution) that
have been passed by both houses (a single chamber in Queensland) in the respective state
parliament and given Royal Assent by that state’s Governor. Additionally, in a common law
jurisdiction such as Australia a high court can ‘create law’ by deciding cases and establishing
precedents that must be followed by lower courts of the same hierarchy. This brief description
shows the significant difference between the two systems: that of Saudi Arabia and that of
Australia.
Thus, an explanation of the structure of the Saudi judicial system will make it easier for the nonSaudi reader and researcher to understand the judicial system in general, which will help in their
visualising the process of sentencing. Also it is important to explain the role and the effect of
Shari’a law on the legal system in Saudi Arabia.
Accordingly, the Shari’a law, as already explained in the introduction to this research (1.1
General Background), is the basic law that will be applied in Saudi Arabia, and is the basis of
Saudi laws and public policy. Therefore, it is important to know that any provision contrary to
Islamic law (that is, a provision that is consequently ‘haram’ or ‘forbidden’) will not be
implemented. In addition, any rule of law in any Saudi regime will not be applied by the Saudi
public courts or the Grievances Board if it is contrary to Islamic law. This is evident in the
Articles 1 and 7 of the Saudi Basic Law, which state that the Qu’rān and Sunnah are the
nation’s Constitution and govern all laws and regulations. This shows the extent of the effect of
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Shari’a rules on the Saudi law, which is reflected in the judicial rulings where they can not
violate any Shari’a ‘basics or assets’. This means that any foreign award that conflicts with
Shari’a law will be rejected by the Grievances Board. This principle, ‘the governing role of
Shari’a law’, is not a social custom or a historical basis for the Saudi regime which it is possible
to change but it is mostly fixed rules that cannot be adjusted over time and which stems from
the principles of Islamic Shari’a law. So the Shari’a law is the legal basis in Saudi Arabia.8
On the other hand, the common law system, as developed in the United Kingdom, forms the
basis of Australian jurisprudence and judicial system. It is distinct from the civil law systems
that operate in Europe, several Middle Eastern countries, South America and Japan. The chief
feature of the common law system is the ‘precedent’ which means that judges’ decisions in
pending cases are informed by the decisions of previously settled cases.
It is important to state that Shari’a allows other formal laws and the decrees of the Muslim
governor (or ruler, in the instance of Saudi Arabia this is the King) to play their role in
commercial practice and even to co-exist with it, but it does not allow any direct conflict to the
provisions of Shari’a from such laws and decrees. Even the King and his Cabinet have no
authority to ratify legislation that is against Shari’a.9
In fact, it is necessary to understand the relationship between the King and the judges. In the
Islamic judicial system, Muslim scholars have agreed that the Muslim ruler has the right and the
obligation to appoint judges.10 On the other hand, there are differences between Muslim scholars
on the right of the Muslim ruler to dismiss a judge without reason.11 The first view is that the
Muslim ruler has the right to dismiss a judge without a reason because of his power in the
For more information, see Abdulrahman Al Shalhoub, ‘Alnezam Aldstori{ fy Almamlakah Al‘rabih
Als‘wdih: byn Ashari’a ū Alqanwn Almuqarn [The Constitutional System in Saudi Arabia: Between
the Sharia and the Comparative Law] (Safir Press, 2nd ed, 2005).
9
See Abdulrahman Yahya Baamir, Shari’a Law in Commercial and Banking Arbitration: Law and
Practice in Saudi Arabia (Ashgate Publishing, 2010) 18. More details about the Saudi legal system will
be discussed in Chapter 2 (2.2.1 The Saudi Competent Court ‘Saudi Grievances Board’).
10
Al Shalhoub, above n 8, 327.
11
Ibid; Mahmoud Arnous, ‘The History of the Islamic Judicial System’ (Cairo: Egyptian private
publisher) 161.
8
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appointment of the judge.12 The second view is that any decision to dismiss the judge must be
based on purely legal grounds, which makes the role of the Muslim ruler logical and in line with
the principle of ‘separation of powers’, where judges enjoy immunity.13
Currently, according to the Saudi judicial laws, the judges are appointed by the judicial
authority represented in the Supreme Judicial Council. Additionally, there is no right for that
Council to dismiss any judge except in cases prescribed by the Saudi Judiciary System 1975.14
In fact, Saudi Arabia just like other Arab countries with similar jurisprudential systems has legal
and philosophical schools that developed overtime during Islam’s history. One such school is
the Hanbali Juristic School.15 This is the most important source of law in Saudi Arabia and the
one which has subjected the people of Saudi Arabia and their government to the rule of
Shari’a.16 It has guided interpretation of Qur’ān and the Sunnah which from the Constitution of
Saudi Arabia. This is in accordance with the Basic Law of Governance (Royal Decree No A / 90
of 1412 H (1992)), which also provides that Saudi Arabia is a monarchy that shall be ruled by
the family of King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud; the Kingdom’s founder. It also provides that the
Kingdom shall be ruled according to the principles of Shari’a.17
Over time, however, Saudi Arabia has experienced various changes that have affected its
development positively. Things like the oil boom, increased business interest from international
entities, and global legal changes such as the development of treaties that encourage investment
and good relations among nations. These changes have prompted changes in the Saudi legal
system. The Kingdom has therefore over the years developed a legal structure with institutions

12

Ibid.
Jamal Marsafy, ‘The Judicial System in Islam’ (University of Imam Muhammad bin Saud, 1401 /1980)
53.
14
See Al Shalhoub, above n 8, 344. The author refers to the Saudi Judiciary System issued by the Law No
M /64 of 14 Rajab 1395 AH 23 July 1975 (‘Saudi Judiciary System 1975’).
15
For more information see, Al Shalhoub, above n 8, 17.
16
Ibid 339.
17
See Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), (nd) The Legal Guide to Investment in
Saudi Arabia (SAGIA Circular, June 2012)
<http://alandaluslaw.com/library/LegalData2/Additional_Regs/sagiacircular/legal02%20Revised.pdf>.
13
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that Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) refers to as ‘appearing western and
modern’.18 This gives the impression that they are neither modern, nor western. The issue,
however, is not on whether the Saudi legal system is westernised, but rather on the current
structure. An examination of the reformed system will increase understanding of the legal
processes and practice of Saudi courts and judges.
Specifically, the Saudi legal system has been transformed with the creation of several
regulations, laws and decrees; and the development of some judicial bodies to handle future
challenges and new requirements or issues. The system does not exactly resemble the civil law
or common law systems. This is because the Saudi legal system is based on Shari’a principles
that are mostly in agreement with what is taught at the Hanbali School. It has no codification of
laws as is found civil and common law jurisdictions. It has however been influenced by Western
legal concepts and laws that have led to a transformation to a system that incorporates modern
legal concepts applied in current Saudi Arabian commercial practice. The essential core of the
Saudi legal system still remains, and these concepts as applied, are provided by the Shari’a, and
show similarity or are identical to concepts reached by Western legal system jurists.19
In fact, Saudi Arabia has adopted a duality in the judicial system that consists of both general
(public or Shari’a) courts and administrative courts. This duality in the judicial authorities
creates the Grievances Board as an administrative court, and the public courts (Shari’a courts)
which adjudicate the remaining civil disputes, both commercial and criminal. In addition, public
courts were given the authority to consider all disputes except those that have been excluded by
the relevent law.20 In this respect, it should be noted that the Commercial Court System 1930
excludes commercial disputes from the Shari’a Courts jurisdiction where the proceedings

18

Ibid.
Ibid; also see the Saudi Ministry of Justice, The New Reform of the Saudi Judicial System [Altshkeil
Aljadeed Lelmahakem Alqadha Ala’m] (2011)
<http://www.moj.gov.sa/ar-sa/Courts/Pages/StructureCourts.aspx>. Australia’s system will be voered
in 2.2.2 The Competant Courts in Australia.
20
See Article 443 of the Saudi Commercial Court System, issued by Royal Decree No 32 of 15/1/1350
AH 1930.
19
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before the Commercial Court will not be accepted unless the case is between merchants and the
subject of the case is a purely business matter. According to Article 26 ‘Jurisdiction of Courts’
of the Saudi Judiciary System 1975, the Shari’a Courts
[s]hall have jurisdiction to decide with respect to all disputes and crimes, except those
exempted by law. Rules for the jurisdiction of courts shall be set forth in the Law of Shari’a
Courts Procedure and Law of Criminal Procedure. Specialised courts may be formed by
21
Royal Order on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council.

Thus, administrative disputes have generally been excluded from the authority of the public
(Shari’a) courts by the Saudi legislature in Article 1 of the Grievances Board System 1982 and
such matter given to the Grievances Board its consideration.22 In Saudi Arabia’s dual judicial
system of general and administrative courts, the main difference between these courts is that the
public courts or ‘Shari’a Courts’ do not have the right to consider any dispute to which the
Saudi government is a party. This in turn means that the authority of the Grievances Board is
limited to considering disputes where the state is a party. Consequently, it is very important to
explain the Saudi legal structure to establish a knowledge base about the Saudi judicial system.

B.

The Saudi Court Structure

The Saudi public court system is composed of a Supreme Judicial Council, Courts of Appeals
and First-Instance Courts (General Courts and Summary Courts). There is also the Grievances
Board which is an administrative judicial body. Its judicial role is carried out through the High
Administrative Court, the Court of Appeal, and First-Instance Courts (Administrative Courts).
Currently, the Saudi Grievances Board includes three types of courts which adjudicate
administrative, commercial and some criminal cases and each court has its own relevant law
that determines its judicial jurisdiction.

21

Saudi Judiciary System, issued by the Law No M / 64 of 14 Rajab 1395 AH 23 July 1975 (‘Saudi
Judiciary System 1975’).
22
Saudi Grievances Board System issued by Royal Decree No M / 51 of 17/07/1402 AH (1982) (‘Saudi
Grievances Board System 1982’) art 26.
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1. General Courts (Shari’a Courts)
a. Supreme Judicial Council
Under the 1975 (1395 AH) Saudi Judiciary System, the Public or General (Shari’a) court
system was organised into the Supreme Judicial Council, the Courts of Appeals (Court of
Cassation), and the First-Instance Courts (General Courts and Summary Courts (see Figure 1:
The Structure of the General (Shari’a) Courts). The Supreme Judicial Council was the highest
judicial authority (a situation that continued until the issuance of legislation reforming this
structure in 2007).23 The Council had judicial, legislative, consultative, and administrative
duties. Its judicial duties involved reviews of judgments involving major crimes and death
sentences. Its legislative role included establishing judicial precedents and general principles
that were to be followed by lower courts. It also looked into questions on Shari’a that required
general Shari’a principles. The consultative role involved provision of opinions on and reviews
of matters referred to it by the Minister of Justice or the King.24
The administrative roles of this council were defined by Article 7 of the Saudi Judiciary System.
It supervised the judicial system in accordance with the law. It also administered employment
related affairs — such as promotion, assignment, transfer, appointment, monitoring of proper
discharge of judiciary member duties, secondment, and termination of the judges’ services
through the inspection division members — for all judiciary members.
b. Courts of Appeal (Courts of Cassation)
Currently this court is the second ranked in the judicial system. The court’s opinion is generally
rendered by a three-judge panel, but in cases of certain major punishments, the court’s opinion
is rendered by a five-judge panel. The main concern of this court is to review Summary and

23

See Abdullah F Ansary, ‘A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System’ (July 2008) Hauser
Global Law School Program, New York University School of Law
<http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/saudi_arabia.htm>; also see Al Shalhoub, above n 8, 359.
24
See Al Shalhoub, above n 8, 359.
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General Courts’ application of the Shari’a and the Saudi laws. Because of this, it could produce
contradictory opinions. This problem, however, is set to be solved by a General Council of the
Court of Appeal, which is to make sure that the conflicts are settled, and the principles applied
by the General and Summary courts homogenised. The Courts of Appeal also discuss matters
that are to be examined by the Full Court, in accordance with the provisions of the Saudi
Judiciary System 1975 or other laws. It decides whether principles or interpretations are to be
abandoned.
Generally, the Appellate Court is allocated the responsibility of monitoring the methods (or
ways) of interpretation, and the application of the legal rules and the provisions of regulations
by the Summary and General Courts. The main function, however, is to hear or review
objections to judgments from the lower courts.25
c. First-Instance Courts
Under this court there are two types: the Summary Courts and the General Courts.
i.

Summary Courts: according to the Saudi Judiciary System 1975 these courts had
jurisdiction over certain cases, namely the ta’zir cases (excluding those excluded by a
statutory law), fixed punishment (Hudūd) cases, and decisions concerning monetary
damages or compensation for crimes that do not exceed one-third of the diy’ah (blood
money), which corresponds to 20,000 Saudi Riyals (‘SAR’). These courts also had
jurisdiction civil claims for amounts over SAR 8,000.

ii.

General Courts: these had jurisdiction over cases involving the possibility of a death
sentence as the penalty; or in cases other than those involving the death penalty, the

25

See Ayoub M Al-Jarbou, ‘Judicial Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia’ (2004) 19(1:4) Arab
Law Quarterly 5, 20; also see Soliman A Solaim, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Judicial System’ (1971) (Summer)
25(3) Middle East Journal 403–7; also see Oxford Analytica, ‘Saudi Arabia: Judicial/Commercial Law
Reforms Progress’ Oxford Analytica Daily Brief (7 March 2008).
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retaliatory punishments known as quyas. They also had jurisdiction civil claims for
amounts over SAR 20,000.
Figure 1: The Structure of the General (Shari’a) Courts
Diagrammatic Representation of the Structure of the Shari’a Courts
SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL

COURTS OF APPEAL
“Cassation”
MECCA COURT OF APPEAL

RIYADH COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST INSTANCE COURTS

Mecca First-Instance Courts

General
Courts

Riyadh First-Instance Courts

Summary
Courts

General
Courts

Summary
Courts

General Courts are located in every major centre, province and region of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia where the jurisdiction was divided geographically (that is, a court would hear cases
within not only its area of expertise but also only from a particular geographically determined
area). These courts consist of one judge or more, and all cases can be considered by one judge
except the Hudūd offences which shall be considered by three judges.

It should be noted that the Saudi Grievances Board is the competent court for considering and
implementing foreign arbitral awards but a description of the public ‘Shari’a’ courts was
important to show (and explain) the structure and operations of the general Saudi judicial
structure.
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2. The Grievances Board (Diwan al-Mazalem)
In Saudi Arabia, the Grievances Board was originally a Circuit of the Saudi government in the
Council of Ministers which was established by the Royal Decree of 12/7/1373 AH (1954).
Article 1 of Royal Decree No 2/13/8759 of 17/09/1374 AH (1955) emphasised the stature of the
Grievances Board as an independent court, separating it from the Council. The jurisdiction of
the Grievances Board was not specified in the beginning, and its decisions were not considered
as ‘provisions’ in the strict Saudi sense of the term; rather it was considered an advisory body to
the competent minister.26
This is the administrative court of Saudi Arabia. It is a body that was derived from the concept
of the tradition set out for Islamic rulers who were traditionally able to adjudicate matters that
came before them. This court was formed to adjudicate disputes and grievances that came
before the King. These included disputes involving government officials. Increased number of
disputes between private contractors and government officials led to the formation of the
Grievances Board.27 With time, its roles improved expanded to include reception and
investigation of complaints, and reporting to the relevant minister and then to the King if the
recommendations by the Board were not accepted by the minister in government. The King had
the final authority.28 The Board was later given judicial responsibility to deal with
matters/disputes of a criminal nature, such as fraud and bribery. In 1967, the Board was then
given independent authority from the Shari’a Court System. A Royal order declared that no
lawsuit against any government agency should be heard by any Shari’a Court without prior
Royal consent.29

26

For more information about the Saudi Grievances board, see Abdullah Hamad Al-Wahibi, ‘Alqwa‘d
Almonaz}mh Lel‘qwod Aledariah u> T}atbiqatha fy Almamlakah Al‘rabih Als‘wdih [Rules of

Administrative Contracts and Their Applications in Saudi Arabia]’ (Al-Humaidhy, 1st ed, 2002), 382.
Ibid 380; Al Shalhoub, above n 8, 380.
28
Al-Wahibi, above n 26, 380.
29
Ibid 383.
27
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The nature of the Grievances Board changed in 1982 when a new law established it as an
independent judicial body, parallel to the Shari’a Courts but directly connected to the King. The
Board was composed of the President with one of more Vice-Presidents, assistant VicePresidents, and members specialised in the law and Shari’a.
The Grievances Board is an administrative judicial board. However, it formerly had the power
to pass judgment on commercial and criminal disputes. It also had the sole power over
enforcement of foreign arbitration decisions and foreign judgments. In fact, there were four
main categories that the Board covered:
1. Disciplinary actions against civil servants
2. Disputes involving the government as a party
3. Disputes involving unethical business practice subject to statutory provisions, and
4. The execution of foreign arbitration and foreign judgments.
The administrative duties of the Board (according to Article 8 of the Law of the Grievance
Board adopted in 1982) included adjudication of the following disputes:
(A) Cases related to the rights provided for in the Civil Service and Pension Laws;
(B) Cases of objection filed by parties concerned against administrative decisions where the
reason of such objection is lack of jurisdiction, a deficiency in the form, a violation or
erroneous application or interpretation of laws and regulations, or abuse of authority;
(C) Cases of compensation filed by parties concerned against the government and
independent public corporate entities resulting from their actions;
(D) Cases filed by parties regarding contract-related disputes where the government or an
independent public corporate entity is a party;
(E) Disciplinary cases filed by the Bureau of Control and Investigation;
(F) Penal cases filed against suspects who have committed crimes of forgery as provided
for by law, crimes provided for by the Law of Combating Bribery, crimes provided for
by Royal Decree No. 43 dated 29/11/1377H [June 16, 1958], and crimes provided for
by the Law of Handling Public Funds issued by Royal Decree No. 77 dated
23/10/1395H [Oct. 29, 1975], and penal cases filed against persons accused of
committing crimes and offenses provided for by law, where an order to hear such cases
has been issued by the President of the Council of Ministers to the Board;
(G) Requests for implementation of foreign judgments;
(H) Cases within the jurisdiction of the Board in accordance with special legal provisions
and,
(I) Requests by foreign courts to carry out precautionary seizure on properties or funds
inside the Kingdom.
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There were two types of the Grievances Board circuits: Board of Appeal Circuits and FirstInstance Circuits (see Figure 2: The Structure of the Old Grievances Board).
a. Board of Appeal Circuits (Audit-Circuits
This had the highest authority in the system of the Grievances Board. It decided only on
abandonment of principles or interpretations. If, while deciding on a case, the Appeal Circuit
thought is necessary to depart from an existing interpretation, it would refer the matter to the
president of the Grievances Board. The president then passed it on to the Board of Appeal
Circuits. Approval by at least two thirds of the Board members is required to change a principle
and adopt a new one. Interpretations from which the Appeal Circuits would depart are those
previously adopted by it, previously adopted by another Circuit, or previously adopted by
another Circuit and affirmed by the Appeal Circuit.
b. First Instance Circuit (Sub-Circuits):
The First Instance Circuit (Sub-Circuits) occupied the lowest rung in the Grievances Board
heirarchy. There were several First Instance Criminal, Administrative, Subsidiary, Disciplinary,
and Commercial Circuits (see Figure 2 below). These Circuits are reformed regularly and over
80 have now been formed. These Circuits are composed of three members appointed by the
Board’s president. The president of the Board also appoints the head of the circuit from one of
the three members, and can form a one member First Instance Circuit as an appeal Circuit for
minor cases as specified by a regulation. Initiation of an administrative case happens is a
plaintiff files it with the President of the Board or his designee, who then refers the case to a
competent circuit. Judgment made by the Circuit is final, but parties have a right to appeal. The
Structure of the old Saudi Grievances Board:
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Figure 2: The Structure of the Old Grievances Board
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c. Administrative Committees (Tribunals)
The Saudi Arabian judicial system has several Administrative Committees or Tribunals. These
have been created periodically since 1932. They have jurisdiction over commercial, criminal,
civil and administrative cases. They also have jurisdiction over ‘disputes arising out of the
implementation of several laws and provisions’. Administrative committees include:


The Fraud, Cheating and Speculation Committee



The Committees for Penalising Traffic Violations



The Banking Disputes Settlement Committee



The Tax Committees



The Copyright Committee



The Mining Disputes Committee

In fact, there are nearly 40 such committees or tribunals.30

30

For more information, see Youssef Sabri, ‘Allijan Shbh Algad<aiah [Quasi-Judicial Bodies]’
(2009/1430) Centre for Judicial Studies Specialist <http://www.cojss.com/article.php?a=5>; also see
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It should be noted that these committees are not recognised as part of the judicial authority by
the Basic Law of Governance. Therefore, it could be said that all these committees were created
to help the Saudi Court System cope with economic development and social requirements of the
Kingdom, and also ease the case workload of the Saudi Court System.

C. Judicial System Reform in 2007: The New Judicial System
Reforms to the system focused on the establishment of specialised courts for labour
(employment law), criminal, commercial, and domestic cases. The reforms ensured that the
jurisdiction of the general courts and the specialised courts were defined to avoid conflict. These
new reforms were approved in 2007. There are many points that characterise this new system
which can be listed as follows:
1. New Role of the Supreme Judicial Council
Its rank as the highest court was removed, but it continued to oversee the administrative aspects
of the judiciary. Under the new law, the Supreme Judicial Council is guided by Article 6 of the
new law in conducting its administrative roles.31 These roles include: supervision of judges and
Shari’a Courts as provided for in the law. In supervising the courts, it will administer
employment-related affairs of all judiciary members. The affairs include transfers, promotions,
secondments, assignments and training. The Council also has the role of ensuring the
independence of the judges in the discharge of the duties of judiciary members, in accordance
with established rules and procedures.32

Osama Bin Salem Tfran, ‘Allijan Shbh Algad<aiah Fy Almamlakah: Dirasah Tahliliah [Quasi-Judicial
Committees In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: an Analytical Study on the Most Important QuasiJudicial Commissions’, (Masters (Research), Naif University for Security Sciences, Riyadh, 1417 AH,
1996).
31
Saudi Judicial System 2007, issued by Royal Decree No M / 78 and 19/9/1428, 2007, Umm al-Qura
Gazette No 4170 of 30/9/1428 AH 12 October 2007.
32
Saudi Judicial System 2007, pt II, art 6.
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2. The New General (Shar’a) Courts System
The new court system comprises the following hierarchical structure: the High Court, Courts of
Appeals, and First-Degree Courts. The First-Degree courts are composed of; Commercial
Circuits, Civil Circuits, Personal Status Circuits, and Criminal Circuits (see Figure 3 which
diagrammatically represents the structure of the new courts system after the 2007 reforms).

Figure 3: The New Structure of the General (Shari’a) Courts
The High Court

Courts of Appeal

Commercial
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Personal
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Criminal
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Commercial
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Criminal
Courts

Personal
Status Courts

General
Courts

The High Court has taken over the responsibility of the previous Supreme Judicial Council. It
became the highest authority of the judicial system.
The Courts of Appeal function as a safeguard. They are meant to overturn lower courts’
decisions where these are unsafe. The Courts of Appeal are established in the provinces of the
Kingdom. After the reforms, the Courts of Appeal have functioned through special circuits with
three-judge panels, which review judgments on major crimes. The Court of Appeal consists of
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the following circuits: Commercial Circuits, Labour Circuits, Civil Circuits, Personal Status
Circuits and Criminal Circuits.
First Degree Courts have been formed on the basis of the needs of the system, and are formed in
provinces, counties and districts. The Courts consist of Criminal Courts, General Courts,
Commercial Courts, Personal Status Courts, and Labour Courts.
3. The Reform of the Grievances Board
The Grievances Board still deals with administrative disputes involving government
departments. The Board previously had the power to hear and punish bribery, exploitation of
official influence, forgery, violations of human rights or abuse of authority in criminal
prosecution proceedings offences. The jurisdiction over criminal offences was, however, handed
over to the High Administrative Court in the new Judicial Court System. The Grievances Board
also does not hear any requests related to sovereign actions, any decisions issued by the
Administrative Judicial Council or Supreme Judicial Council, and decisions issued by legal
panels or courts within their jurisdiction. It remains an independent administrative judicial
commission that reports directly to the King.33
The Grievances Board became a parallel court to the Supreme Judicial Council, but with
administrative duties. It established an Administrative Judicial Council which performs
functions similar to the Supreme Judicial Council, but of an administrative nature
(administrative disputes). This Council covers several committees, such as the Judicial
Disciplinary Committee, the Jurisdictional Conflict Committee, and the Department for Judicial
Inspection. The Saudi Grievances Board Law governs the new structure; and the Board
comprises the High Administrative Court, Administrative Courts of Appeal, and Administrative
Courts.34

33
34

For more information, see Al Shalhoub, above n 8, 380.
Saudi Grievances Board System 2007, issued by the Royal Decree No M / 78, 19/9/1428 AH 2007.
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a. High Administrative Court
The High Administrative Court is the highest ranked and exercises its jurisdiction through
specialised circuits (see Figure 4: The Structure of the New Grievances Board – ‘The 2007
System’). This Court has a General Council whose decisions are issued on a majority vote. The
High Administrative Court Circuits review judgments from different circuits of the same level
and lower levels.35
The High Administrative Court has jurisdiction over the review of rulings upheld or issued by
the Administrative Court of Appeals in cases where objections to judgments are based on:
(a) Entry of judgment from an incompetent court. b) A violation of the Islamic Shari’a
provisions or regulations which do not contradict Shari’a rules, as well as faults in its
implementation or interpretation including violations of judicial principles established by
the High Administrative Court. c) Fault in framing the incident or impropriety in its
description. d) Entry of judgment from a court not properly constituted as provided by the
Grievances Board Law. e) Entry of a judgment contrary to another previous decision issued
between the parties to the proceedings. f) Jurisdictional conflict among the board’s courts. 36

b. Administrative Courts of Appeal
They hear appeals against decisions from the lower Administrative Courts. Judgments are made
after hearing arguments from the litigants, in accordance with the Law of Criminal Procedure
and Procedural Law before Shari’a Courts.37
c. Administrative Courts
These also function through specific circuits such as Subsidiary, Employment, Administrative,
and Disciplinary Circuits. They have jurisdiction over the following:

35

Ibid ch III art 11.
Ibid
37
Ibid ch III art 12. See Law of Procedure before the Saudi Grievances Board, issued by Resolution of
Council of Ministers No 190 of 16/11/1409 AH 1989, Umm Al-Qura Gazette No 3266, 12/4/1409 AH
1989.
36
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i.

Cases of compensation filed by the parties concerned against the government and
independent public corporate entities for a harm resulting from their actions.

ii.

Requests for implementation of foreign judgments.

iii.

Cases related to the rights provided for in the Civil and Military Service and Pension
Laws for government employees and hired hands, and independent public entities and
their heirs and claimants.

iv.

Cases of objection filed by the parties concerned in relation to administrative decisions,
where the reason for such an objection is lack of jurisdiction, a deficiency in form, a
violation or erroneous application or interpretation of laws and regulations, or abuse of
authority. The rejection or refusal of an administrative authority to take a decision that it
should have taken pursuant to laws and regulations is considered to be an administrative
decision.

v.

Cases filed by parties regarding contract-related disputes where the government or an
independent public corporate entity is a party and any other Administrative Disputes, and,
Disciplinary cases filed by the Bureau of Control and Investigation.

vi.

38

Implementing foreign judgments and foreign arbitral awards.38

Saudi Grievances Board System 2007, issued by the Royal Decree No M / 78, 19/9/1428 AH 2007.ch
III, Article 13.
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Figure 4: The Structure of the New Grievances Board - The 2007 System
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Apart from elaborating on the historical development of the Grievances Board, this research will
address its establishment, its role in the consideration of administrative disputes as its main
jurisdiction, and then address the Court’s consideration of foreign arbitral awards.
d. The Grievances Board’s Role in Administrative Disputes
The jurisdiction of the Grievances Board remained unclear until Royal Decree No 11166 of
19/6/1387 AH (1968) was issued. Directed to the Chief Justice, it provides that the General
Courts (that is, the Public or Shari’a Courts) are not to hear such disputes.
This rule has been reiterated in Royal Decree No 20941 of 28/10/1387 AH (1968) which
stressed that the General Courts (the Public or Shari’a courts) must not consider any dispute
against the government without the express permission of the King himself.
With the issuance of the Grievances Board System by Royal Decree No M / 51 of 17/07/1402
AH (1982) and also the issuance of the Law of Procedure before the Saudi Grievances Board,
issued by Resolution of the Council of Ministers Decision No 190 of 16/11/1409 AH (1989),
the Grievances Board is an independent court authorised to consider all of the administrative
disputes, which is any dispute to which the Saudi government is a party, whether these conflicts
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are between the government and its public officials (that is, government employees) or between
any governmental entity and another party. That was stated in Article I of the Grievances Board
System 1982: ‘The Grievances Board is an independent administrative judicial body reporting
directly to his Majesty the King ...’. This system and the text of this provision ensure that the
Grievances Board is an independent administrative judicial body and directly linked to the
monarch.
The pleading according to this 1982 law was on two levels. First was at the Sub-Circuit or
Dawair Farei’h level, where a single judge was deemed sufficient; and in the second phase, the
Audit-Circuits or Tadgeeg where three judges functioned as an appeal Circuit.
The independence of the Board, its administrative jurisdiction and its relationship to the
monarch is also stated explicitly in the new Grievances Board law (the Grievances Board
System 2007) which was issued by Royal Decree No M / 78 of 19 Ramadan 1428 AH (1
October 2007). Article 1 states: ‘The Grievances Board is an independent administrative judicial
body reporting directly to the King and its seat shall be the City of Riyadh ...’. Also, all of the
judgments of this court (the Audit-Circuit/ Tadgeeg under the old system or the High
Administrative Court under the new system) are final (unlike those taken in the court of first
instance from which an appeal can be launched in regard to the same conflict and same parties).
The High Administrative Court also has the power (as the final level in the new Grievances
Board System) to issue principles as judicial precedents which possess res judicata, where the
Court considers judicial decisions according to Article 1 of this law.
However, under the new law, the litigation before this court will now have a possible three
phases or levels, in accordance with Articles 8 and 9 of the Grievances Board System 2007: (a)
the Administrative Courts as the first level (one judge but it could be three judges); (b) the
Administrative Courts of Appeal — Estinaf (three judges); and (c) the High Administrative
Court (three judges), the highest degree or level of appeal in the Saudi Grievances Board. Thus,
all of the former Audit-Circuits became known as ‘courts of appeal’, and in reports of their
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Rulings have the abbreviation ‘ES’ signifying Estinaf instead of ‘T’ which was a reference to
Tadgeeg, the Audit-Circuit.39
e. The Grievances Board’s Consideration of Foreign Arbitration
Regarding the recognition of foreign arbitral awards and their implementation within the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the competent authority according to the relevant laws and
regulations is the Grievances Board. The text of the Council of Ministers Decision No 251 of
28/12/1379 AH (1960) (which was issued before the Grievances Board became a separate court,
that is when it was a circuit of the Council of Ministers) stated that the competent court to
implement the provisions of foreign arbitral awards issued in one of the Arab League countries
is the Grievances Board. This has also been stated explicitly in the previous and current law
related to the independent Grievances Board, namely the Saudi Grievances Board System
1982 and the Saudi Grievances Board System 2007 respectively. Article 13 of Chapter III,
‘Jurisdiction of Courts’ of the current law states: ‘Administrative courts shall have jurisdiction
to decide the following: ... (g) Requests for execution of foreign judgments and arbitral awards.’
Therefore, it is clear that the competent court in considering foreign arbitral awards in Saudi
Arabia is the Administrative Court in the Grievances Board.
However, the determination of the competent court is part of the process that facilitates and
supports arbitration. Therefore, in Saudi Arabia there is an urgent need to assign the task of
implementing foreign arbitration to the court that has originally a jurisdiction in the
39

It should be noted that the case reference or citation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia differs from the
common law jurisdictions style. The names of the parties are not considered important. Thus, the case
citation starts with the decision’s number and then the first letter of the name of the court or the circuit
that issued this verdict, and then the circuit’s number and finally the year of issuance. Therefore, the
names of the parties in the case are not important in the citation of the judicial cases where the citation
is based on the verdict number. For example, verdict No 1 issued by the Fourth Audit-Circuit Tadgeeg
in 1430 AH 2010 will be cited as follows 1 / T / 4 of 1430 AH 2010. Sub-Circuits of the Grievances
Board are indicated by D Dawair (Circuit) and Farei’h (Sub), thus D / F is Dawair Farei’h (SubCircuit). Finally, in the bibliography the Saudi cases will be listed according to the date of the case. So
it is important to explain such a difference at the beginning of this research. Therefore, any letter in any
Saudi court ruling indicates the first letter of the circuit or court name, whether it is an appeal court or
first circuit. Sub-Circuits of the Grievances Board are indicated by D Dawair (Circuit) and Farei’h
(Sub), thus D / F is Dawair Farei’h (Sub-Circuit).
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consideration of commercial disputes (that is, the Saudi Commercial Court) where the
specialisation in the consideration of commercial disputes will help increase understanding of
the needs of international trade and facilitate the implementation of the provisions of foreign
arbitral awards quickly and easily.
Given that the Saudi Grievances Board is an administrative court and its jurisdiction is to
consider conflicts between the government and its public officials or between any governmental
entity and another party, the judicial competence of this court must be reconsidered. This court
is currently authorised to apply the Civil Service System, Retirement System for Government
Employees (Civilian and Military) and Government Procurement System laws in addition to the
principles of administrative contracts, which are the contracts to which any government body is
a party.40
On the other hand, the Commercial Court is authorised to apply the Commercial Court System
law (which almost covers all commercial conflicts within Saudi Arabia) and also the Foreign
Investment System law. Their specialisation in trade disputes gives the judges of the
Commercial Court a better view and a greater ability to understand the requirements of
international trade, international norms and the principles of international trade in general, far
more than would be probable fro the judges of the Administrative Courts. In addition, the
presence of trained judges with greater understanding of the principles of international trade
would ensure the best application of international agreements and ensure the optimal
understanding of the international trade and norms.

2.2.2

Competent Courts in Australia

Australian law on arbitration is based on international conventions, legislation (both Federal and
State) and common law. The States and Territories of Australia have their own uniform

40

In addition, it has jurisdiction to consider any grievances from any verdict issued by any governmental
tribunal in Saudi Arabia (quasi-judicial tribunals). These are the most important laws in relation to the
jurisdiction of the Saudi Grievances Board.
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legislation on arbitration, where each State and Territory’s legislation incorporates the identical
provisions under their individual Acts, each designed the Commercial Arbitration Act (CAA).
Additionally, the Commonwealth IAA contains provisions implementing the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (‘the Convention’) and the
UNCITRAL Model Law. Moreover, the IAA applies the ICSID Convention. Similarly, to the
above outline of the competent courts in Saudi Arabia, this section will briefly address the
competent courts that are authorised to implement foreign arbitral awards in Australia in
general, that are the Federal Court and the NSW Supreme Court as a model for the state courts
in Australia as explained in the scope of this study.

A.

The Federal Court of Australia

The Federal Court of Australia is a superior court of record and a court of law and equity. It
started to exercise its jurisdiction on 1 February 1977, when it was created by the Federal Court
of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Its jurisdiction was ‘formerly exercised in part by the High Court of
Australia and the whole of the jurisdiction of the Australian Industrial Court and of the Federal
Court of Bankruptcy’ and encompasses ‘almost all civil matters arising under Australian federal
law and some summary and indictable criminal matters.’41 This Court consists of a single judge
or a Full Court of three judges. The Full Court hears appeals from decisions of single judges of
the Federal Court and from state and territory courts.
It also hears appellate criminal and civil matters from the Supreme Court of Norfolk Island and
also it has an appellate jurisdiction on a decision of a Supreme Court of a territory other than the
Australian Capital Territory or Northern Territory.42

41

For more information, see Federal Court of Australia, Court’s jurisdiction, ([last update] April 2013)
<http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/about/jurisdiction>.
42
For more information, see Federal Court of Australia, The Court ([last updated] 28 April 2011)
<http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/aboutct/aboutct.html>; see Federal Court of Australia, Appeals ([last
updated] 18 August 2011) <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/litigants/appeals/appeals.html>.
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Section 3(1) of the IAA states that ‘“court” means any court in Australia, including, but not
limited to, the Federal Court of Australia and a court of a State or Territory.’ This shows the
direct authority of the Federal Court in considering the implementation of foreign arbitral
awards. Accordingly, it has an original authority by this text.

B.

Supreme Court of New South Wales

As mentioned in the scope of this study, the Supreme Court of New South Wales will be the
model example for the Supreme Courts of the States and Territories of Australia but reference
will be made to any other supreme court as necessary. Thus, this section will discuss the
establishment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the formation of the Supreme Court,
and its role as a court in the Australian judicial system in relation to international arbitration.
The NSW Supreme Court has jurisdiction over matters arising under the International
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (IAA) (including the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards).43
Section 3 of the IAA states that a ‘court means any court in Australia, including, but not limited
to, the Federal Court of Australia and a court of a State or Territory,’ while section 8(2) of the
IAA states that ‘[s]ubject to this part, a foreign award may be enforced in a court of a State or
Territory as if the award were a judgment or order of that court.’ These texts show that the
implementation of the foreign arbitration in Australia is not limited to the Federal Court.
The main role of the state court is to deal with matters within the state’s ‘geographic limits’ and
they also can be granted power to hear federal law matters in some cases, such as in the
application of the Family Law Act 1957 (Cth).44
Since the IAA did not assign the state competent court, which cannot be done by the Federal
Parliament through the IAA where the establishment of the state’s courts and its jurisdiction is

43

See Gregory Nell, ‘Recent Developments in the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Australia’
(Paper presented at the Fall Meeting of the Maritime Law Associations of the United States, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand, Hawaii. December 2011) (‘Recent Developments Paper’) 25.
44
See Miles and Dowler, above n 3, 49.
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left to the parliaments of the States (in light of the Commonwealth Constitution and the federal
laws), the state’s laws must clarify the jurisdiction of the competent court in implementing
foreign arbitration.
Section 6 of the CAA of NSW 6 places the implementation of the arbitration awards under the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction unless the arbitration agreement specifically gives jurisdiction to
the District Court or Local Court; however, according to Hogan-Doran ‘an agreement for
foreign arbitration almost certainly would not [give such jurisdiction].’45 This could be
supported by the fact that the parties may wish to resort to a higher court that can better
understand the nature of the dispute (that is, the nature of international trade dispute) and thus
enable them to achieve their goals and meet their needs. Additionally, the parties’ goal,
especially on the part of the plaintiff, is to implement the arbitral award quickly and by resorting
to a higher court (the Supreme Court) in order to reduce the number of levels of appeal, this is
more likely to be achieved.
Furthermore, regarding the jurisdiction limitation of the courts in Australia, the commercial
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court often forces the parties to resort to it. For instance, disputes
related to construction or technology matters would be better to be resorted to the Commercial
Division in the Supreme Court.46
Section 21 of the IAA states that ‘[i]f the Model Law applies to an arbitration, the law of a State
or Territory relating to arbitration does not apply to that arbitration,’ which gives the parties the
freedom to choose the Model Law as a governing law and it will be applied by the Supreme
Court of a State or Territory. If there is no Supreme Court established in that Territory, the

45

Justin Hogan-Doran, ‘Registration, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign and Interstate Judgments
and Foreign Arbitral Awards (Foreign Judgments in New South Wales) (Interstate Judgments in
Australia) (NSW Judgments Overseas) (Foreign Arbitral Awards in Australia) Summary Guide and
Checklist
v
3.0
(1
October
2010)
sevenwentworth
<http://www.seven
wentworth.com.au/publications/JH-D-Registration-in-NSW-of-Foreign-Judgments.html#_Toc19646
1794>.
46
Ibid.
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jurisdiction will be to the Supreme Court of the State or Territory that has jurisdiction in relation
to that Territory and in any case the Federal Court of Australia will be the competent court.47
Some views about the jurisdiction of Supreme Courts over arbitration of awards show their role
in implementing arbitral awards. One of these perspectives is that such Courts’ jurisdiction is a
disadvantage and should be eliminated to improve arbitration legislation. According to André
and Secomb, state courts handle a very limited number of international arbitration cases and this
makes it difficult to develop an appropriate level of knowledge of international arbitration.
Additionally, parties by resorting to different state courts can slow the arbitration.48
Because of this perception, proposals were made to improve arbitration legislation which
involved giving exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Courts, for all matters arising under the
IAA to have more consistent precedents in applying the Act.49 Major objections that have been
identified are constitutional, and this further illustrates the continuing role of state courts in
international arbitration in Australia.50
In this regard, some believe that major change,51 would ‘entail practical problems of reeducating parties and their legal advisors. However, the major objection … [Garnet and
Nottage] identify is constitutional.’52

47

See International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 18.
See Angélica André & Matthew Secomb, ‘Australia Moves to improve its Arbitration Legislation’
(2010)
(Winter)
White
&
Case
International
Disputes
Quarterly,
<http://www.whitecase.com/Publications/Detail.aspx?publication=2795> . Additionally, the possibility
of appeal on the Court’s decisions on refusing or implementing foreign arbitral awards will be
discussed in Chapter 4, where we should see that the multiple levels of litigation may create an obstacle
to the implementation of the foreign arbitral awards (4.3 Permissibility of Challenging the Court
Judgment).
49
See the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department ‘Review of the International Arbitration Act
1974 (Cth)’ (Discussion Paper, November 2008) 10 [Question H].
50
Ibid.
51
See Richard Garnett and Luke Nottage, Review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 – Interim
Submission to the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) (13 January 2009) Australian Government,
Attorney-General’s Department, Review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth)
<http://www.ag.gov.au/Documents/Submission%20of%20Mr%20Garnett%20and%20Mr%20Nottage.
PDF>.
52
Ibid 4.
48
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In fact, the re-education of the parties or their legal advisors does not conflict with a principle of
law or any laws. Therefore, it is not a legal problem where there is simply a practical obstacle
that can be overcome. Hence such an argument as the presence of ‘practical problems of reeducating parties and their legal advisors’53 cannot be sustained to prevent such change (that is,
that the Federal Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction) as would facilitate and speed arbitral
implementation. However, there are several points that prevent such change.
First, it is true that there is a constitutional problem regarding the allocation of specific
jurisdiction for each court. The process of federation in 1901 produced a Commonwealth
Constitution that outlined the role of the Australian or Commonwealth Parliament and those of
the State parliaments, including powers in relation to the formation the judiciary and its
jurisdiction. Each of the parliamentary levels of Australia (namely, the Australian Federal
Parliament and the State Parliaments) has specific power in creating a court jurisdiction. Hence,
a State Parliament cannot enact a Federal court jurisdiction and also the Commonwealth
Parliament cannot add a jurisdiction to nor subtract a jurisdiction from a state court. However,
the extent of the ability of the two regimes to interact is governed by the Australian
Constitution, and the interpretation of the relevant clauses has altered over time. The extensive
cross-vesting made possible under the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth)
(introduced to reduce parallel actions and jurisdictional disputes) was challenged in Re Wakim.
It was found that whilst by using the cross-vesting mechanism the Commonwealth Parliament
can vest the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in the various supreme courts of states and
territories (as authorised under Section 77(iii) of the Constitution), the conferral of state and
territory jurisdiction on the federal courts by the State Parliament (even with the consent of the
Commonwealth Parliament) is not valid.54 According to Garnett and Nottage, the Australian
High Court in Re Wakim ‘held that the conferral of power on federal courts to resolve matters
beyond the accrued jurisdiction was unconstitutional. In effect, the pre-1987 position, where the
53
54

Ibid.
See Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 [172].
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Federal Court had limited jurisdiction over state matters, was restored.’55 Thus a State
parliament cannot add a Federal court jurisdiction to its state court system nor can the
Commonwealth Parliament add to not subtract a state jurisdiction from a state court, although it
can vest a state court with a federal jurisdiction.
It is considered unconstitutional because the Australian legal system is based on a federal
jurisdiction and state jurisdiction where the federal jurisdiction is derived from the
Commonwealth Constitution and laws, while the state jurisdiction is derived from the state
constitutions and state laws.56 Although jurisdiction is not to be over-reached (as indicated in
Wakim, above), in fact ‘[f]ederal jurisdiction is co-extensive with the matters specified in ss 75
and 76 of the Constitution in terms of content’.57 (Sections 75 and 76 include matters arising
under any treaty, matters to which the Commonwealth is party, matter between states or their
residents or state and a resident of another state, same subject matter but in different states and
so on).
Hence, the claim of breach of contract in breach of an agreement to arbitrate cannot be brought
in the Federal Court unless it is attached to a federal claim.58 This jurisdictional structure brings
its own complexities. For example, in regard to the public policy defence (as we shall see in
Chapter 5), each Australian state’s court will apply its public policy in refusing foreign arbitral
awards but the view of public policy may differ from one state to another.59 Their views can
also differ from that of the Federal court.
Second, it could be said that arbitration is under the original jurisdiction of the High Court,
which can be found in sections 75 and 76 of the Australian Constitution, where the High Court
55

See Garnett and Nottage, above n 51, 4. The authors refer to Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198
CLR 511.
56
Justice Allsop James, ‘Federal Jurisdiction and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia’
(Paper Given to NSW Bar Association 21 October 2003) (revised 21 October 2003)
<http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/pdfsrtfs_a/admiralty_papersandpublications16.pdf> 2 [8].
57
Ibid 3 [10]. The matter is further detailed in s 71 on judicial power and the courts.
58
See Garnett and Nottage, above n 51, 4.
59
More explanation about the court’s role in applying its public policy will be presented in Chapter 5
(Judicial Role in Applying Public Policy in their Decisions).
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has original jurisdiction and additional jurisdiction which can be created by the Commonwealth
Parliament. Therefore, the Federal Court cannot have an exclusive jurisdiction over such claims
as the state Supreme Courts (as indicated above) handle some matters and these may yet be
appealed to the High Court of Australia as are matters heard by the Federal Court. In Australia
the High Court bears the burden of providing more consistent jurisprudence as the ultimate
court of appeal which will ensure consistent jurisprudence in this aspect of the law.60
Third, giving exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Court (as some suggest) may not support the
Australian position in relation to international arbitration if the domestic arbitration developed
in a significantly different manner, as could be possible were the domestic awards to be applied
by the Supreme Courts and the foreign awards were to be applied by the Federal Court.61
Section 8 of the IAA confers foreign arbitration powers on both the State and Federal Courts of
Australia. This section only covers foreign awards and for other international awards, the force
of the law is given to the UNCITRAL Model Law through the IAA, in regard to international
commercial arbitration. It is also under the Model Law that functions of certain courts or bodies
are specified. The role of the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration
(ACICA), for example, is specified in Article 11 of the Model Law. State Supreme Courts and
the Federal courts perform other functions that have been specified in Article 6 of the Model
Law.62

Finally, it is important to mention that the Federal Court has adopted a practical approach by
establishing in its registry in each State and Territory an Arbitration Coordinating Judge. This
judge has general responsibility for the management of proceedings brought before the Court in

60

See Nell, Recent Developments Paper, above n 43, 26.
Ibid.
62
For more information, see Australasian Forum for International Arbitration (AFIA), Do Australian
Courts Have Jurisdiction to Enforce International Arbitral Awards Made in Australia? (28 February
2012)
<http://afia.asia/2012/02/28/do-australian-courts-have-jurisdiction-to-enforce-internationalarbitral-awards-made-in-australia/>.
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applying the IAA where he will coordinate the proceeding to be commenced.63 Additionally, the
Federal Court has also distributed a Practice Note in relation to the application of the IAA.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of New South Wales and Victorian Supreme Court have lists of a
specialist judges for the conduct of proceedings commenced under the IAA and the State
commercial arbitration legislation.64
Such a trend will send reassuring messages to foreign investors as it encourages the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards in Australia through the clarity in
the principles that have been adopted and published by the courts in regard to the
implementation process. Therefore, while it can be said that giving the Australian Federal Court
an exclusive jurisdiction over the implementation of foreign awards is not possible, the extent of
coordination seeks to overcome difficulties that might otherwise exist.

2.3 Conclusion
Regarding Efficiency, the Saudi Grievances Board is an administrative court and
implementation of foreign arbitral awards can be considered outside the scope of the natural
jurisdiction of that court. This matter falls under competency and may contribute to the
inefficiency of the courts. In fact, the lack of experience among certain judges, due to the
limited number of international arbitration cases before the state’s courts, reduces the judges’
experience in handling such cases and in turn affects the efficiency in handling them. This could
be in terms of decision making, time spent to make such decisions, and competency of the
judges.
In Australia, the Supreme Courts of New South Wales and Victoria have the experience of
having specialist lists, enabling a specialised judge to play a significant role in improving the
efficiency of justice.
63
64

See Nell, Recent Developments Paper, above n 43, 28.
Ibid.
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Both systems have adopted the principle of separation of powers; however, the separation of
powers is clear in the Australian system where it exists more ‘in theory’ in Saudi Arabia, where
under the Shari’a law all political and judicial authority and the authorities in which this power
resides are ultimately in the hands of the King (though he himself is, of course, subject to the
demands of Sharia law), practically authority is divided and separated by the Saudi regime. For
Australia, the separation of powers is a guarantee of the independence of the judiciary which
gives judges a freedom from intervention. Regarding the implementation of the provisions of
foreign arbitral awards, this principle has contributed to the freedom of decision making (that is,
being able to arrive at a decision, without being subject to political or other influence), as we
shall see in chapters 4 and 5 where it is observed that the political authorities have had no effect
on the judge’s ruling in both countries. Judges administer the law in both countries freely and
without intervention from political entities.
It is clear that having all authority in the hands of the King did not affect the implementation of
the provisions of foreign arbitral awards. In fact, the Saudi Judicial System 2007 (Article 1) and
the Grievances Board System 2007 (Article 1) affirm the principle of the independence of the
judiciary and we did not find any effect of any other authority on the decisions of the courts
with regard to the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitration. It should be noted
that the judges in the Grievances Board apply the decisions of the President of the Grievances
Board for the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitration and the provisions of the
foreign courts more than any other law or agreement, as we shall see in chapters 4 and 5 and
there was no effect of any of the authorities on the judge’s ruling.
It is also important to note that there is a significant difference in the legal basis of each system.
The Saudi judiciary is based on the principles of Islamic law and then on the regulations issued
by the Saudi Council of Ministers. In Australia, the judiciary heritage stems from the Common
Law and the concept of natural justice. Additionally, judicial precedents are binding on
Australian judges, unlike Saudi judges who are not obliged to follow judicial precedents, as we
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shall see clearly in Chapter 4. It is also noticeable that ‘public policy’, as we shall see in Chapter
5, varies from place to place and from time to time. However, the Shari’a principles stem from
religious sources (the Qur’ān and Sunnah) which are enduring (and static) sources that can not
be modified.
In addition, this chapter (Chapter 2) has highlighted the competent court in approving foreign
arbitral awards. The interaction between several conflicting meanings of terms used in
arbitration has led to disagreement among judges, arbitrators and commentators. According to
the need for efficiency of laws that implement the provisions of foreign arbitral awards and to
provide justice for the parties to the arbitration, there are a few comments that can be
highlighted.
With regard to Australia, the appointment of the Federal Court as the competent court could be
received positively, as it helps to understand the needs of the international trade and the need for
rapid action on related issues and helps to overcome some obstacles such as the constitutional
problem where it relates to the Australian federal system.
However, the fact is that there are states and territories in Australia and the limited number of
international arbitration cases before the state’s courts made it difficult for the judges to develop
an appropriate level of knowledge of international arbitration. Therefore, the approach of having
a specialist list of judges and the distribution of a Practice Note does, without a doubt, help to
raise the efficiency of the Court’s role in implementation. Better enforcement of the
international commercial arbitration in Australia is also possible due to the direct dissemination
of the experience of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and that of Victoria by having a
specialist list where the specialised judge can play a significant role in improving the efficiency
of justice65 (as well as indirectly via the Practice Note).
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For more information, see European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, European Judicial
Systems: Edition 2008 (Data 2006) Efficiency and Quality of Justice (Council of Europe Publishing,
2008) 76. According to Anderson, Bernstein and Gray:
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This is supported by the fact that there are some countries that have created a specialist judges’
list for the arbitration. The High Court of Singapore, for example, has appointed several judges
as specialist ‘arbitration’ judges.66 This creates unifying principles in dealing with the
provisions of foreign arbitral awards. Thus, the appointment of a specialised court (that is, a
court that applies the commercial laws) is one of the most important aspects that help to activate
the arbitration system as an alternative method in settling disputes. It also contributes to giving
comfort and security to foreign investors, which will in turn help the national economy.
In contrast, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Grievances Board — which is essentially an
administrative court — is the court system that was selected to consider requests for the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards, yet this function is outside the
natural scope of the court. This is because the judges are often dealing with administrative
disputes. Additionally, the Grievances Board is not authorised, unlike the Commercial Court in
the General (Shari’a) Court System, to consider or apply the commercial or industrial laws and
the laws that govern foreign investment.
Therefore, it would be more useful and better to entrust the task of implementing the provisions
of foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia to the Commercial Court (rather than the
Administrative Audit-Circuits of the old Grievances Board system and the Courts of Appeal of

some countries have taken steps to improve the efficiency of their court system by introducing
specialised courts or specialised divisions within courts, revising procedures to reduce
opportunities for parties to delay, increasing the ability of judges to control the pace of
proceedings, and improving the many non-judicial responsibilities with which many judges are
saddled (such as responsibility for registering pledges..)
See James Horton Anderson, David S Bernstein and Cheryl Williamson Gray, Judicial Systems in
Transition Economies: Assessing the Past, Looking to the Future (International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 2005) 58; generally see Héctor Fix-Fierro, Courts, Justice, and
Efficiency: A Socio-Legal Study of Economic Rationality in Adjudication (Oxford and Portland,
Oregon, 2003). That shows the relationship between the improvements of the legal text with the
efficiency of the judicial work.
66
See the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department, ‘Review of the International Arbitration Act
1974 (Cth)’ (Discussion Paper, November 2008) 10 [Question H]. This supports the importance of
understanding the judge’s role in the speed of the trial where the High Court of Australia in Westport
Insurance Corporation v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2011] HCA 37 [111] (5 October 2011) states that ‘[a]
commercial trial judge would have ensured more speed and less expense.’ And such speed could be
achieved by appointing one court in order to reduce the appeal levels within the Federal Court and also
to prepare the judges for such issues and so to achieve the objective of the arbitration system in general.
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the new Grievances Board system) for many reasons, the most important being specialisation.
This high level of relevant experience and expertise might be influential in the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the Kingdom, which may affect the efficiency of
arbitration as an alternative system in dispute resolution.
Additionally, it is in the interest of Saudi Arabia to apply the Australian and Singaporean
experiences by having a list of experts and distributing a Practice Note in relation to the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards. However, one could argue that Australia and
Singapore are common law jurisdictions and question whether Saudi Arabia with a different
legal system could adopt their experience. In fact, such adoption is not inconsistent with the
Saudi legal tradition where it is merely a procedural process which will not affect or breach the
Saudi judicial principles or traditions. In reality, such adoption will develop positively the Saudi
legal process in implementing foreign arbitral awards by speeding the enforcement process.
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3

FOUNDATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS

The previous chapter was clear in its discussion on the competent courts in both countries and
discusses the Saudi judicial system, which was explained in general, and the possible effect on
the implementation process. It also describes the legal hierarchy in Saudi Arabia.
On the other hand, it is important to show the role of national laws, international conventions
and the international norms on the implementation process. In fact there are principles and rules
governing the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards. A court approving an
arbitral award under any principles, whether procedural or substantive, must do so by reference
to those principles which are considered fundamental within its own legal system rather than
any other laws that may govern the contract (such as the law of the place of performance or the
law of the seat of the arbitration).1 Hence, it is necessary to present and discuss all the principles
and provisions that affect the implementation process which will help in the analysis of the role
of the judge. On the other hand, ambiguity in the principles applied will lead to uncertain
results. Therefore, this chapter will deal with the role of legislation (scope of arbitration:
‘arbitrability’ and the capacity of parties), formal requirements and national and international
legal texts and principles in regard to the implementation of foreign arbitral awards.
In fact, such rules and principles come from domestic legislation in terms of identifying issues
that can be arbitrated (that is, arbitrability), the methods of appeal and other general principles
for the implementation of foreign arbitral awards in domestic laws, or additionally may rely on
conventions, whether international, bilateral or regional. Also, the role of international norms
such as the reciprocity principle cannot be overlooked in the admission of foreign arbitral
awards and implementation. This chapter will be divided into three main parts:
3.1
1

Role of Legislation in the Delineation of Arbitration.

Because courts often refer to ‘public policy’ as the basis of the bar. For more information, see Laurence
Shore, ‘Defining “Arbitrability”: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (15 June
2009) New York Law Journal, Special Section.
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3.2

The Role of International and Regional Conventions in Determining the Limits of
Arbitration.

3.3

The Role of International Norms in the Admission of Foreign Arbitral Awards and
Implementation (Reciprocity Principle).

Each section describes the legislation, conventions and international norms in both countries.
An analysis is then done of identified differences. This will contribute to the overall analysis of
the laws of both countries by finding out differences in efficiency, social values and justice to
the parties involved in arbitration. This contributes to the knowledge of the real impact of these
laws and conventions on the role of the national judge in the implementation of the provisions
of foreign arbitral awards which will help to examine the effectiveness of such legal rules.

3.1 Role of Legislation in the Delineation of Arbitration
It is true that legislation has an important and central role in determining the scope of arbitration
in terms of matters where resort can be made to arbitration (‘arbitrability’) and the parties who
can enter into arbitration agreements. So, because each country has the power to enact its
arbitration system, it is necessary to analyse how Saudi and Australian legal systems frame
arbitration before deciding whether they comply with their international obligations on
arbitration and evaluating which system is more efficient.
Such laws set the formal requirements for arbitration to be met by the parties. Legislation
governs the role of the judge in the consideration of arbitral awards. Thus, the judge must first
research and ascertain the availability of those laws before he proceeds in the implementation of
the arbitral award. Therefore, there are two main axes of the legislation in determining the
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arbitration:2 namely, the scope of arbitration ‘in terms of the subject matter and parties’ and the
formal requirements of enforcement (3.1.1 and 3.1.2 below respectively).
3.1.1 Scope of Arbitration
The scope of the arbitration refers to matters for which it is permissible by law to resort to
arbitration and also includes the capacity of parties at the time when the agreement to resort to
arbitration was made.

A.

Subject Matter of the Conflict

The subject matter must be arbitrable in accordance with the law. The term ‘non-arbitrability’
has a general meaning, which can be expressed as specific classes of disputes that are barred
from arbitration because of national legislation, international convention or lack of judicial
authority; thus, courts often refer to ‘public policy’ as the basis of the arbitrability. The subject
matter of the arbitration is the main key in determining the arbitrability.3 In fact, most domestic
laws clarify all rights and matters that can be arbitrated,4 because the origin of the legality of the
arbitration processes is that a matter be able to be arbitrated under the law, otherwise, the
judiciary will refuse to implement that provision as it violates public policy.
The Convention has established this approach in the implementation of foreign arbitral awards,
stipulating in Article II that (1) each contracting state shall recognise an arbitration agreement
‘concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration’ and in Article V(2)(a)
provides that an arbitral award may be refused recognition and enforcement if the ‘subject
2

3

4

It should be noted that these points will deal with all matters relating to the implementation of foreign
arbitral award only where it would not include any conditions or requirements for the implementation
of the provisions of the national arbitration.
For more information, see Shore, above n 1; Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration:
Commentary and Materials (Kluwer Law International, 2nd ed, 2001) (‘International Commercial
Arbitration: C & M’) 243; Steven C Bennett, ‘The Developing American Approach to Arbitrability’
(Feb–Apr 2003) 58 Dispute Resolution Journal 1, 8.
See Walter Mattli, ‘Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration’ (2001) 55(4)
International Organization Journal 919, 229; see generally Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L
Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law
International, 2009).
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matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that
country.’ Accordingly, the subject matter is the basis of the objective limits of arbitration. Thus,
states have the right to exclude certain disputes from arbitration if it conflicts with public policy.
1.

Subject Matter in Saudi Arabia

According to the Arab Convention 1952,5 Article III ‘the execution of the provisions’ states that
‘it is possible to refuse the enforcement of the award in the case where the law of the requested
state excluded the solution to the issue of the dispute by arbitration.’ This Article shows the
possibility of refusing the recognition and the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, if the
subject matter of the conflict is not subject to arbitration (non-arbitrable) according to the law
where the award is intended to be implemented.
Additionally, in accordance with the Saudi Arbitration System 1983, there are two types of
issues that cannot be solved by arbitration. These types that are expressly prohibited by the law
can be divided into two sections as follows:
a.

Matters that are expressly prohibited to be solved by arbitration, further fall into two
categories
i.

Article 3 prevents the resort to arbitration by any of the government departments
without explicit prior consent by the President of the Council of Ministers of Saudi
Arabia. This text made arbitration in disputes with government agencies
impermissible in principle, but it is possible and permissible after the authorisation
of the Saudi Prime Minister.6

5

6

Convention of the Arab League on the Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards, 14 September
1952 (entered into force in 10 November 1952). This applies to all Arab League member states.
For more information, see Abdulaziz Bin Zaid, ‘Mda> Jwaz Alth}ki>m fy Al‘qwd Aledari>h: Derasah
Muqarnh [The Permissibility of Arbitration in the Government Contract]’ (Masters (Research) Thesis,
Faculty of Law, University of Jordan, 2006).
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Accordingly, Article 8 of the Regulations of the Saudi Arbitration System (No 7 /
2021 / M 1985) states:
In disputes to which a government is a party with others, and this organisation should
prepare a note on arbitration in this conflict in recourse to arbitration, explaining the
theme and rationale for arbitration and the names of the litigants [parties], to be
submitted to the Prime Minister for consideration in the approval of the arbitration. It
is also permitted to be a prior determination by the Prime Minister to authorise any
government body in a particular contract to terminate a specific dispute by arbitration
and in all cases the Council of Ministers should be notified about any judgments that
may issue.

This trend came after the case of Government of Saudi Arabia v Arabian American
Oil Co (Aramco) in the 1970s, which was explained in the introduction of this
dissertation,7 and it can be said that such a provision can be justified when the
government disputes relate to the public wealth so the recourse to arbitration must
be carefully considered to maintain the public interest. This does not absolutely
mean the refusal of foreign arbitration when the government is a party in the
dispute. It means that the recourse to arbitration at the beginning of the dispute or
accepting it as a condition in the original contract must be carefully thought out to
be considered in the public interest. This principle is not applied in Australia where
the Australian judiciary does not distinguish between administrative and
commercial disputes. It can be considered that such trend supports the possibility
of arbitration in all disputes, which in turn supports facilitating arbitration as a way
to resolve disputes peacefully.
ii.

Article II of the Saudi Arbitration System states that ‘arbitration in matters wherein
conciliation is not permitted shall not be accepted…’,8 which means the
inadmissibility of arbitration in the conflicts of personal status and criminal

7

8

For more information on this case, see Walaa Refat, ‘ Alth{ki>m Altjari> Alwt{ni> u> Aldwli> fy Almmlaka
Al‘rbiah Als‘wdiah [International and National Commercial Arbitration in Saudi Arabia]’ (Chamber of
Commerce and Industry in Jeddah, 1999); also See Bin Zaid, above n 6, 144.
The same provision came in the Grievances Board President’s Decision No 116/1428 sub 6(1): ‘[T]he
subject matter of the dispute should be susceptible to solution through arbitration’.
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matters.9 Article 1 of the Regulations of the Saudi Arbitration System 1983 states:
‘It is not permissible to arbitrate matters that cannot be solved by conciliation such
as ‘Hudūd’, ‘Li’aan’ in disputes between a couple, and all that is related to public
policy.’ It should be noted that the ‘Hudūd’ provisions are a set of specific offences
(such as murder or theft) that have specific penalties in Shari’a. The Li’aan or
‘oath’ method of advocacy or determination can be implemented in specific
situations such as, for example, in the event of a dispute between the spouses. Thus,
while divorce in Islam can be arbitrated and under the Saudi laws the court will
accept any arbitration within the family issues, there is an exception in regard to a
matter where the Li’aan which cannot be arbitrated has been applied. For example,
in a case relating to a child’s paternity, where a husband claims that a boy is not his
son and the wife counter-claims that the husband is a liar, the process of li’aan (a
solemn oath taking by both parties) is implemented.10
This definition of ‘matters that cannot be solved by conciliation’ is still wide as
there is no mention or exhaustive listing of those matters or topics amenable to
‘conciliation’. It can therefore be said that the Saudi law has left the determination
of such matters to the court in each case individually according to Shari’a. Thus,
saying that the reason for a lack of defined topics for arbitration in the Saudi
Arbitration System is that this law ‘could settle any disputes at the time of its
enactment in 1983 because most of the disputes at that time were simple, minimal,

For more information, see Mohammed Al-Issa, ‘Tat{byq Ah{kam Alth{ki>m Alajnabi>h fy Almmlaka
Al‘rbiah Als‘wdiah [The Implementation of the Provisions of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi
Arabia]’ (Paper presented at the New York Convention 50 Years: Practical Perspectives on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Cairo, 10–11 November 2008) 7. However,
in Islam it is permissible for the couple (husband and wife) to resort to ‘conciliation or arbitration’ as a
special case in the event of family conflict in order to end the dispute and reconcile the couple when
they are otherwise going to end it. In this case, they have to appoint two persons, one from each side
(for the husband and the wife) to solve the dispute. For more information, see Mahdi Zahraa and Nora
A Hak, ‘Tahkim (Arbitration) in Islamic Law within the Context of Family Disputes’ (2006) 20 Arab
Law Quarterly 2.
10
For more information, see Mahmoud Naguib Hosni, ‘Mbade Alqanon Aljnai> Al-Islami> [Principles of
Islamic Criminal Law]’ (2006) 24, 151.
9

128

and not complicated’11 is not accurate where the Saudi legislature adopts the
Hanbali view in general where it allows the arbitration in all matters (except those
excluded, see further below).12 However, it is still broad and undefined where it
links arbitrability with conciliation (that is, Article 1 in the Saudi Arbitration
System). In contrast, Australian laws identified some topics that cannot be arbitrated
where the text in some law, as we shall see in the next few lines, has mention the
non-arbitrable topics as an exception from the original principle which authorises
arbitration in all disputes.
b. The second section concerns the Shari’a law, which excludes some disputes from
arbitration, as we shall see in Chapter 5 (5.4.1 the Saudi Grievances Board and the
Application of the Public Policy). Actions or commodities that are forbidden (haram)
cannot be the object of a contract. So a contract involving alcohol or gambling (maisar)
would be void. The presence of Gharer clauses or circumstances (as we shall see in Chapter
5 subsection 5.4.1 The Saudi Grievances Board and the Application of Public Policy ((B)
Scope of ‘Violation of Islamic Law’ in the View of the Saudi Grievances Board)) would
make an otherwise legal (halal) contract into an illegal one, which will make the contract
void. For example, certainty as to the identity of a party and ownership of the asset is also
required. Hence, generally if a party’s commitments are unclear or not known at the time of
signing a contract, that means the contract contains Gharer and is invalid. To insist on
certainty is to protect both parties. Ribā (taking or giving of interest, variously defined) is
also forbidden under Shari’a law (as explained in detail later in the thesis – Chapter 5

11

See Abdullah Alassaf and Bruno Zeller, ‘The Legal Procedures of Saudi Arbitration Regulations 1983
and 1985’ (2010) 7 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 170, 173.
12
For more information about the arbitration in the Hanbali and other Islamic schools, see Kahtan AlDoari, ‘Alth}ki>m fy Alfqh u> Alqanwn Alwad} ‘y [Arbitration Contract in the Fiqh and the Law]’ (Dar
Al-Furqan, 2003). This adoption of the Hanbali School is based on the decision of King Abdul Aziz
(the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) where he ordered that the Hanbali School be followed
by the judiciary because of the ease of comprehension and application this doctrine, as well as easy
access to its sources. For more information, see Abdulrahman Al Shalhoub, ‘ Alnezam Aldstori{ fy
Almamlakah Al‘rabih Als‘wdih: byn Ashari’a ū Alqanwn Almuqarn [The Constitutional System in
Saudi Arabia: Between the Sharia and the Comparative Law] (Safir Press, 2nd ed, 2005) 339.
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subsection 5.4.1). Thus Ribā is forbidden under Shari’a law and a contract containing it
cannot be implemented by the Saudi courts where the rest of the award can be implemented
if it severable. Hence it is clear that the implementation of the foreign arbitral award shall
not be contrary to Shari’a. This principle is not applicable, of course, in Australia, but it
could be said that it is very similar to the principle of non-violation of the Common Law and
the principles of Natural Justice as stipulated in the Convention as we shall see in Chapter 5
(5.4.2 Australian Courts in Approving Public Policy). However, the nature of the public
policy exception under Article V(2)(v) of the Convention varies from country to country but
reflects the core values of those countries, such as whether an award is incompatible with
the public interest or a breach of fundamental law or principles (New Zealand), good morals
and social order (Korea), the most basic notions of morality and justice (Hong Kong), or
injurious to the public good or contrary to natural justice (UK). In countries
where Shari’a applies, it shapes public policy and what is perceived as the public good or
the public interest.13
This means that in Saudi Arabia arbitration is permissible in all disputes except those exempted
by Shari’a or the Saudi legal text. Hence, if, for example, there is a contract involving a
purchase of alcohol, the subject of the contract is prohibited by the Islamic Shari’a law, though
the arbitration may arise over any aspect of the dispute (such as transport, storage, and so on)
related to the proposed implementation of that contract and not about the (prohibited) subject
matter of the contract (like the quality of alcohol). In such a case the arbitral award (or severable
contrary part if partial award is possible) will not be enforced in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,

13

Which means that the award should not violate the public policy of Shari’a. However, the question is
whether these topics or matters in Shari’a are subject to negotiation. In other words, are these matters
able to be changed from time to time under Shari’a? (Such a policy would reflect an acceptance of the
notion of developmentability within Shari’a.) For more information about a various definitions of
public policy by a number of different countreis, see generally Anton G Maurer, ‘The Public Policy
Exception under the New York Convention’ (Juris Arbitration Law, revised ed, 2013).
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because of the breach of Shari’a, although it is within the framework of international trade
contracts.14
In fact, the majority of the Muslim scholars believe that each contract has three pillars which are
the contractors (the parties) (for example, their capacity, authority), offer and acceptance of the
contract (the free will of the parties), and the subject matter of the contract (the legality of the
subject matter).15 Aljarba, for example, believes that the three pillars contained in the arbitration
contract are the contractors (the legal capacity of the parties) and the offer and acceptance,
which represents consensual aspect of the contract, and the possibility of referring the dispute to
arbitration, that is, its ‘arbitrability’.16 This means that whenever these pillars exist, the
arbitration agreement is valid.
2.

Subject Matter in Australia

The scope of the subject matter exists in Article 5(1)(C) of the Convention which states:
[T]he award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of
the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced.

Additionally, section 8(7) of the IAA stresses:
In any proceedings in which the enforcement of a foreign award by virtue of this Part is
sought, the court may refuse to enforce the award if it finds that: (a) the subject matter of
the difference between the parties to the award is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the laws in force in the State or Territory in which the court is sitting;

This means that the NSW Supreme Court will implement NSW laws especially the Commercial
Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW) in identifying matters that are capable of being solved by
arbitration. In fact, section 1(5) and (6) of this Act reveal that the matters that can be solved by
14

For more information, see Mohammed A H Aljarba, Commercial Arbitration in Islamic Jurisprudence:
A Study of Its Role in the Saudi Arabia Context (PhD Thesis, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2001)
60.
15
Ibid 59.
16
Ibid.
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arbitration are not limited where subsection 5 states that ‘[t]his Act does not affect any other Act
by virtue of which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration or may be submitted to
arbitration only according to provisions other than those of this Act.’ This is also clear in
subsection 6 which states:
The term ‘commercial’ should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising
from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not.
Relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following
transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services;
distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing;
construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking;
insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial
or business co-operation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.

These texts show the right of the court and the parties to seek to refuse to implement the foreign
arbitration on the grounds that the dispute is not subject to arbitration. However, these texts
regarding foreign arbitral awards did not specify the exact matters that cannot be submitted to
arbitration. Additionally, these texts had left a large portion for the court to determine on these
issues.
It should be noted that ‘arbitrability’ can be measured in according to section 8(5)(b) of the IAA
under the applicable law which has been chosen in the contract, but if there is no law specified
in the contract, arbitration will be in accordance to the law of the state where the award was
made.17
Also, an arbitral award may be refused if the subject of the dispute is not arbitrable in the
country where the parties request the implementation of the arbitral award.18

17

International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (IAA) s 8(5)(b) states that ‘the arbitration agreement is not
valid under the law expressed in the agreement to be applicable to it or, where no law is so expressed to
be applicable, under the law of the country where the award was made.’
18
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature 10
June 1958, 330 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 June 1959) (‘New York Convention’ or herein ‘the
Convention’) art V(2). It should be noted that section 12(2) of the IAA states that ‘nothing in this part
affects the right of any person to the enforcement of a foreign award otherwise than in pursuance of this
Act’. Therefore, the scope of arbitration does not exceed that stipulated by the International Arbitration
Act and the New York Convention regarding the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral
awards.
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Finally, according to Article II(3) of the Convention the court can refuse the award if ‘it finds
that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.’ Thus, it
can be said that IAA did not express what disputes are not ‘capable of settlement by arbitration’
and the public interest (that is, ‘and the public policy’) in various types of situations that differ
especially when it comes to determining the extent to which such disputes should be
arbitrable.19

B.

Parties to Arbitration

First of all, it should be noted that parties to an arbitration agreement shall be treated with
equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his/her case.20 This means
that the parties shall be treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings this
depends on the fact that all parties must have a full legal capacity. This section describes laws
on parties that can resort to arbitration to settle disputes.
1.

Saudi Arabia

According to Article 2 of the Saudi Arbitration System, an ‘agreement to resort to arbitration
shall be accepted only from the authorised persons.’21 In addition, according to the regulations
for this System in regard to Article 2, it states that ‘it does not fit the agreement to arbitrate only
those who have full capacity to act; thus, it does not fit the guardian of the minor [underage] or
guardianship [position] or ‘Waqf’ recourse to arbitration unless it is authorised to do so by the

19

For more information, see Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett, ‘The Top Twenty Things to Change in or
around Australia’s International Arbitration Act’ Final Submission to [Commonwealth] AttorneyGeneral’s
Department,
Review
of
the
International
Arbitration
Act
1974,
23
March
2009
<http://sydney.edu.au/law/scil/documents/2009/IntArbitrationAct_
Nottage.pdf> 4.
20
This is a natural right for all parties and it has been stated in the New York Convention that the arbitral
award can be refused implementation if one of the parties has proof that he was unable to present his
case: art V(1)(b) of the Convention. For more information, see Pieter Sanders, ‘UNCITRAL’s Model
Law on International and Commercial Arbitration: Present Situation and Future’ (2005) 12(4)
Arbitration International 443.
21
Saudi Implementing Rules to the 1983 Arbitration Act, issued by the Council of Ministers No M / 7 /
2021 of 8/9/1405 AH 1985. It should be noted that the English translation was inappropriate in the
Saudi Arbitration System (English language version) because it inserts the word ‘authorised person’
instead of ‘the capacity to act’ because it is clear that in the Arabic version meant the ‘capacity to act’.
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competent court.’ Such a trend is time consuming, which may conflict with the main goal of
arbitration ‘the speed of deciding the dispute’.
Thus, it is clear that capacity for making an arbitration agreement under the Saudi Arbitration
System is related to the capacity for making a contract. Thus, if any person legally lacking that
capacity (for example, a guardian) has resorted to international arbitration without the court’s
permission, the arbitral award will not be implemented within the country as it is contrary to
public policy. Therefore, Saudi courts will never enforce any foreign arbitral award that has
been signed by person lacking legal capacity where such case is contrary to the Saudi
Arbitration System.
2.

Australia

Section 8(5)(a) in the IAA states that the court may refuse to recognise or enforce the foreign
arbitral award if it finds that the party to the agreement (for which the award is sought) was
under some incapacity under the law applicable to him when the agreement was made.
Additionally, the same provision exists in Article V(1)(a) of the Convention where it states ‘(1)
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused... [when the party has proof that] (a)
the parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the law applicable to them,
under some incapacity.’ Thus, it is clear that Australian courts will never enforce any foreign
arbitral award that has been signed by person lacking legal capacity. 22 For example, lack of
capacity to enter into the arbitration agreement (in one or all of the parties) will force the court
to refuse to implement the foreign award as such a case is contrary to the Convention and also
contrary to the principles of Australian contract law. It is the same result pursued by the Saudi
courts.

22

This raises the question about the effectiveness of the existence of such a provision in the international
convention, where this matter of the actions of ‘persons lacking [legal] capacity’ is linked to natural
justice and the public policy in the country. Thus, we cannot accept such actions according to public
policy so it was better not to include such a provision in the Convention as it is under the public policy
defence.
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Finally, it is clear that legislation guiding what subject matter is to be arbitrated in Saudi Arabia
stem from the Saudi Arbitration System 1983, and Arab Convention 1952. If the subject matter
is non-arbitrable according to Saudi laws, it will not be recognised and enforced. There are
matters that are exclusively prohibited by Saudi laws from being resolved through arbitration.
These are: resort to arbitration by any of the government departments without explicit consent
by the President of the Council of Ministers of Saudi Arabia, and matters wherein conciliation is
not permitted. There are also subject matters that are against Shari’a law which also renders an
arbitration unable to be implemented.
On the other hand, in Australia, the issue of the scope of the matter is guided by the Convention.
Under the Convention, recognition and implementation of foreign arbitral award based on the
subject matter is not permitted when ‘the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or
not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration…’, if the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed, and if the subject matter is not capable of
settlement by arbitration according to the laws of the State or Territory in which the court is
sitting. For example, section 11(2) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth) or section
43(1) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) prohibit the arbitration in certain matters; thus,
the arbitration clause will not be valid because it infringes a mandatory statute of the forum
making arbitration illegal.
Considering parties involved: in Saudi Arabia, resort to arbitration has to be authorised by a
competent court. This is time consuming since the parties wishing to resort to arbitration will
have to look for the competent court and seek approval to resort to arbitration. In Australia,
foreign awards are not enforced if the court discovers that it has been signed by a person lacking
legal capacity (as per section 8(5)(a) of the IAA). The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in section
124 gives a company the same legal capacity as ‘an individual’ including the power to enter in a
contract. However, section 125 provides that the performance of an act — including entry into
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an agreement — by a company will not be invalid merely because it is beyond the power of the
company’s constitution.
3.1.2

Formal Requirements of Enforcement

The Convention has addressed some formal requirements that must be met in the foreign
arbitration in order to be accepted by the competent court. These conditions can be found in
Article IV:
1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding article, the party
applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the application, supply: (a)
The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof; (b) The original
agreement referred to in Article II or a duly certified copy thereof.
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official language of the country in which
the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the award
shall produce a translation of these documents into such language. The translation shall be
certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.

A.

Saudi Arabia

The Saudi Grievances Board has applied the same principles and provisions for foreign arbitral
awards and foreign court judgments. This is clear in the decisions of the President of the
Grievances Board.23 Additionally, the arbitration system has identified some of these formal
requirements. Thus, the party who is seeking to apply the arbitral award must attach the
following:
1.

A duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy.

2.

Proof of the finality of the award. However, there is still some level of ambiguity in the
type of document that should be presented as proof of the finality of the award. The recent
Decision No 116 of 2007 (of the President of the Grievances Board) in paragraph 3(2) has
tried to avoid that ambiguity by including the clause, ‘[u]nless it is provided that the

23

Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No 7 15/8/1405 AH 1985 and Decision of the
President of the Grievances Board No 116 of 11/7/1428 AH 2007.
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award is final in the award itself.’ In fact this expression still requires the same
certificate.24
3.

Proof that the party was given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings. It is enough to include an implementation demand on an official
certificate from the competent authorities to indicate that the proper notice was correctly
given to the parties. However, if the court seeks to protect the party who was absent in a
case where the award had been issued in absentia; first, an in absentia verdict is
applicable within the state. Second, paragraph 4 of the President of the Grievances Board
Decision No 116 of 11/7/1428 AH (2007) requires an approval for the proper notice if the
judgment in absentia.

4.

Proof that the award was announced if the judgment was in absentia. Despite this, the
finality is enough to ensure the application of the award and, also, laws have ensured that
the right of the appeal ‘under some conditions’ for anyone and for any verdict if the
judgment was in absentia.

5.

All the papers and documents submitted to apply and implement the foreign arbitral
award must be translated into Arabic, which is the official language of Saudi Arabia25 and
it is the official language in any court within the state.

It should be noted that the Saudi law is not clear whether the ‘agreement in writing’ is necessary
for the convening of the arbitral award or only to prove the existence of the arbitration.26 To

24

Some scholars believe that the Saudi Grievances Board deals with the foreign awards in general as a
final provision in line with the legal status of arbitration at the international level. For more
information, see Mohammed Al-Mqswdi, ‘Alshru>t} Alshkli>h u> Almwd}u>ih ltnfi>th h}km Alth}ki>m Alajnby
fy Almmlakh [Substantive and Procedural Requirements to Implement the Provisions of Foreign
Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia]’ (Al-Dar Alhndsih, 2000) 25. That will be examined in more depth
later in this research.
25
Law of Procedure before the Saudi Grievances Board, issued by the Resolution of Council of Ministers
No 190 of 16/11/1409 AH 1989, Umm Al-Qura Gazette No 3266, 12/4/1409 AH 1989, art 13.
26
As the New York Convention states. On the other hand, it should be noted that in Shari’a writing in the
field of trade is at least recommended, if not obligatory; otherwise parties have to have witnesses where
the trade requires speed in performance. Therefore, the writing requirement is not clearly addressed in
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answer such question, consideration should be made of the general rules to identify the
importance of a written document. Such provision is certainly subject to the Shari’a law in
general. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Finally, paragraph 4 of the new decision — Decision No 116 of 1428 AH (2007) — of the
President of the Grievances Board27 stressed that any copies of the documents submitted must
be certified by the competent authority. The competent authority here means, ‘the authority that
issued the original document’; thus, this authority must certify any copy.
B.

Australia

In addition to what the Convention states about the formal requirements, there are a few aspects
that must be mentioned and clarified. Section 9 of the IAA is very clear about the formal
requirements where it requires that the person who seeks to enforce a foreign award produce a
duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy and a duly authenticated original of
the arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy. Section 9 also explains the meaning of a
certified copy, where it considered the document certified if it
purports to have been authenticated or certified, as the case may be, by the arbitrator or,
where the arbitrator is a tribunal, by an officer of that tribunal, and it has not been shown to
the court that it was not in fact so authenticated or certified [or if it] has been otherwise
authenticated or certified to the satisfaction of the court.

Moreover, this Article has identified the quality of the required documents and also set the
language in such documents, where all the documents produced must be in English or have been
translated into the English language in ‘certified translations’. The translation shall be certified

the Saudi laws regarding the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. However, it is possible to say that
Saudi Arabia has joined the New York Convention, which makes this text in force in matters before the
Saudi courts. But it can be also said that there is a possibility of proving the arbitration agreement still
exists by any means of proof before the Saudi courts. For more information about documentary
evidence, see Jamila Hussain, Islam: Its Law and Society (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2011) 190.
27
President of the Grievances Board Decision No 116 of 11/7/1428 AH 2007.
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by ‘a diplomatic or consular agent in Australia of the country in which the award was made or
otherwise to the satisfaction of the court.’28
It is clear that the formal requirements of the Australian system are fewer than what exists in
Saudi regime. This favours arbitration as a method of solving disputes as the lower number of
conditions means an easier mechanism. However, some conditions are needed to protect the
parties’ rights or social rights (such as those sought to be protected by the public policy
defence); hence, it is important to examine each condition to weigh its value as we shall see in
Chapter 4.
Finally, the formal requirements in both countries are in accordance with the requirements of
the Convention. It is clear that there are several differences due to the fact that Saudi judges
seem to be more formalistic in regard to the legal requirements. For example, the reciprocity
principle has to be proved in Saudi Arabia even in today’s world where this type of issue can be
confirmed just by checking online. Although the Australian system is adversarial, judges are
more familiar with commercial transactions so they are willing to interpret arbitration in a way
that ensures that the original intention of parties to resort to arbitration is fulfilled. Furthermore,
common law courts are more disciplined by means of the precedents set by a higher court where
the lower court shall follow the higher court.

3.2

Role of International and Regional Conventions in Determining the Limits of the
Arbitration

As a result of the importance of arbitration as a means to resolve disputes that arise in the area
of international trade, international conventions have played a significant role in the delineation
of this mechanism and in the recognition of many binding principles on the implementation of
the provisions of foreign arbitral awards.

28

See IAA s 9(1), (2), (3), (4).
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This section will address the role of the most important international conventions that relate to
this study, namely, the New York Convention, the rules of the UNCITRAL Model Law and,
finally, the Riyadh Convention.29 The selection of these agreements is due to the importance of
these treaties to the two countries studied in regard to the application of the provisions of
foreign arbitral awards. First, the Convention is the most important international agreement and
has been in force for more than 50 years. Second, the UNCITRAL Model Law is considered to
have more detailed rules, where it explains several points about the application of the arbitral
award. In addition, the adoption of the Model Law by the Australian Parliament, where it
became a part of the domestic law, made it a very important convention, central to
understanding the implementation of foreign arbitral awards in Australia.
The Riyadh Convention is considered to be the most important treaty created by the League of
Arab States, and governs the recognition and enforcement of any arbitral award between the
signatory states. It is the convention that has been applied by the Saudi courts before the country
became a signatory to the Convention and it is still valid with regard to awards issued in an
Arab state that is a Riyadh Convention signatory, even if that country is now also a signatory to
the Convention where the Saudi courts will firstly apply the regional agreement. Moreover, the
Convention in Article VII states that this convention ‘shall not affect the validity of multilateral
or bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards’.
These international agreements, as will be seen in this chapter and also later in chapters 4 and 5,
have a very large impact on the role of the judge in the implementation process, where the
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law have become a part of the Australian International
Arbitration Act 1974 (IAA), while the Saudi judge contemplates several international and
regional agreements that affect his role in the implementing process. Therefore, this section will
explore these conventions and provide a simple definition and mention the most important

29

Convention of the Arab League on Judicial Cooperation between the States of the Arab League, opened
for signature 6 April 1983 (entered into force October 1985) (‘Riyadh Convention’).
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provisions and reservations to these conventions. It will also highlight the role of such
reservations in the definition of arbitration. Additionally, mention will be made of the most
important principles contained in those conventions and which show the real purpose of those
conventions. It is important to note that these agreements include several rules and principles,
but what will be described here are those rules and principles that are related to this research,
those which serve the process of implementing foreign arbitral awards. As stated before in the
research methodology, comparison and analysis will be addressed in the conclusion of the each
chapter, and will include the differences between these international conventions.

3.2.1

New York Convention 1958

A. Historical Context
Before the adoption of the New York Convention, there was the Geneva Protocol of 1923. This
was expanded by the Geneva Convention of 1927, and focused on the execution of foreign
arbitral awards. This established the framework for the enforcement of international arbitral
awards.
In accordance with the Geneva Convention local procedural rules guided the enforcement of
arbitral awards. This was however only allowed among signatory countries; it was not allowed
in non-signatory countries. The Geneva Convention did not apply to the enforcement of awards
made in non-signatory countries. It, therefore; interfered with international enforcement of
awards. There was also the requirement of double exequatur, in which enforcement of an award
was only possible after confirmation of the award in the country of origin. This requirement
slowed down the process of arbitration and ‘subjected the party to the partiality of the domestic
courts of its adversary’.30 Dissatisfaction with the Geneva Convention led to the development of
the New York Convention. The New York Convention encourages resolution of international

30

Kenneth R Davis, ‘Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at Articles V and VII of the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (2002) 37(43) Texas International Law
Journal 55.
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disputes through arbitration. It has a set of rules for recognition and enforcement. Application of
the Convention is only to awards made in countries other than that where recognition and
enforcement is sought. It means that the provisions of the Convention do not apply in the
country where the award was made. This provision is based on an argument that the country in
which the award was made, in enforcing or refusing to enforce an award, it will apply its
domestic law to annul or confirm an award.31
Therefore, it could be said that this convention aims to ensure that foreign arbitral awards are
not discriminated against in relation to national decisions, and therefore it commits the
signatories to the recognition and implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards. It
also aims to bind the courts of the signatory states to the full and absolute recognition of
arbitration and not to allow parties to resort to courts if there is an arbitration agreement
between the parties.32
The focus of the Convention is on two aspects, namely the recognition of foreign arbitral awards
and the enforcement that is a result of that recognition. It should be noted that meeting the
formal requirements in a request for the implementation of foreign arbitral awards act as a kind
of guarantee in regard to implementation.
Therefore, there are several articles with different provisions concerning the formal
requirements. Such articles and provisions will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. For example,
Article II provides for recognition of written arbitration agreements by each signatory State.
Article III requires the recognition of the arbitral awards as binding by signatory States, and also
requires the enforcement of such awards to be in accordance with national rules of procedure.
Article V of the Convention provides grounds for refusal to enforce or recognise an award.
31
32

Ibid.
It should be noted that Saudi Arabia ratified this convention on 19 April 1994 (entry into force for
Saudi Arabia 18 July 1994); Australia ratified this convention on 26 March 1975 (entry into force for
Australia 24 June 1975). For more information, see UNCITRAL: United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, Status: ‘1958 - Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards’ (2 October 2010) <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NY
Convention_status.html>.
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In fact, there was a great debate revolves around the drafting of Article V of this Agreement. In
the 1955 draft, Article V(1)(a) did not mention, for example, which law is to be interpreted
regarding the incapacity of one or all parties. According to Kronke, New Zealand commented
on the draft and suggested that the draft should specify the law by which these criteria are to be
interpreted, and that this should be the law of the place where the award was made.33
The discussions also revolved around the mandatory arbitration provision where the drafters
suggested the word ‘binding’ instead of ‘final’ at the stage of the adoption of the final text. The
language of Article V clearly shows that it is intended to facilitate enforcement, and therefore
the drafters had ‘accordingly, carefully considered the language used to manifest such
intention.’34 According to Alfons, there were fewer discussions about permitting a court to
refuse enforcement, while there was extensive debate on the change of terminology from ‘final’
to ‘binding’, and there is no explanation as to why the final award adopted the phrase ‘may be
refused’ under certain circumstances at the discretion of the enforcing court — with this being
subject to the party against whom the award is invoked having satisfied one or more criteria
(Article V(1)–(2), which include incapacity, lack of arbitral validity, lack of proper notice,
contrary to public policy and so on (see further below)). This may be to confirm the
discretionary power of the court and leave a wider range of discretion for the execution of the
award (even if it was contrary to some of these conditions listed in Article V). Indeed Alfons
believes that ‘the drafters knew what they intended when they adopted the permissive “may” in
the language of Article V(1).’35 This shows that Article V of the Convention has a permissive
interpretation nature to support and facilitate the implementation process.

33

See Herbert Kronke, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary
on the New York Convention (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 217.
34
See Claudia Alfons, Recognition and Enforcement of Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards: An Analysis
of the Legal Framework and Its Interpretation in Case Law and Literature (Peter Lang, 2010) 78.
35
Ibid 79. For more information, see Jane Jenkins, Simon Stebbings, ‘International Construction
Arbitration Law’ (Kluwer Law International, 2006) 304; also see Alfons, above n 34, 78.
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Thus, it is provided that an award may not be enforced or recognised if there are substantial
irregularities found to have occurred in the arbitration proceedings. Both parties for example,
are supposed to be aware of the proceeding of arbitration and any intention to award a party. If
one party is not informed about the proceedings, if a party is denied a fair hearing, and even if
an arbitrator is appointed without adequate notice to one party, the courts are, as directed by the
rules of the Convention, supposed to refuse recognition and enforcement. A court may also
refuse to recognise and enforce an arbitral award if the procedures that the award employed, or
the composition of the arbitral authority, violated the arbitration agreement. Incapacity of a
party and invalidity of an arbitration agreement are also grounds for refusal to enforce and
recognise awards. Other grounds include; when arbitrators decide on issues not submitted to
them, when an award is set aside by a competent authority (that is, under the law of the country
in which the award was made), if an underlying dispute is not arbitrable according to the
national laws of the country, and if enforcing an award would violate the public policy of a
country.36

B. The Most Important Principles in the New York Convention
The most important principles in the New York Convention are:
1.

It has adopted the geographical criterion to determine ‘foreign’ arbitral awards, regardless
of the nationalities of the parties to the conflict. Additionally, the Convention has a new
criterion in addition to the geographical criterion. It refers to the application of the
Convention to an arbitral award which is not considered to be a domestic award in the
state where recognition and enforcement are sought.

2.

The Convention explicitly recognised the provisions of arbitral awards that issued by the
centres of international arbitration. This is clear in Article I(2) which states: ‘The term
“arbitral awards” shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each

36

Davis above n 30, 56.
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case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have
submitted.’
3.

The Convention established the scope of application of contractual and non-contractual
disputes (Article I(3)). Additionally, it gives states the right to enter reservations and limit
application on contractual relationships of a commercial nature.37

4.

It has adopted in Article II(2) both forms of arbitration — the arbitration clause in the
original contract between the parties and the subsequent arbitration agreement, which
comes in the form of a special separate agreement from the original contract between the
parties to the conflict.

5.

The Convention adopted the principle of mutuality or reciprocity in the case of the
issuance of an arbitral award in one of its signatory countries. This shows how it supports
the application of foreign arbitral awards as far as is possible.

6.

Article V states a number of defences ‘the seven defences’ for the refusal to implement
the rule of foreign arbitration and these defences were to ensure the maintenance of
public policy and national procedural laws. These seven defences came to induce the
largest possible number of states to sign the Convention. The Convention also gives the
right to any country to enter some reservations. There are five defences under section 1
and two under section 2. These ‘seven’ defences as stated in the Convention can be
summed up as follows:

Article V(1) lists five defences or ways to refuse the enforcement of any foreign arbitral awards:
a.

When the parties were suffering some incapacity or the arbitral agreement was invalid
‘under the law applicable to them’.

37

That article permits a state to reserve applicability of the convention in the commercial dealings. See
Rashda Rana and Michelle Sanson, International Commercial Arbitration (Thomson Reuters, 2011)
294.
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When the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
arbitrator’s appointment or the arbitration proceedings or is unable to present his case.38 In
fact, according to the case samples obtained for the purposes of this research, this defence
(a party was not giving proper notice) is the most formal requirement that has been used
before the Grievances Board with respect to the implementation of the provisions of
foreign arbitration (as explained in the appendix ‘General points regarding to the formal
requirements (4)’).
b.

Enforcement can be refused when the award decides matters that are not falling within
the scope of the arbitration. The ability to separate the award if it contains two parts
should be invoked, with the two parts being (i) first the part that cannot be submitted to
arbitration, and (ii) the second arbitrable part of the award which contains decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration, which part can be recognised and enforced ‘if that [is]
possible’.39

c.

When the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the procedure used did not accord with
the parties’ agreement or the law of the country where the arbitration took place.

d.

When the award has not yet become binding or has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country where the award was made.40

38

It should be noted that the Convention did not specify the law that shows the violation of these rights of
defence. Thus, the text of the Convention was very wide, trying to cover the most important principles
of pleadings and litigation. Thus, the arbitrator/s or the arbitral tribunal should apply the basic
principles of litigation. For more information, see Fathi Wali, ‘Alth}ki>m fy Alnz}rya u> Altat}bi>q [The
Arbitration Law in Theory and Practice]’ (Manshat Alma’rf, 2007) 301.
39
The partial enforcement of an arbitral award will be discussed with the role of the court in the
application of public policy principle in Chapter 5 (5.4 Judicial Role in Applying Public Policy in their
Decisions).
40
It should be noted that Article V of the Convention did not mention finality as a condition for the
implementation of the foreign arbitral award, but it stipulated that the award shall be binding, and
binding necessarily means that the award has the force of res judicata and becomes binding on the
parties. However, Article V of the Convention did not provide support for the knowledge of the law
which determines the mandatory nature of the award, but that the judiciary in most countries settled the
jurisdiction of the law of the country where the arbitral award was issued. See Yahya Al-Samaan,
‘Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia’ in Eugene Cotran (ed), Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern
Law vol 7 (2000–2001) 35, 35.
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Article V(2) of the Convention provides two further grounds for refusing to enforce a foreign
arbitral awards:
1)

When the subject matter of the arbitration is non-arbitrable under the law of the country
where the award is sought to be enforced.41

2)

When the recognition or the enforcement of the award would be in a contrary to public
policy.42 This is the most objective requirement and one that has been used before the
Grievances Board with respect to the implementation of foreign arbitration as we shall
see in Chapter 5 (5.4.1 The Saudi Grievances Board and the Application of Public
Policy).

3.2.2

The UNCITRAL Model Law

The UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) is a supplementary
body of the General Assembly which had been designed to assist States to develop their legal
framework and modernise their laws on arbitral procedure. It provides suggested legislative
texts which can be used by states in modernising international trade law as well as by
commercial parties in negotiating business dealings.43 Among other issues addressed by
UNCITRAL legislative texts is international commercial dispute resolution through both
arbitration and conciliation, whereby in the non-legislative texts for example, rules of conducts
in arbitration and conciliation proceedings are comprehensively addressed.
The Model Law was adopted by UNCITRAL in June 1985 and it covers all the stages of the
international commercial arbitration process right from striking arbitration agreements in the

41

Non-arbitrability is discussed in Chapter 3 (3.1.1 Scope of Arbitration).
Chapter 5 will be about the controls on the implementation of foreign arbitral awards (public policy and
the limits of Shari’a).
43
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UN GAOR, 40th sess, Supp No 17,
UN Doc A/40/17 (21 June 1985), annex 1 (‘UNCITRAL Model Law 1985’); also see UNCITRAL:
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law website, above n 32.
42
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country of origin to the all-inclusive recognition and implementation of arbitral awards which
are acceptable to the states of the world regardless of their own legal or economic differences.44
The main ‘objective of the UNCITRAL rules was to create a relatively predictable and stable
procedural framework for international arbitration without stifling the informal and flexible
character of such dispute resolution mechanisms.’45
It should be noted that this law has provisions similar to those of the New York Convention.
There are several points that must be mentioned in dealing with the enforcement of foreign
arbitral award under the UNCITRAL Model Law. These can be summarised as follows:
1.

This law has clarified two points at the beginning, where it says that the Article headings
are for reference purpose only and not for interpretation, and more importantly, it expands
the interpretation of the term ‘commercial’ where required. It provides a broad
interpretation and it addresses the issue with many examples.46

2.

The geographical criterion is not an important point in this law as this law distinguishes
between international and non-international awards (not ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ awards)
and thus substitutes a ‘new demarcation line’ on substantive grounds for the previous
‘territorial borders’ which were deemed ‘inappropriate’; instead of the selection of a
‘convenient’ place of arbitration, the same principles were to apply to all international
arbitration.47

44

Some of the procedural aspects have been discussed at the beginning of this chapter (3.1.2 Formal
Requirments of Enforcement).
45
See Born, International Commercial Arbitration: C & M’, above n 3, 46.
46
See UNCITRAL Model Law art 1.
47
See ‘Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration’ UN Doc A/CN.9/264 reproduced in UNCITRAL Yearbook, vol XVI, 1. B(8)(a) [46] (under
‘8. Recognition and Enforcement of Awards’).
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3.

The Model Law expressly reiterates Article V of the Convention regarding the
implementation of the provisions of the arbitration.48 Additionally, Article 34 embodies
the provision regarding the ‘party under some incapacity’ in the Convention but with a
slight modification ‘because it viewed [it] as containing an incomplete and potentially
misleading conflict rule [however, it adopted the] same approach and wording as this
important convention’.49 According to Article 34(2) of the Model Law, ‘an arbitral award
may be set aside by the court specified in Article 6 only if: (a) the party making the
application furnishes proof that: (i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in
article 7 was under some incapacity.’

4.

Many modifications and additions to this Model Law that have taken place since its
inception. There have been some amendments undertaken in 200650 and also in 2010;
these amendments were supportive of arbitration and the implementation of the
provisions of the non-national arbitration.
One of the latest amendments is that of 25 June 2010, where ‘the Commission adopted
the report of the Committee [of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law] of the whole and agreed that it should form part of the present report.’51 The most
important amendments were:

48

It should be noted that Garnett and Pryles believe that ‘where both the Convention and the Model Law
apply to enforcement of an award, the Convention shall prevail.’ See Richard Garnett and Michael
Pryles, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards under the New York Convention in Australia
and New Zealand’ (2008) 25 (6) Journal of International Arbitration 899, 901.
49
See, ‘Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration’ UN Doc A/CN.9/264, above n 42, 1.B(8)(c).
50
For more information about these amendments, see UNCITRAL: United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, 1985 – UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration with
Amendments as Adopted in 2006 [Text] (18 September 2010) <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/
en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html>.
51
For more information, see United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Forty-third Session (21 June – 9 July 2010),
UN GAOR43rd sess, Supp No 17 UN Doc A/65 /17, 30.
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i.

The 1976 Rules of UNCITRAL was revised in 2006 in order to improve its
performance and suitability for use in national laws and with the updated
provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law.

ii.

Articles 2 and 4 clarify the procedure for commencing arbitration (especially by
email) and expressly provide that a respondent must file an initial notice of
response.

iii.

Article 28(4) authorises the use of technology, such as videoconferencing, for
examining witnesses.52

These most important modifications on the UNCITRAL Model Law are that related to the
implementation of foreign arbitral award. It should be noted that this Model Law has been
adopted by the Australian Parliament as Schedule 2 UNCITRAL Model Law to the IAA 1974.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has not adopted the Model Law. Thus, it remains in force in
Australia but not in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
3.2.3

Riyadh Convention on Judicial Cooperation

The Convention of the Arab League on Judicial Cooperation between the States of the Arab
League (‘Riyadh Convention’) was drawn up in April 198353 to replace the three conventions
that had been agreed upon in 1952 under the scope of the Arab League: namely the Convention
on Judicial Notifications and Procurations, the Convention on the Enforcement of Judgements
and Arbitral Awards, and the Arab Convention on Extradition.

52

It should be noted that arbitration through internet or any electronic means lacks the physical presence
of the parties and others before the arbitrator/s, which may be viewed as a lack of fulfilment of some of
the formal conditions that are to be met under the New York Convention. So it is better for national laws
to adopt special provisions in their arbitration laws to enforce any electronic arbitral award and to go
beyond any formal requirements. For more information, see Bin Zaid, above n 6.
53
Convention of the Arab League on Judicial Cooperation between the States of the Arab League, opened
for signature 6 April 1983 (entered into force October 1985) (‘Riyadh Convention’).
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It should be noted that all Arab League member states signed the Convention of the League of
Arab States on the Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards, which entered into force 10
November 1952 (‘Arab Convention 1952’), but Egypt (a founding member) and the Comoros
(which joined the Arab League in 1993) have not yet signed the Riyadh Convention; thus, the
older conventions are still valid and applicable for the arbitral provisions that are issued in these
states.54
The most important provisions related to the implementation of foreign arbitral awards in Arab
League signatories under the Riyadh Convention (which adopts the geographical standard to
determine a foreign arbitral award) state in Article 25 that in the application of this section, the
term ‘provision’ means every decision — whatever the name — issued according to a judicial
proceedings in or with a mandate from the courts or any competent body of one of the
contracting parties (that is, other Arab League signatories).
Additionally, Article 25(b) and Article 31(a) mention that the finality is determined according to
the law of the State where the arbitral award has been issued.
Importantly, there is an identical provision in both this and the previous convention, namely ‘the
execution of the provisions’ in regard to arbitration matters to which these provisions apply, that
is the arbitrability of the judgment or award. Article 25(b), states:
Subject to the provisions of Article 30 of this convention, each of the contracting parties
has to recognise the verdicts of the courts of any another contracting party in civil cases,
including the judgments relating to civil rights made by the penal courts, and in trade
issues, administrative issues and issues of personal status that has the force of res judicata
[also] and it shall implement this award [judgment] in its territory in accordance with the
55
procedures concerning the implementation of the provisions stipulated in this section ...

54

See the Riyadh Convention art 17. I think that the most important reasons for the existence of such
regional agreements together with the New York Convention is the geographical convergence between
the regional countries, the unity of language, and also the unity of religion, which is the legal basis for
these countries.
55
See the Riyadh Convention art 25(b).
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However, this convention excludes some matters from arbitration, such as the verdicts against
the government of a contracting party (signatory nation) or against one of its employees on the
work carried out in the course of their employment. In addition, it excludes verdicts that conflict
with the conditions of international treaties and agreements, verdicts that concern temporary and
precautionary measures and judgments in cases of bankruptcy, taxes and fees.
On the other hand, this convention gives the right to refuse the implementation in the event of
such action violating public policy. This includes if the award is contrary to the provisions of
Shari’a (for example, in regard to a contract involving alcohol) or the provisions of the
country’s Constitution or public policy or fundamental conception of morality in the contracting
party where the award intended to be recognised and enforced (that is, the subject matter is not
arbitrable under the law in that country). Implementation can also be refused if the award was
issued in absentia and the other party was not properly notified so that he/she can defend
himself. Moreover, if the award does not take into account the rules of the law of the contracting
party for legal representation for persons who are incompetent or have a legal incapacity,
implementation can also be refused. This is also the case if the dispute has been solved by a
judicial ruling in the matter between the litigants themselves and has the res judicata in the
contracting party where the award is intended to be implemented or in another contracting party
or if the dispute is in a case before a court in that country between the litigants themselves in
respect to the same right and cause.
Finally, the competent court, which considers the application for enforcement in accordance
with the text of this Article, can take into account the legal rules of its country. It should be
noted that the text of Article 32 made it explicitly permissible to request the implementation of
the arbitral award in whole or in part, if a request to execute the award is capable of being
divisible.
It clear that there is a significant difference between the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL
Model Law and the Riyadh Convention. The UNCITRAL Model Law has the same provisions as
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those of the Convention. In addition to the Convention provisions, the UNCITRAL Model Law
allows commencement of arbitration through email, where a respondent has to file an initial
notice of response, and also authorises the use of technology in its process (specifically
videoconferencing) for examining witnesses. These additional provisions are not provided in the
Riyadh Convention.
The Riyadh Convention has clearly described the issues or matters that are to be excluded from
arbitration, unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law. This specification is also lacking in the New
York Convention. The Convention has only stated that enforcement can be refused when the
award decides matters that do not fall within the scope of the arbitration. The Riyadh
Convention has however specified matters (as explained above) that have been excluded from
arbitration.

3.3

Conclusion

In Saudi Arabia, subject matters against Shari’a law make arbitration unable to be implemented
and may appear to be an element that discourages recourse to arbitration; however, it represents
the public policy principle. Nevertheless, the requirement that the competent court has to
authorise resort to arbitration is time consuming. Matters that do not fall within the scope of
arbitration are not defined or limited in the IAA which may affect the efficiency of arbitration.
However, the objective of this procedure is the prohibition of certain matters from arbitration to
provide protection in some special cases, as has been explained with regard to the eligibility of
companies. Hence, it could be said that clear definition of matters excluded from arbitration
discourages resort to arbitration in regard to such matters, but also provides important
information to those wishing to resort to arbitration.
Regarding the conventions the Saudi judge is confronted by several international and regional
agreements that affect his role in the implementing process; thus, in some cases, as we shall see
in chapters 4 and 5, the Saudi judge has fallen into an error in the application of the proper
convention. This affects the efficiency of the role of the court in terms of the error in the
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application of the proper legal text which may be considered as rendering an injustice to one of
the parties. This in turn affects the justice to the parties in the individual cases. On the other
hand, the adoption of the Convention in addition to the adoption of UNCITRAL Model Law
under the IAA is a very important step in achieving effectiveness of the role of the judge who
will find the text directly without any indecision or lack of clarity, which will lead to the court
achieving a high measure of justice in terms of the application of the appropriate legal text. In
fact, the UNCITRAL Model Law has additional provisions that encourage arbitration: for
example adoption of the use of new technology. This may mean that Australian laws are more
effective in terms of the availability of texts which cover all probable forms of arbitration.
On the one hand, part of Saudi legislation in regard to the subject matter in the implementation
of arbitral awards may be accounted as discouraging the resort to arbitration. On the other hand,
Saudi Arabia is a signatory country to the New York Convention, yet arbitral awards that are in
breach of Shari’a and are within the framework of international trade contracts are not applied.
The kind of decisions made and the law here affect implementation of foreign arbitral awards as
a public policy matter which was adopted in all international conventions as a reason for refusal.
Thus, the law does not allow implementation of foreign awards against Shari’a law.
In terms of efficiency, it means that arbitral proceedings are more highly favoured than judicial
proceedings since parties in disagreement can more rapidly obtain a ruling. However, if a court,
which is competent, is unable to enforce the final arbitration in a timely and reasonable manner,
then the efficiency of the convenience of arbitration is said to have been weakened or frustrated.
Therefore, one of the key issues under discussion in international arbitration circles is the
efficient enforcement and implementation of foreign arbitral awards. In fact, in every judicial or
arbitral proceeding, justice and efficiency are very important. This is due to the fact that
inefficient justice, that is, justice which cannot be applied or could scarcely be applied or even
delayed justice, is not genuine justice. Thus, judicial efficiency reflects the desire to achieve
justice and also respect law.

154

As a result, there is a clear need for care to be taken in drafting national legislation for the
arbitration system. However, it can be seen that the Saudi lawmaker did not identify specifically
the matters that may be arbitrable; thus, this identification is left to the competent court. It is the
same in Australia where the Australian Parliament in the IAA has left the identification of the
matters that can be arbitrable to the competent courts. That is also stated by most of the
conventions to ensure the highst possible number of signatory states and, most importantly, is
due to the fact that some topics are related to the public policy of the state, and so it has been
left to the relevant judge to apply. Additionally, there is the pivotal role of domestic legislation
in determining the general framework for arbitration in terms of non-arbitrability. For example,
arbitration may not be resorted to in regard to some issues in particular, such as government
contracts in Saudi Arabia (with the possibility of that as explained earlier) and also in regard to
issues that are contrary to public policy. Yet, determining the matters that can be solved by
arbitration remains imprecise and too loose. It was noticed that the Australian Parliament has
adopted the limits of the public policy in the Convention for the arbitrability without any
reservations in order to support the implementation of arbitration to the fullest extent;
conversely, Saudi Arabia did not. However, it is important to examine that adoption and find
out whether it makes public policy clear. This will be discussed in more details later in Chapter
5. Moreover, the legislation of both countries specified formalities and documents required to be
submitted in request for the implementation of a foreign arbitral award.
On the other hand, those drafting international agreements have been keen to cover all relevant
issues associated with the implementation of foreign arbitral awards and to keep a very large
area for national jurisdiction in order to be able to apply the rules of respect for state policies
and the principles of justice. It has also been noted that the UNCITRAL Model Law is the
international format for the convening of an international arbitration. It would have been better
for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to adopt the Model Law for several reasons. The most
important reasons are: this instrument is involved in developing the legal framework for global
trade through the preparation of legislative and non-legislative texts for use by states in
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modernising international trade law; the rules for conducting arbitration and conciliation are
addressed comprehensively in this treaty; it expands the interpretation of the term ‘commercial’
which may support the enforcement of foreign arbitration be inclusive of all kind of trade
conflicts; it adopts international and non-international awards and that can widen the circle of
provisions that can be implemented within the country; and it provides the same seven defences
that appear in Article V in the Convention. Additionally, this law was amended twice (in 2006
and 2010) which further improved its performance as explained above.
These conventions have approved some restrictions on the implementation of the provisions of
foreign arbitral awards, and contain some defences to enable the provisions of foreign
arbitration to be set aside or refused implementation. Some of these are specific and clear, such
as the defences related to the judicial procedures; and others are loose and broadly defined so as
to include many areas, such as public policy, in order to give more space in the relevant
convention for the elimination of the possibility of implementing the rule of foreign arbitration.
It should be noted that the Riyadh Convention has strongly supported the implementation of the
provisions of foreign arbitration, where it requires treating the foreign party (who seeks to
implement the award) as a citizen requesting the enforcement of the award in the event of filing
a lawsuit without the imposition of additional fees, which is taken as a significant benefit of this
convention and a support for the implementation of the provisions of arbitration.
Finally, it can be said that the Australian legislation is more effective in these matters by its
adoption of the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law, because both of them are
expanding the provisions that fall within the scope of foreign arbitration and also both of the
them have adopted different broad standards in determining the foreign arbitral award, this helps
to cover as many as possible of the foreign arbitration provisions, especially there are also few
reservations to these conventions. Additionally, clarity in Australian law, as explained, in terms
of adopting a unified law (the IAA) is seen to better support the implementation of foreign
arbitration. In Saudi Arabia the judge deals with the decisions of the President of the Grievances
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Board and a number of agreements for the implementation of foreign arbitral award. This can be
seen as an implementation obstacle. However, law texts in both countries are not explicit nor do
they address the specific matters that cannot be submitted to arbitration; rather, it is left to the
court to determine these issues. However, both laws have almost the same formal requirements
in regard to what must be submitted to the court in the event of application for enforcement.
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4

CONDITIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS

This is a continuation of an examination of the requirements of arbitration that will help in the
analysis of the differences between the two countries to find out any factors that affect
arbitration. These requirements and the role of the judge will be analysed based on the chosen
criterion to arrive at findings on these factors of arbitration and help contribute to answering the
question of which country’s arbitration system and judges discourage or encourage arbitration.
This chapter will explore the judicial role in implementing the formal and substantive
requirements contained in international conventions and domestic laws. Such requirements must
be met before the competent courts. These include the type of paperwork required to file a claim
before the competent courts, proof of reciprocity and other formalities. Such an analysis will
demonstrate the real role of the judge in dealing with the provisions of foreign arbitral awards
and the manner of implementation of national and international rules relating to foreign
arbitration.
Basically, the court decision for the implementation of foreign awards is just to give executive
force to that award.1 Thus, the res judicata and the award should be recognised by the judiciary
when the necessary conditions are met. On the other hand, there are some scholars who link the
res judicata with the executory force, which will be given by the competent court. Accordingly,
the arbitral award will not be enforced without an order from the competent court.2 This is
counterfactual because the execution order is only to give executive power, but arbitration

1

2

However, the difference in the cultural systems may affect the real job of the judge. For more
information, see Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter with Nigel Blackaby and Constantine Partasides,
Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed, 2004) 295.
See Arthur J Gemmell, ‘Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East’ (2006) 4(12) Santa Clara
Journal of International Law 169, 185. It should be noted that differences between the countries in
terms of legislation regarding the role of the judiciary have produced different types of control by the
competent court where some countries’ legislation made the external control of the Court ‘without the
presence of the parties’ possible while there are other countries that made it substantive control ‘with
presence of the parties’. For more information, see Fathi Amer Batayneh, ‘ Dwr Alqad{i> fy Alth}ki>m
Altjari> Aldawli>: Drash Muqarnh [The Judge’s Role in International Commercial Arbitration: A
Comparative Study]’ (Dar Althaqafah, 2008) 226.
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should have such power since it is issued validly and in accordance with the law of the country
in which it was issued.3
In fact, there are several countries that have decided on direct implementation for the arbitral
award when it was issued validly according to the law, such as in Egypt and Jordan, so there is
no need to have a court ruling to implement such award.4 However, some countries like Saudi
Arabia have decided on a different provision in terms of linking the execution order with the
judicial decision of implementation, and that was addressed in Article 20 in the Saudi
Arbitration System 1983:
The judgment of the arbiters [arbitrators] shall be enforceable when it becomes final by the
order of the authority originally responsible for considering the dispute [the court originally
competent to consider such dispute] and this order shall be made on the request of any of
the parties concerned after ascertaining that there is nothing that prevents its enforcement
from the Shari’a point of view.

This could be accounted a waste of time and effort on the part of the parties and the arbitral
tribunal; also, it ignores the will of the parties to go to arbitration instead of the competent court
to resolve the conflict. It is, therefore, important that the arbitral award has full recognition since
it was issued validly, and this view is supported by what is stipulated in national laws and
international conventions, where the function of the judge is restricted to the verification of the
formalities of the award.5 Therefore, this chapter will analyse the decisions/rulings of the

3

4

5

For more information on these views, see Nabil Zaid Al-Makabla, ‘Tat{bi>q Ah{{kam Alth{ki<m Alajnabi>h
[Implement the Provisions of Foreign Arbitral Awards]’ (Dar Al-Nahdha, 2006) 50.
See Article 52 of the Arbitration Act No 31 / 2001 (Jordan); see also Article 55 of the Arbitration Law
No 27 of 1994 (Egypt). It should be noted that this is what had been adopted in the UNCITRAL Model
Law in the 1980s.
The court’s powers are much the same in all countries; however, there are some differences depending
on the terms of the governing statutes and the decisions of these courts. For more information about the
court’s actions in such cases, see Markham Ball, ‘The Essential Judge: The Role of the Courts in a
System of National and International Commercial Arbitration’ (Paper presented at the International
Conference on the Active Role of National Jurisdiction in the Arbitration, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, 19–
21 November 2007) 1.
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Grievances Board and decisions of the Australian Federal Court and also the Supreme Court of
NSW with respect to these conditions.6
Additionally, it will explore the legal nature of the role of the judge in enforcing jurisdiction
issues in order to implement foreign arbitral awards, highlighting his power and role in the
consideration of such cases. In addition, it will address the possibility of appeal against the
national judge’s decisions/rulings and the limits of such an appeal under the general legal rules
(legal principles), conventions and domestic laws.
Such analysis will indicate the judge’s role and the real application of these conditions. This in
turn will make the measurement of the effectiveness of the judge’s role in the implementation
phase easier and more credible. Moreover, such an analysis which highlights the role of the
judge will contribute effectively to the knowledge of the importance of such conditions and
method of application, which in turn will contribute to the clarification of the implementation
process in both countries.
4.1 Role of the Judge in Implementing the Formal Requirements
At the outset, it is noted that the international conventions have developed some formal
requirements that must be met in the request to implement foreign arbitral awards. Moreover,
several domestic laws have adopted this approach by stating clearly such terms, and the laws of
Saudi Arabia and Australia have these terms. This section will try to show if the formal
requirements are mandatory, how they are applied by the courts and whether there are
exceptions to their application.
Also, there are some conditions or requirements that were general and not clearly defined, such
as the requirement for reciprocity, which require the study and analysis of judicial decisions to

6

It should be again mentioned that the Supreme Court decisions of other Australian States will be used if
needed to clarify the implementation of such conditions in Australia. Additionally, the Saudi
Grievances Board is dealing with the foreign judgments and foreign arbitral awards in the same manner
as explained earlier.
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determine the meaning of ‘reciprocity’ from the viewpoint of the judiciary and in order to know
the limits of this term, and also to recognise the need to demonstrate the existence of any
documents required to prove its (reciprocity’s) existence. The inclusion of these requirements
for implementation in the national law is one of the rules of private international law.
This section will address the implementation of the formal requirements by the national judge in
Saudi Arabia and Australia.

4.1.1

Formal and Substantive Requirements in Saudi Arabia

The formal requirements that have been applied by the Grievances Board can be divided into
two parts: first, the conditions in international conventions and national laws; and secondly, the
conditions stated in the Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No 116 of 1428 AH
(2007). This decision was expressly based on the Royal Decree No 8071/M of 11/11/1427 AH
(2007) which has been issued by the Saudi Council of Ministers. This Royal Decree is
considered as a delegation from the Saudi Council of Ministers (the Saudi Lawmaker) to the
President of the Grievances Board to make the necessary legislation in this matter.

A.

Terms and Conditions in National Laws and International Conventions

According to the Saudi Arbitration System 1983, the dicisions of the President of the Grievances
Board and the Arab Convention, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Convention for the
Execution of Judgments, Delegations and Judicial Notifications and international conventions,
the party who requested the implementation of a foreign award must provide the following:
1.

A duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy.

2.

An official document to prove that the award is final.

3.

An official document to prove that the award has been notified to all parties.
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4.

A certificate indicating that all parties have been properly notified to appear before the
arbitrators and whether the decision had been issued in absentia.

5.

All the documents submitted to apply and implement the foreign arbitral award must be
translated to the Arabic language.

6.

All documents shall be signed and certified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State
where the arbitral award was issued as well as by the Saudi Foreign Ministry.

At the outset it should be noted that there are several important points affecting the application
of the formal requirements before the Grievances Board. These are:
1.

The relationship between the first instance Sub-Circuits and Audit-Circuits under the old
law in the Saudi Grievances Board. This is quite complicated: the Audit-Circuit
discretionary power in reviewing the Sub-Circuit’s rulings is not mandatory on the SubCircuits, unless the ruling of the Sub-Circuits was overturned based on procedural
grounds (such as jurisdiction, acceptance or nonsuit or other action relating to the
examination proceedings and adjudication of or related to the fulfilment aspects of the
dispute ‘proof or denial of the provision’); thus, the Audit-Circuit’s verdicts are final and
binding on Sub-Circuits regarding these grounds.7
But if the rulings of the Audit-Circuit are based on an Islamic jurisprudence opinion
(‘fiqh’) or objective reason/s, then the Sub-Circuit has the choice of adopting the opinion
of the Audit-Circuits or insisting on its previous ruling. In the latter case, if an AuditCircuit is not convinced by the point of view of the Sub-Circuit, it will directly consider
the case. In this case, the Audit-Circuit will be changed from the ‘Court of Law’ (appeal
or review) to a normal court. This means that in the Saudi judicial system the role of the
Audit-Circuit is basically limited in the examination of the Sub-Circuit’s ruling to make

7

See Chapter 2 Figure 2: The Structure of the Old Grievances Board; and Figure 4: The Structure of the
New Grievances Board ‘2007 System’.
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sure that this court has not infringed the laws and regulations in force in the country in
deciding the case without the presence of the parties. But if an Audit-Circuit is not
convinced by the point of view of the Sub-Circuit, the Audit-CIrcuit will be altered to
function as a normal court, which means that this court will consider the case with the
presence of all parties in a normal trial.
This is demonstrated by Ruling No 479 / T / 1 of 1411 AH 1991.8 Therefore, all
submissions relating to the formal requirements are binding on the Sub-Circuits.9
This is not the case in Australia where in a common law jurisdiction a high court ‘creates
law’ by deciding cases and establishing precedents that must be followed by lower courts
of the same hierarchy. Consequently, it is clear that the Saudi legal system is based on
Shari’a principles that are mostly in agreement with what is taught at the Hanbali School
and Australian law is adapted from the British Common Law. In fact (as stated before), in
Australia — as a common law jurisdiction — courts must follow the precedents set by
superior courts in their hierarchy; and, as we shall see later in this chapter, it is rare that

8

However, it should be noted that the judges of the Sub-Circuits for the most part decide what is to be
approved by the Audit-Circuits as these are rulings from judges with great experience, and that is what
appeared to occur from many of the decisions that were analysed in relation to this research. In fact,
this principle or rule is determined by Article 36 of the Law of Procedure before the Saudi Grievances
Board, issued by Resolution of Council of Ministers No 190 of 16/11/1409 AH 1989, Umm Al-Qura
Gazette No 3266, 12/4/1409 AH 1989 where it states that
the acceptance of application for appeal [entails] that the competent Audit-Circuit has to support
the sentence or set it aside, and if it cancelled the case shall be returned to the Sub-Circuit which
rendered it or the Audit-Circuit has to consider the case; if it [is] returned to the Sub-Circuit and
the latter insisted on its provision, the verdict shall be returned to the Audit-Circuit to consider the
case if it is not satisfied with the Sub-Circuit provision. In all cases [where] the Audit-Circuit
reviews the case, the verdict shall be given after hearing the statements of all parties.
This law was issued by the Resolution of Council of Ministers No 190 of 16/11/1409 AH 1989, Umm
Al-Qura Gazette No 3266, 12/4/1409 AH 1989; and from the practical side that supports this
application, which is addressed by the Audit-Circuit in Ruling No 479 / F / 1 of 1423 AH 2003 and the
issuance of Ruling No 102 / T / 4 of 1424 AH 2004 after a lack of conviction by virtue of the SubCircuit with the insistence of the Sub-Circuit on its opinion.
9
Therefore, in accordance with the Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No 9 of 13/3/1411
AH 1991, if the provision of the Sub-Circuit is cancelled by the Audit-Circuit to take a particular action
in the procedures related to the case, the Sub-Circuit is obliged to take that action and it cannot insist on
its own decision. Also, it is obliged to clarify the reasons for that decision and it is obliged to carry out
the actions that have been set out in the ruling of the Audit-Circuit.
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decisions are overturned by the appellate courts, which tends to indicate a degree of
accuracy and reliability in the initial ruling which could tend towards greater efficiency.
2.

The role of judicial jurisdiction. Based on what has been established by the Grievances
Board provisions and on what is stated in the Decision of the President of the Grievances
Board No 2 of 1410 AH 1990, where it stated in Article III that ‘in the case of multiple
formal defences the Sub-Circuits shall consider the judicial jurisdiction defence before
any other defences’, the ‘lack of jurisdiction’ defence has precedence over other defences
before the courts. This is evident in Ruling No 49 / T / 3 of 1418 AH 1998, where the
Audit-Circuit advised the judge of the Sub-Circuit to ignore all pleas and begin with the
judicial jurisdiction defence (that is, the lack of jurisdiction) as an essential defence; then
the judge could consider any other defences if it was proved to him that the court had
legal jurisdiction in the case. This is logical to make sure the court has jurisdiction in this
case according to the law.10

3.

Adherence to proper procedural processes. Administrative courts can overturn a ruling if
it violates the procedure of consideration of the case because this is what Ruling No 273 /
T / 1 of 1411 AH 1991 states: ‘[I]f the ruling violates the procedures [then it has an error
and] must be annulled.’11 This shows that the award must fulfil all the formal
requirements that have been mentioned earlier for the case to be considered. This
provision was also confirmed in another case (Ruling No 63 / T / 4 of 1416 AH 1996)
where the basis of the plea and the starting of any case before the Court is the initial
provision to the Court of clear and unambiguous memorandum, where the plaintiffs must
submit a detailed complaint that show their requests. Thus, we shall say the court requires
a written document to start to consider the case, and the aim of this written document is to
outline the plaintiff’s requests, with such requests in the memorandum to be clear and

10

The lack of jurisdiction was addressed as a defence related to public policy in Chapter 5 (5.4.1 The
Saudi Grievances Board and the Application of Public Policy).
11
For more information, see Bakr Abdullatif Alhabob, ‘Nz{ryt Albutlan fy Nz{am Almoraf‘at [The Theory
of Nullification in the System of Legal Proceedings]’ (1426 AH / 2006) 28 Majalat Al‘dl 164, 167.
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unambiguous. Therefore, if a plaintiff provides an ambiguous document, the court will not
accept it. However, if the requests are generally clear and specific but some need to be
explained or edited (and even if some points are vague), the court can ask the plaintiff to
clarify these points or use an experienced person, such as a legal accountant, to clarify
some specific matters.12 This requirement and other formal requirements are discussed
widely in the Appendix to this research.13

B.

Terms and Conditions in the Decision of the President of the Saudi Grievances Board
No 116 of 1428 AH (2007)

This decision contains all of the conditions that have been mentioned in national laws and
international agreements; moreover, it contains some new conditions and these are:
1.

The award must not violate Shari’a.14

2.

The award shall be final and enforceable. Also, the dispute can be resolved by arbitration,
according to national laws ‘arbitrability’.

3.

The award shall be issued in a State associated with Saudi Arabia in a convention,
whether bilateral, regional or international. Or the application is based on reciprocity.

4.

The award shall not be inconsistent with any ruling issued by a national court or
inconsistent with a case pending before a national court.

12

For more information about this principle, see the Saudi Grievances Board, Commercial Audit-Circuit
in the Grievances Board: Guideline Principles and Case Law, from 1407 AH (1987) to 1419 AH (1999)
84. It should be noted that this document, although written by the Saudi Grievances Board, is not an
‘official’ publication, but is in the hands of the vast majority of legal practitioners and is widely
available on the internet as a doc file on a number of websites. Its original title in Arabic is: [ هيئة التدقيق
هـ7072 هـ إلى عام7001 المبادى والسوابق القضائية من عام
:]التجاري بديوان المظالم.
ْ
13
See the Appendix for more information about the general points regarding to the formal requirements.
14
This relates to the public policy defence as a substantive defence, which will be discussed in the next
chapter (Chapter 5 particularly 5.4.1 The Saudi Grievances Board and the Application of Public
Policy).
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5.

The award shall not be issued against the Saudi government (contested, see further
below).

6.

The dispute has not been resolved by conciliation before submitting to arbitration.

7.

The award shall take into account the rules of the law of the contracting party for legal
representation for persons incompetent or incapacitated.

8.

The award should not be incompatible with agreements or treaties to which the Kingdom
is a party.

9.

The arbitral award should be issued pursuant to an arbitration clause in the original
contract or according to a valid agreement.

10.

Arbitrators should be competent in accordance with the contract or the arbitration clause,
or in accordance with the system in which it was made.

11.

Court’s power should not exceed the merits of the case.15

These conditions affect the merits of the case or the parties; if one fails, it means refusing to
implement the foreign arbitration. This shows the importance of these conditions; thus, they
shall be discussed in detail separately.
1.

The Award should not be in Violation of Shari’a

This is an objective requirement relating to the public policy exception which will be the focus
of the discussion in the next chapter.

15

This requirement will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter because of its
importance; it relates to the judge’s work in the implementation of the rule of foreign arbitration
(subsection 4.2).
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2.

The Award Shall Be Final, Enforceable and Able To Be Resolved by Arbitration –
‘Arbitrability’

This condition, in fact, includes three conditions that must be taken into account. First: the court
requires that the award be final and also have res judicata, according to the provision of Article
III(2) of the Decision of the President the Grievances Board No 116 of 1428 AH (2007);
secondly, the award should be capable of being performed in the Saudi Arabia; and thirdly, the
subject matter of the dispute must be capable of being resolved through arbitration.
First condition — Finality and res judicata: In fact, in regard finality and res judicata, there
are some rulings that dealt with this requirement, such as two notable decisions: Ruling No 152 /
T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006 and Ruling No 36 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005. The former dealt with
implementing a foreign judgment issued by the Court of First Instance in Kuwait, and states that
‘the rule to be implemented, became final and enforceable’, where the court has checked the
finality of that award and agreed that it is enforceable within Saudi Arabia. This finality of a
ruling must be in accordance with state law where the arbitral award was made. This means that
the award shall be final, according to the law where the arbitral award was issued.
The latter decision is Ruling No 36 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005. This states that ‘the arbitral award
had fulfilled the conditions for its implementation set forth in Article V of the Arab Convention
…, and the executive form [which is some phrases within the decision that prove the possibility
of enforcement] has been appended to that award …’.16 This means that the foreign arbitral
award to be implemented within Saudi Arabia must be final and have such form, which proves
the executory force of that award, otherwise it will be refused. Moreover, based on the Ruling
No 115 / D / E / 15 of 1429 AH 2009 (see further below), which considered that all the formal
conditions that have been addressed in the Decision of the President of the Grievances Board
No 116 of 2007 (as well as the subject matter of the arbitration) are related to the public policy
16

This ruling has used the Arab Convention 1952 because the foreign provision was issued by the Giza
Court in Egypt which is a member state to that convention.
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defence. Thus, the judge can reject the execution of the award, even if the other party did not
request that refusal on the basis of a public policy defence.17
Moreover, one of the applications of this principle of ‘finality’ was the Fourth Audit-Circuit’s
Ruling No 119 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006. This case involved the application of the South Cairo
Court’s judgment, which was supported by the Court of Appeal in the Arab Republic of Egypt.
The facts of this case were the claims by an Egyptian woman that she was the widow of the
deceased (her Saudi ex-husband) and he the father of her child for whom she requested
disbursement of his entitlement from the father’s estate by the Administrative Department in the
Emirate of Medina. This included funds for real estate that had been confiscated by the Emirate
of Medina for the development of that city’s centre. The case was considered by the TwentyFirst Sub-Circuit and the defendant sought the refusal of that provision based on the fact that
this provision was not final and was still pending before the Egyptian Court of Cassation.
Nevertheless, the Sub-Circuit supported the application of this provision. However, the AuditCircuit had refused implementation for several reasons, including the fact that the foreign
provision was not yet final, because it was still before the Egyptian Court of Cassation and the
provision that was presented was from the appeal court. Thus the provision was not yet final.18
Second condition — Being capable of being performed in Saudi Arabia: From an
exploration of the Grievances Board’s provisions, it is noted that the term ‘validity of the ruling
for implementation in the Kingdom’ was not frequently contained in the court’s rulings, except
where an award is contrary to Shari’a, or where there is a no obstacle to implementation. For

17

In regard to the defence of public policy, the judge is obliged to apply such defences on his own
without any need for a special request from any party to do so. This ruling (No 115 / D / E / 15 of 1429
AH 2009), which represents a very important judgment in the implementation of foreign arbitral
awards, will be discussed in more detail above in the next few lines and also in Chapter 5 (5.4.1 The
Saudi Grievances Board and the Application of Public Policy).
18
As at 1426 AH 2006 (the matter has not been brought after that before the Saudi courts: as at 31
December 2013). It should be noted that the Court of Cassation is at the apex of the judicial system in
Egypt where it has the authority to consider all of the sentences passed by the courts of appeal. This
court is considered the highest general court (that is, the third level of litigation in Egypt over the
Courts of Appeal which are in turn above the Courts of First Instance); only the Supreme Constitutional
Court of Egypt is higher.
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example, Ruling No 166 / T / 4 of 1428 AH 200819 states that ‘this provision has met the
necessary conditions for its implementation in the territory of the Kingdom...’. The statement is
an example of how the court frequently uses very general words in rulings both to accept
implementation (as here) or to deny or refuse implementation. Again, the court may reject it for
specific procedural reasons without the need to mention the lack of suitability for
implementation in the territory of Saudi Arabia (such as where an award is contrary to Shari’a,
Saudi law principles and peremptory norms). Logically, rejection of an award means certainly
that an award is not valid and is incapable of being performed within the country. Therefore, it
could be said that this general condition is related to the public policy defence (as a substantive
condition) more than any formal requirements where these concern the following of the
appropriate (suitable) application procedure and furnishing the appropriate documentation.
Thus, rejection of the abitral award is a result of the application of the conditions that prevent
the implementation where the general condition cannot be a reliable independent ground for the
rejection of implementing any foreign provision.
Third condition — Arbitrability: The subject matter of the dispute must be capable of being
resolved through arbitration (arbitrability). Through a perusal of the available decisions and the
Collection of Judicial Principles which was published by the Grievances Board in 2008, there
appear to be no rulings based on this defence (arbitrability) in circumstances where the award
cannot be settled by arbitration.20 Therefore, and to avoid repetition, the theoretical aspect of
such a condition will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter as a matter of public policy
defence more than a formal requirement.

19
20

This case was earlier explained earlier: Ruling No 166 / T / 4 of 1428 AH 2008.
Set of Principles Issued by the Administrative Audit-Circuits in the Saudi Grievances Board for the
Year 1427 AH 2008; and also the unpublished Commercial Audit-Circuit in the Grievances Board:
Guideline Principles and Case Law, from 1407 AH (1987) to 1419 AH (1999). It should be noted that
the new Grievances Board System 2007 requires the Board to compile and publish annually the
decisions handed down by the Grievances Board.
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3.

Reciprocity

A ‘Convention state’ here means that this State is linked with Saudi Arabia in a special
convention in regard to the implementation of foreign arbitral awards (that is, the New York
Convention). Otherwise, the application is based on the principle of reciprocity. This condition
was mentioned in all the international conventions and the national laws in Saudi Arabia. It is
obvious that the Grievances Board has proceeded with this approach, as it requires the existence
of an international convention or the existence of reciprocity in order to implement any foreign
arbitral award. It is also obvious that the court will verify the existence of any agreement that
would affect the application of any foreign award. But the question that was posed in the
previous chapter concerns the burden of proof for the reciprocity. Moreover, the documents that
may be required to prove the existence of reciprocity between the foreign country and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should be detailed.
It should be noted that most of the provisions examined in this study did not address this
requirement as a condition separate from the rest of the formal conditions. It always came
within the formal requirements in general. A single decision details this requirement, Ruling No
208 / T / 2 of 1418 AH 1998. This decision related to the implementation of the rule of foreign
arbitration between two companies (the plaintiff from Denmark against a Saudi company). In
this case, the plaintiff was obliged to supply and install machinery and operate a plant in
Dammam, Saudi Arabia. The contract included an arbitration clause to apply in the event of any
future dispute between the parties, in accordance with the rules of International Chamber of
Commerce. The plaintiff supplied these machines, but the defendant did not cover the full
amount on the basis of a difference in the types of these machines. That prompted the Danish
party to resort to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration clause in the agreement between
the parties and the suit was filed before the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce, which appointed a sole arbitrator with the approval of the parties.
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It should be noted that the arbitrator was in Amman in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and he
issued a ruling dated 7 July 1987 requiring the Saudi party to pay an amount of DKK 2,307,697
(with interest) as of 1 September 1980. The award became final upon the approval of the Court
of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, which sent a notice to the
parties about that ruling. The Saudi party did not comply with the arbitral award, thus forcing
the plaintiff to apply to the Grievances Board for the implementation of that provision, with the
explicit waiving of the interest part in that award (as a violation of Shari’a); thus, it limited its
requests to the real value of the contract (beside the arbitration expenses), which amounted to
USD 11,800. The defendant sought the refusal of the award on the basis that he did not attend
the arbitral tribunal and that the award was made in absentia; however, he could not deny
knowledge of the notices to attend meetings nor that he had received a copy of the ruling.21
Thus, the arbitral award was issued by the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris by a Jordanian arbitrator when he was in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
So, the Sub-Circuit decided to apply the Convention to that award as France is a party to this
convention; however, as the award is considered to be Jordanian as it was issued in Jordan, the
Riyadh Convention was to be applied to this award. Thus, the Circuit considered this as a proof
of the existence of the principle of reciprocity. There are two points that need to be clarified
here; first, the Circuit here is confirming the adoption of the geographical standard for the award
to be considered as being foreign, as the award was issued in Jordan although the arbitrator is
actually under the Court of Arbitration in the Chamber of Commerce in Paris. Second, the
Circuit has considered that proof of the existence of an international convention in that matter is
proof of the principle of reciprocity.
This represents a serious confusion and integration of the two criteria. The basic principle is that
if there is an agreement between the two countries or a convention governing arbitral relations
21

The plaintiff was seeking implementation in accordance with New York Convention and the Riyadh
Convention. He also submitted a certificate that was provided by the Jordanian Minister of Justice,
which states that the award became final, enforceable and has the res judicata, proving the possibility
of its application within the country (Jordan).
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between them, this means that there is no need for the reciprocity principle; but, if there is no
such agreement, this means there is a need for the principle of reciprocity to be demonstrated,
which is the second option to cover this shortfall. Thus, the existence of a relevant convention
(to which the country where the award is made and the country in which it is sought to be
implemented are signatories) obviates the demand for proof of reciprocity, but the lack of such
an agreement or convention means that this principle is the second option where foreign
arbitration is attempted to be applied.22
With regard to the reciprocity principle and the documents required to be submitted to prove the
existence of reciprocity, the Grievances Board has acknowledged some provisions that can be
discribed as follows:
a.

The reciprocity principle and the burden of proof: The burden of proving the existence of
reciprocity is, as explained before, on the party who requests the implementation of
foreign arbitral award in the Kingdom. This is a natural and logical requirement. This is
evident in the first decision released by the President of the Saudi Grievances Board in
that regard (Decision No 7 of 8.15.1405 AH 1985), where it states in paragraph IV that in
instances where there is no agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the
other state where the award was issued, the party who seeks implementation must prove
the principle of reciprocity; thus, he or she has the burden of proving that the state is
applying the provisions that were issued in the Kingdom according to the principle of
reciprocity.

22

The consideration of an agreement as demonstrating reciprocity is a major misunderstanding in regard
to this condition contained in all of the international conventions and the decision of the President of
the Grievances Board, because the conventions and also the resolution differed between these two
options (the existence of the agreement and the reciprocity). Also, according to the Saudi Basic Law
when any international convention is ratified by the Saudi Council of Ministers this convention
becomes binding; thus, there is no need to prove the principle of reciprocity. See Article 20 of the Saudi
Council of Ministers System, issued by Royal Decree No A / 13 of 3/3/1414 AH 1994 and
dissemination in Umm Al-Qura Gazette No 3468, 10/3/1414 AH 1994.
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This paragraph was repeated literally in some of the Grievances Board rulings. 23 In
another clear ruling (No 97 / T / 3 of 1411 AH 1991),24 the Audit-Circuit declared that the
implementation of a foreign award in the Kingdom depends on the presence of the
reciprocity and that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof as the seeker of
implementation.
b.

The documents required to prove reciprocity: The Articles of the Saudi Arbitration
System and also the Decision (above) of the President of the Grievances Board did not
specifically mention the documents required for proof of reciprocity. Therefore, the party
who seeks to implement the foreign arbitral award will resort to the general rules of
evidence and proof. Accordingly, the circuits have decided on more than one method in
some rulings about what is acceptable regarding the types of such documents. For
example, in Ruling No 102 / T / 4 of 1429 AH 2009, the Twentieth Sub-Circuit reports
that the plaintiff did not prove legally or practically that the provisions issued in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could be carried out in the United States of America.25 Thus,
the principle of reciprocity was not demonstrated.26 It should be noted that the term
‘legally’ here means that the party who made the request to enforce the foreign award did

23

For example, see Ruling No 102 / T / 4 of 1429 AH 2009.
In this case, the provision was released in the UK, pre-accession to the New York Convention, and
requested the submission of proof of reciprocity according to Ruling No 97 /T / 3 of 1411 AH 1991;
but after accession, such a requirement cannot exist because England is now one of the signatory
countries to the Convention.
25
This case was a request to implement a foreign judgment issued by the District Court of Columbia in
the United States. In fact, this case is to complete Ruling No 103 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005, as the old
judgment requested that the plaintiff ratify the document presented (as explained before). After the
ratification, the case was considered by the Twentieth Sub-Circuit for enforcement. The plaintiff also
presented other documents as evidence to prove reciprocity. However, the Sub-Circuit again refused to
implement that provision on the basis of the lack of proof of reciprocity. Again, it is an application of a
foreign judgment, not an arbitral award; however, it is very important to analyse this ruling to illustrate
the Grievances Board’s path in any documents submitted to prove the reciprocity, since the Court is
dealing with both the provisions of Arbitration and the provisions of foreign courts in the same manner
and applying the same principles. Once again, this shows the powers of Audit-Circuit on the SubCircuit’s provision where the Audit-Circuit reverses the decisions of Sub-Circuits and returns the
provision to the Sub-Circuits to determine its provision in light of the Audit-Circuit notice.
26
This ruling is similar to a ruling issued before joining the New York Convention, that is, Ruling No 57 /
T / 3 of 1411 AH 1991, where it is judged that the plaintiff did not prove the existence of reciprocity
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and France in the implementation of the verdicts with the use of
the same principles.
24
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not provide the legal texts of foreign law which would have demonistrated the possibility
of applying the Saudi provisions in that country. The word ‘practically’ means that there
are no judicial precedents to prove the application of a Saudi provision. However, this
circuit ignored some documents that had been submitted:
1.

There were some letters written by a judge in the US District Court of Columbia,
wherein it is explained that the US courts will implement any foreign judgments,
that according to the principle of courtesy in public law (as a basis for dealing with
one another) and under the law of the recognition of foreign funds under ‘District
of Columbia Code No. 15-381’; thus, the courts in that District are applying the
principle of reciprocity. So it can be said that this certificate includes two things,
namely, a proof of the legal text and judicial approval.

2.

A certificate from the Saudi ambassador to the United States explaining that the
provisions of US laws permit the enforcement of foreign judgments.

3.

The plaintiff had provided an old American case, where a US court in New York
had rejected the implementation of a Saudi ruling according to the limitation of the
right to file a suit and the expiration of the period allowed for starting the case. So,
the rejection of the Saudi verdict was not based on the lack of reciprocity.
Additionally, the US court declared that final and definitive foreign judgments are
binding before the Court of New York and can be implemented and also it
considered them binding on the two parties. This may prove the possibility of the
application if the suit was filed in a timely manner. Surprisingly, the Sub-Circuit
judge did not take these documents as a proof for the principle of reciprocity.

4.

However, the Audit-Circuit annulled that verdict and recognised these documents
and stated that the Saudi Arbitration System did not specify the documents required
to prove the existence of the implementation of the reciprocity principle. As a
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result, there is no text that limits the principle of reciprocity to the application of a
Saudi judicial ruling in other states to implement or accept the foreign provision.
Therefore, the request to prove an existing judicial precedent is not according to the
law. Moreover, the conduct of the US court means that there is a possibility of the
application of the Saudi provisions, as the refusal was based on procedural and
formal grounds. Thus, it is obvious that under the US laws there is a possibility to
implement foreign judgments. This requires the Saudi court to apply the principle
of reciprocity and apply that judgment. Furthermore, this provision did not violate
the public policy in Saudi Arabia; hence, it has to be implemented.27
In the same context (that is, methods of proof of reciprocity), there is a ruling that was issued
before Saudi Arabia joined the Convention 1958, namely, Ruling No 97 / T / 3 of 1411 AH 1991.
In this ruling the court refused to implement a provision issued in the United Kingdom based on
the absence of proof of reciprocity between the two countries; and there was no agreement
linking the two countries for the implementation of such provisions.
The plaintiff had submitted a certificate issued by the Office of the Ministry of Justice in
England showing that there was a possibility of implementation of any foreign judgment,
including the Saudi judgments, within the United Kingdom. Also, he provided a written
certificate by a British lawyer working in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, explaining the
possibility of the enforcement of foreign judgments in the United Kingdom. The plaintiff also
submitted a copy of the British Civil Procedural Rule, which refers to the possibility of
enforcement of foreign judgments.

27

It should be noted that the Audit-Circuit did not address the testimony of the Saudi ambassador; thus, it
is not sure that such document can prove the principle of reciprocity. In fact, this certificate was not
issued by an official authority in a foreign country where it is a certificate from a national department
that has no authority over national courts; however, it could represent the existence of the principle of
reciprocity where it is similar to an expert’s testimony; however, in my opinion, it is not binding on the
national judge.
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The Audit-Circuit refused the implementation of that provision due to the lack of proof of
reciprocity and commented on those documents as follows:
1.

The certificate issued by the Office of the Ministry of Justice in United Kingdom does not
prove exactly the existence of reciprocity between the two countries.

2.

The certificate submitted by the British lawyer is not valid, because he is an ordinary
citizen and does not act on behalf an official department.

3.

The submission of a copy of Article 14 of the British procedural rule is not enough
because the plaintiff has to provide a copy of the intire British Civil Procedural Rule to
enable the Circuit to evaluate that defence according to British law.

This may mean that each certificate must be specified, unequivocal, issued by an official
department or a court in the foreign country and decisive in regard to the possibility of the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards.
Returning to Ruling No 208 / T / 2 of 1418 AH 1998, which was actually handed down in Jordan
in 1991 by an arbitrator belonging to the International Court of Arbitration under the Chamber
of Commerce of Paris, this is, in fact, a strange ruling, as this award was diverted from other
circuits for lack of jurisdiction according to the changes that took place at that time in the
Grievances Board. As a result, the verdict was not issued until 1998, after accession of the Saudi
Arabia to the Convention in 1414 AH (1994).
Consequently, the defendant asked that the Convention not to be applied because the ruling was
issued in 1991 before Saudi Arabia’s accession to that convention. The response of the AuditCircuit was that the award is applicable under both the Convention and the Arab Convention
1952. Additionally, the certificate that was provided by the Jordanian Minister of Justice records
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that the award was final, enforceable and had the res judicata and thus proved the possibility of
its application in the Kingdom of Jordan.28
These rulings demonstrate that the burden of proof for the existence of reciprocity before the
court rests with the plaintiff; and this reciprocity could be proved by:
i.

Proving the existence of an agreement or treaty between the two countries.

ii.

Proving the existence of the implementation of a Saudi provision in that foreign state.

iii.

A certificate from a court of the country that issued the ruling, or by the Ministry of
Justice of that country, which contains evidence that the provision is final and enforceable
in the same country if there is any convention between Saudi Arabia and that country (as
in Jordan where the award was capable of being performed in the two countries under the
Arab Convention 1952).

iv.

Finally, it is possible to accept the provisions of the foreign arbitral award if an approved
translation of the full text of the foreign law supports the implementation of the
provisions of foreign arbitration, but the text must be clear and explicit. The clarity in the
text is, in my opinion, necessary and imperative, so that the national judge does not have
to interpret the foreign law. The reason is that interpretation may create a difference in the
understanding of the foreign law or an error in the application of certain principles due to
a variation in the judicial principles from one country to another.

4.

The Foreign Award Shall Not Be Inconsistent with a National Court Judgment or a Case
Pending before a National Court

There is a single provision released by the Twenty-First Sub-Circuit when implementing a
foreign rule; and there is also a domestic ruling issued by a Saudi public court (the Court of
28

Again, Jordan is a signatory to the Riyadh Convention so it was better to refer to this convention than to
any other convention, because it is the direct convention in this regard and also the plaintiff mentioned
this convention in his defence.
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Jeddah). This case, which was referred to earlier, is Ruling No 119 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006. It
was a request to implement a foreign judgment released by the Giza Court of First Instance,
between an Egyptian woman against the heirs of her Saudi ex-husband. It should be noted that
the Sub-Circuit did not discuss the existence of that Saudi national ruling (Ruling No
146/384/41 of 28/6/1418 AH 1997 issued by the Shari’a Court in Jedda) and its finality!
Surprisingly, it gives the foreign provision force, which means the foreign provision is binding
and enforceable. However, the Fourth Audit-Circuit annulled this verdict for several reasons
relating to the formal requirements, which included failure to provide proof of finality for the
foreign provision,29 as the case was still before the Egyptian Court of Cassation and the
presented provision was from the Egyptian Appeal Court (a court lower than the Court of
Cassation). Also, it is inconsistent with a national provision issued by a Saudi court (the Court
of Jeddah), which produced results and an ending of the conflict according to the Saudi laws.
Thus, the foreign rule requires verification in terms of being final and not contrary to a national
court ruling in any aspect. Thus, the Audit-Circuit has directed the Sub-Circuit to consider these
reasons in order to give the correct judgment.30
This may raise a number of issues about the violation or contravention of any national judgment
by the foreign award.31 One is whether this contravention would need to be clear and involve
‘the whole case’, that is, with like parties and like subject of the dispute; or whether it would be
sufficient for a contravention to exist in some respects only. Logically, the conflict, which can
be the basis for the rejection of the foreign rule, must be contrary as a whole, or substantially to
29

It should be again noted that this is a family case and, as explained before, the Saudi Grievances Board
is dealing with foreign judgments and foreign arbitral award in the same manner; thus, such a case will
show the court’s trend in applying the formal requirements in applying foreign judgments or foreign
arbitral awards.
30
It should be noted that this provision did not discuss this issue deeply (that is, the existence of a
national ruling) but merely made reference to the ruling of the national court as one of the reasons that
prevent the implementation of this provision, and relied more on other reasons. For more details about
this provision, see Ruling No 119 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006.
31
This situation may be similar to the violation of public policy where the violation of public policy is
either violating a general legal principle or violating a legal text. But the violation of a court ruling may
conflict with the res judicata principle, which may fall under the public policy defence or it could be
counted as an independent substantive requirement where it only concerns the violation of the national
judgments.
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the national judgment. But, if the award is partially contrary to a national judgment, we can
apply the proper part and refuse to implement the contrary part. This can only be in case where
the contrary part in the foreign award is able to be severed from the rest of the award and a
partial award implemented (as is possible under the Convention).
This result can be deduced by comparison to the possibility of severability of the foreign award
in regard to its application, if it partly contrary to the public policy which will be explained in
the next chapter. In the absence of the severability (the possibility of separating the award into
sections able to be implemented and those unable to be implemented), the judge is obliged to
reject the execution of the award as a whole. This trend may be logical in comparison with what
is contained in Article V of the Convention; thus, it can be regarded that in relation to the res
judicata in the national judgments, it is a matter of public policy to be able to apply the
possibility of severability. It should be noted that this remains a wide standard; also, it is subject
to the judge’s discretion in determining the fundamental breach of the national judgment and to
determine the possibility of the severability of the application of foreign award.
5.

The Award Shall Not Be Issued against the Saudi Government

In fact, there is no ruling presented to the Grievances Board about arbitration between the Saudi
government and any other party. However, it should be noted that this is a strange or
unexpected condition, or it can be said that this appears contrary to what was stated in the Saudi
Arbitration System 1983 and the Saudi Grievances Board System 1982, where Article 3 of the
Saudi Arbitration System 1983 admits the possibility of arbitral awards where it states:
‘Government departments may not resort to arbitration to settle their disputes with their parties
except after approval of the President of the Council of Ministers. This provision may be
amended by a resolution from the Council of Ministers.’ (emphasis added)
This indicates that once approval is secured from the President of the Council of Ministers, the
government department is allowed to resort to the arbitration. Thus, the arbitral award is under
the jurisdiction of the Grievances Board in accordance with the Article 3 of the Saudi
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Arbitration System 1983 and also according to paragraphs (d) and (g) of Article 13 of the
Grievances Board’s new governing legislation, which was issued by Royal Decree No M / 78
dated 19/9/1428 AH (2007), where paragraph (d) gives the Grievances Board the authority to
consider any claims relating to contracts to which the administrative departments are party,
while paragraph (g) gives the Grievances Board the authority to consider any foreign arbitral
award. Such jurisdiction cannot be taken from the Grievances Board except by law.
The above analysis of the President of the Grievances Board Decision No 116 of 1428 AH
(2007), which relies on a legal mandate from the Council of Ministers, shows that with regard to
this paragraph, that decision may exceed its true function (that is, the foundation of controls to
implement any foreign arbitral award) and that adoption is beyond the issues of authorisation
issued by the Council of Ministers, which violates a high and explicit legal provisions.32
Therefore, any departure from the mandate can be considered as null and void. But the question
remains whether this court will apply this condition or will apply the principles of law regarding
the mandate and its limits to eliminate such requirement. In fact, such cases are very few, such
as the case of Aramco, which is one of the most important cases in the area of international
trade. Such cases often end peacefully, as happened in this instance, with each party
implementing their part without any need for the appeal against the arbitral award.33
Furthermore, according to the above, and also to the Articles of the Saudi Grievances Board
System 2007, it is stated that the administrative court shall — as the competent court —
undertake the examination of all applications for the implementation of the provisions of foreign
arbitral awards. Also the Articles of the same legislation give the Grievances Board the

32

It is well known that the legal nature of the decision of the President of the Grievances Board is a
regulatory decision issued in according to a mandate from the Saudi legislature, but the above
provisions were contained in a legal texts (the Saudi Arbitration System and in the Saudi Grievances
Board System) which are higher than such a regulatory decision. Therefore, according to the principle
of legality, any legal rule must not contravene a higher legal rule or it will be abolished.
33
For more information about this case see Ahmed El Kosheri, ‘International Arbitration and Petroleum
Contracts, in Encyclopaedia of Hydrocarbons’ vol IV, Hydrocarbons: Economics, Policies and
Legislation (Instituto Della Enciclopedia Italiana, Fondata da Giovanni Treccani, 2007) 879.
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authority to consider all of the administrative disputes to which any government body is a party.
It did not specify a particular kind of issue, so the text is very general, and includes any
government body and any disputes, in accordance with Article 13(d) of the Saudi Grievances
Board System 2007 as stated above.34 Finally, it could be said that this condition is still
mandatory until any party to any future case appeals on it to see the trend of the Grievances
Board.
6.

Dispute Was Not Resolved by Conciliation before Submission to Arbitration

It should be noted that this condition is not mentioned in any of the conventions or agreements
that the Kingdom has joined and also this condition did not exist in the older decision by the
President of the Grievances Board, that is, Decision No 7 of 1405 AH (1985), but has been
added in the new decision — Decision No 116 of 1428 AH (2007) — which deals with the
conditions of implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards.
According to the sample cases that have been examined in this research and listed in the
bibliography, there is a single provision in this regard that was issued before the issuance of the
new decision — Decision No 116 of 1428 AH (2007), that is, Ruling No 187 / T / 4 of 1426 AH
2006.
This case was a request to implement a foreign judgment released by the Court of the Sultanate
of Oman. This case was raised before the Fifth Sub-Circuit, and then cancelled because of the
absence of the plaintiff’s lawyers. Also, the parties had made a settlement agreement outside the
court in 2004. Then the case was again submitted in the same year to the court because the
defendant did not comply with the conciliation agreement. The plaintiff, therefore, called for the
execution of the foreign provision. The Sub-Circuit refused to implement that decision on the

34

For more information, see Abdulaziz Bin Zaid, ‘Mda> Jwaz Alth}ki>m fy Al‘qwd Aledari>h: Derasah
Muqarnh [The Permissibility of Arbitration in the Government Contract]’ (Masters (Research) Thesis,
Faculty of Law, University of Jordan, 2006) 19. It should be noted that the Aramco case may be the
reason for such an Article, that is, to ensure that government departments have done some research
before rushing to resort to arbitration to preserve the national wealth.
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basis that the conciliation had replaced the foreign decision. Also, the conciliation contract had
ensured in one of its articles that this conciliation would end all disputes between the parties and
be binding on them all. So if the parties have any dispute regarding that contract, they must go
to the competent court (the Shari’a court).
The Sub-Circuit claimed that the Grievances Board courts may consider a foreign judgment if
the conciliation has been annulled or revoked by the competent court for considering
conciliation contracts as a civil contract, which here is the Shari’a court. Therefore, Grievances
Board courts are not competent to consider conciliation claims. The plaintiff had appealed
against that ruling, asking for annulment on the basis that the Sub-Circuit had discussed the
merits of the case and entered into the details of the contract, when it had no right to do so
according to the Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No 7 of 1405 AH 1985 and
any international convention that Saudi Arabia has ratified. However, the Fourth Audit-Circuit
had supported the ruling of the Sub-Circuit on the grounds that the judge did not elaborate on
the merits, but stressed that the conciliation agreement had replaced the foreign judgment,
meaning that the conciliation has settled the rights of the parties. Additionally, the conciliation
agreement itself did not stipulate the invalidity of that agreement in the event of breach of its
implementation, but, it decided that the party who breached the implementation of this
agreement was obliged to compensate the other party. Then the Audit-Circuit ended its ruling
by saying when the case had ended, that the Audit-Circuit supported the Sub-Circuit in its
ruling. Therefore, the Audit-Circuit considered the case to be terminated because of the
existence of conciliation.
Several points in this ruling should be noted:
a.

The long procedures (starting with the dates for suing and then the cancellation of the
case and then the re-opening of the case) raises a question about the Audit-Circuit’s
function and not commenting on such lengthy procedures, which inevitably affect the
course of justice, is impossible. There are two possible causes in such an instance: first,
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the re-consideration of this case may mean that the plaintiff has performed all the
procedures pursuant to the law and within the legal time limit before the Sub-Circuit, and
thus, this circuit has accepted consideration of the case for the second time. Alternatively,
the plaintiff did not perform all the legal procedures or did so but exceeded the legal limit,
so the request in this case shall be refused where the Audit-Circuit had erred by
disregarding such violations.
b.

According to the conventions and laws in force at that time, the existence of the
conciliation contract is not a reason to reject the enforcement of such decisions (either a
foreign judgment or a foreign arbitral award). The judge was applying the general
provisions of law and Shari’a about the conciliation as a mean of ending the dispute.
However, it should be noted that the two circuits did not refer to public policy as a reason
to reject the case where the conflict, according to public policy in the Kingdom, is
terminated because of conciliation between the parties.

c. If this was the case before the Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No 116 of
1428 AH (2007), currently the ruling would produce the same results and the foreign award
would be rejected, and that is not due to the expiration of the lawsuit, but to the following:
i.

For violation of public policy. It is important to take into account the fact that the
condition is contained in the Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No
116 of 1426 AH 2006 and that all such conditions may relate to public policy
according to the Fifteenth Sub-Circuit’s Ruling No 115 / D / E / 15 of 1429 AH
2009. As explained, this was where the Sub-Circuit considered all the requirements
(that is, both the substantive and formal) as public policy defences and there was
no comment from the Audit-Circuit on this outcome. Therefore, the existence of
the conciliation contract before the suit prevents the court from considering the
case.
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ii.

If we look at the second part of this requirement, namely that ‘the case should not
have been reconciled before submission to the application for enforcement’, in this
instance the application for enforcement came first and then the case had been
cancelled and then reopened again. Thus, one could ask whether it is right for a
judge to refuse to consider the foreign judgment according to the existence of the
conciliation between the parties.

iii.

In this particular case, the conciliation had been held and agreed between the
parties outside the court, so that is the reason that the plaintiff did not attend the
court, thus causing the cancellation of the case. Therefore, the existence of the
conciliation prevents the court from considering that case as an implementation of
that new agreement. Thus, any consideration of the case after that cancellation
needs to be as a new case. It is not clear when the parties had asked the judge to
stay the proceedings of the case because of the existence of the new agreement or
‘conciliation’, and after the conciliation the parties have to return to raise the issue
before the same judge for any reason. In this case, the judge is obliged to resume
the case, where the conciliation was an option for the disputants, and under the
authority of the judge.

7.

Parties to the Conflict Shall Not Be under Any Incapacity

For this condition, there is no case relation to this matter in the research sample and also by the
extrapolation from the set of principles issued by the Grievances Board in the year 1427 AH
(2008); however, it is not difficult to predict the court role in the future if it faces such a
situation. The court will deal with it on the ground of public policy to protect the rights of
incapacitated persons as one of the conditions that was received in the Decision of the
Grievances Board (as explained previously) in Ruling No 115 / D / E / 15 of 1429 AH 2009
where all of these conditions are considered to be a public policy defence as explained earlier.
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8.

The Award Should Not Be Incompatible with Agreements or Treaties to Which the
Kingdom Is a Party

There are many provisions that have been discussed in regard to the obligation to adhere to
certain formal requirements in some international agreements. Therefore and to avoid repetition,
the Grievances Board, in many of these provisions, may refuse to implement some foreign
awards or implement others on the basis of whether those provisions violate the formal terms
and conditions of a specific agreement, particularly the 1952 Arab Convention and GCC
Convention, or not. But for substantive requirements that have been mentioned in the
conventions to which the Kingdom is a party, there is no award that has been refused
implementation due to a violation of any certain convention, whether the convention relates to
the implementation of foreign judgments and arbitral awards or any other convention. Hence,
the Saudi Grievances Board has been applying the formal requirements contained in
international agreements (especially the regional agreements) but where there is no provision
that violates any other convention. One could imagine some of the irregularities of some
international agreements if the arbitral award is contrary to regional or international agreement
on ways to transfer money and the foreign award required the conversion of certain amounts
from one country to another. In such cases the parties must follow the provisions in that
convention in regard to any payment, or they might be in contravention of the national law
according to a signed international agreement.
9.

The Award Should Be Issued Pursuant to an Arbitration Clause or According to a Valid
Agreement

This was included in the Convention in Article 2(3), but there is no decision from the
Grievances Board about this condition. However, it should be noted that there is a general wellknown rule in Shari’a governing such situations, namely, ‘That which is built on falsehood is
false’. Therefore, any arbitral award that has been obtained by a false or void clause or
agreement is an invalid award, making it unable to be implemented in the Kingdom. Hence, an
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arbitration provision would be null and void for violating Shari’a, ‘the public policy in the
Saudi Arabia’. Moreover, the arbitration award will be null and void because it is contrary to the
conditions that have been stated in the President of the Grievances Board’s decision, in which
all of these conditions are considered (by the Sub-Circuit) as a public policy defence according
to the Ruling No 115 / D / E / 15 of 1429 AH 2009 as explained before.35
However, the critical question here revolves around the authority of the court in the case of
absence of an arbitration clause or agreement, which would open the field to asking about the
possibility of considering the case and starting the proceedings. That was clarified in Ruling No
99 / T / 4 of 1415 AH 1995, where it stated that the lack of an arbitration document (clause or
agreement) is a contravention of the arbitration system and the award that is issued by the SubCircuit had been issued contrary to the provisions of the law. As a result, the parties had to
prepare an arbitration document. It should be noted that, this ruling was about a domestic
arbitral award. However, this does raise the same question about the foreign arbitral award.
First of all, it is hard to imagine that the parties to a dispute about an international contract
would resort to arbitration without an arbitration clause in the contract or an arbitration
agreement issued after the emergence of the dispute; it is almost impossible and unlikely.
However, it is important to have a real case in that regard in order to explore the role of the
Grievances Board in an instance where an arbitration clause or agreement is absent.
I believe that the court can refuse to consider such an award due to a violation of public policy
because, first, it violates the texts of the Saudi Arbitration System, which requires the existence
of an arbitration agreement, whether as a clause in the original contract or in the form of an
agreement. It also violates the Convention, where it stipulated in Article I(2) that the arbitral
awards include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case, but also those
made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted, and under Article II(2)
35

This case will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter where it is related to the public policy
defence more than any other defence, but it is important to mention it here in regard to this condition.
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the term ‘agreement in writing’ includes an arbitral clause in a contract or arbitration agreement
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. Therefore, there must
be written documents to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement (or clause).
10.

The Authority of the Arbitrators

Arbitrators should be authorised in accordance with the contract or the arbitration clause or in
accordance with the system applicable where it was made. In fact, and according to the sample
that has been taken for the application of this research, there is no ruling about the arbitral award
that has been released or issued by a non-authorised arbitrator (according to the law of the state
where the award was issued). But it is clear that the court would reject any award if it is proved
that the arbitrators were not authorised in accordance with the arbitration clause/agreement. The
critical question that could be raised here is limited to the criteria that will be used to determine
the authority of the arbitrators. It is obvious that it is useful for the judge to resolve such
practical problems by the analysis of the provisions of foreign law with the analysis of the
provisions of the arbitration clause or arbitration agreement to reach the intention of the parties.
Thus, there is a need for a real case to be considered to determine the path of the court and its
powers to determine the arbitrator’s authority for us to be able to discuss the many topics arising
from this situation.
However, another situation should be noted in this regard, which is instances of lack of
jurisdiction, where the arbitrators exceeded the terms of the arbitration agreement. For example,
if the conflict was about applying the penalty clause related to a delay in the payment of a debt
but the arbitrator ruled that one party had to pay the full amount of the debt; the rule would be
invalid because it exceeded the limits of the arbitration agreement between the parties, which
was about the application of the penalty clause not the whole debt.
The court will apply the part that corresponds to the arbitration agreement, while the other part,
which is exceeded, will be refused. This was the decision of the Audit-Circuit in Ruling No 33 /
T / 4 of 1414 AH 1994, where it stressed that the arbitrators are obliged to the subject of the
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claim, and it was agreed by the parties to resort to arbitration. Therefore, any request that is
different from the original claim should be annulled.36 This situation may arise with respect not
to the arbitration agreement, but in regard to the arbitration clause, which came within the
original contract terms. In fact, before the emergence of any conflict, it is hard to imagine that
the parties can specify the type of any future conflict.37
11.

Court’s Power Should Not Exceed the Merits of the Case

This requirement will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter because of its
importance and its relation to the judge’s work regarding the implementation of foreign arbitral
awards.
These are the formal conditions that have been mentioned in the decision of the President of the
Grievances Board which contained ten formal conditions as discussed starting with the proof of
the finality of the award and ‘arbitrability’ (Decision No 7 of 1405 AH 1985), also the issuance
place (that is, in a Convention State), or the application is based on reciprocity. Additionally, the
award shall not be inconsistent with any ruling issued by a national court or inconsistent with a
case pending before a national court.
Moreover, Decision No 116 that the award shall not be issued against the Saudi government
should be read in the context of a legislation that reads ‘without prior permission’ to resort
to arbitration as the arbitration process would be invalid from the beginning before the issuance
of the award which makes the award invalid. (Hence if a department had entered into arbitration
without permission, any award secured could not be implemented because of the invalidity of
the arbitration process.) In addition, the dispute must not have been resolved by the conciliation
before submission to arbitration, or the award will not be implemented.

36

See the Commercial Audit-Circuit in the Grievances Board: Guideline Principles and Case Law, from
1407 AH (1987) to 1419 AH (1999) Ruling No 33 / T / 4 of 1414 AH 1994.
37
It should be noted that through the exploration of many of the Grievances Board cases, the circuits do
not require a particular formulation for the arbitration clause, so they will accept the general
formulation of the arbitration clause as proof of the existence of arbitration.
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Furthermore, the award shall take into account the rules of the law of the contracting party for
legal representation for incompetent or incapacitated persons. The award should also not be
incompatible with agreements or treaties to which the Kingdom is a party. Additionally, the
arbitral award should be issued pursuant to an arbitration clause in the original contract or
according to a valid agreement, and the arbitrators should be competent in accordance with that
clause or agreement, or in accordance with the system under which it was made. Finally, the
court’s power should not exceed the merits of the case.
4.1.2

Formal and Substantive Requirements in Australia

Article II of New York Convention requires that, ‘[e]ach contracting state shall recognise an
agreement in writing ...’ and Article III states that the contracting states ’shall recognise and
enforce’ foreign arbitral awards in accordance with the rules of procedure law applying in the
state where the award is to be applied (and under the conditions set out in the Articles of the
Convention). Conditions imposed are not to be ‘substantially more onerous’ than those applying
to that state’s domestic awards.38 Article IV prescribes the documentation that must be produced
to enable the foreign arbitral award to be enforced, namely, the supply of the duly authenticated
original award or a duly certified copy thereof, the original agreement (referred to in Article II)
or a duly certified copy thereof, and a translation of the foreign award certified by an official or
sworn translator (or diplomatic or consular agent) if the award or agreement is not in the
language of the country where the award is sought to be enforced.
These requirements are, in fact, reflected in section 9 of the IAA, where it states:
(1) In any proceedings in which a person seeks the enforcement of a foreign award by
virtue of this part, he or she shall produce to the court:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy; and
(b) The original arbitration agreement under which the award purports to have been made
or a duly certified copy.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an award shall be deemed to have been duly
authenticated, and a copy of an award or agreement shall be deemed to have been duly
38

Additionally, IAA s 8(2) provides that ‘a foreign award may be enforced in a court of a state or territory
as if the award were a judgment or order of that court.’
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certified, if: (a) It purports to have been authenticated or certified, as the case may be, by
the arbitrator or, where the arbitrator is a tribunal, by an officer of that tribunal, and it has
not been shown to the court that it was not in fact so authenticated or certified; or (b) It has
been otherwise authenticated or certified to the satisfaction of the court.
(3) If a document or part of a document produced under subsection (1) is written in a
language other than English, there shall be produced with the document a translation, in the
English language, of the document or that part, as the case may be, certified to be a correct
translation.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a translation shall be certified by a diplomatic or
consular agent in Australia of the country in which the award was made or otherwise to the
satisfaction of the court.
(5) A document produced to a court in accordance with this section is, upon mere
production, receivable by the court as prima facie evidence of the matters to which it
relates.

Such conditions must be met in order to have an enforceable arbitration award. Additionally, in
Australia it is necessary to follow the court’s procedures for the enforcement of the foreign
award. In this regard, it should be noted that section 8(3A) of the IAA has limited the judge
powers in refusing to implement the rule of foreign arbitration, where the text states that ‘the
court may only refuse to enforce the foreign award in the circumstances mentioned in
subsections (5) and (7)’.39 This limitation frequently appears in the application of the formal
requirements where section 7(A) gives the judge wide discretion in the public policy defence (as
we shall see in the public policy chapter).
39

It should be mentioned that subsections 5, 6, and 7 state:
(5) Subject to subsection (6) in any proceedings in which the enforcement of a foreign award by
virtue of this Part is sought, the court may, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked,
refuse to enforce the award if that party proves to the satisfaction of the court that: (a) that party,
being a party to the arbitration agreement in pursuance of which the award was made, was, under
the law applicable to him or her, under some incapacity at the time when the agreement was
made; (b) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law expressed in the agreement to be
applicable to it or, where no law is so expressed to be applicable, under the law of the country
where the award was made; (c) that party was not given proper notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his or her case in
the arbitration proceedings; (d) the award deals with a difference not contemplated by, or not
falling within the terms of, the submission to arbitration, or contains a decision on a matter
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; (e) the composition of the arbitral authority or
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(f) the award has not yet become binding on the parties to the arbitration agreement or has been
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, the award was made. (6) Where an award to which paragraph (5)(d) applies contains
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration and those decisions can be separated from decisions
on matters not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters so
submitted may be enforced. (7) In any proceedings in which the enforcement of a foreign award
by virtue of this Part is sought, the court may refuse to enforce the award if it finds that: (a) the
subject matter of the difference between the parties to the award is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the laws in force in the State or Territory in which the court is sitting; or (b) to
enforce the award would be contrary to public policy.
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Therefore, it can be said that according to the Convention and the IAA, the power of the judge is
to ensure that the arbitration satisfies the formal requirements without going into the merits of
the case. These formal requirements before the Australian courts can be discussed as follows:
1.

The arbitration clause/agreement must be in a written document: that is, a clause in a
contract or a written arbitration agreement.

2.

Formal requirements include the need to submit the original arbitral award or a certified
copy, with a translation for any document submitted in a language other than English.

3.

Parties to the conflict shall not be under some incapacity.

4.

The arbitration agreement should be valid under the law expressed in the agreement or
where no law is so expressed to be applicable under the law of the country where the
award was made.

5.

A party must have been given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings.

6.

Arbitrators must not exceed the powers granted them by the agreement or clause of
arbitration.

7.

The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure must be in accordance
with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, in accordance with the law
of the country where the arbitration took place.

8.

The award must have become binding.

9.

The award has been issued in a Convention country or the enforcement will be in
accordance with the reciprocity.

These are the formal requirements that have been required by the Convention, the IAA and
required by some Australian state and territory courts as we shall see. It is obvious that these
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requirements to some extent match the formal requirements mentioned in the decision of the
President of the Saudi Grievances Board. As Saudi Arabia has become a signatory to the
Convention, these conditions can be applied before the Saudi courts on the international arbitral
awards which are required to be implemented in accordance to the Convention. In this section,
each requirement will be discussed separately.
1. The Arbitration Clause/Agreement Must Be a Written Document
The term ‘agreement in writing’ has the same meaning before the Australian courts as in the
Convention. It is defined in section 3(2) of the IAA as ‘a clause in a contract or an arbitration
agreement signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams’.40 Thus, the
Australian judge will check the existence of such a written document before proceeding in the
case.41 In a contrast, there is no such clear and direct requirement concerning the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia.
This written document is proof of the existence of the arbitration, because the courts are the
competent authority to consider any disputes between the parties, and while the law gives the
right to the parties to resort to arbitration as an alternative route and parallel to judiciary, this
right must be clear and specific and shown to be the will of the parties to the exclusion of the
judiciary.

40

See FG Hemisphere Associates Llc v Democratic Republic of Congo [2010] NSWSC 1394, where
Hammerschlag J addresses these formal requirements. Also, concerning the agreement of the written
documents and the process of international arbitration governed by the International Arbitration Act
1974 (Cth), see His Honour Justice Barrett in WesTrac Pty Ltd v Eastcoast OTR Tyres Pty Ltd [2008]
NSWSC 894. For more information about this case, see New South Wales Supreme Court website,
WesTrac Pty Ltd v Eastcoast OTR Tyres Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 894 (2 February 2009)
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/scjudgments/2008nswsc.nsf/aef73009028d6777ca25673900081e8d/1
af2ab9a91f29757ca2574b3000ca90b?OpenDocument>.
41
It should be noted that in Australia, as we shall see, Kirby J in Hide & Skin Trading Pty Ltd v Oceanic
Meat Traders Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 310, at G, 313 observed: ‘It is the fundamental rule that a Court
should give the words of a written agreement [which has been addressed in the IAA and the
Convention] the natural meaning that they bear.’
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Judge Einstein has summarised the purposes for requiring the written agreement in three points
in his judgment in HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited v R J Wallace sued (HIH),42
where he stated:
The policy underlying the definition in Article II(2) and the requirement that an agreement
be “in writing” is to ensure that [1-] The arbitration agreement was actually consented to
and concluded ... [2-] The formal requirements also serve the purpose of ensuring that the
terms of the arbitration are clear and susceptible of proof ... [3-] The Requirement of a
Written Form ... was included in the Convention with the intention of overcoming the
43
divergence of national laws in favour of a uniform rule as to formal validity ...

In HIH, Einstein J held that the service of suit clause offered HIH a contractual option to either
litigate or to arbitrate disputes arising under the contract where HIH exercised its right to
litigate. Hence, there is no arbitration clause in force where ‘the arbitration agreement contained
in Article XIX of the policies would not be operative because of the exercise by HIH of the
option contractually reserved to it.’44 As a result, the IAA is not applicable. This shows the role
of the competent courts in the examination of the words ‘written agreement’ where it should
give it the natural meaning that they bear.45 However, it is a delicate problem that may be seen
as an issue in applying arbitration and that is due to the authority of the court and its
interpretation of the arbitration clause/agreement.46

42

See HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited (in liquidation) v R J Wallace, [2006] NSWSC 1150
(3 November 2006) (HIH) at 135(i). Wallace sued on his own behalf and on behalf of all other
members of Syndicate No 683 at Lloyd’s of London in regard to the 1993 Underwriting Account.
Einstein J stressed that the signatures of all parties to an agreement or arbitration clause are required.
43
For the same meaning, see Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd v The Ship ‘Comandate’ (No 2) [2006] FCA
1112.
44
HIH [2006] NSWSC 1150, at 123 (Einstein J).
45
See Hide & Skin Trading Pty Ltd v Oceanic Meat Traders Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 310, G, 313 (Kirby
J).
46
It should be noted that the judge in this case attempted to define each word contained in the Convention
on the written agreement, where the word ‘include’ in his view is exhaustive all of the documents
between the parties and the word ‘exchange’ ‘means that there must be a mutual transfer of documents
[thus] The mere transmission of a document by one party to the other cannot linguistically satisfy the
requirement of “exchange”.’ It is worth mentioning that this case was about a party seeking a stay of
proceedings pursuant to the IAA rather than the implementation of foreign award. However, it shows
how the court defines the term ‘agreement in writing’, which also defines the existence of arbitration
clause/agreement. In the same direction, see Parharpur Cooling Towers Ltd v Paramount (WA) Ltd
[2007] WASC 234, where the court found that the clause in the basic contract was wide; however, it
should be characterised as an ‘arbitration agreement’ for the purposes of s 7(2).
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Most importantly, the Federal Court of Australia, in a Full Court Decision, has considered that
the term ‘written clause in a valid agreement’ includes the term ‘exchange of letters or
telegrams’ in the Convention. It stated in Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty
Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192, at paragraph 149 that:
Article II does not say that the only agreement to which it refers is one which was formed
or concluded by the act of signing or by the dispatch or receipt of a letter or telegram. What
is required is that there is more than a unilateral statement in writing of the arbitration
clause or arbitration agreement. The bilateral recognition of the clause or arbitration
agreement will be achieved if the arbitral clause is in a contract, or if the arbitration
agreement is signed by the parties, or if the arbitral clause is in a contract, or if the
47
arbitration agreement is contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.

In this case there was no signing of any such document. But, in fact, there was an exchange of
letters or telegrams. Thus, even if there was not an arbitration clause or a separate arbitration
agreement, once the contract exists, the arbitral clause or the arbitration agreement can be seen
to be contained in the exchange of letters or telegrams.
This illustrates the broad interpretation of the Convention in order to adapt to the requirements
of international commercial arbitration, and also demonstrates the requirement of the existence
of the agreement in writing in accordance with the IAA.48 But, again, it is not expected by the
parties to a conflict in international commercial contracts to resort to arbitration without a
written agreement. This is due to the fact that each party wants to fully ensure his/her rights. It
47

It is a very important judgment where it is discussed in detail the binding nature of an arbitration
agreement. See Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192. In
another case (APC Logistics Pty Ltd v CJ Nutracon Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 136), Kiefel J found:
The first draft of an agreement to arbitrate was sent by the first respondent to the second
respondent, combined, and the first respondent accepted, mediation and arbitration. At the point
when the second respondent’s lawyers recommended the two methods of dispute resolution be
split, and the focus put on an outcome from mediation, the second respondent had not committed
to the terms of an agreement to arbitrate.
Therefore, the stay of the proceedings and referral of the parties to arbitration are dismissed because of
the absence of the agreement on that clause between the parties.
48
It should be noted that, according to Crawford, the requirement for an ‘agreement in writing’ has been
eliminated from the revised UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 due to the fact that ‘domestic legislation on
the subject varies, and many states do not require [an] arbitration agreement to be in writing … the
requirement of writing was not a formal one’ and it ‘might be separated from the question of the
validity of the arbitration agreement … or from the question of enforcement under the New York
Convention’. See James Crawford, ‘Developments in International Commercial Arbitration: The
Regulatory Framework’ in Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett (eds), International Arbitration in
Australia (Federation Press, 2010) 253, 260.
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is, in fact, the basic principle in such transactions: even if there is a clause in the contract, the
parties are expected to write a special arbitration agreement, which specifies the arbitrators and
the relevant law. It can be said that this condition of a ‘written document’ is basic in relation to
several other conditions, such as the powers of the arbitrators in the arbitration agreement,
‘arbitrability’ that determines whether the subject matter of the conflict is such that it is
permissible to resort to arbitration, and as a proof of the existence of the arbitration as a whole.
2.

The Award Shall Be the Original Award or an Authenticated, Certified and Translated
Copy

The power of the court in applying these formal requirements is described in section 9 of the
IAA as a procedural provision in many respects, where the principal provision in section 9(1)
provides:
In any proceedings in which a person seeks the enforcement of a foreign award by virtue of
this Part, he or she shall produce to the court: (a) The duly authenticated original award or a
duly certified copy; and (b) The original arbitration agreement under which the award
purports to have been made or a duly certified copy.

Additionally, section 9(2) is about the authentication or certification of an award or copies of the
award, respectively, but that sub-section (3) and (4) relate to the certification of any translation
of the award. This may show that the court’s undertaking to ensure the satisfaction of the formal
requirements is a routine task, which does not require the court to enumerate all of these
requirements separately. Hence the court will refer generally to all of these conditions. In fact,
this condition here is only about how binding the presentation of such documents is.49 Thus, the
court will accept any documents submitted on the basis that it is genuine and valid which is
necessary for the conduct of the proceedings.50

49

Thus, it could be said that the ‘written agreement’ condition is to consider whether an arbitration
agreement exists for the purpose of s 8 and whether this matter falls under the enforcing court’s
jurisdiction. In addition, the Authenticated, Certified and Translated condition is to show the binding
nature of such documents.
50
This may explain the court’s role in the application of such formal requirements.
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The Supreme Court of NSW clarified these conditions, by confirming that the provision of
appropriately certified identical copies (as per section 9 of the IAA) was equally acceptable,
where Hall J in Transpac stated:
40. At the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff provided to this Court a copy of the foreign
award, certified by a Singaporean public notary as a true and identical copy, as well as
copies of the two agreements, certified by the same Singaporean public notary.
Accordingly, I find that the plaintiff has met the formal conditions imposed by ss.9(1)(a)
and (b) of the Act, as facilitated by s.9(2)(b).
41. Consequently, these documents – the Award and the two agreements – form prima facie
51
evidence of the matters to which they relate: s.9(5), International Arbitration Act.

Regarding the translation requirement, a recent judgment has been released of White J in the
Supreme Court of New South Wales in Yang v S & L Consulting.52 The application was for a
foreign arbitral award made in China under the IAA. The defendants had submitted an English
translation of the award, which had been certified by the First Secretary of the Consular
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China but was not certified by a diplomatic or
consular agent in Australia.53 However, the Court noted that these documents had also been
translated by an accredited translator and interpreter in Australia. This translator had identified
some mistakes in the certified English translation; none were significant, except a misstatement
of the daily percentage rate of interest. The Court also noted that the translation made by the
Australian translator was not in dispute and was a translation to the satisfaction of the court
within section 9(4) of the IAA.
The important point is that the Court recognised that the translation was not disputed by the
parties in this case and the court was satisfied with the translation within the meaning of section
9(4) of the IAA (that is, ‘to the satisfaction of the court’). That Article was very clear, where it
required either full certification for all of the documents presented or that the court was satisfied
with what had been translated. This was done by the court, where it referred to the lack of

51

See Transpac Capital PTE Limited v Buntoro [2008] NSWSC 671, at [40]–[41.
See Yang v S & L Consulting [2009] NSWSC 223.
53
As required by s 10 of the IAA.
52
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certification, but at the same time stated that it was not considered a problem requiring rejection
of the documents because the translation had satisfied the court.
It should be noted that the adoption of the Convention within the IAA enables the Australian
courts to implement the Convention as a national law. It is also facilitates the Australian courts
role by allowing referral to one uniform legislation (IAA), which in turn facilitates the
application of such conditions.
3.

Parties to the Conflict Shall Not Be under Some Incapacity

Article V(1)(a) of the Convention states:
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: (a) The parties to the agreement referred
to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity…

This has also been adopted by Article 34(a)(i) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, where it states that
refusal can derive from ‘a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in Article 7 [being]
under some incapacity …’. Born believes that the requirement for legal capacity ‘to enter into a
binding arbitration agreement is often little different from the role of capacity in other areas of
law … [however, generally] going to capacity such as incompetence, minority and the like’ in
the context of arbitration agreement will be applied as it is in any branch of law. 54 However,
various national laws have adopted special cases regarding the incapacity of parties to resort to
arbitration, such as restricting the power of government related entities to resort to arbitration in
certain disputes.55
It should be noted that some Australian court judgments numbered the formal requirements
according to the Convention. This, in turn, is a declaration of the implementation of such
requirements; however, there is no case where the appeal from any party has been rejected
54

See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary and Materials (Kluwer Law
International, 2nd ed, 2001) 231.
55
Ibid.
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because one of the parties was under some incapacity.56 Conversely, it should be also noted that
this incapacity is measured according to the law applicable to the arbitration agreement but, if
there is not any particular law, the law should be applied in accordance with Article V(1)(a) of
the Convention in the law of the state where the arbitration was made. This requires the judge to
know the law applicable to the dispute.
4.

The Arbitration Agreement Must Be Valid

The less commonly invoked exception to enforcement of foreign arbitration by parties seeking
to avoid the effect of an agreement to arbitrate is that the agreement is null and void.57 In fact,
there are a few Australian cases in that regard.58 However, it can be said that the cases that can
clarify the standard of the validity of arbitration agreement is that the original contract breaches
public policy, as is stated in section 7(5) of the IAA: ‘A court shall not make an order under
subsection (2) if the court finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed’.59 As a result, any contravention of the arbitration agreement to
public policy, such as denial of a legitimate defence, can cause the invalidity of the arbitration
agreement.
For example, in Hi-Fert v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers,60 the Federal Court mentions that any
general claim without any proof, such that the enforcement of the arbitration agreement would
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See Yang v S & L Consulting [2009] NSWSC 223.
For more information about the defence that the agreement is null and void, see Mary Keyes,
‘Jurisdiction under the Hague Choice of Courts Convention: Its Likely Impact on Australian Practice’
(2009) 5(2) Journal of Private International Law 181, 188.
58
There is no case presented before the Saudi Grievances Board in that regard.
59
This Article is a counterpart to s 8(5)(B) of the IAA and also to UNCITRAL Model Law art 36(1)(a)(i)
which states that enforcement may be refused where ‘the said agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country
where the award was made.’
60
In this case Hi-Fert Pty Ltd was the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff was Cargill Fertilizer Inc (a
US corporation and the consignor of the damaged cargo). KMC was the defendant. The claims against
KMC can be summarised as follows: by three bills of lading issued in Tampa, Florida on 24 March
1996, KMC was alleged to have acknowledged shipment, on board the vessel, of the cargo in apparent
good order and condition for carriage to Australian ports for delivery in the same good order and
condition as when shipped. KMC breached the duty of care in the contract by failing to carry and
deliver the cargo in good order and condition. The cargo became contaminated with a quarantineable
fungal disease, namely ‘karnal bunt’, and the vessel was prevented from discharging at Newcastle in
57
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result in one party being deprived of the ability to claim under the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth), results in the refusal of such claim.61 Thus, a general attack on the validity of the
arbitration agreement/clause may not be heard and may not make an arbitration agreement null
and void where any defence or claim on the validity of the arbitration agreement/clause must be
valuable and worthy to be examined by the court.62
In another case, that of Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc [2011] VSC 1,63 the plaintiff was
claiming that the arbitration agreement was not valid under Queensland law, which is the
applicable law on the arbitration agreement, whereas the second defendant claimed that the
arbitral tribunal failed to properly determine the issue according to and applying the law of
Queensland. As is stated in the case:
[I]t was said that the submission by the second defendant ... that there is an initial onus on
the plaintiff under sub-s 8(1) of the IAA to prove the validity of the arbitration agreement
has been consistently rejected by courts in various jurisdictions. Further, it was submitted
that there is abundance of authority which confirms that the onus is on the award debtor to
make out or prove any of the limited defences or grounds available to it under the New
York Convention for resisting enforcement. It would follow that this applies to the
provisions of sub-ss (5) and (7) of the IAA insofar as those provisions reflect the defences
or grounds provided for under Article V of the New York Convention for resisting
64
enforcement.

The court also considered whether an award debtor was estopped from raising a claim on the
enforcement and if it had failed, or had unsuccessfully attempted, to raise the issues before the
arbitral tribunal or the supervisory court. Here, the evidence was that the courts of Mongolia, a
Australia so that the cargo was not delivered. Thus, it was claimed that the loss and damage in the
goods were caused by the negligence of KMC in breach of its duty as carrier. For more information
about this case (Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [1996] 71 FCR 172), see Keyes,
above n 57, 188.
61
For more information, see Ricky H Diwan ‘Problems Associated with the Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards Revisited: Australian Consumer Protection; Conflict of Laws; An English Law Perspective’
(2003) 19(1) Arbitration International 55, 55.
62
See Keyes, above n 57, 194. In addition, in the case of LKT Industrial Berhad (Malaysia) v Chun
[2004] NSWSC 820 (which will be discussed later for another reason), the defendant claimed that to
enforce the award all parties had to be correctly named whereas he had been misnamed in the award so
he maintained that the award was not valid against him. The court stressed that any minor
typographical or transcription errors were not accepted as a ground to refuse implementation. For more
information, see Richard Garnett and Michael Pryles, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Awards under the New York Convention in Australia and New Zealand’ (2008) 25(6) Journal of
International Arbitration 899, 906–907.
63
See Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc (No 2) [2011] VSC 12.
64
Ibid [45].

200

civil law country, would, if asked to do so, review the award and would satisfy themselves by
proper inquiry that the requirement of the Mongolian civil code had been made. The evidence
was that the Mongolian courts had verified the award and the findings of the arbitral tribunal
and it was concluded that ‘it was a legitimate award under Mongolian law and is capable of
being enforced in accordance with the New York Convention.’65
The Queensland Supreme Court concluded that, with respect to the issue of the parties to the
arbitration agreement, the second defendant had failed to resist the enforcement, and discharge
the onus of establishing that an exception to enforcement applied.66 This shows some points,
which are:
a.

The court stated that the submission by the second defendant had been consistently
rejected by courts in various jurisdictions. However, the legal nature of that rejection is
not clear. Hence, the court could consider that as conclusive evidence on the validity of
the arbitration agreement or as a legal presumption which is not binding on the court.

b.

It is also clear from this judgment that the court assumes that the arbitral award is valid
and anyone who claims its invalidity must prove it, so the burden of proof is shifted to the
party resisting the enforcement of the award.

c.

The court considers that the defendant had the opportunity to raise the invalidity of the
arbitration agreement before the arbitral tribunal or the court overseeing the arbitration
procedures prior to sentencing.

65
66

Ibid [91].
It should be noted that this defence is not the only one that deals with the validity of the arbitration
clause or the agreement, as there is another instance where the case has already started before the court
and before the arbitration process has started. In this case the plaintiff claims that the arbitration
agreement/clause is invalid in order to avoid the arbitration process and let the court proceed in the
case. Although the number of such cases is small, the court explicitly adopted a liberal approach to
interpretation of the arbitration clause where it accepts the general phrase for the scope of the
arbitration clause. Accordingly, Austin J suggests that ‘while Australian courts are not constrained by
considerations of public policy to adopt a “liberal” construction of arbitration clauses, reflection on the
likely intention of the parties will steer them away from any narrow construction.’ For more
information, see Keyes, above n 57, 187. That is due to the fact that when the parties to a commercial
contract have agreed at the time of making the contract (and before any disputes) to resort to
arbitration, their agreement should be respected and not be narrowly interpreted.
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For the last point it could be said that the appeal against the invalidity of the arbitration
agreement is relative and not absolute, where the losing party must raise that claim at the
beginning of consideration of the conflict before the arbitrators. Thus, accepting an appearance
before the arbitrators appointed under the arbitration agreement would mean surrendering the
upholding of this invalidity. Consequently, in instances where the losing party did not undertake
such a procedure, it means that they are satisfied with the arbitration agreement and there is no
objection to the validity of that agreement. But if the losing party has proved such a challenge
and the court of arbitration has rejected the appeal for invalidity of the arbitration agreement,
then the Australian court will accept that provision and then it will become ‘in effect’ before the
Australian courts. However, the critical point is when the court of arbitration did not respond to
that claim of ‘invalidity’. In such a case I think the Australian courts must address such claims
first and then consider whether to accept or reject implementation.
As a result, it can be said that the general rule in the case of invalidity of the arbitral award due
to the invalidity of the arbitration agreement is that the invalidity of the arbitration agreement is
due to the fact that the conflict is not permitted to be resolved through arbitration (‘arbitrability’
as we shall see in the next chapter is a public policy defence), but if the invalidity of the
arbitration agreement is due to other reasons, it is not permissible for it to be raised before the
court of enforcement before it has been raised before the Arbitration tribunal.
Finally, it should be noted that ‘a court which refuses to annul an award may grant enforcement
of that award.’67 This may be a natural result to confirm the validity of the arbitration, but must
take into account the reminder of the defences contained in the IAA. Thus, confirming the
validity does not mean the award is directly capable of being performed. That is due to the need
for the presence of the rest of the conditions having been met.

67

See Winnie (Jo-Mei) Ma, Public Policy in the Judicial Enforcement of Arbitral Award: Lessons for and
from Australia (Thesis of Doctor of Legal Science (SJD), Bond University, December 2005) 23.
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However, in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC, the plaintiff appealed Justice
Croft’s decision concerning the enforceability of the arbitral award (the validity of the
award).68 The Court of Appeal stated:
In our opinion, at stage one, the award creditor must satisfy the Court, on a prima facie
basis, of the following matters before the Court may make an order enforcing the award:
(a) an award has been made by a foreign arbitral tribunal granting relief to the award
creditor against the award debtor;
(b) the award was made pursuant to an arbitration agreement;
69
(c) the award creditor and the award debtor are parties to the arbitration agreement .

Therefore, the Court of Appeal found that Croft J erred in enforcing the award against IMC
where it was not apparent that IMC was a party to the arbitration agreement and he did not
receive notice of Altain Khuder’s application for enforcement of the award and that the
application should have been heard inter partes. Thus the Appeal Court stated:
Where the contents of the arbitration agreement and the award do not provide prima facie
evidence of the matters … the Court, rather than proceeding ex parte, should require the
award creditor to give notice of the proceeding to the award debtor and the proceeding
70
should continue on an inter partes basis.

Therefore, an award creditor must establish on a prima facie basis that the award was made
pursuant to an arbitration agreement, where the award creditor and the award debtor are parties
to the arbitration agreement.
The Court of Appeal found that Altain Khuder had not discharged their burden of proof and
could not show prima facie that IMC was a party.
In this decision the Court of Appeal has adopted the approach of deciding whether an award
debtor is a party to an agreement. Therefore, the burden of proof of validity is again shifted
again to the party seeking the enforcement of the award.

68

See IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC [2011] VSCA 248 (22 August 2011).
Ibid [135].
70
Ibid [140].
69
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5.

Proper Notice Must Be Given

It should be noted that the defence for those opposing implementation of award includes two
important areas, these being where the party is not given proper notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator, or where she or he is otherwise unable to present his or her case in the arbitration
proceedings.71 This requirement lies on fairness ground where the ‘violation of the requirement
for natural justice [is] in the procedure adopted by the arbitral tribunal.’72
In LKT v Chun,73 the defendant in this complex and lengthy case claimed that he did not receive
any proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or a notice of the arbitration proceedings
so he was not able to present his case in the arbitration proceedings. It is noticeable here that the
judge summoned the defendant to question him about several things; through this questioning,
the judge made some very important points which are:
i.

Mr Chun argued that his English language was poor and he needed an interpreter;
however, the judge found that Mr Chun’s understanding of English was sufficient for him
to understand the notice if he had received it. That was clear from his responses to some
questions before they were translated.

ii.

Mr Chun denied receipt of mail addressed through a courier company (DHL) at his
residence in Sydney and claimed that he was outside Australia at that time. However, the
judge explored and brought the sub-directors of the company (DHL) to testify on its way
of delivering packages. The judge considered the methods of delivery and the electronic
process and came to the conclusion that Mr Chun must have received the package,
perhaps via his wife or his son. The judge discussed the system of the building security,

71

Convention art 5(1)(b) provides that a party may resist recognition or enforcement of an award on the
basis that the party: (i) was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator; or of the
arbitration proceedings; or (ii) was unable otherwise to present his case. For more information and
explanation about this requirement: see Batayneh, above n 2, 164.
72
Rashda Rana and Michelle Sanson, International Commercial Arbitration (Thomson Reuters, 2011)
303.
73
LKT Industrial Berhad (Malaysia) v Chun [2004] NSWSC 820.
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where there was no access by anyone to the apartment without permission from the
owners; this showed that the postman had received a reply from one of the residents.
iii.

The judge also discussed another method, which is facsimile transmission, where the
defendant had received faxes at his headquarters in Hong Kong; he tried to deny receipt
of these messages and to prove that he had had some technical problems that caused nonreceipt of these faxes during that period of time. However, these reasons did not convince
the judge because he believed that the defendant or any one of his family members could
have received them and let Mr Chun know.

Through lengthy discussions of these defences, with attempts to prove the arrival of mail
messages and fax, the judge reached the conclusion that the defendant was evading the
receiving of the notice to the appointment of arbitrators and times of meetings. Hence the judge
said (in the paragraphs numbered below):
74. [I] find that Mr. Chun was given notice of the arbitration proceedings against him.
Although he was misnamed in the letter and notice (and other correspondence) that he
received, I find that he would have understood the documents that he received as relating to
him, and that they identified him as a party to the arbitration proceedings.
75. Mr. Chun did not [make his case, which] means ... the principal ground of defence fails,
there is no reason for finding that he was unable to present a case in the arbitration
proceedings.
76. I therefore conclude that enforcement of the award should not be refused on the ground
set out in s 8(5)(c) of the Act.

This shows the significance role of such a defence, which must be real. This explains why the
judge discussed the details of ways of receiving notices. Most importantly, there is a significant
and fixed role of the court in such defences, where the judge has the power to determine the
validity of the notifications and the legality and power of those means.
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It also shows that if one of the parties did not receive any proper notice,74 that means he would
be unable to present his case. However, if both parties are well aware of the nature and progress
of the arbitration proceedings, they are able to present their case in the arbitration proceedings.
It, in fact, is under the Court’s discretion to weigh evidence and examine the facts to ascertain
whether the parties have given proper notice or not. In addition, it shows the importance of the
availability of proper notices to the parties so that the judge can consider the case. Finally, it can
be said that the requirement to prove that someone is a party to the arbitration agreement comes
before the proof of notification of the arbitral process.75
On the other hand, the court can refuse the implementation if the party was not able to present
his or her case in the arbitration proceedings. In fact this is a natural right for all parties and it
has been stated in the Convention that the arbitral award can be refused implementation if one of
the parties has proof that he was unable to present his case (that is, Article V(1)(b)).76
6.

Arbitrators Must Not Exceed the Powers Granted Them by the Agreement or Clause of
Arbitration

This condition reflects Article V(1)(c) of the Convention and is also mentioned in section
8(5)(d) of the IAA, where it states:
[T]he court may, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, refuse to enforce
the award if that party proves to the satisfaction of the court that: …. (d) the award deals
with a difference not contemplated by, or not falling within the terms of; the submission to
arbitration, or contains a decision on a matter beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration.77
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Proper notice should be for the location, timing of arbitration and the commencement of arbitration
proceedings and finally a proper notice of the final decision.
75
In fact, it is a logical situation where anyone should be a party to the arbitration process so he can seek
the refusal of the enforcement on the grounds that he did not receive a proper notice.
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For more information, see Pieter Sanders, ‘UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International and Commercial
Arbitration: Present Situation and Future’ (2005) 12(4) Arbitration International 443. This was
explaind in section 3.1.1 Scope of Arbitration (Subject Matter of the Conflict).
77
For the application of this requirement under the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985, see Pindan Pty Ltd
v Uniseal Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 168.
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It should be noted that according to that Article, the defence that an arbitrator exceeded his/her
power should be raised by one of the parties in accordance with the provisions of the
Convention and according to the provisions of the IAA. Therefore, the court cannot raise it of its
own volition.
It should be also noted that the legal nature of arbitration affects the work of the arbitrators and
their decisions. Thus, if it is of a judicial nature, the award that has been issued is binding on
both parties as a judgment; but if it is of contractual nature, the decision becomes binding on the
parties according to their will, and the contractual principles will be applied. These differences
in the legal nature certainly lead to differences in the types of defences before the competent
court.78 However, most laws have made arbitration binding by enacting a special arbitration law
and joining some international treaties in enforcing arbitral awards; anyway, the arbitrator’s
decision is, in fact, creating a right or duty for the parties.79
On one hand, the arbitrator has the authority to determine the validity of the original contract
before the arbitration proceedings and also the validity of the arbitration agreement. This power
is through the original contract and the arbitration agreement as determined by the parties.80 But
if the underlying contract is invalid, this may raise questions about the impact of that invalidity
on the validity of the arbitration clause/agreement.
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It should be noted that arbitration has a binding nature in Western countries while in the Middle East its
legal nature still debatable. This ‘binding nature’ has been affected by some theories which characterise
the nature of commercial arbitration (such as in contractual theory where it depends on the parties’
selection of and ‘will’ in regard to arbitration). For more information, see Hong-Lin Yu, ‘A Theoretical
Overview of the Foundations of International Commercial Arbitration’ (2008) 1(2) Contemporary Asia
Arbitration Journal 255, 265.
79
For more information, see Jesse Kennedy, ‘Arbitrate This! Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards and
Chapter III of the Constitution’ (2010) 34(2) Melbourne University Law Review 558; also see
Mohammed A H Aljarba, Commercial Arbitration in Islamic Jurisprudence: A Study of Its Role in the
Saudi Arabia Context (PhD Thesis, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2001) 234.
80
Additionally, an arbitrator is permitted to rule on his or her own jurisdiction according to Article 16 of
the Model Law that incorporates the principle of competence, which allows arbitrators to rule on their
own jurisdiction.
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The Federal Court of Australian in QH Tours Ltd v Ship Design and Management (Aust) Pty Ltd
was concerned with a domestic arbitration agreement,81 but the principles are logically
applicable to an international agreement subject to the Convention. Thus, the court considered a
situation where the party who was resisting the arbitration process claimed that the original
contract was void according to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and hence the arbitration
process was invalid, and accordingly, the arbitrator was without jurisdiction. The court,
however, held that the arbitral clause could be severed from the original agreement or principal
contract (with the result that an arbitrator could exercise power under an arbitration agreement
to declare the contract void (without destroying his own power to act)). Thus the original
contract cannot have any effect on the arbitration agreement. Therefore, it can be said that the
arbitration clause has progressively received more liberal interpretation before the Australian
courts in determining its validity.82
On the other hand, one might wonder about what the court’s decision might be if the arbitral
tribunal has exceeded the authority or the power that has been set in the arbitration clause or
arbitration agreement.
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See, Re QH Tours Limited and Sazalo Pty Ltd v Ship Design and Management (Aust) Pty Ltd and
Charles Russel Gibbons [1991] FCA 637. The judge said:
I am not satisfied that there is any rule of law which prohibits the empowering of an arbitrator to
decide the initial validity of the contract containing the arbitration clause. With respect to those
who hold a different view, I do not consider that there is any “received doctrine” to this effect.
Moreover, having regard to the specific nature of an arbitration clause, as discussed by Lord
Wright in Heyman, I consider that, generally speaking, it can be regarded as severable from the
main contract with the result that, logically, an arbitrator, if otherwise empowered to do so, can
declare the main contract void ab initio without at the same time destroying the basis of his power
to do so.
For more information, see Peter Gillies, ‘Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration Awards
– The New York Convention’ (2004) 9 International Trade and Business Law Review 19.
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This shows the adoption by the Australian courts of the principle of the independence of the arbitration
clause from the original contract. See also Qantas Airways Limited v Dillingham Corporation (1985) 4
NSWLR 113. This severance of provisions of an award is permitted by the common law, see
International Movie Group Inc v Palace Entertainment Corporation Pty Ltd [1995] 128 FLR 458.
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This situation is challenged when, after the arbitration process has been concluded and an award
made, one of the parties claims that the arbitrators have no powers to decide the dispute, and
thus, it is beyond the limits of their mandate.83
For example, in LKT v Chun, the defendant claimed that ‘it was not open to the arbitrator in the
final award to determine joint and several liabilities’.84 However, the judge, after reading and
evaluating the arbitration agreement, decided to refuse such submission. He noted: ‘It is clear,
from the relevant paragraphs of the partial award, that the arbitrator was making a finding of
liability in terms of cl. 11.1 of the agreement.’85 In this case, the court’s had the authority to
gauge the authority of the arbitrator by reading and analysing the arbitration agreement.
Therefore, Austin J has stated: ‘Any limitation on the scope of the contentions agreed to be
arbitrated is to be found in the contractual wording …’86
This analysis cannot be considered as extending into examining the merits of the case or the
original contract; the only and the proper way for the court to determine the arbitrator’s
authority is in accordance to the arbitration agreement or clause.
In such cases, where the arbitrators have exceeded their authority according to the arbitration
clause or agreement, a distinction must be taken into account about two hypotheses which are:
i.

When the award contained an unlawful but severable provision (for example, a violation of
public policy), the court will grant severance and implement the part that is lawful.
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However, is there any impact of the existence of such a defence before the arbitrators before the verdict
or not. The court here is deciding the power of such a defence. For more information, see Ball, above n
5, 11.
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LKT v Chun [2004] NSWSC 820, [82].
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Ibid [83].
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See Austin J in ACD Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896. In Reinsurance Australia
Corporation Ltd v Members of Lloyd’s Syndicate 1027 [2001] FCA 1426 (Unreported Judgments
Federal Court of Australia) Stone J stated:
[A]t the risk of oversimplification, the submission was that the arbitrators in London do not have
jurisdiction to deal with the claims made under the Trade Practices Act. It was submitted, first,
that the arbitration clauses do not, on their true interpretation, purport to give that power and
second, that any attempt to do so would be void as an attempt to contract out of the Trade Practices
Act. In the alternative it was submitted that if the effect of s7 of the International Arbitration Act
1974 (Cth) is to require a stay of these proceedings then the section does not fall within s76 and
s77 of the Constitution and for that reason is invalid.
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However, severance of an award will not be granted where the remainder of the award is
affected by the part of the award rejected.87
ii.

Where an award deals with a difference not contemplated by, or not falling within the terms
of, the submission to arbitration, or contains a decision on a matter beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, the court will refuse to implement it according to section 8 (6) of
the IAA.88

7.

Composition of the Arbitral Authority and the Arbitral Procedure Must Not Violate Law
or Arbitration Agreement

This condition, according to section 8(5)(e) of the IAA, contains three parts, namely, the
composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitration procedure is not in accordance with the
parties’ agreement; the non-existence of the arbitration agreement; and the composition of the
arbitral tribunal is not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration was made.
This brings us back again to point out that Australian courts take the theory of the independence
of the arbitration clause from the original agreement as stated previously.89
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For more information, see International Chamber of Commerce, Country Answers: Australia (Law as at
18 July 2008) [Material Reproduced from: ICC, Special Supplement 2008: Guide to National Rules of
Procedure for Recognition and Enforcement of New York Convention Awards (2009) 29]
<http://www.iccdrl.com/CODE/LevelThree.asp?page=Country%20Answers&Locator=32.2&L1=Coun
try%20Answers&tocxml=ltoc_CountryAnswersAll.xml&contentxsl=arbSingle.xsl&tocxsl=toc.xsl&co
ntentxml=CA_SUPP_0021_3.xml&AUTH=&nb=0>, where it explains the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards in Australia and provides some examples and some cases, such as ACN 006 397 413 Pty
Ltd v International Movie Group (Canada) Inc [1997] 2 VR 31, Supreme Court of Victoria.
88
See HIH [2006] NSWSC 1150, where the parties have to refer to arbitration directly in clear language.
Additionally, in Resort Condominiums International Inc v Bolwell (1993) 118 ALR 655, the Supreme
Court of Queensland has held that ‘a decision must determine finally “at least some of the matters in
dispute before the parties” before it will be considered an award within the meaning of the New York
Convention’. See International Chamber of Commerce, Country Answers: Australia (Law as at 18 July
2008) ICC website, above n 87.
89
See Enterra Pty Limited v ADI Limited [2002] NSWSC 700. This also may be related to the natural
requirements of impartiality and independence of the arbitrators, and also it relates to the good faith
principle where parties have to follow a high degree of good conduct in their dealings.
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Justice Einstein’s decision90 confirmed and commented that the words ‘to deal with the
particular dispute’ applied only to what the parties have agreed upon.91 But, saying that the
arbitrator is unsuitable due to his lack of availability until May the following year
(approximately 8 months later) did not mean that a satisfactory arbitration could not be reached
at a later date.
More clear is a recent case dealing with the arbitrator’s authority, namely Uganda Telecom
Limited v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 131. In this case the contract was governed by
Ugandan laws. The defendant (Hi-Tech) submitted that clause 14.2 of their agreement was
uncertain and thus void because it failed to address certain issues. These were: the seat of
arbitration, the service of documents by which the arbitration was initiated, the number of
arbitrators, the manner in which any dispute concerning the appointment of the arbitrator(s) was
to be resolved, the identity of the arbitrator(s), and the rules that were to apply to the arbitration.
The defendant also submitted that the clause was uncertain because it did not specify the law
governing arbitration.
The judge, however, stated that the meaning of the clause was clear. But the question that was
to be raised in the situation at the time was whether some of the matters submitted by Hi-Tech
were not covered by clause 14.2 and the Uganda Arbitration Act 2000, and if they were not
covered, were the omissions sufficiently serious for the clause to be considered void due to
uncertainty as claimed by Hi-Tech? Consequently, after reviewing the provisions of the Uganda

90

It should be noted that the plaintiff was seeking to apply s 44(c) of the Commercial Arbitration Act
1984 (NSW) for the removal of the arbitrator appointed to arbitrate a dispute concerning an agreement
between the parties.
91
In the same meaning, see a very important British case where Colman J (in Westacre Investments Inc v
Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd) has reported the effect of his authorities by saying that ‘[t]he effect
of the authorities is in my judgment as follows: … (iv) When, at the stage of enforcement of an award,
it is necessary for the court to determine whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction in respect of disputes
relating to the underlying contract, the court must consider the nature of the disputes in question.’ See
Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd [1999] QB 740, 76. For more
information, see Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2006, vol XXX
(Kluwer Law International, 2006) 410–15. It should be noted that this case was cited in a number of
Australian cases. It is an important case that helps in understanding the implementation of foreign
arbitral awards in general and in understanding this condition in particular.
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Arbitration Act 2000 (Uganda) (UAA) regarding the definition of the arbitration agreement, and
also with regard to the determination of the arbitral tribunal, Foster J found that the arbitration
agreement was domestic arbitration according to the UAA. He also found that the appointment
of the arbitrators was in accordance with that law. Therefore, he gave his judgment in favour of
the arbitration clause in the original contract, as it was not ambiguous or uncertain.
Additionally, the judge found that all that Hi-Tech submitted were omitted from clause 14.2
were covered in detail and adequately by the UAA, that the arbitrator/s were validly appointed
pursuant to that Act, including the procedures followed, that the arbitration was within the scope
of clause 14.2, and that clause 14.2 was not void due to uncertainty. Thus, Hi-Tech’s
submissions were rejected. This reveals several points, which are:
i.

Under this condition the judge has the right to interpret and evaluate the provisions of
Ugandan law with respect to the point raised.

ii.

The judge always looks to match the arbitration clause with the law of the country where
the arbitration was held (Uganda) in order to judge the correctness and clarity of the
arbitration clause.

iii.

It is clear that any challenge based on this condition should be based on one of two things
(or both): the first is uncertainty; the second is ambiguity in determining the resort to
arbitration or the appointing of the arbitrators. Additionally, the challenge to the
arbitration clause must be for violating the law of the country where the award was held
or for violating the arbitration agreement concluded between the parties.92
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It should be noted that, according to Statham, this is the first decision that applies the new amendments
(2010) to the IAA. For more information, see Kimberly Statham, ‘Testing the Enforceability of an
International Arbitration Award in Australia’ [Law Society of NSW Young Lawyers] Civil Litigation
Committee Newsletter No 2, 30 March 2011, 2. Therefore, Foster J in the Federal Court found that
Ugandan law was the law of the arbitration and that the arbitral award was not void for uncertainty
under that law and he rejected an argument that ‘public policy’ included an error of law by the tribunal.
This shows that the court in this case upheld the international standard for public policy. Finally, Foster
J confirms that there is no general discretion for the court to refuse to enforce a foreign award.
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8.

The Award Must Have Become Binding

As stipulated in Article III of the Convention which is Schedule 1 of the IAA, ‘Each contracting
state shall recognise arbitral awards as binding and enforce them …’ (as also stated in section
8(1) of the IAA).
The word ‘binding’ in these texts means that the arbitral award must be performed within the
country as a mandatory rule on the parties to the conflict. Hence, these texts are concerned with
the enforcement of valid foreign arbitral awards within the country as explained before.
However, regarding the words ‘become binding’, the meaning of the word ‘binding’ must be
established. That the award has become ‘binding’ is seen as a condition for implementation of a
foreign arbitral award.
According to many Australian law texts, there seems to be some variation in meaning or goal
for the word ‘binding’ when dealing with foreign arbitral awards (for example, in terms of what
is included in the legislation of Australia and the United States). Article V(1)(e) of the
Convention which states that a defence for those opposing implementation of a foreign arbitral
award is that ‘[t]he award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that
award was made’ is echoed in Article 36(1)(a)(v) of the Model Law which also states that ‘the
award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made’. These terms are also
embodied in the IAA at section 8(5)(f) as well as appended in the Schedules to the Act
(Schedule 1 being the Convention, and Schedule 2 being the UNCITRAL Model Law). Section
8(5)(f) states that ‘the award has not yet become binding on the parties to the arbitration
agreement or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which,
or under the law of which, the award was made’.
However, there are different applications for the term ‘binding’, where in the United States,
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[A]n arbitral award becomes binding when the arbitration panel has resolved all the issues
before it, and no further recourse to another arbitration panel exists. This does not mean,
however, that the parties must exhaust all remedies in the awarding country before the
award is binding. Unlike the United States, England requires the award to be binding and
final before a court will enforce it.93

That condition is also mentioned in some European laws.94 These differences in the
interpretation may affect the implementation of foreign arbitral awards where each contracting
state has its own interpretation for the ‘binding nature’ which may disrupt or at least delay the
implementation process.
Thus, it could be said that the ‘binding’ in the Australian legal texts means that the foreign
award must be final for both parties and is binding according to the law in the country where the
award was issued. Section 39(2) of the IAA also supports this meaning where it states under
‘Matters to which court must have regard’ that ‘the court or authority must’ when considering
exercising or exercising enforcement of a foreign arbitral award or refusing (under section 8
(public policy) or 16(1) (public policy) and other applicable sections detailed in section
39(1)), have regard to the objects of the Act and ‘the fact that (i) arbitration is an efficient,
impartial, enforceable and timely method by which to resolve commercial disputes ... [and]
(ii) awards are intended to provide certainty and finality.’
According to Pierre Lalive ‘most, if not all, arbitration regulations (in particular in the case of
“institutional arbitration” [that is, arbitration issued by an arbitration centre such as the ICC])
say that the arbitration award is ‘final and binding’.’95 That facilitates the role of the court in this
regard.
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See May Lu, ‘The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards: Analysis of the Seven Defenses to Oppose Enforcement in the United States and England’
(2006) 23(3) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 747, 760.
94
For more information, see European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, European Judicial
Systems: Edition 2008 (Data 2006): Efficiency and Quality of Justice (Council of Europe Publishing,
2008) 105; generally see Lu, above n 93, 760.
95
See Pierre Lalive, ‘Absolute Finality of Arbitral Awards’? in Revista International de Arbitragem e
Conciliaçao-Año1-2008 (Assoçäo Portuguesa de Arbitraragem ed, 2009) 109 reproduced at ICCA

214

First of all, it is well known that the national courts have supervisory authority over arbitration
proceedings from their inception until the decision.96 In regard to giving judgment, laws provide
several grounds to appeal the ruling to the competent courts. If there is a court challenge on the
arbitration ruling before the courts (in the country where the arbitral award was issued), this
award is still not final. Also, there are some situations or cases where the award is not final,
such as where the foreign award has not been ratified by the authorities concerned in that
country, where this certification means that all procedures complied with the law. Failure to
demonstrate certification or ratification in the country of origin means the existence of
uncertainty as to the finality of the award. Additionally, the meaning of ‘uncertainty’ may also
refer to the existence of ambiguity or uncertainty in the award itself (in terms of its language) as
a reason that makes the award not binding (for example, the lack of definitive phrasing
regarding the contract, such as ‘may’ have to pay and so on). This can be linked with the case of
Resort Condominiums International Inc v Bolwell [1995] 1 Qd R 406, where the Supreme Court
of Queensland considered the uncertainty as a matter of public policy defence and refused to
implement the foreign award on that ground.97
However, the Convention has made a significant provision which is that once an award becomes
binding, it is enforceable (but no documents are specified as needed to be provided).98
Therefore, this condition raises the questions about the two possibilities. First, an important
question revolves around the role of the court in the arbitral award when it has not yet become
final for any reason (lack of the necessary approvals, the period of appeal in the country where
the award was made is still valid or if the validity is related to the law of that country ‘public
‘International Council for Commercial Arbitration’ (22 January 2010) <http://www.arbitrationicca.org/articles.html>.
96
See Ball, above n 5, 11.
97
This case will be explained as a public policy defence in the next chapter; however, this highlights the
question about whether there may be any possibility that the Australian court would consider the
uncertain award as not binding.
98
However, such a request for ‘proof [of] the binding nature of the foreign award’ is a domestic
requirement (for example, in the Kingdom) to ensure that the award that has been presented is valid and
binding according to the law of the country where it was made. By contrast, the party who seeks to
invoke or is seeking to ask the court to refuse implementation bears the burden to proof to demonstrate
that the award is not binding or not yet final and not binding: art V(1)(e).
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policy’). Second, it is important to know the attitude of the court if the arbitral award was null
and void according to the law under which it was made. In both these instances (lack of finality
in the country in which it was created and null and void where it was made), the award is not
binding under that law. The answer to such questions must be addressed in the following points:
i.

The existence of formalities, as we saw in the first condition, is necessary to make sure
that the award was issued in the context of a particular law. On the other hand, there is no
time limitation for the enforcement of an award under the Model Law, but the award may
be subject to domestic limitation periods.99 Therefore, the estimate of the finality is at the
Court’s discretion.100 In Hallen v Angledal, Rolfe J refused to adjourn the proceedings
according to section 8(8). This foreign award was issued in Sweden. The defendant
claimed that the award was not final and that the NSW Supreme Court should adjourn the
proceeding in pursuant to section 8 where ‘the proceedings be adjourned pursuant to
section 8(8) [IAA] pending the final determination of the Swedish Court proceedings
referred to in the affidavit of the second defendant sworn on 2 June 1999.’101 However,
according to the arbitration agreement, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant did not
prove that this Swedish court was a competent authority to consider this award. Rolfe J
stated: ‘The absence of any such evidence is critical to the operation of sub-s.(8), as there
must be an application to a competent authority before reliance can be placed on it.’ This
shows the court’s discretion in evaluating the finality of the award. Additionally, it shows
that if the award is not final in the country where it was made, the court will refuse or at
least adjourn the proceedings until it becomes final. Finally, the party who seeks the
enforcement of the award has the onus to prove the finality of that award in any way.

99

See John Trone and Gabriel Moens, ‘The International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) as a Foundation for
International Commercial Arbitration in Australia’ (2007) 4 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 295,
311.
100
See Hallen v Angledal [1999] NSWSC 552 (10 June 1999).
101
Ibid.
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ii.

It is very clear that the Australian courts will refuse any award that is not final. For
instance, in Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc where the arbitration proceedings were
administered by the Mongolian National Arbitration Centre at the Mongolian National
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the dispute had been resolved according to
Mongolian law, the Supreme Court of Victoria recognised the award as final and binding
under Mongolian law which in turn made it capable of being enforced in Victoria under
the Convention.102 Also, in such a case there is no need for the court’s discretionary
power where, in fact, there is a clear and direct text in the IAA gives the court the power
to refuse the enforcement if ‘the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law ... of the
country where the award was made.’103
Most importantly, the award had been raised before Mongolian court and this court had
exercised a civil law jurisdiction and then accepted that award because it is complied with
the Mongolian Civil Code. As a result, the award is binding and final before the Victorian
court. This shows the other possibility, that is, if the court finds that an award is not final
or has been annulled or set aside, it would refuse to enforce it for that reason.104

9.

Reciprocity

This requirement has been cited in section 3(1) of the IAA which states: ‘“Convention country”
means a country (other than Australia) that is a contracting state within the meaning of the
Convention’. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are no reservations that have been made by
Australia to the Convention under Article I(3) of the Convention. Thus, Australia will apply the
Convention, on the basis of reciprocity. However, this must be read in accordance with the
definition of the foreign award in sections 3(1) (‘Interpretation’) and 8(4). The latter is
differentiates Convention and non-Convention member countries in regard to recognition when
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See Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc [2011] VSC 1.
See IAA s 8(5)(b).
104
Taking into account the possibility of the independence of the arbitration clause from the original
contract.
103
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under: ‘Recognition of foreign awards’ it states that a foreign arbitral award may be refused to
be enforced ‘Where (a) at any time, a person seeks the enforcement of a foreign award by virtue
of this Part; and (b) the country in which the award was made is not, at that time, a Convention
country’.
This requirement also has been cited in sections 7 and 8 of the IAA and in fact, it is a logical
requirement, where it requires the application of any award issued in a signatory state to the
convention, or where the foreign party is a resident in a state that had joined the Convention,
and finally it applies the principle of reciprocity.105 In Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia
Shipping Pty Ltd, the Federal Court had stated that, ‘For the purposes of s.7(1)(d), Pan [the
defendant] was at the time of the agreement ordinarily resident in a Convention country’.106 This
shows that the court directly referred to the law, but it did not show how this court checked the
Convention status of the country.107 (It should be noted that such information now is very easily
available online and clearly published on the UN website).
In this regard, we cannot ignore what is stated in section 10 of the IAA, where it requires
issuance of a certificate by the Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Department ‘stating that a
country specified in the certificate is, or was at a time so specified, a Convention country’ with
such a certificate being ‘receivable in any proceedings as prima facie evidence of that fact’. This
may clarify the matter. This also indicates the Convention status at time of initial arbitration is a
consideration. Additionally, Article XIV of the Convention states that, ‘[a] contracting State
shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present Convention against other contracting States
except to the extent that it is “itself” bound to apply the Convention.’ This supports the
reciprocity for each contracting State.
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The principle of reciprocity exists also in the Memorandum, International Arbitration Amendment Bill
2009 (Cth) in regard to these requirements.
106
See Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192.
107
Similarly in the Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [1998] FCA 558 judgment, where
the judges had only mentioned the text of Article 7 without any explanations. Also, that is clear in
some judgments, where the defendants were absent and the courts had dealt with these requirements
without any request from any party (which we will deal with in the next few lines (above)).
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Finally, it is important to mention that section 8(4)(b) determines the time of the issuance of the
award is crucial in determining the applicability of a foreign country’s accession to the
Convention and in the determination of reciprocity.108
In addition to these formal requirements, it is worth mentioning that the Australian Federal
Court and the NSW Supreme Court undertake some defences by their own ‘court’s discretion’
and enforced three cases in different courts where the defendants did not appear before the court
at the enforcement application (namely, Transpac (FCA), China Sichuan Changhong Electric
Co Ltd (NSWSC), and Xiaodong Yang (NSWSC)).109 However, it is important to highlight
some points in these cases, which are:
i.

The court had exercised its discretionary powers in the examination of the papers
presented and stressed that there was no reason or any violation mentioned in section 8 of
the IAA, which may have called for rejection of the implementation of the foreign award.
In Transpac, Hall J states:
11. There is no reason discernable from the material relied upon why this Court should not
enforce the award.
12. By the operation of s.8(2) of the International Arbitration Act and also of s.33 of the
Commercial Arbitration Act the plaintiff accordingly requires, and in the present
circumstances is entitled to, leave of the Court to enforce the award. I now grant such
110
leave.

It is noted here that the court had expressly stipulated the terms of section 8 because it
contains the most formal and substantive defences to reject or accept the implementation
of the rule of foreign arbitration.
ii.

The courts, as demonstrated in the three cases cited, have agreed that the evidence
submitted by the plaintiff satisfied the requirements for enforcement as a ‘foreign award’

108

This differs from what the Saudi Grievances Board has adopted, as we have seen previously; the time
when the lawsuit is raised before the court for the implementation is checked against the Convention
access status of the foreign State.
109
See China Sichuan Changhong Electric Co Ltd v CTA International Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 397,
Transpac Capital Pte Limited v Buntoro [2008] NSWSC 671 and Xiaodong Yang v S&L Consulting
Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1051.
110
Transpac Capital PTE Limited v Buntoro [2008] NSWSC 671, [11]–[12].
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under the Act, which means that the court itself has confirmed the presence of all formal
and substantive requirements to implement the foreign arbitral awards.
iii.

The last observation may relate to Australian court procedures, where the courts
emphasise that the defendants had received a legal notice about the dates of court
hearings, but they had not attended.111 This is certainly a guarantee of the right of the
parties (or their legal representatives) to attend and defend themselves.

4.2

Role of the Judge under International Conventions and National Laws in
Considering Foreign Arbitral Awards

This section focuses on the role of the judge in the consideration of foreign arbitration, which
includes the discussion of the case merits, the nature of the judge’s judgment and the legal effect
and force of that judgment. Thus, it is an advantage in some provisions to know the judge’s
authority to consider the case, the nature of what he/she will issue in the implementation of the
rule of foreign arbitration, and also the legal effect of the judge’s decision according to the
domestic laws and international conventions.

4.2.1

Role of the Judge in the Consideration of Foreign Arbitral Awards

First of all, the judge is obliged to apply the national laws and also to maintain public policy in
the country of the enforcement court. However, there is an urgent need for the judge to
cooperate in the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards pursuant to the will
of the parties, as far as is possible. This favours the principle of the ‘law of the will’, which
governs actions in the field of international trade and also with respect to the nature of
arbitration where the arbitration process depends on the will of the parties.
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Where Hammerschlag J in Xiaodong Yang states: ‘The evidence establishes that the defendants are
aware of today’s motion. They were called this morning when the matter commenced before Bergin J
and did not appear. Her Honour then referred the matter to me for disposition. The evidence also
indicates that the defendants did not intend to appear today.’ See Xiaodong Yang v S&L Consulting
Pty Ltd & Anor [2008] NSWSC 1051 [7]–[8].
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Therefore, it can be said that in the judge’s role there is a natural obligation to respect the
parties’ will, as long as they do not violate national public policy. The judge’s role shall be in
accordance with the national laws and international conventions where the judge at the same
time monitors public policy. This requires that the parties have to implement the arbitral award
‘in a good faith’. This ‘good faith’ principle is a moral obligation where the parties have to
follow a high degree of good conduct in their dealings. This principle supports the need for the
obligations between the parties to be observed with respect for their will. Thus, it is clear that
‘[t]he aim of the Convention is to accord respect and recognition to the autonomy of the parties
in the choice of arbitration’.112 Moreover, the Australian courts have shown full respect to the
parties’ will. For example, the Federal Court of Australia in Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang
Maritime Carriers Inc has stated that ‘[i]f the plaintiff chooses not to refer the dispute to
arbitration, the claim could not otherwise be pursued’. 113
Moreover, the judge must give his/her decision in such a manner as not to turn the advantages
of arbitration into disadvantages. The parties have resorted to the arbitration because of its
benefits, the most important of which is the reduced time taken to resolve the dispute. In order
to achieve this goal, it is most important that the judge be more lenient in the application of
formal requirements, because the general rule in the proceedings is the need to fulfil the purpose
of the procedure itself, even if the parties did not fulfil that procedure.
Saudi Arabia: It is noted that all the international agreements (the Arab, GCC, and New York
conventions) have emphasised the inadmissibility of considering the merits of the case. 114
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See Rares J in Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192, [237].
See [1998] FCA 558 (at 9). For more information about the good faith in the Shari’a law, see AbdulHalim Alqony, (H{usn Alni>h u> Tathyrh ‘la Alslwk fy Alfqh Alislami> u> Alqanon Almdni>: Derash
Moqarnh) ‘[Good Faith and its Impact on Behavior in the Islamic Jurisprudence and Civil Law: A
Comparative Study]’ (PhD thesis, Faculty of Law, Menofia University, Egypt, 1997); also see Nudrat
Majeed, ‘Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the Shari’a’ (2004) 20(1) Arbitration
International 97
114
See Riyadh Convention art 32; Arab Convention art 2. Convention on the Execution of the Delegations
and Judicial Notifications in the Gulf Cooperation Council for Arab Gulf States (1996) (‘GCC
Convention’); New York Convention art 3. All have obliged each contracting state to recognise any
foreign arbitral award as binding under the conditions mentioned in the conventions, and they did not
113
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Moreover, the decisions of the President of the Grievances Board (both former and current
boards) have also confirmed this condition. This illustrates the extent of support for the
provisions of foreign arbitral awards and the real intention to facilitate the recognition and
implementation of such provisions.
In practice, there are several decisions from the Grievances Board where the judges have
applied that condition (inadmissibility of considering the merits of the case except on grounds
of public policy) by limiting the consideration to the fulfilment of the formal requirements. For
example, Ruling No 102 / T / 4 of 1424 AH 2004115 where the text explicitly expresses this
requirement where it states: ‘The Article No 32 of the Riyadh Convention on Judicial
Cooperation between the Arab States has stated that [the role of the judge is] to verify whether
the foreign provision has met all the formal conditions set forth in this Agreement, without any
exposure to the subject matter of the case.’
Also, Ruling No 187 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006116 has explained the meaning of ‘not to dwell on
the merits of the case’, where it limits ‘the merits’ to the basis of the contract between the
parties to the conflict.117 In fact, the discussion of the merits of the case by the judge is
prohibited, because it can be considered, in one way or another, as a reconsideration of the main
case, that is of ‘the conflict’ itself.118 This indeed eliminates the usefulness of arbitration, where
the parties resort to an arbitrator in order to avoid the judicial path but, if we say that the judge
has the authority to consider the merits of the case, such a view may lead to a further review of

give the national court the jurisdiction of reconsidering the subject matter of the case. For more
information, see the public policy chapter (Chapter 5 5.4 Judicial Role in Applying Public Policy) for
an instance of where the national judge gave himself the authority to evaluate the subject matter of the
case just to preserve the public policy and to determine whether there was a violation of the public
policy.
115
This ruling, was issued by the Court of Personal Status in Kuwait, and supported by the Kuwaiti Court
of Appeal. For more information, see the last chapter and also the beginning of this chapter.
116
This case, as explained before, was an implementation of foreign judgment issued by the Court of the
Sultanate of Oman.
117
Additionally, there are many decisions support this rule which will be detailed in the next chapter
(Chapter 5) which will be about the public policy, in addition to what was dealt with at the beginning
of this chapter.
118
This was confirmed by Ruling No 139 / T / 4 of 1416 AH 1996.
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the case. This is absolutely unacceptable because it makes the whole arbitration process useless
and a waste of time and money.
Therefore, there are many provisions confirming this principle as a rule that cannot be exceeded.
Thus, according to the analysis of some provisions in this regard, the ‘merits of the case’ means
or may include the following:
A.

Any Defences Related to the Original Contract: hence, the judge is prevented from
hearing any arguments on those defences, as all parties had their chance to express their
views during proceedings before the arbitrators. However, there are few exceptional cases
where the judge can consider some of these defences, that is, if the original contract
(whole or in part) is contrary to the public policy. In Saudi Arabia public policy
comprises ‘Islamic law’ or Shari’a.119

B.

Any Substantive Defences (Sub-Circuits reffered to them as ‘substantive issues’)
concerning the merits of the case, which are under the jurisdiction of the court that issued
the verdict. Thus, any substantive defence raised before the arbitral tribunal (before the
issuance of the arbitral award) cannot be raised before the court, as it is beyond the scope
of its competence. Therefore, in the instance of a final foreign arbitral award, the court
will not consider such defences (substantive defences), for to do otherwise would be to
consider a matter that goes to the merits of the case. This was confirmed by Ruling No
102 / T / 4 of 1424 AH 2004. Ruling No 208 / T / 2 of 1417 AH 1997 also confirmed that
the court does not reconsider the case or discuss its merits, but has a limited role in
monitoring the fulfilment of the formal conditions in any foreign award so as to accept its
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A contract concluded between the parties is not subject to a hearing before the court in such cases
except in cases where the original contract is based on a prohibited transaction. For example, if the
original contract was a purchase of alcohol. In this instance, the court will refuse implementation as
the arbitration award violates public policy in the Kingdom. This is shown in Ruling No 189 / T / 4 of
1427 AH 2007 which has been expounded in the chapter with regard to public policy.
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implementation in the territory of the Kingdom in accordance with the rules set by the
decisions of the President of the Grievances Board.120
This was also confirmed by the court Ruling No 36 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005 where the
court accepted the implementation of a foreign award without paying attention to the
plaintiff’s claims, where he was claiming that the arbitrator had erred in applying the
proper law; that is, the arbitrator had applied the Egyptian law and did not apply the Saudi
law. The court considers that a substantive defence, where the plaintiff was able to use it
before the arbitral tribunal or before the court that was controlling the arbitration process.
Hence, the court could not apply Article V(1)(d) of the Convention and consider that the
arbitrators had exceeded their powers in the case or had made a mistake in the application
of the law.
The reason here is that the parties did not specify a particular law applying to the dispute.
Therefore, the arbitral tribunal applied the law of the country where it was held as the
applicable law. It should be noted that the defendant claimed that the Saudi law was the
applicable law because of the fact that the contract would be executed in Saudi Arabia,
but the arbitral tribunal considers the application of the law of the country where the
arbitration was held and the court did not object to that application.
C.

The Discussion of the Performance or implementation of the right that has been decided
by the arbitral award is not a discussion of the merits of the case. This is approved by
Ruling No 143 / T / 2 of 1413 AH 1993,121 in that the calling of witnesses to prove the fact

120

121

Additionally, there are a number of rulings on the inadmissibility of the discussion of the merits, such
as Ruling No 235 / T / 2 of 1415 AH 1995.
This case was an application for a foreign judgment raised by a wife against her ex-husband to get the
nape of dowry after their divorce; the husband claimed that he paid that amount of money before the
start of this case. Thus, such a defence is not related to the subject matter of the original case where he
(the husband) tried to avoid the double implementation of that provision. [Note: The ‘nape of the
dowry’ is an amount of money that is given to the wife by the husband (her dowry
to legalise the marriage) in an agreement prior to marriage but she can ask to take some at the
beginning of the marriage and the rest of it due (a) if the husband dies before her so she will take it
from her husband's heritage beside her share in the inheritance or (b) in the event of divorce.]
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that the defendant has fulfilled his obligation according to the arbitral award can not be
considered as a discussion of the merits of the case, but is, in fact, considered a new case,
as it depended on an independent incident that existed after the issuance of the award to
avoid the repetition of the implementation of that foreign arbitral award.
Australia: The role of the judge in the consideration of foreign arbitral awards in the Federal
Court of Australia and the State and Territory Supreme Courts can be done without any
discussion of the merits of the disputes. This is consistent with the Convention’s objective in
making the arbitrator’s decision final, with no appeal being permitted to a court on the merits.
Under this principle ‘the interdict of the discussion of the dispute merit’ can be done through
two steps:
1.

The judge’s role is exclusive to the examination of the fulfilment of the formal
requirements and he/she cannot discuss the merits of the case. The Australian Federal
Court in Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc emphasised that:
The effect of an order is to render the Court incompetent to try the merits of the case.
However, it may retain competence for matters relating to the arbitration, particularly
where the arbitration is to take place within the geographical area over which the court has
122
jurisdiction.

In the same way, Croft J in Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc has expressly
mentioned that where he addressed some US court judgments and supported that
principle with some conditions, saying:
[I]t is not correct for an enforcing court under the New York Convention to go behind the
holding on the merits on this aspect that has been made by the Arbitrator except to the
extent that this is permitted by the Convention grounds during the second stage of the
enforcement process ... [However] It does not follow that this principle requires or implies
that the exercise by an arbitral tribunal of the power or jurisdiction to determine the extent
of its own jurisdiction is necessarily unreviewable by the courts under certain
123
circumstances; such as in enforcement proceedings under the New York Convention.

122
123

See Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [1998] FCA 558, 37.
See Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc [2011] VSC 1.
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This illustrates the extent of the authority of the judge in such cases where he/she cannot
consider the merits of the dispute. As discussed earlier with respect to the formal
requirements and the court’s discretion, and as is noticeable in many cases, the judge’s
authority is to ensure the availability of such conditions and the need for these conditions
to be applied in order to recognise and implement foreign arbitral awards.
2.

The Australian judges can check just the legal reasons for the award to make sure there is
no misconduct or errors of law in the award, as explained above, where the judge has
reserved the right to set aside the arbitral award on the basis that the arbitral award was
not inclusive of legal reasons.124

4.2.2

Legal Nature of the Judge’s Decision

It should be noted that some countries have made the implementation of the provisions of
foreign arbitral awards before the execution judge.125 As for Saudi Arabia and Australia, they
consider the case for implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral as a new stand-alone
lawsuit.
Saudi Arabia: Article 20 of the Saudi Arbitration System provides that:
The judgment of the arbiters shall be enforceable when it becomes final by the order of the
authority originally responsible for considering the dispute and this order shall be made on
the request of any of the parties concerned after ascertaining that there is nothing that
prevents its enforcement from the Shari’a point of view.

This implementation, like the situation in Australia, cannot be created except by a new case
before an independent court (the competent court) because in the view of Article 21, ‘The
judgment passed by the arbiters after an order has been issued for its implementation according

124

125

Hargrave J has stated that if the reasons given by the arbitrators for making the interim award are
manifestly inadequate and if there is an error of law on the face of the interim award, the arbitrators in
these cases have misconducted the award and made an error in law. For more information, see BHP
Billiton Ltd v Oil Basins Ltd [2006] VSC 402.
For example, Article 33 in the Code of Civil Procedure No 11 of 1992 (United Arab Emirates) gives
the authority to consider the implementation of foreign awards to the execution judge.
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to the foregoing article shall be as good as a verdict made by the authority which issued the
implementation order.’ Thus, what was issued for the implementation is a judicial ruling issued
by a judicial body. This also demonstrates that this judicial matter, in reality, is a court ruling,
because everything that is issued by the judiciary in a particular dispute between parties and
formed in accordance with the established rules for adjudication is a decision or ruling. This
change in the text regarding ‘court order’ and ‘decision’ could cause some confusion, but the
text has the same impact.
The differences are in the proceedings of the court, where normally everything issued by the
judge is a ‘ruling’. There are so called ‘judicial orders’ and it is known that if the judge does not
follow the issuance of these orders using the same procedures, he will never settle disputes by
such orders. Additionally, ways to challenge ‘judicial orders’ differ from the appeal in the court
judgments.126
Finally, it should be noted that there is a ruling released by the Audit-Circuit where it changed
the formulation of the verdict to be more mandatory, as stated in Ruling No 74/ T / 4 of 1427 AH
2007. However, it is not exactly or literally changing the Sub-Circuits’ provision to give legal
force or the powerful texts for the enforcement, but the alteration will be in the Audit-Circuits’
provision ‘part’, which gives such rulings legal force. This shows the authority of the AuditCircuit in the Grievances Board. On the other hand, it shows that the verdict of implementing or
refusing foreign arbitral award should be issued complete as a regular judgment to end the
conflict and also shows the extension of legal form stating its force, which can make it
implemented as a national provision.127

For more information, see Edward Eid, ‘Mwso‘t Os{ol Elmoh{akmat Elmadni>h u> Al Ethbat w Altnfi>dh:
Joza II: Nz{ri>at Al Ehkts{as{ [Encyclopedia of Civil Procedure, Evidence and Implementation, Volume
II: Theory of Jurisdiction]’ (S{ader Publishing, 1985) para 284; also see Ahmed Abu Al-Wafa, ‘Nz{ri>at
Elah{kam fy Qanon Elmuraf‘at [The Theory of the Provisions in the Procedure Law]’ (Dar Almatboat
Aljame’iah, 2007) 31.
127
See Ruling No 74/ T / 4 of 1427 AH 2007 which was also stated in Ruling No 152 / T / 4 of 1426 AH
2006.
126
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Australia: According to section 8(2) of the IAA (under ‘Recognition of foreign awards’), it is
stated that ‘Subject to this Part, a foreign award may be enforced in a court of a State or
Territory as if the award were a judgment or order of that court.’128 This is expressly provided
so that what comes from the court in the implementation of foreign arbitral award has the same
legal force as a normal judicial ruling; thus, it should be implemented expeditiously, by force, if
necessary. However, there is a unique enforcement problem in Australia under the Convention,
where it is required that the award be enforced in two or more of Australian states or territories,
because in such situations, the persons who intends to enforce the award may find themselves
forced to file multiple parallel enforcement proceedings in the Supreme Court of the relevant
state or territory and could not be presented before the Federal Court.129

4.2.3

The Legal Effect of the Judge’s Decision

Initially, according to the above, it should be noted that the idea of challenging the arbitration
ruling revolves around the test of the arbitration procedures in terms of the fulfilment of the
formal requirements of the arbitral award, so the request for implementation of a foreign arbitral
award is not challenging the verdict of the award itself, nor the reasons for it. Thus, the national
judge’s task is to consider the fulfilment of the formal and substantive requirements and not to
consider the merits of the case. It is natural that bringing the case before the competent court for
implementation ends with one of two decisions, namely:
A.

Rejecting implementation by relying on any defence, whether formal or substantive
means the inadmissibility of the application of the arbitral award within the territory or
the state. This opens the possibility of appeal against the ruling of the competent court to
a higher court.

128

According to the Explanatory Memorandum, International Arbitration Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth): ‘1.
Item 5 of Schedule 1 of the Bill amends subsection 8(2) of the Act to remove reference to a foreign
arbitral award being enforced in a state or territory court “as if the award had been made in that state
or territory in accordance with the law of that state or territory”.’
129
For more information, see Simon Greenberg, Christopher Kee and J Romesh Weeramantry,
International Commercial Arbitration: An Asia-Pacific Perspective (Cambridge Press, 2011) 431.
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B.

Acceptance of implementation confers legal force on the rule of foreign arbitration and
provides the possibility of its implementation within the territory or the state. This
implementation of the rule of foreign arbitral award is equal in the legal force to the
national decisions in terms of implementation and the possibility of the use of all legal
methods of implementation, including coercive force. In fact, the foreign award became a
national ruling by the issuance of the court provision for the implementation, so it is no
longer foreign ruling. This is stipulated in the Saudi and also the Australian laws. Article
21 of the Saudi Arbitration System states that ‘the judgment passed by the arbiters after an
order has been issued for its implementation according to the foregoing article shall be as
good as a verdict made by the authority which issued the implementation order’; while
Article III of the Convention (which is Schedule 1 to the IAA), stipulates:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon,
under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the
recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.

It should be noted that if the court has accepted the implementation that does not mean, of
course, the abolition of the right to overturn that ruling or the right to appeal before the highest
court according to the national laws of both countries.
Therefore, it is obvious that when the court decides the invalidity of the arbitral award that does
not mean the loss of the right of appeal to the higher court (Administrative Courts of Appeal in
Saudi Arabia and the appeal court within Supreme Court or the full court of the Federal Court in
Australia). After that, this verdict becomes final, either by the expiry of the veto or the appeal
court supporting the provision of the first court by refusing to implement the foreign arbitration,
in this case, the arbitration agreement becomes invalid and the parties to the arbitration have to
resort to the competent court to submit the dispute or organise another arbitration agreement or
use any other peaceful means to resolve their dispute.
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It is worth noting the special case that exists when the arbitral award contains a part that is
contrary to public policy; in this case, the final provision from the national court will apply the
lawful part, and it will cancel, refuse to implement or ignore the unlawful part. Thus, the
severability here confirms the invalidity of the unlawful part and rejects it for implementation
with the lawful part, which was approved by the court in the final provision and is able to be
implemented.
However, there is a very important and delicate issue, which is that of a situation where the
arbitrator/s has exceeded his authority according to the arbitration clause or agreement, the
court, as we saw, will apply the lawful part and refuse to implement the unlawful part (that is,
the part where the arbitrator exceeded lawful authority). That brings up the question about the
part rejected or cancelled and the possibility for the parties to go to the competent court or resort
to any alternative dispute resolution to resolve that part. It is also important to know the legal
power of the court provision in refusing to implement that part the ‘exceeded’ part in any other
jurisdiction. Basically, if the parties did not conclude such conflicts or parts in their arbitration
clause/agreement, that means these parts are not at issue between the parties or, if they are
conflict areas, they did not intend to solve or end these issues at least in that arbitral award.
However, in the event that they had intended to finalise all of the matters of conflict but they did
not mention all of these conflicts in the arbitration clause/agreement for any reason, it would be
important to establish the legal power of that award in regard to these parts and the legal power
for the court judgment to refuse the part/s where the arbiter had exceeded his/her authority.
It should be noted that in Australia, according to Article V(1)(c) of the Convention and also
section 8(5)(d) in the IAA, this defence (the arbitrator/s has exceeded the arbitration agreement)
should be raised by one of the parties. Therefore, the court cannot raise it by itself. That means
if no one objected on the arbitrator/s’ exceeding the terms of authority in the arbitration clause
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or agreement, the Australian court will apply the whole award while taking into account the rest
of the conditions.130
Accordingly, there is no legal power of such an award in regard to these parts unless the parties
give it that power by applying this award peacefully. Therefore, the parties (in the case of
refusing to implement the exceeded parts) can choose to go to the competent court or to resort to
any other alternative dispute resolution to solve these parts and that depends on the fact that
these issues were not legally resolved, as the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to rule on such issues.
On the other hand, the court decision in refusing the exceeded parts has no power against any
future case about these exceeded parts where the fact is that these parts have not yet been
solved. In the event of the parties resorting to the competent court to establish a new case, or
present the case (the exceeded part issue) before a new arbitrator/s or any other dispute
resolution mechanism, such an arbitral award (just in the exceeded part) has no legal force. The
new court or arbitrators can consider the old rule that the arbitrators exceeded their powers as a
valuable ruling to help them to achieve justice but they are not obliged by that award.
In regard to the situation in Australia and in Saudi Arabia, if the parties did not agree about the
exceeded parts (apart from if the judge by his authority refused to implement the exceeded part
as a matter of public policy where the parties agreed about these exceeded parts in the arbitral
award), the new jurisdiction can take that award as a presumption before any new jurisdiction as
an acceptance by the parties for that award. In fact, such situations hardly occur, but it is still
possible.

130

In Saudi Arabia and according to the available rulings, there is no such case in that regard; however,
by reviewing the Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No 116 of 1428 AH 2007, the
situation is quite opposite where such defence is considered as a public policy matter (based on Ruling
No 115 / D / E / 15 of 1429 AH 2009, (which considered all of these conditions in this decision as a
public policy matters as we shall see in the next chapter), Thus, such a defence could be raised by the
judge himself, which means the parties have to resolve these issues by any other means. This is still an
assumption, relying on the ruling that makes all of the defences related to the public policy. Thus,
there is a need to have a real case presented to determine the path of the court on such a critical point.
More comparisons between the two systems will be applied in the Conclusion.
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4.3

Permissibility of Challenging the Court Judgment

This section deals with the possibility of appeal, impact and powers of the verdict after the
appeal. Thus, when the foreign arbitral award is either rejected or accepted by the competent
court, this does not mean the end of the case. There is a kind of judicial review of or ‘challenge’
on the decisions of the competent court before a higher court. This section seeks to describe the
nature of the appeal and show if it is formal or substantive. This will provide information that
will help determine if the appeal ensures the integrity of the decision where it meets the
litigation procedures and ensures justice, or involves the merits of the case to verify the
application of the law.
The philosophy of arbitration, the secret of its existence and its goals are speed and
confidentiality in resolving the conflict. But in order to achieve these goals, the judiciary’s role
must be limited to validating the arbitral awards if it was proper and in accordance with
statutory procedures. Thus, there is no need to go into the merits of the case and consider the
subject matter again. Accordingly, the logical and proper way is that the role of the judge is just
limited to validating the formal requirements.
Therefore, the Saudi and Australian laws ensure the possibility of an appeal from recognition or
non-recognition on the arbitral award if refused. This, at first glance, gives the suggestion that
this is an advantage. However, these laws have enabled the appeal on the arbitral award, with
the possibility of appeal which would again prolong the dispute rather than facilitate the process
of implementing the rule of foreign arbitration by ensuring that it conformed to the law. In this
scenario, it can be said that the arbitration stage became one of the litigation stages.
In Saudi Arabia, for example and according to the process of litigation, recourse to the judiciary
from the beginning is better than arbitration, because resorting to the judiciary places the parties
before possibly two levels of litigation (as in the old Grievances Board System where there were
the Commercial Sub-Circuits and then the Audit-Circuits as an appeal court), but resorting to
arbitration necessarily would involve three levels, the first level being the arbitration, second the
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Commercial Sub-Circuit and the third the Audit-Circuit. As for the new law for the Saudi
Grievances Board,131 litigation before the court is running through three phases or levels, which
can be summarised as: (a) the Administrative Courts, (b) the Administrative Courts of Appeal,
and (c) the High Administrative Court as the highest degree or level of appeal in the Saudi
Grievances Board. With these levels, arbitration becomes the fourth phase in the conflict, which
may impede an important goal of resorting to arbitration (that goal being to secure a speedy
resolution to conflict). Therefore, this section will argue the permissibility of challenging the
ruling that has been issued regarding implementation or refusal to implement the rule of foreign
arbitration.
Saudi Arabia: there is no explicit and direct text in the Saudi Arbitration System or its
Regulation stipulating that an appeal on the ruling is permissible, where this law refers to the
competent court for the consideration of the arbitral award in more than one article. Thus, the
methods of appeal and the lawsuit are filed under the law governing such a court. In regard to
Article 19 of the Saudi Arbitration System 1982, it is obvious that if the litigants, or any one of
them, has objected to the arbitral award within the period provided, the original competent
authority has to hear the dispute regarding the objection and decide to either reject the objection
and issue the order of execution or to accept the objection and decide it.132
This suggests that there is one degree of litigation, which means that the request for the
implementation of foreign arbitral award is a new and independent case before the competent
authority for it to rule on implementation. But it in fact does not stop at this limit, as ‘generally’
according to the new legislation governing the Grievance Board System 1982 (Chapter III,
which defines the jurisdiction of the courts in the Grievances Board) and according to the rules
of proceedings before this court, the appeal on the judge’s ruling (whether in arbitration or an
131
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Implementation Mechanism of the Judiciary Law and the Board of Grievances Law 2007, issued by
Royal Decree No M / 78, 19/9/1428 AH 2007.
For more information about the Grievances Board role as an administrative court, see generally
Abdulrahman Al Shalhoub, ‘Alnezam Aldstori{ fy Almamlakah Al‘rabih Als‘wdih: byn Ashari’a ū
Alqanwn Almuqarn [The Constitutional System in Saudi Arabia: Between the Sharia and the
Comparative Law]’ (Safir Press, 2nd ed, 2005).
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administrative case) is permissible and the appeal can be made before the higher courts. This
practical and real problem reflects the situation where arbitration has become as an additional
layer of litigation.
This is supported by the principles enunciated in the ‘Commercial Audit-Circuit in the
Grievances Board: Guideline Principles and Case Law, from 1407 AH (1987) to 1419 AH
(1999)’, where it stated under the principles established:
First: the Arbitration Proceedings before the Court: degrees of litigation and the
procedures for arbitration cases (The appeal): the texts of the Saudi Arbitration System
have given the jurisdiction of the consideration of foreign arbitration to the authority that is
originally competent to hear the dispute to decide either reject or implement that award...

Thus, there has been a general statement ‘the competent authority to hear the dispute’ without
specifying the degree of judicial standing, and then the competent authority hearing the case
will apply its procedures. It is therefore not correct to say that the Sub-Circuit’s provision is
final as a second degree after the arbitral tribunal (which is a first degree). This contradicts the
procedural rules prescribed in considering cases before the Grievances Board.133
It should be noted that the Audit-Circuits under the old system have the authority to carry out
any amendment in the Sub-Circuits’ rulings and also have the right to modify the operation of
the ruling itself as necessary to make it a mandatory provision. That was clear in the Ruling No
152 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006 as explained above, where the ruling stated: ‘However, the fact that
the operative ruling of the Sub-Circuit does not contain a mandatory phrase for the
implementation; hence, the Audit-Circuit has amended the ruling [to make it operative] … ,
then the amendment becomes a part of the ruling of the Sub-Circuit.’ This is a formal work
rather than substantive, which only emphasises the existence of the mandatory wording of the
provision. Additionally, it should be noted that the natural way of appeal is in accordance with
the request of any party to the dispute, but the court in accordance with Decision of the Full

133

This judgment was in Ruling No 53 / T / 4 of 1415 AH 1995.
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Audit-Circuit No 21 of 16.11.1423 AH (2003)134 decided by majority that any provision decided
by the lack of jurisdiction shall not be final until considered by the competent Audit-Circuit in
all cases.
This means that even though there is no request for an appeal, the case shall be sent to the
Audit-Circuit to be heard because it is a serious defence where the court is deprived of the
possibility of considering a case. This could be a guarantee of justice because it ensures that the
rule of the Sub-Circuit was legally correct. This also is demonstrated by two decisions: first,
Ruling No 82 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005 and the second is Ruling No 103 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006.
These aimed to ensure the validity of the provision because a ruling of non-jurisdiction avoids
any consideration of the decision and would prevent any circuit from considering the case. But a
question arises about the binding nature of the provision before the Audit-Circuit amendment. It
could be said that the parties did not appeal the Sub-Circuit decision, so they must be satisfied.
As a result, they will apply that decision, but their knowledge of the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court cannot prevent the application of justice and this course is an additional guarantee of
justice. This proves that an appeal on the ruling of Sub-Circuits (Administrative Courts) is,
according to the old or the new Grievances Board legeslation, permitted, and there is no explicit
text preventing that appeal, whether the ruling approves implementing the foreign arbitral award
or rejects it. Furthermore, any party can appeal on the ruling for any other formal reason, such
as the case memorandum lacking causes, the cessation of the case due to absence of
party/parties, or where the case has been dismissed for any reason. This is so with regard to the
regular methods of appeal. There are also issues related to the parties’ right to resort to the
extraordinary method of appeal, such as the presence of new evidence to challenge the court’s
decision in an action for the nullity, including the request for a retrial.

134

In fact, this decision is not relying on a real case but it is a decision affirming a judicial principle. Such
action comes in the form of resolutions issued by the Full Audit-Circuit. However, such decisions are
very few and often come in the establishment of a new principle that has been taken in a particular
case. However, the Audit-Circuit does not show at all the details of the case or the number of rulings,
rather it just issues a decision confirming a particular principle.
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Basically, the Saudi Arbitration System 1983 did not allow or deny such a right in any clear and
explicit text, so for clarification one must return to the general rules set forth in the Grievances
Board System 2007 and the Rules of Pleadings and Proceedings before the Grievances Board
that had been issued in 1989. In fact, there is a new Law of Procedure that has not yet been
formally adopted, but is still a draft law and not yet approved.135
Therefore, it can be said that the appeal against the court provision as to the implementation or
the rejection of foreign arbitral award is in principle permissible on one condition, which is that
the appellant has to fulfil all of the appeal conditions, so that the appeal can be accepted.
However, the special nature of the nullification must be taken into account where it means that
the Court of Appeal is just determining the correctness of what happened at the trial and
whether that trial was conducted fairly.136 Also, the arbitration system as a whole must be
supported by the judiciary and that can be done by ensuring that all the formalities have been
met, and this supports the suggestion that arbitration should confer the status of accelerated
implementation of a court ruling on the implementation of foreign arbitral award.
Based on the above, under the old Grievances Board System the Audit-Circuits (Administrative
Court of Appeal in the current system) receive appeals on the provisions/rulings of Sub-Circuits
(Administrative courts in the current system). As a result, there are some important principles
issued by the Audit-Circuits on the provisions of arbitration. The most important of those
principles talks about the legal nature of arbitration, where the Audit-Circuits consider the legal
nature of arbitration as forming a special category of the judiciary and individuals can resort to
it to resolve their disputes away from the procedures established by the state to facilitate the
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The old one is the Law of Procedure before the Saudi Grievances Board, issued by Resolution of
Council of Ministers No 190 of 16/11/1409 AH 1989, Umm Al-Qura Gazette No 3266, 12/4/1409 AH
1989. The new legislation was issued after the completion of this thesis and is the Saudi Grievances
Board System Implementation Mechanism 2007, issued by Royal Decree No M / 3, 1/22/1435 AH
25.11.2013.
The Annulment in this regard is ‘a judicial decision which sets aside or invalidates an arbitral award.’
See Rana and Sanson, above n 72, 296.
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litigation process, so this was a ‘special judiciary’ that goes ‘hand in hand’ with the ordinary
courts.
However, this special judiciary cannot eliminate the authority of courts because they still have
some authority over arbitration. It should be noted that this was contained in the Commercial
Audit-Circuits in the Saudi Grievances Board Guideline Principles and Case Law 1407 AH
(1987) to 1419 AH (1999), where it is stated under the Arbitration Chapter in paragraph 3 that
‘the existence of the arbitration clause: requires the court not to consider the case.’137
This binding nature of arbitration means that the Saudi court has changed what has been passed
by Islamic jurisprudence, under which scholars believe that arbitration is just a contract; thus, it
has contractual nature. Hence, it is binding as is any contract and the theory of contract law will
be applied to it. However, the binding nature of this description ‘special judiciary’ is not clear,
which may mean ‘it is not a real or [lacks] full judiciary nature’. Accordingly, the mandate of
arbitration is also not clear where it raises the question about the applicable rules for arbitration,
when there is a lack of a text that governs the arbitration process. It is obvious that the court will
apply the general rules of the theory of contract or the general rules of the judiciary.
Australia: the situation differs from Saudi Arabia in accordance with the difference between
the two judicial systems. As explained earlier (Chapter 2), the Federal Court of Australia and a
Supreme Court of a State or Territory are the competent courts in considering the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards.138
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This view was stated in Ruling No 143 / T / 4 of 1412 AH 1992, which was mentioned in the principles
enunciated in the Commercial Audit-Circuit in the Grievances Board: Guideline Principles and Case
Law from 1407 AH (1987) to 1419 AH (1999). The parties still have the right to go to the court to
raise any claim against the arbitrator or any error on the procedures, even the annulment of the award
after its issuance. But in the first stage if there is an arbitration clause/agreement, the court cannot
consider this case if one of the parties claim to set aside or ask for the arbitration.
138
Chapter 2 in this research (2.2.2 Competent Court in Australia) dealt with the Supreme Court of New
South Wales as an example of these courts. It should be noted that most of the cases concerning the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitration are brought before the supreme courts. For
more information see, International Chamber of Commerce, Country Answers: Australia (Law as at
18 July 2008) ICC website, above n 87.
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In fact, the Federal Court of Australia is a superior court. This may raise the question about the
possible dual jurisdiction of the Federal Court when this court shares original jurisdiction with
the Supreme Courts of the States and Territories in considering the application of foreign
arbitral awards and also operates as an appellate court for the Supreme Courts in some cases
under special leave. Accordingly, this situation requires an understanding of the jurisdiction of
the Australian Federal Court, especially in relation to the provision of arbitration, and also in
regard to the possibility of appeal on the decisions of these courts (that is, the Supreme Court
and Federal Court) on the implementation of foreign arbitral awards.
To find out the possibility of appeal on a Supreme Court’s ruling to the Federal Court, there has
to be an explicit legal text that allows such appeal in these disputes or the appeal could not be
granted. Thus, the text of the law to be applied (that is, the IAA) must contain a text that allows
appeal from the single judge of the Supreme Court ‘single judge’ to the full court of the Federal
Court (three judges); however, the IAA does not contain such a provision; therefore, the appeal
on the Supreme Court’s decisions to recognise or not recognise the foreign arbitral award to the
Full Court of the Federal Court is not possible.139 Thus, the appeal from the single judge of the
NSW Supreme Court is to the full court of the Supreme Court (three judges) and similarly in the
Federal Court from one judge to the full court (three judges).140 It should be noted that there is a
possibility under a special leave to appeal on a ruling of the full court of Supreme Court or the
full court of Federal Court before the High Court of Australia.141
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So, it can be said that it is under the controle of or at the will of the plaintiff to choose the suitable
court to seek the implementation of the arbitration award. This could be determined by the location of
the defendant but also according to the distribution of the defendant’s funds within the country. But
the option remains, however, with the plaintiff except in some cases where the subject of the conflict
is beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts, or vice versa, as explained in Chapter 2.
140
See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) section 25 stated that it could be one or more judges.
141
See s 33 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and also see Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act (‘Commonwealth Constitution’) s 73 ‘appellate jurisdiction of the High Court’.
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4.3.1

The Possibility of Appeal on the Provisions for the Implementation of the
Arbitral Award

Just like the situation in Saudi Arabia, there is no legal text in the Convention or IAA or even the
UNCITRAL Model Law that prohibits or allows the appeal on the court’s judgment on
implementing or refusing a foreign arbitral award.142 Therefore, in such cases we have to resort
to the court’s law or to the procedural law to ascertain the possibility or permissibility of appeal
against the court’s decision.
Therefore, it is important to mention that the role of the full court of the Federal Court regarding
the implementation of international arbitration as it accepts ‘under special leave’ the appeal on a
decision of a single judge of the Federal Court.143
On the other hand, in accordance with the law governing the courts an appeal is permitted where
the Supreme Court’s judgments (single judge) can be appealed before the Court of Appeal
within the Supreme Court (most appeals are heard by three judges) and the Federal Court
judgments can be appealed before the Full Court of the Federal Court.144 Additionally, as stated
above, under some circumstances the judgments of the appeal courts and the full court
judgments can be appealed before the High Court of Australia.145
This brings us back to the previous point with respect to Saudi Arabia, where the possibility of
appeal to more than one level may lead to the loss of the advantages of arbitration and result in
142

However, CAA 1984 (NSW) s 40(1)(b) formerly appears to have restricted the right of appeal where
‘exclusion agreements’ had been reached by arbitral parties regarding ‘the right of appeal under
section 38(2) in relation to the award or, in a case falling within paragraph (b), in relation to an award
to which the determination of the question of law is material.’ That does not exist in the IAA or New
York Convention. Note: This Act was repealed and replaced by the CAA 2010 (NSW), wherein the
appeal against the foreign award is mentioned in ss 34 and 34(A).
143
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25(1AA). Also see Federal Court of Australia, Appeals
([last update] 18 August 2011) <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/litigants/appeals/appeals.html>.
144
For the appeal before the Federal Court, see section 25(1AA) of the Federal Court of Australia Act
1976 (Cth). For more information, see the Federal Court of Australia website. And for the appeal
before the Supreme Court of NSW, see section 101 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Also see
the Court of Appeal ([last update] 17 April, 2012) Supreme Court of NSW
<http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_courtofappeal.html>.
145
Court of Appeal ([last updated] 17 April 2012) Supreme Court of NSW
<http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_courtofappeal.html>.
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the parties having to repeat the proceedings before the courts; this could be a long process, in
view of the number of levels of appeal. Therefore, linking the appeal to one level is more logical
and more effective, where it can, on the one hand, be evaluated from the application of justice
and the preservation of public policy in the country and, on the other hand, the advantages of
arbitration be maintained, which attracts dealers in the trade area to the method of peaceful
settlement of disputes, as the most important aspect is the speed in adjudicating the dispute.
Such effects on the choice of arbitration need a special study to examine the effects on the
investor’s decision in choosing arbitration if he/she knows that there are many levels of
litigation in the country.

4.4
4.4.1

Conclusion
Findings and Analysis

There are no major differences between the Saudi and Australian formal requirements. Most of
the formal requirements are similar except for the fact that for implementation in Saudi Arabia
an award must not violate Shari’a. The award shall not be inconsistent with any ruling issued by
a national court or inconsistent with a case pending before a national court. The award shall not
be issued against the Saudi government (that is, no recourse to arbitration is permitted without
prior permission having been obtained). The dispute must not have been resolved by the
conciliation before submitting to arbitration.
In Australia, there are only two requirements that are different from Saudi Arabia. These are: In
Australia, there are only two requirements that are different from Saudi Arabia. These are:
that the arbitration clause/agreement must be in a written document (which remains unclear in
Saudi Arabia although it could be argued that since the Kingdom joined the Convention, it is a
requirement although it may be open to proving the existence of a contract via witness
testimony); and the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure must be in
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accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, then in accordance with
the law of the country where the arbitration took place.
The only requirement that may be considered a problem to arbitration is, ‘The award shall not
be issued against the Saudi government’. Without understanding the Saudi legal system and
laws, it is easy to conclude that this provision discourages arbitration.
Error in applying the proper convention by the Grievances Board: In Ruling No 100 / T/ 4 of
1425 AH 2005, the court made an error in choosing to apply the Riyadh Convention instead of
the Arab Convention 1952. Irrespective of the corrections made in Ruling No 166 / T / 4 of 1428
AH 2008, this could be a source of discouraging arbitration since any party that views the way
that the system handles its cases might lose confidence, fearing that the evaluation of an
application for implementation may be based on any preferred conventional laws, that may only
suit to serve the aims of the courts and not arbitration and justice to the interested party. The
same applies to errors made by the Fifth Sub Circuit leading to revocation in Ruling No 192 / ES
/ 4 of 1429 AH 2009. Hence, when the judge finds himself in front of several agreements he/she
may be vulnerable to falling into such an error.
On the other hand, Australian judges did not fall into such a mistake where the Convention has
become part of the IAA and this may also be attributed to the expertise and training for judges.
Additionally, the Australian judges in several judgments have adopted a broad interpretation of
the Convention in order to adapt to the requirements of international commercial arbitration,
which may demonstrate the purpose of the existence of the arbitration.
There is also laxity in the provision of facts supporting rulings such as observed in Ruling No
164 / T/ 4 of 1424 AH 2004 and Ruling No 166 / T / 4 of 1428 AH 2008. The rulings did not
address or name the formal requirements, but rather expressed them in general terms.
Some of the rulings, however, show accuracy in the implementation of foreign arbitral awards
by abiding by what is required under the formal requirements for foreign award implementation.
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Examples are the decision supported by the Fourth Audit-Circuit in Ruling No 231 / T / 4 of
1426 AH 2006, Ruling No 23 / T / 2 of 1413 AH 1993, Ruling No 192 / ES / 4 of 1429 AH 2009
and Ruling No 71 / T / 2 of 1413 AH 1993.
In Saudi Arabia, all formal aspects are also required to be abided by as seen in Ruling No 103 /
T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005. Ruling No 36 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005, Ruling No 152 / T / 4 of 1426 AH
2006 and Ruling No 102 / T / 4 of 1424 AH 2004 also prove the application of formal
requirements are provided for in the laws. They mention and specify the basis of the formal
requirements, and are mandatory in both countries.
Concerning the role of the judge in international conventions and national laws in considering
foreign arbitral awards, judge’s decisions are based on legal grounds provided by domestic
arbitration laws; that is Article 20 of the Saudi Arbitration System. The court system, however,
affects the final decision. The Audit-Circuit, for example, can change the Sub-Circuits’
provision to give it legal force.
Similarly, in Australia the judge’s decisions are based on legal grounds provided by domestic
arbitration laws. That is section 8(2) of the IAA. Decisions have the same legal force as normal
court rulings. The foreign award is considered a national ruling by the issuance of the court’s
provision for the implementation in both countries. This is a provision of the respective
countries’ laws. In Saudi Arabia, it is Article 21 of the Saudi Arbitration System; in Australia, it
is Article III of the Convention (which is Schedule 1 to the IAA).
It is also clear that in both countries, the judge’s decision is final and has final legal force except
for cases where the arbitrator exceeded his legal authority. Such exceeded parts are left for the
parties to decide on whether to go for a new arbitration agreement including the exceeded part
or to resort to a competent court to help resolve the matter. In both countries the judge has no
power to discuss the merits of the case.
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Another finding is that in Saudi Arabia, cases related to the lack of jurisdiction have to be sent
to the Audit-Circuit to be examined even if there is no request for an appeal. There are no
explicit texts allowing or prohibiting appeals on Sub-Circuit rulings, but evidence from certain
rulings show that such appeals are allowed. This can be considered disadvantageous to
arbitration in Saudi Arabia; however, it could be said that such procedure is to protect
legitimacy in the country in terms of making sure that the court had no jurisdiction. Though, if
rulings on cases are not published and there are no references to previous cases to make new
rulings, any foreigner would not know if such courts allow appeals. If this material were to be
made clear to anybody who wishes to resort to arbitration, it would be far easier for such person
to consider arbitration in Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi legal structure could also be another disadvantage to arbitration and could be the
reason why some researchers and professionals consider Saudi Arabia as hostile to arbitration. It
has the Court of Appeal which has to review the rulings of Sub-Circuits irrespective of the
presence of an appeal. This slows down the arbitration process.
In Australia, the IAA does not contain any explicit legal text that allows appeal on arbitration
rulings from a Supreme Court to a Federal Court and similarly from a Federal Court to the full
Federal Court. Appeals are made from the Supreme Court single judge to Supreme Court full
court with three judges. The same applies to the federal court’s appeal system. Appeals from
both full courts can only be submitted to the High Court of Australia. This shows the match
between the Saudi and Australian judicial systems in this point where both arbitration laws did
not mention the possibility of Appeal; however, this depends on the foundations and principles
that underlie the judicial system in the two countries.

4.4.2

Applying the Three Criteria

Efficiency of the conditions requires examining that whether these conditions ensure the
purpose for which arbitration is sought or discourage the arbitration. Therefore, the law and

243

more positive role of the national court that provide more facilities for arbitration and supports
the implementation is considered more efficient.
Justice in this analysis means ‘assessing whether the law provided equal rights to the parties in
the litigation proceedings’; it also means that it is not fair ‘in the arbitration’ for the subject
matter of the case to be considered by the national judge who is making the decision regarding
the recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award.
In Saudi Arabia: laws guiding the implementation of foreign awards and the legal structure of
the Saudi’s judiciary are factors that have affected efficiency where the lack of explicit texts
allowing or prohibiting appeals on Sub-Circuit rulings is a draw-back in the conditions used to
recognise and implement foreign arbitral awards, and the arbitration system. Additionally, lack
of explicit texts that specify documents (that is, the documents required to prove the reciprocity
principle) affects efficiency based on ideological diversity. Moreover, not considering writing as
a condition for arbitration or arbitration agreement may be seen as an advantage that increases
the effectiveness of the judicial role as it is possible that the Saudi judge will accept arbitration
in any form whatsoever. However, the existence of the arbitration clause or arbitration
agreement in writing is, in some cases, essential as the judge may be forced to read and examine
the clause/agreement to prove the existence of the arbitration, to find out the limits and the
powers of the arbitral tribunal or to examine the extent of the arbitral award’s conformity with
public policy, as we shall see in the next chapter (Chapter 5). Moreover, the willingness to use
any regional convention to which the Kingdom is signatory rather than the optimally relevant
convention to which it became signatory in 1994 (the New York Convention) or the Arab
Convention 1952, however, is an example of the Sub-Circuits errors in making decisions.
On the other hand, a reform of the Saudi judicial system could focus on how to eliminate case
reviews or on how to improve the Sub-Circuit’s competency in decisions concerning arbitration.
The Audit-Circuit Court has to review Sub-Circuit decisions which slows down arbitration (due
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to the number of processing times, treatment by the lower court), and incompetency of the
judges and court staff all affect the efficiency of the system in handling arbitration cases.
The time taken to handle the cases, the fact that decisions have to be reviewed in Audit-Circuit
courts, and the number of court levels that the case has to go through are all sources of
inefficiency.
However, justice is served irrespective of the time taken and the number of courts it is subjected
to. There is also evidence that in all cases, societal values are maintained. Most Sub-Circuits in
their decisions consider the violation of Shari’a laws. The Audit Courts in their rulings ensure
justice and the maintenance of societal values. Finally, there is laxity in provision of facts
supporting rulings (which can serve to expedite rulings). All these show that there is a focus on
maintaining societal values and ensuring justice.
In Australia, there are very few issues affecting the efficiency of the laws in this regard. The
conditions are simpler and fewer compared to those of Saudi Arabia.
It is evident that there is no explicit legal text in the IAA that allows appeal of arbitration rulings
from Supreme and Federal courts to full courts. Such absence of the legal text affects efficiency
based on ideological diversity. The appeal process, however, could discourage resort to
arbitration, because of the time taken. This affects efficiency based on the time taken to
complete the process of arbitration. On the other hand, the judge’s discretion in deciding what
public policy is, is both advantageous and disadvantageous. It encourages arbitration, for justice
is observed (the judges ensure justice in handling cases), but it could discourage arbitration
because the scope of public policy is not defined. Justice is served, however, irrespective of the
time taken and it is evident that in all cases, societal values are maintained.

4.4.3

Discussion

There are multiple decisions and conventions that govern the implementation of the provision of
arbitration in the Saudi Arabia, in contrast to Australia, where the IAA contains the most
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important international conventions and covers nearly all of the arbitration provisions as well as
having precedents as a common law jurisdiction that are regularly published and readily
available for perusal by judges. Also with respect to the requirement for written documentation,
in Australia this is expressed explicitly, but in Saudi Arabia this condition has not been formally
confirmed, because if there is no written agreement, the courts can apply the principles of
Shari’a where the existence of arbitration is accepted by all methods of proof not just by the
existence of a ‘written document’. However, the absence of a ‘written agreement’ may violate
the texts of the Saudi Arbitration System in general and the Convention as explained earlier.
There are many similarities in these formal conditions between the two countries but with some
differences in application according to some instances, such as requiring proof of reciprocity,
where the Australian and Saudi courts considered the accession to the Convention as sufficient
reason for the existence of reciprocity. However, the Saudi Grievances Board went further than
that because certain provisions of national laws (in the foreign country) may be present that
demonstrate the possibility of applying the rule issued by any Saudi courts in that country (as
stated in the Saudi Grievances Board ruling regarding to a ruling issued in the United
Kingdom). Therefore, it can be said that on the practical side many decisions have been issued
and an examination of them helps elucidate the facts. In Australia, there is no judgment about an
award that has been issued in a non-signatory state; indeed most of the judgments that have
been presented for implementation in Australia have been issued in a New York Convention
signatory state.
On the other hand, the judge’s discretion is very important aspect with regard to the
implementation of arbitral awards in Australia. The authority of the judge is very broad and
flexible in the assessment of defences and can even create (by interpretation) some conditions
not stated in the legal text; but, it can be accounted as a public policy matter and thus required to
be maintained by the Australian courts that an arbitral award is to be accepted wherever at all
possible. Finally, the legal nature of arbitration has an impact on the work of the judge, and it
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was clear that arbitration has a mandatory nature in many of the Australian rulings. But the
Saudi Grievances Board’s rulings did not address the degree to which arbitral awards are
mandatory.
Saudi Arabia: International conventions and national laws have provisions that guide the
implementation of foreign arbitration in each country. These provisions are the formal and
substantive requirements that have to be made available by the judges. The role of the judge is
to ensure that the formal and substantive requirements of any foreign arbitration award are met;
however, this is affected by several factors and this affects the efficiency of the laws. In Saudi
Arabia, laws guiding the implementation of foreign awards and the legal structure of the
Kingdom’s judiciary are factors that have affected efficiency.
The relationship of the Saudi Grievances Board’s circuits (Administrative Courts (Sub-Circuits)
with the Courts of Appeal (Audit-Circuits)) affects the application of the formal and substantive
requirements as provided by the national laws and the international conventions. The AuditCircuits are superior to the Sub-Circuits, yet their ruling is not binding on the Sub-Circuits
except under specific conditions outlined in the discussion above. The Sub-Circuits are free to
choose their or the Audit-Court’s opinion if the rule of the Audit-Circuit’s provision is based on
objective reason/s or the jurisprudence, and the Audit-Circuit can directly take up a case if they
are not convinced by the Sub-Circuit’s point of view. It means that decisions by Sub-Circuits
can be overturned irrespective of their freedom to make their own judgment. This affects the
efficiency of the laws guiding implementation of foreign arbitration since it reduces the speed of
resolving the disputes and further complicates the process of solving disputes through
arbitration. This militates against the reasons for resolving disputes through arbitration. If the
degree of complexity of the process increases and the time likewise rises, resolution of disputes
would just have ‘easily’ and ‘swiftly’ been done through the courts directly.
The principle of reciprocity is also another provision that reduces the efficiency of the laws. The
courts are allowed to determine whether the principle of reciprocity should be applied; and there
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are no specific definitions of what documents should be submitted to prove the reciprocity.
From the above discussion, Saudi Arabian judges have refused to enforce some foreign
provisions based on the lack of proof of the reciprocity, which may accounted as unfair to those
seeking to prove the existence of reciprocity to their courts. Implementation of some arbitral
awards to those who seek to prove reciprocity has been denied on the basis of the type of proofs
they provide, yet if the right documents needed to prove reciprocity had been specified, there
would have been no issue, but that lack of specificity in the governing legislation is an obstacle
to efficiency in this regard, and the application is rejected on that basis that ‘the principle of
reciprocity could not be demonstrated’. Such is the case of Ruling No 102 / T / 4 of 1429 AH
2009 and Ruling No 97 / T / 3 of 1411 AH 1991 as explained. However, in this regard it is
important to mention that the search in regard to condition of reciprocity before the Saudi courts
will be based on the time of the case is brought before the Saudi courts and not the time of the
issuance of the arbitral award. This could be counted as a support to the efficiency of arbitration
law. This is approved in Ruling No 102 / T / 4 in 1429 AH 2009.
There is also a problem in the condition dealing with disputes that have been solved by
conciliation before being submitted for arbitration. Indeed, if there is conciliation, there should
not be any arbitration, but consideration should be given to cases where one party does not
honour the agreement. There are no specific rules guiding judges on how to deal with such
cases, and one of the cases may have been unfairly judged (Ruling No 187 / T / 4 of 1426 AH
2006). Additionally, in this Ruling the process of solving the problem became longer, as it does
in such instances. The long procedures in this case (starting with the dates for suing and then the
cancellation of the case and then opening the case again) raise questions about court efficiency,
the lack of which in turn inevitably affects the course of justice. It should be noted that it is
difficult in most cases to know the time that was taken to decide the case. This is due to the style
of presentation of the cases in the Grievances Board. However, in this case (Ruling No 187 / T /
4 of 1426 AH 2006) the ruling of the Sub-Circuit was sent to the Audit-Circuit in 26/05/1426
AH (02/ 07/ 2005) and it has been considered in 15/08/1426 AH (19/ 09/ 2005).
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Efficiency is also determined by the judge’s action in dealing with cases, specifically if the judge
considers the merits of the case of arbitration award or not. In Saudi Arabia, it is stated clearly
that ‘all the international agreements (the Arab, Gulf [GCC] and the Convention) have
emphasised the inadmissibility of considering the merits of the case.’ The inadmissibility is
confirmed by both the older and the more recent decisions of the President of the Grievances
Board. By not considering the merits of the case, the judges are encouraging arbitration,
otherwise solving of disputes through arbitration would be the same as solving them in the
courts following the normal procedures of the court rendering arbitration meaningless.
There is a condition that allows an appeal on the arbitration award if refused with a possibility
of a second appeal (at more than one level). This condition could be a setback to the efficiency
of the laws of foreign arbitration. By allowing parties to appeal and appeal again, the process of
resolving the dispute is prolonged rather than dealt with once and for all.
The safeguard of the principle of a fair trial within a reasonable time could improve the
efficiency of the judiciary system. This could be done by improving the ability of the court to
react promptly and to make an appropriate judgment which can be a determining factor in the
efficiency of the enforcement in a just and reasonable time.
Therefore, the appeal should be narrower in arbitration disputes than in other contexts because
the dispute has already gone through one stage of resolution. This appeal is permissible in both
Saudi Arabia and Australia, but its negative effects can be felt more in the Saudi Arabia than in
Australia because of the Saudi legal structure. Saudi Arabia had (according to the old system of
the Saudi Grievances Board) many degrees of litigation, where the arbitration is the first step of
solving the dispute and the ability of appeal before the competent court (the Sub-Circuits) and
then again later to the Audit-Circuits which may then return the case to the Sub-Circuits if does
not agree with the Sub-Circuits provision; the parties still have the right to appeal again to the
Audit-Circuit, so ‘in some cases’ the parties may face nearly five levels of appeal. However, in
the new system of the Grievances Board the Saudi lawmaker tried to cover this legal loophole.
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This new system has decided on three degrees of litigation which are: the Administrative Courts
as the first, the Administrative Courts of Appeals as the second and the High Administrative
Court as the highest degree. Thus, if the stage of arbitration is taken into account with these
three degrees of litigation, that makes solving the problem through four levels. Because of this,
opting for litigation can be considered better than arbitration. If a foreign arbitral award is
refused enforcement and a party (defendant) appeals and appeals again, the process of solving
the dispute can be prolonged which affect the efficiency of the arbitration process.
As a result of these levels, the Sub-Circuits have refused some provision where the AuditCircuits apply them. This is due to the lack of training of judges for this type of issue where
some judges consider that any breach of any legal Islamic rule is contrary to public policy, even
if the offence is not according to an explicit text or breaching of an Islamic principle, as
explained earlier.
This leads one to wonder about accuracy as an element of efficiency. The probability of issuing
an accurate judgment by the court of first instance (Sub-Circuit in Saudi Arabia and Supreme
courts and Federal Court in Australia) is very high in Australia. Thus, based on the judgments
that have been used in this chapter, it can be said that generally the Australian courts are more
accurate because there have not been much judgments reversed by higher courts. This also may
be due to the fact that the Australian courts follow the provisions of the High Court which
provide stability in the judicial principles and provisions. On the other hand, most of the Saudi
courts’ judgments (Sub-Circuits) were overturned by the Audit-Circuit as previously explained.
This shows the need for the Grievances Board to express more interest in training judges. More
importantly, with the new structure of the Grievances Board, it is suggested that the Saudi
lawmaker give the authority for the implementation of any foreign arbitral award directly to the
Administrative Court of Appeal (the Audit-Circuits in the old law) to ensure greater efficiency
by applying the proper provision and reducing the number of appeals to be a single process
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from the Administrative Court of Appeal to the High Administrative Court. This will encourage
the resort to arbitration and contribute to efficiency of the law.
Furthermore, there is no case before the courts of Saudi Arabia on the defence that the
arbitrator/s has exceeded their powers according to the arbitration clause or arbitration
agreement or misconduct of the application of the law. This compares with the situation in
Australia, it is clear that based on Ruling No 115 / D / E / 15 of 1429 AH 2009 (which was
detailed earlier), all the conditions are within the public policy defence; thus, the judges
themselves can raise the defence that ‘the arbitrator/s has exceeded [their] powers’ as a public
policy matter. By contrast, in Australia, the law and the cases settled regarding that matter have
shown that this defence must be raised by one of the parties or the court will apply or refuse the
whole award. This is due to the adversarial system in Australia. So there is no such power for
the Australian judge which makes his/her job easier, whereas the Saudi judge has greater
obligation to check such a defence.
In Saudi Arabia, therefore, the level of effectiveness of the law is reduced due to some few
conditions (such as the award shall not be issued against the Saudi government (unless prior
permission to resort to arbitration has been obtained)) while a large number of conditions
positively support the implementation of foreign arbitration hence efficiency (for example, the
court’s power should not exceed the merits of the case). Therefore, it could be said that the
efficiency of the Saudi law regarding the implementation of foreign arbitral awards is low
compared to Australia, as we shall see below.
Saudi Arabia’s judicial jurisdiction defence is superior to other defences before the courts. This
is as provided by Ruling No 49 / T / 3 of 1418 AH 1998 where the Audit-Circuit advised the
judge of the Sub-Circuit to begin with the judicial jurisdiction defence before any defence (that
is, the lack of jurisdiction) as an essential and logical defence. There is no clear unfairness
portrayed in this provision, but this does not mean that it will not be unfair in specific cases.
Almost all the rulings by the judges are fair according to the explanations given as to why the
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final rulings are accepted. For example, Ruling No 273 / T / 1 of 1411 AH 1991 shows that
violation of procedures is unacceptable and so considered against public policy. Another
example is Ruling No 231 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006, where the original documents were required,
but only a copy of the original award were presented.
A few Saudi cases have raised some questions about the equal rights of both parties. One
instance is Ruling No 100 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005, where the Fourth Circuit Court did not
provide any analysis of the use of Articles 30(b) and 34(c) of the Riyadh Convention. The
arbitral award was issued in Egypt, which is an Arab state but is not a signatory to Riyadh
Convention. The Saudi court made an error in considering such provisions from a state that was
not a signatory to the convention. The same error occurred in Ruling No 137 / T / 4 of 1427 AH
2007 where Egypt was considered a signatory to the Riyadh Convention while it was not clear
whether it was. It could be said that parties who may not get equal rights in such cases are the
defendants where the court did not apply the proper convention which may affect their rights.
The Saudi courts’ inability to define and deal with reciprocity cases in a simple way is also
another issue that may contribute to inefficiency. When the one seeking foreign arbitral
implementation has been given the duty to prove reciprocity, he/she should be well informed of
what the courts require to prove the reciprocity (the requested documents). This is not done by
the Saudi law or by the courts; instead, the party who seeks to implement the foreign arbitral
award is left to resort to the general rules of evidence and proof. This may be accounted as
unfair since some of them are not accepted on the basis that they do not prove any reciprocity.
Ruling No 102 / T / 4 of 1429 AH 2009 involved an award where the party relied on the general
rules of evidence and proof, and the Twentieth Sub-Circuit refused the implementation on the
basis that there was no legal or practical provisions. This ruling was overturned by the AuditCircuit and the proofs submitted accepted. The Audit-Circuit stated that the Saudi Arbitration
System did not require specific documents to prove the reciprocity principle; thus, it is fair to
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accept any documents that show the reciprocity. However, the existence of the reservation of
reciprocity in the absence of a detailed legal text may contribute to unfairness.
Inefficiency does not always mean injustice. There may be some inefficient conditions that still
lead to justice. However, ambiguity in the text or conditions imposed by the court without legal
basis may increase uncertainty about the legal requirements in the implementation of foreign
awards, which may involve injustice to the affected party. Yet in another ruling, Ruling No 97 /
T / 3 of 1411 AH 1991, implementation was refused based on the absence of proof of
reciprocity. The obvious question here is about where to implement the arbitration award in the
case of refusal of both countries on the basis of reciprocity, where this refusal has nothing to do
with the arbitration award, but just a rule that governs the judicial work.
Ruling No 187 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006 may reveal some injustice because the plaintiff was
supposed to be heard in a court based on the complexities of the case but was not. A single
unmet requirement led to a judgment that can be considered unfair. Thus, the plaintiff tried to
solve the dispute through legal means, but did not succeed. The first step was raising the issue in
a Fifth Sub-Circuit court where the case was cancelled due to the absence of the defendant’s
lawyers. Then the parties resorted to conciliation outside the court but the defendant failed to
keep the commitments agreed under the conciliation. The court refused to implement the initial
award based on the existence of the conciliation. This may be right according to the law but it is
hard to say that is fair. Among all the cases, there are no cases where the subject matter was
considered. This guarantees the effectiveness of preserving the rights of all parties by respecting
their will when they resort to arbitration and ensures the application of the law.
In Australia, there are very few issues affecting the efficiency of the laws in this regard. The
conditions are simpler and fewer compared to those of Saudi Arabia. There are nine conditions,
all of which guide the judges in the implementation of foreign arbitral award and almost all of
them have shown how effective they can be in implementing foreign arbitral awards. From the
discussion, there are very few or no rulings that can be considered biased or discouraging
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arbitration. Some that could even discourage arbitration have been dealt with in a manner that
still encourages the use of arbitration instead of the normal judicial procedures of settling
disputes. Some of the issues are: the issue of the principle of reciprocity and consideration of
merits of a case.
When the merits of a case are considered, the value and meaning of arbitration is lost and this
can discourage people from going for arbitration as a way to solve their disputes. Australia had
a case (LKT v Chun) where a defendant claimed that the arbitrator had exceeded the powers
he/she was given by determining the joint and several liabilities. The judge read and evaluated
the arbitration agreement and concluded that the arbitrator made no mistake and was acting
according to the provisions of the agreement (specifically clause 11.1 of the agreement). The
judge’s analysis may have been considered as going into the merits of the case, but considering
the defendant’s claims, the only way to determine the arbitrator’s authority was by evaluating
the arbitration agreement or clause. This could mean that the Australian courts have adopted a
liberal attitude in interpreting arbitration agreements to determine the authority of the
arbitrator/s, where in this case the judge went deep into the conflict and discussed the clauses of
the agreement. It may also indicate that Australian courts are dealing with the defence ‘the
arbitrator has exceeded his authority’ with more powers than any other formal requirement by
considering the matter of the dispute or by considering the arbitration agreement/clause to
determine the powers of the judge. Hence, it could be affirmed that the Australian judges apply
arbitration in a way that reaffirms the will of the parties to the disputes.
The principle of reciprocity is also a problem in Australia since there are no defined conditions
that guide its application. Determination of reciprocity is left to the Australian courts which,
according to the case presented above, have determined that ‘to the satisfaction of the court’
delineates the meaning of this principle. Additionally, there are no specified documents that
should prove reciprocity or clear requirements stated by the Australian courts as requirements of
proof of reciprocity.
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The court, however, dealt with the issue in a simple way that encourages arbitration. The Saudi
process in this regard does not seem as favourable to arbitration as there the courts seem to have
specific requirements for proof of reciprocity, leave the burden of proof to the plaintiff and do
not make clear the requirements to the plaintiff. As a result, one would be more likely to go
for arbitration in Australia rather than Saudi Arabia if an award could be enforceable in both
countries.
Additionally, in Australia (as mentioned in Chapter 2), the courts that have jurisdiction over the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are the state Supreme Courts and the Federal Court. This,
as indicated above, allows foreign arbitral award enforcement cases to be appealed. The
Supreme Court judgments can be appealed in the Appeal Court (three judges), the Federal Court
judgments can be appealed in the Full Court (three judges) and in some cases, the Appeal Court
and the Full Court judgments can be appealed in the High Court of Australia by special leave
but this is rare and exists where a claim should involve a constitutional issue or on deciding
issue of major public importance or involve questions of law that have been decided in
inconsistent ways by two or more lower courts. Decisions made by Australian courts can be
appealed. This makes the process of solving disputes through arbitration long just as is the case
of Saudi Arabia. However, in Australia (as a common law jurisdiction) courts must follow
precedents set by superior courts in their hierarchy and it is rare in arbitration cases to have
special leave to be considered before the High Court, and as stated earlier it is also rare that
decisions are overturned by the appellate courts, which tends to indicate a degree of accuracy
and reliability in the initial ruling which could tend towards greater efficiency. This is made
possible by the existence of precedents that are published and readily available to judges.
The difference may also be in the levels where Saudi Arabia may have five (under the old law)
if an appeal is made twice while Australia may have four if an appeal is made twice (and in both
instances considering arbitration as a separate level). Australia has the two courts (that is
Supreme Courts at state and territory level and Federal Court at national level, each containing
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its own appeal courts). Here arbitration is level one, first re-examination by court creates a new
level, and the appeal within the courts (that is, within the Supreme Courts and the Federal
Court) and the possibility to appeal to the High Court creates other levels. Saudi Arabia has two
court levels both of which have jurisdictions on foreign awards, but one has to audit the other’s
decisions, that is, the Sub-Circuits’ verdicts have to be audited by the Audit-Circuits making it
two levels plus the arbitration, making it three levels. First and second appeals add the levels to
five. The most important characteristic of arbitration is the speed in adjudicating the dispute, so
with these kinds of procedures, such a characteristic may be lost.
Australia has fewer and simpler conditions compared to the Saudi Arabian conditions (plus the
judge’s discretion, which is very important factor). Saudi Arabian courts give the same
treatment to foreign arbitral awards and foreign judgments; using the same principles may affect
the process of implementing the provisions of arbitration because of the difference between the
two provisions, which shows the need for a separate international arbitration system to
implement such awards.
There are no cases where equal rights are not observed. All the cases mentioned in this chapter
maintain the parties’ rights. There is a case where a defendant argued that the arbitrator had
exceeded his/her power in deciding the liabilities of the case (LKT v Chun [2004] NSWSC 820).
The judges had to go back to the conditions of the agreement to determine the truth. This
defendant may have been arguing in this manner with the thought that the judges were not
supposed to consider the merits of the case, which makes him or her correct, but wrong
considering the reason why the courts exist and why the arbitration implementation was taken to
court. There was no other way for the judges to determine the role and power of the arbitrator,
except to analyse the provisions of the arbitration agreement or the arbitration clause. Justice
was served through that. It clearly shows what the Australian judges focus on.
Another case that shows what the Australian judges focus on is Comandate Marine Corp v Pan
Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192, where an arbitration agreement by an act of
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signing was not considered to be valid, (nor would the dispatch or receipt of a letter or telegram
if unilateral have been sufficient) but an exchange of letters, telegrams and emails (as in this
case) made both contract and arbitral clause valid (at [149]–[151] especially [151] (Alsop J)).
This is an argument based on Article II of the New York Convention. The ruling describes what
such an agreement is and how broad the interpretation of the Convention is while considering
the requirements of international commercial arbitration.
There are cases where the court’s wide discretion is used to weigh evidence, but justice is still
achieved as in Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc. There is only one case with a critical
problem (a problem in regard to determining reciprocity) but which still secured a just ruling
(Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd). In this case, it is clear from the
discussion that the court did not comment on how the reciprocity was checked although it
pointed out the use of section 7(1)(d) of the IAA; there was no indication of who bore the onus
to prove reciprocity, and there was no indication of how the papers were examined to prove
ratification of the Convention or not (at [5]). There are no defined rules or requirements on how
to assess reciprocity, but the courts may have checked the position of the parties without any
request from any of them to check the availability of all the formal requirements first and then
considered the objective conditions. Finally, there are no cases where discussions about the
merits of the disputes were undertaken.
It is important to look more at the willingness of the court to examine the arbitral award if it was
obtained by fraud or corruption or is contrary to the natural justice. Such a trend by the courts
shows its interest in achieving justice for all parties in terms of protecting the honest party, who
has fulfilled his legal obligations; it also shows the court’s intention to provide legal protection
for all parties from the arbitrator if he/she exceeds the powers granted to him/her by the
arbitration agreement.
It could be said that all the conditions have reasons for existence which includes the
maintenance of societal values in general. So all of these conditions as depicted in the analysis
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encourage arbitration hence help achieve the aim of arbitration, although some deficiencies and
differences are present in some aspects of the law in both countries.
Finally, in the balance between these criteria, justice to the parties in the individual cases can be
seen in the court’s role highlighted more in supporting parties in holding to their bargain, which
is consistent with efficiency, versus the need to protect the parties from a defective process,
which might involve re-trying the dispute, which in turn militates against both judicial and
arbitral efficiency.
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5
5.1

GENERAL CONDITIONS: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE LIMITS OF SHARI’A

Introduction

The implementation phase of the arbitral award is a very important stage in the arbitration
process. The real purpose of resorting to arbitration is to end the conflict by applying the arbitral
award. Thus, the application process affects the arbitration process in general, from the
beginning in the resort to arbitration until the issuance of the award. For example, one of the
noticeable results in an international arbitration survey, which was conducted in 2010, was that
66 per cent of the respondents identified the neutrality and impartiality of the legal system as
one of the top influences on the choice of the law governing the substance of the dispute. 1 This
shows the importance of the interaction of the competent courts with the foreign awards, where
they should support the implementation of the arbitral awards.
In fact, the Convention has played a significant role in the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards by adopting several provisions that establish common definitions and rules to govern the
process of recognition of international commercial arbitration agreements and the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards, while maintaining the national legal
system of any signatory state. In general, national arbitration laws prescribe various grounds for
challenging the implementation of foreign awards. These limited lists of grounds followed what
has been stated in the UNCITRAL Model Law and Article V in the Convention.2
Indeed one of the most important defences that can be used to refuse to implement the foreign
arbitration is the arbitrability of the dispute. The international conception of arbitrability derives

1

2

For more information, see School of International Arbitration, 2010 International Arbitration Survey:
Choices in International Arbitration (QMUL, White & Case) <http://www.arbitrationonline.org/
research/2010/index.html> 12.
See Katia Yannaca-Small, ‘Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Overview’
(Paper prepared for the Symposium on Making the Most of International Investment Agreements: A
Common Agenda, Paris, December 2005) 6.

259

from the Convention.3 It provides that every contracting state shall recognise arbitration
agreements referring to matters falling in the domain of arbitration.4 In fact, the formulation of
legislation and laws governing states continues to be influenced by globalisation leading to
many countries having similarities in some aspects of public policy as well as differences.5 In
addition, ‘A subject matter that may not be submitted to arbitration in domestic cases may, by
virtue of the narrower international public policy, be submitted to arbitration in international
cases.’6
In fact, the public policy defence is one of the major grounds to set aside foreign arbitral awards,
and many countries have interpreted this concept in accordance with their national legislation
rather than international laws and values.7 For example, Ribā is one of the major ‘sins’ in Islam,
and is the imposition of interest on a debt or the payment of interest on money deposited; or
ways of selling or buying specific commodities that are unacceptable in Islam. 8 Thus, Ribā is an
action that is forbidden in the commercial area in Islam, which makes it a public policy
principle before any Saudi judge. Hence, any foreign award containing Ribā will force the judge

3

See Christian Bühring-Uhle, Lars Kirchhoff and Gabriele Scherer, Arbitration and Mediation in
International Business, (Kluwer Law International, 2nd ed, 2006) 213.
4
See Amazu A Asouzu, International Commercial Arbitration and African States: Practice,
Participation and Institutional Development (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 56.
5
For more information, see R Daniel Kelemen, ‘Globalization, Federalism and Regulation’ in David
Vogel and Robert A Kagan (eds), Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects
National Regulatory Policies (University of California, 2004) 269, 272.
6
See Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview, International Council for
Commercial
Arbitration
<http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12125884227980/new_york_
convention_of_1958_overview.pdf> 11. It has been observed that ‘international public policy is
generally considered to be narrower in scope than domestic public policy.’ See Pierre Mayer and
Audley Sheppard, ‘Final ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral
Awards’ (2003) 19(2) Arbitration International 249, 249–50.
7
For more information see Fifi Junita, ‘Experience of Practical Problems of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Enforcement in Indonesia’ (2008) 5 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 384; also see Gennady M
Danilenko, ‘Implementation of International Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice’ (1999) 10
European Journal of International Law 51.
8
Riba as a public policy defence will be discussed in more detail in section 5.4.1 The Saudi Grievances
Board and the Application of Public Policy ‘B. Scope of ‘Violation of Islamic Law’ in the View of the
Saudi Grievances Board’. Additionally, Baamir believes that the banking interest is a very important
goal in the bank sector and also the main contradiction in the public policy of Saudi Arabia. See
Abdulrahman Yahya Baamir, Shari’a Law in Commercial and Banking Arbitration: Law and Practice
in Saudi Arabia (Ashgate Publishing, 2010) 4. A ‘sin’ is something that is a ‘transgression against
divine law or principles of morality’: Concise Oxford Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 6th ed, 1976).
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to refuse the Ribā section and apply the rest of the award if severability is possible, or else
refuse the implementation for the whole award.
The term ‘public policy’ is one of the main provisions contained in Article V of the Convention;
it explains exclusively the reasons of refusal for recognition and implementation of foreign
arbitral awards in the member states. These reasons are contained in paragraph 2(B), which
allows the national courts to refuse the implementation of any award if that award is contrary to
public policy.
One of the major difficulties that may face the process of adjusting the application of this
defence is that the rules or principles which can be considered related to public policy in one
country may differ from those in other countries.9 Thus, some actions that may be permissible in
a particular country may be considered invalid in another state because they violate public
policy. For example, the existence of financial benefit, which consists of interest on debt or
interest on bank deposits, is considered legitimate in a country like Australia, yet it is considered
contrary to public policy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia because, as a kind of usury or Ribā, it
is contrary to Shari’a.10 Further to that, the evaluation of these actions may differ in the same
country, from one region to another, or over time.11

9

For more explanations, see Catherine Kessedjian, ‘Public Order in European Law’ (2007) 1(1) Erasmus
Law Review 28.
10
It should be noted that there are two main types of Riba recognised by all of the Muslim scholars.
These are ‘Riba al-nasi’a’ and ‘Riba al-fadhl’. This will be discussed in more detail in section 5.4.1
The Saudi Grievances Board and the Application of Public Policy ‘B. Scope of ‘Violation of Islamic
Law’ in the View of the Saudi Grievances Board’, 1. The prohibited Contracts … 2. Usury).
Additionally, for more information, see Mahmoud A El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and
Practice (Cambridge, 1st ed, 2006) 49–50. Additionally, any loan that contains a financial benefit is
Riba and this is very important point because it relates to the most important factor in modern
economic life, which is the contracting of loans. For more details, see Frank E Vogel and Samuel L
Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return (Kluwer Law International, 1998) 77.
11
For more information about this defence, see May Lu, ‘The New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Analysis of the Seven Defenses to Oppose Enforcement
in the United States and England’ (2006) 23(3) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law
747, 770; Rashda Rana and Michelle Sanson, International Commercial Arbitration (Thomson Reuters,
2011) 298; also Mohammed Aboul-Enein, ‘Tnfi>th Itfaqi>at New York fy Aldwl Al‘rbiah [Application
of the New York Convention 1958 on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Implementation
in the Arab World]’ (Paper presented at the New York Convention 50 Years: Practical Perspectives on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Cairo, 10–11 November 2008) 5.
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This chapter shall address the issue of public policy where the role of the national judge in the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards takes a wider range and has greater
freedom in determining the meaning of public policy. This is due to the wider meaning of this
principle, as we shall see in the next lines. This ambiguity or indeterminacy in the definition of
the public policy gives judges the authority to assess what is considered a breach of public
policy. Hence, it could be said that the national judge examines the foreign arbitral award in
terms of availability of the formal requirements and he/she cannot discuss the merits of the case.
However, the judge’s authority is beyond that in the case of examining the breach of public
policy. This makes the study of this principle necessary as those affected need to know its
borders and its dimensions in the national laws and international conventions and to know the
real role of the judge in the determination of such principle.
In examining this matter, the chapter shall highlight the most important aspects of this principle:
the definition of public policy ‘in theory’ as an attempt to arrive at a legal definition; the scope
of public policy and its impact on the application of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards;
and finally the judicial role in applying the public policy in the provisions of the courts. The
matter of public policy in Australian and Saudi courts will be addressed by analysing court
rulings in both countries (that is, provisions that have been obtained in accordance of the
research method, which was described at the beginning of this research in the research
methodology).

5.2

General Principles of Public Policy

Public policy is based on the citizens in a given society and can be characterised as a single
pattern, flow or path, often its most basic values that are embodied in domestic legislation;
hence, each state has its own notion about what is required by its own public policy. 12 Such a
pattern facilitates the enforcement of laws while at the same time allows the creation of simpler
12

See Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter with Nigel Blackaby and Constantine Partasides, Law and
Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 4th ed, 2004) 419.
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codes and rules or laws in relation to the given society. Public policy in essence refers to the
absence of disorder as it relates to societal norms.13
Therefore, the essence of public policy is not easy to define and it differs from context to
context and from country to another. For instance, public policy in the context of the criminal
justice system may be defined as the absence of public disorder and the quiet orderly behaviour
of people in public situations. It entails people acting sagaciously and reasonably, and with
respect for others. Problems can arise, however, when there is disagreement regarding what
comprises a breach even within a society, for example when one person’s harmless excitement
on the street may constitute an aggravation to another.14 Internationally, it may be more
complex when there is a disagreement between what comprises public policy as the public good
in one country is different from another. Examples in this regard could include Ribā (interest) in
commercial transaction contracts, or permissibility of arbitration in or contracts involving trade
in alcohol or equipment for gambling or importation or transportation of prohibited material.
It is noted in the International Law Association’s Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards (‘ILA Final Report on Public Policy’) that the
public policy exception is mentioned in most enforcement conventions and in domestic
legislation.15 This exception is also involved in international conventions that concern the
enforcement of foreign judgments. In regard to the enforcement of arbitral awards, the term
‘international public policy’ has been used by a number of countries to restrict the scope of
public policy. Thus, the narrowing of the public policy exception and the application of
13

Ibid 165. In fact, this ‘public policy’ defence prevents courts from enforcing contracts or awards if it
violates the law or is generally against the interest of the public. For more information, see Jonathan A
Marcantel, ‘The Crumbled Difference between Legal and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street
Associates and the Waning Public Policy Exception’ (2009) XIV, Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law 597, 608.
14
See Ahmed Fathi Sorour, ‘Alqanon Aljenei> Aldstwri> [The Criminal Constitutional Law]’ (Dar Al
Shorooq, 2nd ed, 2002)10.
15
International Law Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, Final Report on
Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitratio Awards, ILA Conference, New
Delhi, 2002. Text available as a pdf file at International Law Association, Committees – International
Commercial Arbitration (1989 – 2010), ‘Conference Resolution (English) New Delhi 2002’, see
<http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19>. (‘ILA Final Report on Public Policy’).
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‘international public policy’ has been adopted by the ILA Final Report on Public Policy, where
it recommended that
the expression “international public policy” is to be understood in the sense given to it in
the field of private international law; namely, that part of the public policy of a State which,
if violated, would prevent a party from invoking a foreign law or foreign judgment or
foreign award.16

In fact, there have been many attempts to define the contents of ‘public policy’ and
‘international public policy’, but unfortunately, there is no precise definition.17 Additionally, the
main recommendation given by the ILA Final Report on Public Policy was regarding the
content and scope of international public policy so as to limit such exception.18 Thus, it seems,
‘it is difficult, if not impossible, to define the concept of public policy.’19
On the other hand, acts are categorised as not adhering to public policy when they are contrary
to public norms, social customs and values.20 In trade, public policy can involve public norms,
social customs, values, and regulations that involve the parties. In addition, some scholars have
opined that the idea of public policy is linked to social, political or moral foundations of each

16

Ibid 3[11].
According to Rana and Sanson, public policy is incapable of precise definition; thus, it is ‘a variable
notion, depending on changing manners, morals and economic conditions’. See Rana and Sanson,
above n 11, 310.
18
See Mayer and Sheppard above n 6, 251. According to Shaleva ‘The idea of “public policy” is
notorious among judges and scholars as a concept not susceptible to definition. Theory and practice
generally agree that public policy reflects some moral, social, economic or legal principles …’:
Vesselina Shaleva, ‘The “Public Policy” Exception to the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards in the Theory and Jurisprudence of the Central and East European States and Russia’ (2003)
19(1) Arbitration International 67, 76.
19
See Julian D M Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis and Stefan Kröll, Comparative International Commercial
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2003) 722. In fact, ‘public policy has a different meaning
within different legal traditions…’. For more information, see Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, ‘Towards a
Transnational Procedural Public Policy’ (2004) 20(4) Arbitration International 333. Additionally, for
more information about the difficulties in defining the public policy principle, see Mayer and Sheppard,
above n 6, 250. Additionally, according to the ILA Final Report on Public Policy there have been real
attempts to define the contents of the term public policy and also the term ‘international public policy’;
however, no precise definition is possible. See ILA Final Report on Public Policy, above n 15, 4 [12].
20
For more information, see ‘public order crime’: lawyerment, Law Dictionary <http://dictionary.
lawyerment.com/topic/public_order_crime/>.
17
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state, and relates to the higher interest of the country, that is, to the interests of the society and
the legal system as whole.21
Thus, all of the rules of law in the state that affect these foundations can be considered as public
policy rules. This is apparent from the provisions of the law itself and the wording of legislation
and associated texts. It may be also inferred from the rulings that are settled by the judiciary
(precedents). As such, the idea of public policy is one with a degree of relativity, as it may vary
according to circumstances, time and communities.22 Thus, it can be said that it is still an
undefined concept of unknown scope.23 However, it is a concept that the courts do apply for a
variety of reasons and justifications related to the wide scope of such concept. Thus, it is not a
meaningless concept, but it is not highly specified.
The existence of such a condition makes parties hesitant to conduct trade in a foreign country as
their actions may be regarded as a ‘cause of disorder’, contrary to how the very same operations
or activities or negotiations are confidently regarded in their domestic jurisdictions, where these
are viewed as perfectly acceptable.24 Thus, it has been argued that public policy and what
constitutes trade irregularities are directly correlated to the views of morality existing in the
various jurisdictions.25 For Middle Eastern countries that link Islam with government power
(including in the government’s scope the duty to maintain and protect Islam as the religion of
the state and its people), public policy in dealing with citizens from other countries should be in

21

See Wolfgang Kasper and Manfred E Streit, ‘Institutional Economics: Social Order and Public Policy’
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000) 311–12.
22
See Hamza Haddad, ‘Alth}ki>m fy Alqwani>n Al‘rbiah [Arbitration in Arab Laws]’ (Al-Halabi Press,
2007) 384, 389.
23
It should be noted that some researchers differentiate between the international and the national public
policy. But what matters here is what will be applied before the national courts, which will apply the
national public policy to any foreign rule. For more information, see ibid, 390.
24
See Asouzu, above n 4, 56; also G Bajaj, Arbitration in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (DLA Piper,
2009) <www.dlapiper.com/arbitration-in-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia/>.
25
For more information, see Kasper and Streit, above n 21, 312; also see Brendan Maguire and Polly
Radosh, Introduction to Criminology (West/Wadsworth, 1999).
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accordance with Shari’a.26 For instance, in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Arbitration System of 1983
provides an example, where Article 20 demonstrates the need to follow the rules of Shari’a so
as to be able to implement any arbitral award, when it states that the enforcement may be issued
at the request of any of the parties ‘after ascertaining that there is nothing that prevents its
enforcement from the Shari’a point of view.’
The same meaning has also been clarified in Article 39 of the Implementing Rules [Regulations]
of the Saudi Arbitration System of 1983. These Rules did not only take care of international
trade norms, but also gave attention to the local norms and values with explicit stress on the
prohibition of the violation of the precepts of Shari’a that control and monitor domestic and
foreign awards.27
Foreign investors and companies should therefore be aware of the constraints of public policy in
the states in which they wish to operate or invest, for states do not intend to compromise their
public policy. In addition, if they are to succeed in the region, those engaging in foreign arbitral
awards need to be aware of public policy of the country in which the award is intended to be
implemented and ensure that their negotiations and actions are in accord with it.28
The Islamic term for the public policy principle is ‘the common interest’ (‘Masaleh Morsalah’).
An often cited academic adage states that Muslims have to fulfil contractual requirements
except those which ‘allow what is prohibited or prohibit what is allowed’.29 This shows that the
public policy in the Shari’a is linked generally to the explicit texts that have cited clearly in the
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For more information about Islam and state laws in the Middle East, see Nicholas H D Foster, ‘Islamic
Commercial Law: An Overview (I)’ (2006) 4 InDret: Revista para Analisis del Derecho 1, 4; also see
Baamir, above n 8, 32.
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See Saudi Arbitration System 1983 art 20. For more information, see George Sayen, ‘Arbitration,
Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia’ (Special Series 2003) 24(4) University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 509.
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Ibid 32; also see R Doak Bishop, James Crawford and William Michael Reisman, Investment Disputes:
Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Kluwer Law International, 2005) 1263. For more information
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Qur’ān and Sunnah. As for the provisions that have no explicit texts, these are not included in
the public policy principle.30 This view has been supported by the President of the Saudi
Grievances Board in the old Decision No 7 in 1405 AH 1985 where it stated in the third
paragraph that it is not legal to implement a foreign rule if it is contrary to an ‘asset’ of
Shari’a.31 However, assets of Shari’a, as we shall see in the analysis of the Grievances Board’s
rulings later in the application section, are not confined to specific provisions or texts. However,
judges and Islamic scholars have tried to limit the scope of these assets to a certain frame, that
is, where it is restricted to the existence of an explicit text in the holy Qur’ān or Sunnah or a
consensus (‘Ijma’a’) among scholars about a particular issue.
As mentioned earlier, there are international efforts designed to facilitate the use of transnational
arbitration, for example, the UNCITRAL Model Law, which was adopted on 21 June 1985 and
was amended by the UN Commission on International Trade Law on 7 July 2006. This law
applies to international arbitration in commercial matters and any agreement that has been made
or ratified between the United Nations and the signatory states is subject to it. It provides the
option of the parties to authorise a third party to make determinations on issues of arbitration
while giving states some room for the possibility of refusing to implement any foreign arbitral
award if it is contrary to public policy. The aim is to restore and maintain policy (and hence
confidence) in trade activities.
The Convention was tailored to make arbitral awards faster and more efficient. A recurring
problem for the scheme has been the court’s refusal to recognise these awards due to their
conflict with the laws of the enforcing states on the basis of matters of public policy. 32
Unfortunately, all of these efforts have not resulted in a specific definition of ‘public policy’ that
can prevent any ambiguity in the text. The Convention has left it to the national courts of
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See President of the Saudi Grievances Board’s Decision No 7 of 05/15/1405 AH 1985, art 3. This was
replaced by the Decision No 116 of 1428 AH 2007.
31
This will be explained in more detail later in this chapter when analysing the Grievances Board’s
decisions (see section 5.4.1 The Saudi Grievances Board and the Application of Public Policy).
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Convention art V.
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member states to interpret what constitutes ‘public policy’ in their individual states. This may
lead to different interpretations between countries. Rajagukguk states that one view is the
‘narrow’ interpretation, one that refuses to enforce any foreign award may only occur in the case
of violation of ‘the most basic notions of morality and justice’.33 Another view he describes is
the ‘broad’ one, where courts in some countries interpret ‘public policy’ in a wide manner,
which may include the violation of the national laws and regulations of the state as breaches of
‘public policy’.34
Whilst states increasingly recognise the significance of rapid and impartial resolutions to crossborder trade disagreements, it has been said that the ‘Middle East is yet to fully embrace’ the
contemporary arbitral scheme.35 A more optimistic view argues that this stance toward global
arbitration is ‘increasingly reversing’.36 In recent years, many countries in the Middle East have
shown greater openness and confidence in their judicial systems to accept and implement the
provisions of foreign arbitral awards. The reconstruction of arbitration laws in several Middle
East countries, the mounting number of Arab nations that have become signatories to the
Convention, and the institution of arbitration hubs all over the region, show that international
arbitration is acquiring favour.37 Saudi Arabia is at present in the process of opening up its
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economy, which process includes a vast program of privatisation and restructuring of the legal
regime in order to attracting foreign investment.38
In Australia, the IAA is the inclusive Commonwealth Act for implementing foreign arbitral
awards where it concerns international foreign arbitral awards, and it also includes the three
international conventions that cover the implementation of foreign arbitral awards. In fact, this
Act has restricted the Australian courts’ interference in arbitration dealings to ensure the parties’
independence in going to arbitration, and thus make certain of its confidentiality and finality, as
‘in most developed jurisdictions, local law affords international arbitrators virtually unfettered
freedom to conduct the arbitral process.’39 The reason for that freedom is clear because greater
court involvement causes the loss of the valued features of arbitration. Additionally, Australia
has adopted (and incorporated into the IAA) the most significant international convention on
arbitration (the New York Convention in addition to the UNCITRAL Model Law) which are of
great importance in limiting the national courts’ control on foreign arbitral awards. 40
Notably, there are some differences between the texts that consider public policy as a reason for
refusing to implement the foreign arbitral award in the laws of both countries. In Saudi Arabia,
the conventions’ texts regarding the public policy defence are cited in several cases. Such a text
is Article V(2) of the Convention, which states that ‘Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award may also be refused ... (b) ... if the award would be contrary to the public policy’
(emphasis added).
The use of the phrase ‘may refuse’ in Article V(2) could imply that a court may, on the other
hand, ‘not refuse to implement the award even if the award is in a contrary to the public policy’,
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thus rendering implementation a matter of discretion for the country concerned and its
judiciary.41 Nevertheless, whilst this may be possible for other jurisdictions, it would appear less
likely in the case of Saudi Arabia where ‘public policy’ is most closely equated with Shari’a.
This is clear from an analysis of the Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No 7 of
1985. It was there expressly stated that ‘it cannot be in any way to imagine the possibility of
approving the execution of any foreign award if it is contrary to the sources of the assets of
Shari’a.’
However, the decision also demonstrates a tendency to identify and restrict the concept of
‘public policy’ in regard to Shari’a; it attempts to determine the term ‘public policy’ by limiting
it to these matters which violate the assets of Shari’a, that is, tenets have been cited in the holy
Qur’ān and Sunnah and agreed on among the scholars.42 This then would permit a foreign
award to be implemented if it violates an issue that is the subject of controversy rather
consensus among Muslim scholars.
It is, however, important to determine what the assets of Shari’a are, if an asset of Shari’a can
survive the presence of theological disputation about a specific issue, or if it is related more to
the existence of explicit texts in the holy Qur’ān and Sunnah.43
In Australia similarly, there is an interpretation in regard to the IAA that says:
The use of the word ‘may’ in s.8 (2) indicates that a residual discretion to refuse an
enforcement of the award outside the provision of s.8 (5) and (7) of that act … [Thus] under
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the IAA “it should be noted that, under the Act, it is the enforcement of the award that must
44
be contrary to public policy” to refuse any foreign award .

Under these rules and regulations, there is a difference between recognition and enforcement of
an award.
Article V(2)(b) expressly recognises this when it says that ‘[t]he recognition or enforcement of
the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country’.
This shows the ability of the court to refuse any award that is contrary to the public policy in the
basic transaction as well as in implementation. Thus, refusing to recognise the award (as it is
contrary to public policy) means to refuse to implement that award based on the same ground.
On the other hand, the application of a foreign arbitral award that includes a violation of public
policy in the underlying contract ‘not in the enforcement itself’ eliminates the legal protection of
the system as a whole, so the court has the right to refuse to implement the foreign arbitration if
the contract is contrary to public policy as a matter of protection of the legal system in the state
based on the public policy exception.45 This shows that anything contrary to public policy
affects recognition and implementation of an award.
Defining public policy is very important in formulating the public policy defence under Article
V of the Convention and also the ‘public policy’ in national laws. First of all it should be noted
that scholars have differed in their understanding of national and international public policy,
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which requires that special attention be paid to that difference.46 However, the national court
will always protect its own national public policy in refusing to enforce any foreign arbitral
award, and that is what Article 5(2) of the Convention relates to (see section 3.2.1 New York
Convention 1958 (A) Historical Context of Article V of the Convention). Additionally,
international public policy ‘has been described as not being concerned with purely national
influences, but rather with “fundamental standards” of the international community, covering
both trading standards and humanitarian concerns’.47 Thus, it is obvious that the public policy
defence can be raised on different grounds, which may include any of the grounds for refusing
any foreign awards.
In recent times countries have formulated a system of international conventions, compacts,
memoranda and communiqués and a variety of other procedures and documents meant to
regulate business activity. Thus, the reconciliation of arbitration rules in the national laws and
international conventions plays an important role as it has a great impact on investment. This is
informed by the fact that arbitration legislation affects foreign investor decisions.
Therefore, it can be said that public policy in accordance with the law and the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards aim to ensure that the actions of business persons conform to the legal
terms of the legal agreement that exists between the parties to that agreement; and also to
preserve the societal values and international trade conditions set by the national laws. 48
However, there have been a number of researchers who have tried to define ‘public policy’ and

46

See Mahmoud, above n 45, 467. Indeed, some researchers believed that there are three categories of
public policy which can be summarised as domestic, international and transnational public policy, and
‘which category is applicable to an individual arbitration depends on the nature of that arbitration’. For
more information, see Kenneth-Michael Curtin, ‘Redefining Public Policy in International Arbitration
of Mandatory National Laws’ (1997) 64 Counsel Journal 271, 281.
47
See Tarlinton, above n 40, xviii. For more information about the public policy types, see Mohammed S
Abdel Wahab, ‘Alnez{am Al‘am u> Tnfi>th Ah{kam Alth{ki>m: Nz{rh Muqarnh [Public Policy and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (A Comparative Assessment)]’ (Paper presented at the New York
Convention: 50 Years: Practical Perspectives on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Cairo, 10–11 November 2008) 7.
48
Not in all cases can the court protect these principles, as in some cases, the courts overturn strictly law
based expressions to protect the higher interests of society.

272

determine its standard, but they were unable to determine exactly what public policy is.49 That is
due to the differences in the public policy principle from state to another and also the
differences in the same state from one region to another or over time.50
For example, Tarlinton believes that finality of the arbitral award is seen in many jurisdictions
as more important than the contravention of public values.51 The reason for that is the
combination of a liberal approach to arbitrability and a restrictive approach to the application of
public policy. Indeed, Tarlinton believes that the Convention is constructed to facilitate the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards; however, it did not give a precise definition of public
policy, so this can act as a safety valve for all signatory countries in the implementation of
arbitral awards.52 However, Tarlinton believes that private arbitration requires public
supervision and that public policy must be applied53 rather than restricted because the latter
would be ‘at odds with the very conception of public policy itself’!54
This may be contrary to the principle of creating a uniform (or unified) understanding of the
term public policy, which was sought by the Convention. Therefore, we cannot allow any
ambiguity or expansion in the powers of the judiciary because any increased ambiguity or
expansion of judicial powers could include elimination of the most important benefits of
arbitration as a peaceful means to settle disputes in the area of international trade.
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Finally, Tarlinton supports the view that suggests the establishment of a court of international
commercial arbitration which will make orders for enforcement and these orders will be
automatically enforced by municipal courts unless public policy is offended.55 Even if the
practical difficulties in establishing such a transnational court could be overcome, this would
not eliminate the need for national courts to define the boundaries of a state’s own public policy.
According to this proposal, the national courts retain the power to estimate the violation of
public policy.
Additionally, Ma in her doctoral thesis has reported several good findings and made some clear
recommendations. Most important is her attempt, in the interest of facilitating ‘consistency and
clarity in the judicial application of the public policy exception’,56 to define the ‘public policy
exception’ by limiting such exception in ‘Mandatory Rules of Public Policy’; which she in turn
tried to define as:
[r]ules intended to encompass the arbitral award, proceedings or dispute under
consideration, as expressed or embodied in the enforcement state’s statutory and case law,
as well as in the international instruments and customs adopted or otherwise recognised by
the enforcement state.57

As a result, she suggested that
In the interests of consistency and convenience, IAA s 19 (which deems certain conduct to
be contrary to Australian public policy for the purposes of the public policy exceptions in
Model Law Arts 34 and 36) should extend to the public policy exception in IAA s 8(7)(b)
58
and New York Convention Art V(2)(b).

Despite the fact that this definition does not give a precise standard or specify certain instances,
because it is too difficult to do so, it is a summary of what may fall under the violation of public
policy (that is, the ‘Mandatory Rules of Public Policy’).
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Ma also believes that ‘the award must be tainted or otherwise affected by the illegality of its
underlying contract, such that its enforcement would be contrary to the applicable mandatory
rules of public policy.’59 This, in fact, corresponds to what has been applied by British courts
and is a requirement in the Saudi Courts. In Britain, the court refused to implement the
arbitration ruling in the case of Soleimany v Soleimany, because the underlying contract was
illegal according to British law. On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia, we find the text of Article
5(1) of the Decision of the President of the Grievances Board’s No 116 of 1428 AH (2007),
where it states explicitly that any arbitration should be refused if it was contrary to Islamic
Shari’a law, where the Shari’a law is considered as the public policy in Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, Ma believes that the judge can consider the subject matter only ‘if the alleged public
policy violation cannot be determined by a mere review of the award’.60 Giving such authority
to judges may allow them more room in regards to the definition of public policy, which may
cause the rejection of many of the provisions, which ultimately does not serve the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards. So, it must be explicitly contrary to
public policy and the violation must be clear so that judges would not need to analyse the
subject matter of the contract. For example, in the case of Soleimany v Soleimany the original
contract included explicit breaches, including smuggling and briberies.61
Therefore, we can say that public policy is an undisciplined and non-specific term, which is also
variable over time and from one country to another. Thus, the real criterion of knowledge of
public policy in the country at a particular time is the analysis of the judicial decisions that may
reflect the true reality of this term. This will be discussed later in this chapter in the section of
‘judicial role in applying public policy’.
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5.3

Scope and Impact of the Public Policy

5.3.1 Scope
There are very important questions that must be answered in order to determine the scope of the
public policy, that is, whether ‘contrary to public policy’ means: contrary to a direct, clear and
explicit legal text; or more than that, and include the violation of the ‘spirit of law’ and the
principles underlying the law. Additionally, it is important to determine if societal values have
any effect in shaping the scope of public policy in regard to arbitration in international trade.
Public policy formulation requires the taking into consideration of public morals in all their
aspects. Hence, societal values determine how public policy relates to business persons from
other countries and cultures. This is because societal values determine what the society can
tolerate and what it cannot. As a result, it is a major determinant of success in international
trade. For public policy to be attained, it is a necessary requirement for the responsible
government agencies in charge of public policy formulation to formulate, pass and implement
the necessary legislation which may be used to enforce public policy.62 This in turn reveals the
differences in the positions of countries in the interpretation of the idea of public policy
contained in Article V(2) of the Convention and this in turn is reflected in the formulation of
arbitration laws in these countries.63
Accordingly, it can be said that public policy includes the moral and social values of a society.
Thus, violating the public policy of a state does not ‘only’ mean the violation of a direct and
explicit legal text but it also means the violation of the social and ethical principles in that state.
Hence, public policy underpins all aspects related to maintaining trade or commercial relations
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while considering the interest of all parties involved and also the interest of public in general.
Thus any aspect that detracts from this harmony disturbs public policy in business.64
Consequently, public policy in international trade can be termed as the accurate application of
the principles of the law and adhering to behaviour that does not disrupt business operation or
offend any of the parties involved in the business. It includes the respect for people’s culture,
behaviour and norms when conducting business and in regard to the terms or clauses of a signed
contract between two parties. Public policy in this regard also involves respecting international
principles and all actions taken to ensure a smooth running in business operations.65
On the other hand, according to the flexible nature of the public policy, the scope can be
determined by the structure of law, culture and the economic position of the country, where the
whole legal system may specify the scope of such a term, and the culture of society and social
principles may contribute to the delineation of this principle. 66
Additionally, it is noticeable that economic development may require the state to be more
lenient in implementing the provisions of foreign arbitral awards and in regard to the degree of
rigour (strictness) with which the principle of public policy is applied, in order to maintain
economic development and attract foreign investments. In the end, however, the final decision
to determine the scope of public policy is in the hand of the court and that differs from one case
to another.67
5.3.2

Impact of Public Policy

Maintenance of public policy is necessary for successful international trade and economic
development of the parties involved. In fact, it is of pivotal importance and it is the judicial way
64
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for the protection of the public interest by determining the application of the law and shaping its
development. Public policy has a significant role in the process of arbitration itself. This is
because it is a part of the overall function of the arbitration. Thus, arbitrators must apply the
public policy of the applicable law.68
Public policy affects the international legal culture. This is because its use in arbitration enables
a convergence of different legal cultures from different countries. It is in these kinds of
convergence that practitioners from diverse backgrounds fashion new practices.69 Several have
suggested that this development has resulted in the development of ‘international arbitration
traditions’, blending together fundamentals of common law and public law traditions.70 Others
perceive arbitration as a field of divergence among traditions or as a contest among various
parties.71
Additionally, the main impact of the concept of the violation of public policy in the jurisdiction
of recognition of foreign awards is nullity, which eliminates the legal disposition. Thus, it can
be said that nullification is always a penalty consequent upon each violation of the concept of
public policy which leads to the lack of legal force and the abolition of any legal impact of the
arbitral award.72

5.4

Judicial Role in Applying Public Policy in their Decisions

It is important to highlight the need for extrapolation of judicial rulings to discover the judicial
orientation in Saudi Arabia and Australia and to extract a definition or at least extract a specific
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judicial standard in regard to public policy. Thus, this section will deal with the courts’
provisions in regard to the public policy in both countries (Saudi Arabia and Australia).
5.4.1

The Saudi Grievances Board and the Application of Public Policy

It should be noted that the Saudi Arbitration System did not explicitly mention the term ‘public
policy’, but states in Article 20:
The judgment of the arbiters shall be enforceable when it becomes final by the order of the
authority originally responsible for considering the dispute and this order shall made on the
request of any of the parties concerned after ascertaining that there is nothing that prevents
its enforcement from the Shari’a point of view.

This may indicate only one exception to recognition, namely the violation of Shari’a. As
mentioned earlier, the regulation of the arbitration system has stated in Article 1 that
‘[a]rbitration is not permitted in matters wherein conciliation is not permitted, such as Hudūd,
Li’aan between the couple, and all that is related to public policy’. Hudūd in Shari’a are: those
crimes which are punishable by ‘Hadd’, ‘Hadd’ being the penalty that has been assessed by
Allah (God Almighty) to be imposed in the circumstances specified; thus, the correctness of this
punishment (whether Qisas (retaliatory) or Ta’zir (discretionary)) has been determined by Allah
himself. This means that the standard for this kind of crime is the type of penalty assessed,
which can be described as a ‘hadd’. ‘Li’aan’ (or oath) is when the husband accuses his wife of
adultery and she in the same time denies the offence. They then have to do the ‘Li’aan’, which
means that each one of them swears that he is sincere in his claim, and then they will be
separated irreversibly, because the impossibility of their life together. This ‘Li’aan’ enables
both parties to avoid the punishment set for them (punishment of the defamation by the husband
(divorce) and the punishment of adultery (stoning) for the wife).73
This new provision (adding ‘all that is related to public policy’) by regulation is an addition to
the text of Article II of the Saudi Arbitration System, yet the role of the regulations is to explain
73
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the system, and basically implementing rules or regulations are not allowed to add new
provisions.74
With regard to international treaties, Article 37 of the Riyadh Convention states:
‘the provisions of the arbitrators’ … the awards of arbitrators shall be recognised and
implemented at any of the contracting parties in the same manner provided for in this
section, taking into account the legal rules of the contracting party and the competent
authority of the contracting party has to implement the award, except in the following cases
… E - If any part of the adjudication be in contradiction with the provisions of Islamic
Shari’a, the public order or morality [rules of conduct, morals] of the requested party.

This can include two terms: public policy and the provisions of Shari’a, but the word ‘morality’
or ‘Aladab’ has been added to ensure non-violation of the social order by the arbitral award.
With regard to the reservations entered by Saudi Arabia to most of the international conventions
it precisely stated that the application of any such convention shall not violate the Shari’a and
public policy.75 It is therefore important to determine the meaning of public policy in Saudi
Arabian context.
In general, for Middle East countries that link Islam with government power, public policy
should run aligned with Shari’a law. The Islamic principle of public policy is that of ‘common
interest’: Masaleh Morsalah. For the rules of Islamic public policy, there are precise borders
such as those prohibiting speculative deals (Gharrer) and those forbidding usurious interest
(Ribā).76 The Islamic legal schools interpret and generate the method for identifying what
precisely is permitted and what is not. Although, the views of each school may be different on a
number of issues, a broad Islamic public policy is obviously to a degree applicable to global
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commercial transactions.77 Accordingly, success in business cannot be achieved if public policy
has been violated. Defining public policy in Islam is more complex and more controversial,
because Islam is concerned not only with the profound theological issues, but it also with the
mundane aspects of everyday life.
By extrapolating from the rulings that have been released by the Saudi Grievances Board, it can
be seen that this court refers to public policy in two instances: the violation of Shari’a, and the
violation of legal regulations relating to the arbitration, the ‘peremptory norms of public policy’.
It should be noted again that the Saudi Grievances Board deals and applies the same principles
for the foreign arbitral awards and foreign court judgments. As a result, this section may refer to
them both in exploring the concept and dimensions of public policy.

A.

Violation of Islamic Law

Islamic public policy, so to speak, in regard to the Saudi Grievances Board can be summarised
as described below. It can be said that in the texts of the Saudi Arbitration System there is a
disparity in expression in some provisions. This is due to the fact that public policy in some
court rulings relating to Shari’a is very wide in reference to the violation of Shari’a in general
without any specifics having been given. In other rulings, this term became more specific by
referring to the fact that the violation related to a particular asset of Shari’a. For example, it is
very clear in Ruling No 33 / T / 4 of 1427 AH 2007, which is in fact a foreign judgment; but, as
earlier explained, the Saudi Grievances Board deals with the provisions of foreign courts and
the foreign arbitral awards in the same manner; thus, the court will apply the same principles to
all such provisions. The parties in this case were from Yemen and the conflict concerned a
contract that involved a commercial partnership between them. The parties initially resorted to
the Court of Western Eb in the Yemen Arab Republic; thus, the original provision was issued by
a Yemeni court. Accordingly, the plaintiff requesting the implementation came to Saudi Arabia
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seeking the enforcement of that provision because the defendant was a resident in Saudi Arabia
and his assets were also in Saudi Arabia.
This ruling was based on the decision of a foreign court, so it is not an arbitral award, although
there is no significant difference in the applicable principles. The Second Sub-Circuit of the
Grievances Board considered this case and supported the foreign judgment by issuing a ruling
in favour of the plaintiff, entitling the plaintiff to SAR 37,000 from the defendant. The AuditCircuit approved that ruling. Noticeably, the Audit-Circuit mentioned that the foreign ruling
fulfilled all formal requirements78 and also did not ‘clash’ with the law and the assets of Shari’a.
It is obvious that the court has merely said that there is no clash with the provisions of Shari’a,
but no further detail or explanation is provided in regard to which Shari’a provisions or
principles are related to the case.
Also, in Ruling No 157 / T / 4 of 1427 AH 2007,79 which was an application for a Kuwaiti court
judgment released by the Kuwaiti Appeal Court, the Audit-Circuit made a general statement
about public policy. The case was filed by a Kuwaiti woman against her Saudi ex-husband. She
was seeking to implement a court ruling issued by the Court of Appeal in Kuwait on payment of
the children’s expenses (child support). The plaintiff objected to the foreign rule as it did not
take into account his financial circumstances and the court had ordered him to pay a large sum
of money. The Audit-Circuit stated that the Court had no right to consider the merits of the case
or answer any substantive defence as long as that foreign rule did not violate Shari’a. Actually,
this observation depends on the fact that the plaintiff had a chance to raise such a claim before
the Kuwaiti court. Thus, the Audit-Circuit concluded its ruling by saying, ‘[I]t is clear that the
provision is not contrary to the Islamic law.’ The Audit-Circuit did not specify the standard of
the violations that can exist or explain any possible violation of public policy or what is the
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The formal requirements are the presentation of the original foreign court ruling and the plaintiff
having proof of the finality of that ruling which must be the res judicata. These requirements will be
discussed and analysed in more detail in the next chapter.
79
The court has also mentioned the formal conditions, which were discussed in the last chapter, and also
mentioned Islamic public policy.
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Islamic public policy in this ruling. The Circuit has merely stated that there is no violation of the
rule of Shari’a.
That also was clear in Ruling No 95 / T / 4 of 1427AH 2007,80 which stated that ‘it has been
proved that the award that was required to be implemented satisfies the [formal] conditions [that
has been mentioned in the Saudi laws] that must be met to accept the request [for] execution and
there is no violation to the rule of Islamic Shari’a law.’81
It is noted that Ruling No 92 / T / 4 of 1424 AH 200482 has added the component of public
morality by stating that the award that was required to be implemented is ‘not contrary to
Islamic law or public morals and public policy in Saudi Arabia and it meets the requirements
specified in the agreement.’ This ruling basically refers to the Riyadh Convention on Judicial
Cooperation, signed between member nations of the League of Arab States. The term public
policy here was taken and used according to Article 30 of the Riyadh Convention without there
being any intent on the part of the Court for public morality that may be fairly new or outside
the scope of Shari’a.83
Another provision (Ruling No 204 / T / 4 of 1428 AH 2008) was about implementing two related
foreign judgments released by two Egyptian courts. The first ruling was released by the Family
Court in Cairo and the other by the Court of Bulaq El-Dakrur in Cairo. The first court ruling
was about the proof of paternity and the second ruling confirmed the payment of expenses for
80

This case was presented by an Egyptian woman against her Saudi ex-husband for the living expenses
for their daughter. The woman was seeking to apply a ruling issued by the South Cairo Court, which
ruling was supported by the Court of Cassation in the Arab Republic of Egypt.
81
Also the Sub-Twenty-Fifth Circuit’s Ruling No 11 / D / F / 25 of 1417 AH 1997, which is supported by
Ruling No 208 / T / 2 of 1418 AH 1998 issued by the Second Audit-Circuit, and stated that ‘the formal
requirements are available and that [the] waiver of the plaintiff bank interest, which [is] inconsistent
with the provisions of Islamic law, makes the award valid for … implementation on the territory of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.’ This case will be discussed in detail in the next chapter because of its value
in explaining the principle of reciprocity.
82
This case was raised by a Syrian woman, who was seeking to enforce a Syrian court ruling against her
ex-husband who has the Saudi nationality so that she would be able to recover the rest of her dowry
after their divorce.
83
It should be noted that Article 30 in that convention has stated the cases of refusal to recognise any
foreign arbitral award may be based on ‘(A) if it is contrary to the provisions of Islamic law or the
provisions of the constitution or public policy or morality in the contracting party where the award is
requested to be recognised’.
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the child. It is noticeable that the court referred to the violation of rule of Article II of the Arabic
Convention 1952 and copied the text of Article 3(d) without any explanation or comment. The
latter states that the ‘competent judicial authority: shall not refuse to implement the provision
except in the following circumstances: … (c) If the verdict was contrary to public policy or
public morals in the requested state of implementation’.
Ruling No. 188 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006 reported that ‘the text of judgment is not contrary to
Islamic law and public policy in Saudi Arabia’84 and hence the judgment could be implemented.
In this sentence the term ‘the text of judgment or pronouncement’ underlines the lack of
exposure to the merits of the case, but the court has a restricted role that is limited in the
implementation.

B.

Scope of ‘Violation of Islamic Law’ in the View of the Saudi Grievances Board

According to some of the Grievances Board’s rulings, the scope of Islamic public policy is
limited to the assets of Shari’a. This is evident in the court identification of the violation of
Islamic public policy where this is limited to the violation of the explicit texts (from the Qur’ān
or Sunnah), where there exists no difference of opinion among the scholars or where there is a
consensus among scholars (‘Ijma’a’) on a particular issue. According to Trumbull,
There are very few laws that bind all Muslims. Only laws that are explicitly stated in the
Qur’an, or have been reached by the consensus of the Muslim community [Ijma’a’] are
considered binding on all Muslims. The prohibition of pork, for example, is an explicitly
85
stated rule that is unanimously recognized by the Muslim community.

A very important ruling was released by the former Second Audit-Circuit (Tdgeeg), which is
now the Fourth Court of Appeal under the new law. This ruling, Ruling No 235 / T/ 2 of 1415
AH 1995, was on an application for the enforcement of a foreign judgment that had been issued

84

This case involved a Syrian woman against her Saudi husband to apply a provision issued by the court
of Damascus in the Syrian Arab Republic. This woman obtained her divorce, the rest of her dowry, and
also the husband has to pay for the child support.
85
See Charles P Trumbull, ‘Islamic Arbitration: a New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts’
(2006) 59(2) Vanderbilt Law Review 609, 631.
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by the Shari’a Court in Dubai. The case was summed up as the failure of the defendant to buy
cars and spare parts according to the parties’ agreement; that caused damage to the plaintiff
through loss of profits and the existence of the dispute between the parties also caused
significant effects on the work.
The Tenth Sub-Circuit refused to implement the foreign judgment on the ground that it
breached public policy (Shari’a public policy) because the potential profit is considered as
‘uncertain’ or unable to be ensured and so could be considered ‘Gharer’ under Shari’a.86 Thus,
potential profits do not require compensation unless it is confirmed that such profits are
according to the Islamic principle; ‘what is certain, is possible to be ensured’. Therefore, as this
foreign judgment contains compensation for the potential profit, which is contrary to Islamic
law, it must be rejected. This was the argument of the Sub-Circuit. However, the Second AuditCircuit revoked this ruling and stated that ‘the Sub-Circuit’s provision contained general terms
and phrases and did not show the related evidence [direct text] from the Qur’ān, Sunnah or
Ijma’a, which show the prohibition of the potential profits.’ This omission is cited as the reason
to quash the ruling of the lower court. In fact, ‘potential profit’ is a controversial issue among
scholars.
Thus, there has to be a clear and explicit legal or Islamic text on such points for them to be
considered as a public policy ground. Therefore, ‘the Sub-Circuit has to demonstrate the
violation of the law with real evidence derived from consensus ‘Ijma’a’, from the opinions
issued by the jurisprudence complexes, or senior Islamic scientists which confirms this
interpretation. Any controversial issue is not a matter of public policy.’87

86

According to Khan, ‘[a]ny contract based upon speculation or containing a provision that is activated
on the basis of a specific, but uncertain event is void, meaning that an Islamic arbitrator would not
award anticipated profits in an action for breach of contract.’ See Almas Khan, ‘The Interaction
between Shariah and International Law in Arbitration’ (2006) 6(2) Chicago Journal of International
Law 791, 799.
87
See Ruling No 235 / T / 2 of 1415 AH 1995 (emphasis added).
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Hence, it is clear that the general terms and principles do not fall within the framework of public
policy contained in the conventions. Accordingly, the Audit-Circuit has revoked the sentence
based on the absence of conclusive evidence on the violation of Shari’a because compensation
for the potential profit remains a controversial issue among scholars and has not been settled.
Moreover, there is a very important ruling that has been issued by the Fourth Audit-Circuit
(Ruling No 1 / T / 4 of 1424 AH 2004) which was the abolition of the Second Sub-Circuit Ruling
No 3 / D / F / 2 of 1423 AH 2003. The case was raised by a Kuwaiti woman against her Saudi
husband before the Court of Farwaniya in Kuwait (the couple did not separated, but they did not
live together). The case was about the custody of their children, who were at that time of
litigation in Saudi Arabia with their father.88 The Audit-Circuit’s ruling became more specific,
stating that
the Sub-Circuit ruling stated that the foreign judgment … requested to be implemented in
Saudi Arabia is not violating any explicit Islamic texts that had been agreed upon, the
Islamic assets or its general rules [However,] the Sub-Circuit did not discuss the lack of
jurisdiction [of] the Kuwaiti court [when] the defendant is a Saudi citizen and there is no
89
legal jurisdiction for the Kuwaiti courts to consider such a family case .

In another provision, Ruling No 102 / T / 4 of 1424 AH 200490 released by the Fourth AuditCircuit stated follows,

88

This ruling is very important and worthy of mention here because the Audit-Circuit has not commented
on that phrase which is related to Shari’a public policy, because the reason for revoking this ruling
relates to the violation of domestic legal rules (as we shall see in the next section). Thus, this ruling
may reflect the Grievances Board’s trend in regard to public policy.
89
The verdict was contrary to the rules of jurisdiction where the defendant has objected to the Kuwaiti
courts on the basis of lack of jurisdiction because he was a Saudi citizen and there was no legal
jurisdiction to consider such a family case. However, the Kuwaiti courts did not respond to this request
and issued the provision against him in the case. Thus, there was no violation of Shari’a; however, it is
contrary to domestic legal rule as we shall see.
90
This ruling was issued by the Court of ‘Personal Status’ in Kuwait, which was supported by the
Kuwaiti Court of Appeal. The case was a request from a woman (wife) with Kuwaiti nationality,
against her husband who has Saudi nationality. The claim was for payment by him of a monthly
amount to cover expenses for her and their house and the servant (all of which expenses she was
paying). In Islam, the husband is obliged to spend on his wife and his home. In this case, the defendant
‘husband’ was claiming that his wife was not living in the house and so she did not deserve any money.
But she was claiming that he did not ask her to return home after they were separated, so the husband is
obliged during the period of marriage to pay the expenses of the wife and their house. It should be
noted that there is a debate between Muslim jurists about the women’s rights to expenses in the event
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saying there is a violation from the rule that [is] meant to be implemented [in accordance
with] the Shari’a law is not supported by a clear evidence [evidence here means a direct
text from the holy Qur’an or the Sunnah or an Ijma’a between Muslim Scholars], because it
is not violating a legitimately definitive texts and was not contrary to consensus ‘Ijma’a’,
but it decides what the Shari’a decides....

The same words exist in Ruling No 13 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005.
Indeed, the Court of Appeal became more explicit in a relatively recent decision (Ruling No 269
/ ES / 4 of 1431 AH 2010).91 This case was an application of a foreign arbitral award issued by
the International Court of Arbitration in London.
The plaintiff sought to implement an arbitral award that had been issued by the Court of
International Arbitration in London in the Case No 10142 of January 2004 against the
defendant. The arbitration court’s ruling required the defendant to pay GBP 450,000 for
expenses incurred by the plaintiff and also pay the arbitration fees which had been paid by the
plaintiff (totalling USD 300,000) with annual interest on these amounts equal to 6 per cent.
Significantly, the plaintiff had explicitly waived the usury part (Ribā).
The case had been considered by the Sixteenth Sub-Circuit, which issued the Ruling No 13 / D /
E /16 of 1428 AH 2008, which was revoked by the Fourth Audit-Circuit Ruling No 169 / T / 4 of
1428 AH 2008. After that, the case was referred to the Fifteenth Sub-Circuit which issued the
Ruling No 115 / D / E/ 15 of 1429 AH 2009.92
The first verdict, issued by the Sixteenth Sub-Circuit, is a refusal to implement an arbitral award
based on the failure to prove the reciprocity between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom.
that they leave the house. Thus, the Audit-Circuit has stated that it is not a principle or a legal basis as it
is a controversial issue where there is no explicit text in that regard. So according to the Audit-Circuit,
she deserves to be paid.
91
This ruling was issued by the Fourth Court of Appeal, which was the Fourth-Circuit of Audit in the old
law of the Grievances Board. But after the issuance of the new law of the Grievances Board by the
Royal Decree No M / 78 of 19.09.1428 AH 2007, as explained before, all of the Audit-Circuits became
known as ‘courts of appeal’, and have the abbreviation ‘ES’ which came from Estinaf instead of ‘T’
which was a reference to Tadgeeg (Audit).
92
This change or transfer of the case from the Sixteenth Sub-Circuit to the Fifteenth Sub-Circuit was due
to the new management changes in the court where the Sixteenth Sub-Circuit was abolished and all of
the cases were transferred to the Fifteenth Sub-Circuit in accordance with the Decision of the President
of the Grievances Board No 54 of 1428 AH 2008.
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This ruling was set aside by the Fourth Audit-Circuit in Ruling No 169 of 1428 AH 2008 at a
time when Saudi Arabia and United Kingdom were parties to the Convention. Thus, the case
was returned to the Sub-Circuit to consider the Audit-Circuit’s notice.93
The Fifteenth Sub-Circuit also refused to enforce the foreign arbitration but on another ground,
that is, the violation of public policy in Saudi Arabia, as the contract includes interest or Ribā,
which is contrary to public policy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as it violates Islamic law.
This Fifteenth Sub-Circuit cited the text of the first paragraph of the Decision of the President of
the Grievances Board, which states that, ‘any foreign provision that [is] requested to be
implemented in Saudi Arabia should not be contrary to Islamic law’ and then the circuit stated
that ‘such controls [conditions] are considered from the public policy, which should not be
violated or … any right dropped, even the right to claim some of what came in the provision.’
Thus, the Sub-Circuit declined to implement the foreign arbitral award because it involves the
proportion of Ribā in the aggregate amount of the provision; although the plaintiff’s attorney
expressed his will by waiving the usury part. The Circuit insisted on rejecting the
implementation based on the inclusion of Ribā, which is forbidden (Muharram) by Shari’a,
which in turn then counted as contrary to public policy in Saudi Arabia.
The Fourth Court of Appeal in Ruling No 269 / ES / 4 of 1431 AH 2010 reversed that provision
by saying, ‘This conclusion of the Sub-Circuit is under consideration ...’ and then it explained
the meaning of public policy in Shari’a by saying:
Controls and conditions, for the implementation of foreign arbitral award and judgment that
have been issued by the president of the Grievances Board, are preventing the
implementation of foreign provision if it includes a part that contrary to the law or public
order where it was not possible to apply the non-offending part without the other; but if the
severability is possible [the execution of the sentence without the contrary part] there is no
reason to refuse the implementation; that what has been agreed upon by the court.
93

This means that the Court does not take the date of the arbitration as a criterion in determining the rule
of reciprocity, but rather the date of raising the case of the implementation. In fact, we should support
such an approach where it is in the favour of supporting the arbitration. This was explained in detail in
the last chapter, which was about the formal requirements, which includes the proof of the principle of
reciprocity.
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This decision may express the meaning of Article 10 of the new 2001 law of the Grievances
Board, which supports the consolidation of the principles that have been stabilised (settled) by
the courts in the Grievances Board; however, it gives the court the right to change any stabilised
principle when needed. Additionally, this judgment is a real application of the possibility of
severability for the application of foreign arbitral awards, if a severable part contradicts public
policy (as earlier explained). This possibility is stipulated in Article 5 of the Convention.
Furthermore, this ruling has referred to paragraph 5(1) of the new decision — Decision No 116
of 1428 AH (2007) — of the President of the Grievances Board on the regulations and
conditions of the implementation of foreign arbitral award, where it stipulates the possibility of
severability for the application of the foreign award.94 Thus, the court is obliged, in the case of
the possibility of severability, to implement the non-contrary part.
Equally important to the recognition of the possibility of severability, the Court of Appeal did
not comment on the argument that all of the controls and requirements have been addressed in
the Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No 116 of 1428 AH (2007) and are
considered as a public policy defences, which may mean an agreement to that provision. Such a
trend puts all of these conditions as public policy defences so the court here expands the scope
of the appeal on the basis of public policy and makes it too large.
There was Ruling No 189 / T / 4 of 1427 AH 2007, where the plaintiff sought to implement in
Saudi Arabia a foreign judgment issued by the First Instance Court in North Cairo in the Arab
Republic of Egypt against a Saudi Company. The defendant was obliged by that ruling to pay
SAR 48,944.50. This case was presented to the Seventeenth Sub-Circuit in 2006. This circuit
rejected the implementation of the foreign judgment based on the violation of Shari’a because
the basic transaction was about music (songs), and songs with musical instruments are
forbidden in the Shari’a; thus, this provision could not be applied in Saudi Arabia because it

94

See the new Decision — Decision No 116 of 1428 AH (2007) — of the President of the Grievances
Board No 116 of 11/7/1428 AH 2007.
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contrary to the provisions of Shari’a. However, the Fourth Audit-Circuit annulled this
provision, based on the fact that there is no conclusive evidence or express provision in the
Qur’ān or Sunnah, and also there is no consensus Ijma’a between Muslim scholars about the
status of songs in the Islamic law. Most importantly, the Audit-Circuit stated that it is true that
there are some scholars who have adopted the idea that the prohibition of songs is a tenet of
Islam, but there is not a consensus or prevailing opinion; thus, the judge should not force people
to accept his beliefs in matters of non-consensus.
This provision has specified what should be considered against public policy in Shari’a, what
the assets of Shari’a are, and what are considered to be the controversial issues (nonconsensus). It has also explained the nature of the judge’s role where he cannot impose his
opinion on people in the controversial issues. Thus, what can be rejected is the award that
violates any assets of Shari’a, and the judge should not apply what he believes is true on any
controversial issue among Shari’a scholars, but must take into consideration the existence of
different points of view.
The Saudi Grievances Board has described public policy in general terms in relation to some
rulings to reject the implementation of foreign awards, or in cases to prove that there is no
violation of Shari’a. However, it is through these general terms that the Grievances Board has
tried to limit Islamic public policy in the assets of Shari’a. The assets of Shari’a are difficult to
specify and also contain some general and non-specific principles, such as the Gharer contracts.
Gharer contracts are forbidden by Shari’a. These contracts are almost impossible to specify and
name, because in the real world and from one period to another, the types of transactions are
always creating new kind of contracts, which forces judges to consider each contract separately.
It is important to understand why the court is trying to determine the assets of the Islamic law as
those with relevant direct supporting texts in the holy Qur’ān and Sunnah and to issues that
have been agreed upon among the Shari’a scholars. It is also important to know why the Saudi
Grievances Board allows recognition or enforcement of foreign awards even if the foreign
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arbitration is contrary to a view that is the subject of controversy among Muslim scholars. This
conduct could be due to two reasons: the first is the desire of the Saudi Grievances Board to
facilitate commercial transactions as a step that supports arbitration as a parallel path to that of
the judiciary; and second, such application is to support the Saudi government’s position as an
active member in the system of global trade and a way to show good faith in the implementation
of international conventions.
In regard to international trade contracts and international arbitration cases, it can be said that
the defence of Islamic public policy in Saudi Arabia are inclusive of three features or three types
of defences that are explained as follows:
1.

The Prohibited Contracts: these are contracts that are originally prohibited by the Qur’ān,
Sunnah and Ijma’a, with clear and explicit Islamic legal texts. Any actions or contracts
and even acts that stem from such contracts that are also forbidden by an explicit text in
the Qur’ān or Sunnah render a contract unenforceable. For example, liquor contracts or
any related contract like selling, buying or delivering alcohol, are all forbidden.95
Additionally, the best example of such a category is Ruling No 189 / T / 4 of 1427 AH
2007 where the Sub-Circuit refused to implement the foreign judgment on the basis of the
prohibition of the musical songs in Islam, because music is the basis of the contractual
relationship between the parties in this case.
The Audit-Circuit revoked that ruling because the prohibition of songs is not in
accordance with an explicit text in the Qur’ān or Sunnah or in accordance with Ijma’a
between the Muslim scholars. Thus, in the case of an alcohol contract, the Grievances

95

For more information, see Arthur James Powell, ‘Only in Paradise: Alcohol and Islam’ in C K
Robertson (ed), Religion & Alcohol: Sobering Thoughts (Peter Lang Publishing, 2004) 95, 95.
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Board will refuse implementation on the grounds of the prohibition of the basic
transaction, which here is about alcohol.96
2.

Usury (Ribā): has been mentioned explicitly in the Qur’ān and Sunnah and there is a
consensus Ijma’a among Muslim scholars on its prohibition.97 This is based on the
principle that it is not justice to exploit another person. Unjustifiable profit at the expense
of another person is exploitative. It is also forbidden (haram) in Islam, under the concept
of wealth accumulation, to build up wealth that is not a product of work. Payment of
interest is therefore considered haram and is expressly forbidden in the Qurān.98
Prohibition of Ribā is a very important principle in Islamic finance and therefore in
commercial transactions. The principle has universal application in different schools of
Islamic jurisprudence, but its concept is interpreted differently.99 One type of Ribā has
been revealed in the Qur’ān which is Ribā Al-jahhiliyya, and there are two types of Ribā
recognised in the Sunnah which are Ribā Al-Nasi’a and Ribā Al-Fadhl.100 Additionally, it
is very important to mention that the common translation for Ribā is ‘interest’ but there
are some other meanings apart from that.101

96

Any dispute that is related to such contracts will be refused implementation. For more information
about the prohibition of alcohol and the prohibition of any act or conduct related to alcohol in Islam,
see ibid, 95. Additionally, there are some faults and defects that can dissolve the contract under
Shari’a; however, such faults and defects are considered as substantive issues, where the parties have
to raise them before the arbitral tribunal as they relate to the original dispute; thus, the judge cannot
discuss the merits of the case and he also cannot consider any substantive defences, as we saw in the
last chapter. For more information about the contracts in Shari’a and their termination, see Jamila
Hussain, Islam: Its Law and Society (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2011) 197.
97
According to McMillen,
Conventional Western finance is firmly based on the concept of interest, the accretive earnings on
money with the passage of time, or amounts in excess of principal (i.e. Riba), and related riskreward structures, particularly payment preferences in financing contracts and related collateral
security structures ... The risk-reward [in Islamic] conception is fundamentally different.
See Michael J T McMillen, ‘Contemporary Islamic Finance: An Introduction to Essential Concepts’
(2009) 38(4) International Law News 1, 10.
98
See Abdulkader Thomas, ‘Interest in Islamic Economics: Understanding Riba: Islamic Studies’
(Routledge, 2004) 25.
99
Ibid 26.
100
See Vogel and Hayes, above n 10, 72.
101
These commodities have been mentioned in Sunnah ‘in a direct Hadith’ specifically where these
commodities should not be exchanged except in an equal quantity and in immediate effect. For more
information, see Hussain, above n 96, 202. And for more information about these commodities, see
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a. Ribā Al-jahhiliyya:
Al-jahhiliyya ‘is a description of the period before Islam.’102 This kind of Ribā
could be seen in the event when the lender asked the borrower in an interest-free
loan if he/she would settle the debt or swap it for larger debt of longer maturity
period.103 This kind of Ribā was prohibited and described in the holy Qur’ān.
b. Ribā Al-Nasi’a:
The term nasi’a or nasi’ah means to reschedule or to wait and it refers to the time
period that is allowed for the borrower to repay the loan in return for additional
money. Hence it refers to the interest on loans.104 This kind of Ribā has been
prohibited in the Sunnah and it is accrued ‘when delivery of one countervalue is
deferred in a sale transaction involving countervalues which are susceptible to
Ribā.’105 This kind of Ribā refers to the interest on the loan.
c. Ribā Al-Fadhl:
Ribā Al-Fadl can be defined as all excess over what is justified by the countervalue.106 One of the great goals in Islamic finance is not just to eliminate the
exploitation in having interest on loans but also to avoid any dishonest and unjust

Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba and Its
Contemporary Interpretation (E J Brill, 1996) 31.
102
Ahmed A El-Ashker, The Islamic Business Enterprise (Taylor & Francis, 1987) 39.
103
El-Gamal, above n 10, 50. Also generally see Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance
(John Wiley & Sons, 2009).
104
M Umer Chapra, ‘The Nature of Riba in Islam’ (January – June 2006) 2 (1) Journal of Islamic
Economics and Finance 2; also see Abdulrahman Khalil Tolefat and Mehmet Asutay, Takaful
Investment Portfolios: A Study of the Composition of Takaful Funds in the GCC and Malaysia (John
Wiley & Sons, 2013) 20.
105
See Saeed, Islamic Banking, above n 101, 35; also see Jaquir Iqbal, Islamic Financial Management
(Global Vision Publishing House, 2009)101.
106
Iqbal, above n 105, 102.
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exchanges in business transactions.107 This kind of Ribā is applied on hand-tohand transactions and sale of commodities.108
It should be noted that there is no difference of opinion among Muslim scholars about the
prohibition of Ribā because of the clear texts in the Qur’ān and Sunnah that vehemently
condemn Ribā.109 However, few scholars in the modern era have tried to restrict the
definition of Ribā by allowing some financial benefits on some commercial loans.110
However, contracts that include Ribā could be valid contracts, where the original contract
is permitted. Thus, the foreign award could be partially applied by applying the legal part
of the award with the exclusion of the usury part, as we have seen in some rulings.
3.

Gharer Contracts: were also originally considered forbidden but are not precisely defined
and must be clarified. It is under the judge’s discretionary authority to decide whether an
act is Gharer or not.
Gharer represents uncertainty in the contract, which is forbidden in Shari’a. Gharer
means ‘to undertake … a venture blindly without sufficient knowledge or to undertake an
excessively risky transaction.’111 It is not a specific contract because any civil contract
could become a Gharer given certain circumstances. Jamila Hussain has addressed the
circumstances that can turn any contract into a Gharer contract. They are:




When the seller is not in a position to hand over the goods to the buyer; or
The subject matter of the sale is incapable of acquisition, for example, the sale of
fruit which has not yet ripened or fish or birds not yet caught; or
Speculative investments such as trading in futures on the stock market; or

107

Ibid.
Ibid.
109
See Saeed, Islamic Banking, above n 101, 41; also see Ayub, above n 103, 44. Interestingly, Islam is
not the only religion that prohibits Riba or usury. Christianity and Judaism also have condemned such
action. For more information, see Mervyn K Lewis and Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward
Elgar, 2001) 185.
110
They believe that these benefits should be read in accordance to the general text of the holy Qur’ān’s
prohibition of Riba. Thus, these financial benefits should be excluded from the Riba category. For
more information, see Saeed, Islamic Banking, n 101, 41.
111
Hussain, above n 96, 204.
108
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Where the purchaser is not given the opportunity of inspecting goods before
112
purchasing them.

These legal principles would prevent the implementation of foreign judgments and foreign
arbitral awards in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, because forbidden contracts violate an explicit
provision (text) in the main Islamic sources (Qur’ān and Sunnah). Also, the prohibition of usury
is one of the most important legal principles in business dealings in the Islamic world. However,
where contracts are subdivisible into parts that are applicable / and those not applicable (in
accordance with Shari’a, for reasons such as Ribā), such a principle can prevent the
implementation of the part of the foreign award that violates Shari’a whilst permitting the
application of the part that does not violate Shari’a. In addition, the prohibition of Gharer aims
to ensure the rights of the parties that have a legitimate and logical ground to prevent
manipulation or exploitation of any of the parties in the contractual relationship.
C.

Violation of Legal Regulations Relating to the Arbitration ‘Peremptory Norms of
Public Policy’

From the extrapolation of the available provisions of the Saudi Grievances Board, it is also clear
that public policy is not only confined to the assets of the Shari’a, but extends to any violation
of law within the country. There are legal norms and principles that are considered public policy
from the view point of the Saudi Grievances Board. These are as described below:
1.

Lack of jurisdiction: it is known that the ‘rules of competence’113 can be raised by the
judge on his own without a request from any of the parties to the dispute under public
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For more information about these circumstances and the way to avoid such circumstances, see ibid
124.
113
This means that the local rules of jurisdiction, which govern the distribution of cases to the courts, are
according to the geographical distribution. For more information about the Saudi Courts jurisdiction,
see Nasser Bin Mohammed Al-Ghamdi, ‘Alekhts{as{ fy Alfeqh Aleslami> M‘ Byan Altat{bi>q Alh{ali> fy
Almmlaka Al‘rbiah Als‘wdiah [Jurisdiction in Islamic Jurisprudence with an Indication of its Current
Application in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia]’ (Maktabat Al-Roshd, 1st ed, 1420 AH 2000).
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policy rules.114 This is illustrated by many judgments that have been released by the
Grievances Board. For example, Ruling No 103 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006,115 where it was
expressed that there is no jurisdiction to implement a foreign judicial delegate letter
issued by a foreign arbitrator or judge. Also in Ruling No 52 / T / 3 of 1410 AH 1990 the
court ruled that it has no jurisdiction regarding the enforcement of an arbitral award that
has been issued to a foreigner who had resided in the Kingdom for a period of time, but at
the time of implementation had left the kingdom on a final exit visa.116
2.

Legal status of parties: in the event of a request for implementation of a foreign arbitral
award made by a person who has no interest in that case, the Grievances Board will not
accept the request because the party making the request is not relevant. This was clear in
Ruling No 71 / T / 3 of 1412 AH 1992. This was also settled by the Court in a relatively
recent case, Ruling No 236 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006, where the request for implementation
was by a foreign company against the commercial agent and a distributor for that foreign
company in Saudi Arabia. The agent company claimed that the original ruling had been
against the foreign company, and as the agent had not involved in that foreign ruling, the
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For more information about the judges role in general, see Abdul Rahman Bin Saleh Al-Yahya,
‘Ale‘trad {‘la Elh{km u> Nqd{eh fy Qanon Os{ol Elmoh{akmat Eljzaeyh Als‘wdi>: Drash Muqarnh [The
Objection to the Rule and Its Revocation in the Saudi Law of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative
Study]’ (Masters (Research) Thesis, Umm Al-Qura University, 1425 AH 2005).
Where the case is a request to implement a rogatory decision, which is not a judgment or an arbitral
award. This Rogatory was released by the Court of Civil Execution in Aleppo in favour of a Syrian
woman against her husband, a Saudi national. The Audit-Circuit confirmed that what was presented is
a rogatory decision, which has not the form or content of foreign judgments or arbitral awards that had
been mentioned in the Arab Convention. That is, the Convention of the Arab League on the
Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards, 14 September 1952 (entered into force in 10
November 1952).
And also note that a ruling released by a non-competent tribunal is not applicable in the Kingdom on
the basis of violation of public policy, based on the lack of jurisdiction of the source of the ruling (the
basis of the lack of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction). In this instance, the Kuwaiti court is not competent to
adjudicate in proceedings between a ‘Kuwaiti wife’ and a ‘Saudi husband’ where the husband is a
permanent resident in Saudi Arabia. As a result, if we apply this trend to the provisions of arbitration,
the Grievances Board will not apply any arbitral award where the arbitrators exceed their authority in
adjudicating the case. This was explained in the previous chapter; see Ruling No 1 / T / 4 of 1424 AH
2004 which was explained previously. The arbitrator/s jurisdiction also was discussed in more detail
in the previous chapter.
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case had to be against the original company not the company acting as agent,117 or person
related but not named in the original arbitral award judgment. Therefore, where the
defendant party is just a commercial agent, the matter of whether they are a party to the
case is irrelevant, unless there is an authorised agency to do so.
It should be noted that the Grievances Board has not described that rejection as a public
policy defence; however, it refused the implementation according to a general judicial
principle which is the presence of legal status for the parties to any lawsuit. This principle
did not exist in any convention related to the enforcement of foreign arbitration or in the
Saudi Arbitration System. The rejection can be interpreted, however, as the
implementation of a general principle of law which should be observed and its violation
not accepted.118
3.

Controls on implementation: The Decision of the President of the Grievances Board No
116 of 1428 AH (2007) contains the controls on the implementation of any foreign
arbitral award or judgment, and these are considered as public policy rules that shall not
be violated. In the Fifteenth Sub-Circuit’ Ruling No 115 / D / E / 15 of 1429 AH 2009, the
final ruling of the foreign arbitration included the benefits of usury (Ribā). Although, the
plaintiff expressly asked for the amount of Ribā to be waived and asked the court not to
pay attention to those amounts, the Fifteenth Sub-Circuit refused to implement the award
because of the presence of interest or Ribā, which is contrary to public policy and
contrary to the Shari’a.
Notably, the court cited the text of the first paragraph of the Decision of the President of
the Grievances Board which indicated that any foreign provision should not be contrary
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In this case the plaintiff is a foreign company and the defendant is a Saudi person, ‘Mouawad’ as
general manager of a Swiss Company in Geneva. The foreign judgment was issued by the Federal
Court of Appeal in Abu Dhabi - Civil Division V. The original sentence was issued against the Swiss
company, not against Mouawad, either himself personally or as a general manager of the Swiss
company.
This feature makes this principle related to the public policy.
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to Shari’a to be implemented in Saudi Arabia. Then the court stated that these controls
are considered as public policy, which should not be violated or cannot be severed by any
party. In addition, parties cannot drop or waive some of these provisions.
Nevertheless, this provision has been revoked by the Court of Appeal in Ruling No 269 /
ES / 4 of 1431 AH 2010 where the Court adopted the partial application of the award and
confirmed the court’s ability to implement the legal parts by refusing to implement the
contrary part. The Court of Appeal did not comment on this argument, thus making all of
the controls and requirements that have been addressed in the Decision of the President of
the Grievances Board No 116 of 1428 AH (2007) public policy defences. Again this
silence may mean an agreement to that provision which permits all of these conditions to
be used as public policy defences.
Therefore, the existence of formal and substantive requirements within Decision of the
President of the Grievances Board No 116 of 1428 AH (2007) renders these requirements
public policy defences. This leads to the expansion of the limit of the public policy
defence and will make all of the Grievances Board rulings able to rely on the public
policy ground in refusing any foreign award.
4. Arbitrability:119 the term ‘arbitrability’ has a general meaning, which can be expressed
as disputes that can be referred to arbitration according to national legislation,
international convention or judicial authority. Courts often refer to ‘public policy’ as the
basis of the arbitrability; thus, the subject matter of conflict is the main key in
determining arbitrability of a dispute.120 According to the Implementing Rules of the
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This is according to the regulation and, in fact, there is no such defence before the court in that matter.
Furthermore, according to the regulation text, the issue of arbitrability is not defined clearly in a Saudi
law text, but will refer to the general rules of Islamic law. Thus, the arbitrability considered as a public
policy matter that is related to law texts and also related to the principles of Islamic law at the same
time.
120
For more information, see Laurence Shore, ‘Defining “Arbitrability”: The United States vs the Rest of
the World’ (15 June 2009) New York Law Journal ‘Special Section’; also see Born, International
Commenrcial Arbitration, above n 39, 243.
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Saudi Arbitration System, arbitrability is one of the public policy matters, where it is
stated in the first Article that ‘[a]rbitration in matters wherein conciliation is not
permitted shall be not accepted, such as ‘Hudūd’, ‘Li’aan’ between the couple, and all
that is related to public policy.’
Therefore, any dispute that is not permitted to be solved by conciliation in Shari’a cannot be
solved by arbitration at all.121
It should be noted that the four Islamic schools of thought (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali)
have agreed on the permissibility to arbitrate in business dealings, although some differences
exist in relation to some criminal matters, which is beyond the scope of this research.122 This
explanation concerns the Islamic aspects related to commercial transactions in Shari’a.
The Saudi legislature did not specify the exact types of matter that could be excluded from
arbitration. Additionally, there are no judicial decisions that define and specify the particular
conflicts or the prohibited matters that cannot be solved by arbitration. It is therefore necessary
to return to the principles of law to see what can be applied by the Grievances Board in this
matter. Thus, in Saudi Arabia, it can be said that conflicts that relate to the security of the
country and the high policy of the country (any policy or decisions are related to its sovereignty)
cannot be solved by arbitration. Additionally, any disputes that are related to employment in or
the workings of the judiciary, such as the sacking of the judge, cannot be solved by arbitration.
The reason for such prohibition is that such disputes are related to the higher interests of the
state and could not be considered by special arbitrators.123

5.4.2

Australian Courts in Approving the Public Policy Exception

In Australia there are a number of judgments about the foreign arbitral award and, in most cases,
the issue of violation of public policy has been used as a defence against the enforcement.
121

For more information, see Al-Foraian, above n 42, 92.
For more information, see ibid 90.
123
For more information about this vision, see ibid 131.
122
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Different judges have arrived at different decisions, all of which when analysed, may present a
definition of how public policy is viewed by the judges.
This number of cases raises some questions about the judicial meaning of public policy
according to Australian courts, such as whether the definition could be discerned from the
decisions made by judges in cases where public policy has been adjudged to have been violated,
as well as the standards of public policy, and when the public policy defence should be used and
when it should not be used. Additionally, the approach taken by the Australian courts should be
explained and measured by the provisions of the Convention.

A.

Definition of Public Policy According to Australian Courts

Under normal circumstances, public policy comprises the rules and values that serve the social,
economic or political interests of a region (region in this case may be a nation, a state, a group
of nations or a particular place) or those pertaining to justice or morality of a specific place. 124
These rules and values are developed to ensure law and order.125 Considering the cases that will
be presented in detail, public policy is not just the already written laws and values or already
established and well known rules and values of a particular place. Its judicial meaning in some
instances is the maintenance of the reason why the public policy (under normal circumstances)
was developed in the first place and preservation of the role of the court in ensuring morality or
justice in a specific place.
If contravention of public policy is the defence against enforcement of foreign arbitral award,
this defence is not the only way to serve justice. The intentions of the parties have to be
determined to serve to reveal the real reason for the courts’ existence, which is to preserve
public morals and social values. Therefore, the parties must always take into account the legal
principles in the country of implementation. Also, the court in the interpretation of this
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For more information, see Ma, above n 56, 33.
Ibid.
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exception should not expand its standard, and should take into account the desire of the parties
when they resorted to arbitration.
According to most of the cases, public policy as a defence against enforcement of foreign
awards is more like preventing the recurrence of immorality in the name of acting according to
legal requirement of a country, nation or region. For example, it is clear in Corvetina
Technology Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd,126 where the parties (the British company, Corvetina,
and the Pakistani company, Clough) had a contract governed by the British law. Conflict arose
between the parties and they resorted to arbitration to resolve this conflict. The main claim by
Clough was that the arbitration proceedings were contrary to the public policy of both English
and Pakistani laws (Pakistan being the country of performance of the contract). It is important to
mention that the arbitrators ignored that claim and found in favour of Corvetina. The place of
application for enforcement for this international arbitral award was Australia (Supreme Court
of NSW).
Thus, Corvetina sought to enforce that award in NSW. Clough has argued that Corvetina’s
performance under the contract violated Australian public policy. Corvetina defended such
claim before the NSW Supreme Court on the basis that Clough could not raise the objection of
public policy in the enforcement proceedings because the issue of public policy had already
been settled by the arbitrators. Thus, Corvetina requested suspension of the discovery pending
until the resolution of its request for clarification regarding the defendant’s entitlement to make
allegations or seek to prove certain matters in regard to particular paragraphs of its amended
defence. However, after two notices of motion from Corvetina, the court refused that request
and insisted on settling the public policy question first.127
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See Corvetina Technology Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd [2004] NSWSC 700. For more analysis of
this case, see Albert van den Berg (ed), International Council for Commercial Arbitration, Yearbook:
Commercial Arbitration 2005, vol XXX (Kluwer Law International, 2005) 410–15. (‘2005 ICC
Yearbook 2005’).
127
In fact, this case is a notice of motion filed on 23 July 2004; the plaintiff sought:
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McDougall J dismissed that in accordance with British and Australian legal principles, which
allow the defendant to raise the objection of public policy in the enforcement proceedings, even
if the public policy issue was discussed and dismissed by the arbitrators. Additionally, he
argued for a balance between the defence of public policy and its application mechanism under
the Convention and the court’s discretion in the application. Hence he pointed out that the court
must use its own discretion in implementing its own public policy; therefore, he disagreed with
Corvetina’s argument when he stated that:
I do not think that it can be said that the court should forfeit the exercise of the discretion,
which is expressly referred to it, simply because of some “signal” that this might send to
people who engage in arbitrations under the Act. There is … a balancing consideration. On
the one hand, it is necessary to ensure that the mechanism for enforcement of international
arbitral awards under the New York Convention is not frustrated. But, on the other hand, it
is necessary for the court to be master of its own processes and to apply its own public
128
policy.

Each country has its own public policy; thus, there is no objection or legal impediment to any
party who may wish to raise the public policy defence before the enforcement court, even if he
failed to successfully raise that defence before the court of supervisory jurisdiction.129
Moreover, with changing times, environment and human activities, reasons behind human
actions have to be determined in order to ensure justice or moral behaviour.130 This will not be
obtained unless the judges have been given the right to examine each case separately, which
makes them always obliged to apply the national public policy.

[A]n order that there be no discovery ordered in these proceedings until a question, defined in the
notice of motion, is resolved. That question is as follows: Whether the defendant is entitled to
allege and seek to prove in these proceedings that the plaintiff performed, purported to perform or
intended to perform its obligations under the contracts in a manner which (a) was contrary to the
public policy and laws of the place of performance, namely, Pakistan (b) was contrary to
Australian public policy; by reference to the facts particularised in paragraph 4(b) of the Amended
Defence and the matters alleged in paragraph 4(c) of the Amended Defence.
See Corvetina Technology Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd [2004] NSWSC 700, [1]–[2].
128
Ibid [18] (McDougall J).
129
That was very clear in Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc [2011] VSC 1.
130
For more information, see van den Berg, 2005 ICC Yearbook, above n 126, 410–15.
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Indeed, van den Berg disagreed with the essential argument of the plaintiff in Corvetina,131
which was that the arbitrators had discussed the merits of the case; thus, the issue of public
policy cannot be raised on the subject of proceedings before the court because that is discussing
the merits of the case, which is beyond the court’s jurisdiction. It is important to note that each
judge is obliged to apply the national public policy and this will be possible by considering any
stage of the arbitration proceedings to make sure there is no violation of the public policy
(without considering the matter of the case).
This view has been supported by the text of Article V of the Convention, which approved the
right of raising violation of public policy but it did not specify the type of violation or specify
the stage of the arbitration. Additionally, van den Berg believes that the Australian text in that
regard, section 8(7)(b) of the IAA, is very broad and gives the court a general discretion.132 This
general discretion was observed in International Movie Group Inc (IMG) v Palace
Entertainment Corp Pty Ltd. This case was decided by the Supreme Court of Victoria
(Australia).133 The judge in this case reported:
In my view, the answer should be in the affirmative. The void provisions of the award are
to be regarded as ineffective and not part of the award and any leave that will be given will
be given to enforce the paragraphs of the award that are valid and effective. Thus, any
judgment may be fairly said to have the same effect as the award ... There is no variation in
respect of the matters there dealt with by the award. They are simply to be regarded as
134
ineffective and not part of the award.

The judge also expressed a belief that by trying to preserve the ‘spirit of the Convention’, the
courts are not just in place to act according to the already developed and implemented laws and
rules.
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Ibid.
Ibid 411.
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See International Movie Group Inc (IMG) v Palace Entertainment Corp Pty Ltd [1995] 128 FLR 458.
134
Ibid 11.
132
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For example, in Yang v S & L Consulting,135 the application was for a foreign arbitral award
made in China under the IAA. The main issue was whether enforcement of the award would be
contrary to public policy or not. The plaintiff was a Chinese national and the defendant was
Australian. In 2002, the plaintiff (Yang) applied for a visa (subclass 127 business owner) to
reside permanently with his family in Australia. Yang engaged the services of the second
defendant, Mr Stephen Lee (a registered migration agent). In 2003, Mr Yang was advised by the
Australian Consulate in Hong Kong that his application for a permanent entry visa to Australia
had been approved. In 2004, an agreement between Mr Yang and S & L Consulting Pty Ltd,
entered into force. The agreement was also signed by Mr Lee himself as guarantor.136
In fact, clause 10 of that agreement provided that any dispute arising out of, or relating to, the
agreement should be submitted for arbitration to the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission according to that Commission’s arbitration rules. Additionally, the
clause provided that the arbitral award would be final and binding on both parties. The
agreement was written in Mandarin and it was translated into English by an interpreter and
translator accredited by the National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters in
Australia.
The conflict started in 2007 when S & L Consulting had not procured a third party to purchase
Mr Yang’s shares, nor paid him AUD 500,000 owing if S & L had failed to find a buyer for
those shares in the Australian company.137 Accordingly, Mr Yang resorted to arbitration.138 A
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See Yang v S & L Consulting [2009] NSWSC 223.
Ibid 2.
137
For more information, see Baker and McKenzie, The Baker & McKenzie International Arbitration
Yearbook (Wolters Kluwer Russia, 2009) 8.
138
According to the agreement that was signed in 2002 between the parties, Mr Yang made a
commitment to either establish or participate in an eligible business in Australia; and maintain direct
and continuous involvement in the management of that business. After his successful application for
an Australian visa, Mr Yang entered into a contract with S & L Consulting to buy shares in an
Australian company. S & L Consulting promised to complete all formalities relating to Mr Yang and
his family obtaining Australian citizenship; Mr Yang and his family’s permanent residency would not
be revoked by the government unless they did not live in Australia for sufficient time during the three
years after the contract was signed, which can be seen as a promise in behalf of the Australian
government made by S & L Consulting company; and the most important is that if a third party buyer
136
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notice for the arbitration proceedings was given to the parties; however, the defendants did not
appear before or make submissions to the Commission.
The Arbitration Tribunal consider the conflict and found that the agreement was valid and
effective and the plaintiff had fully performed his obligations and that S & L Consulting and Mr
Lee had failed to carry out their obligations.
The defendant argued that the guarantee in clause 6 of the agreement was contrary to public
policy of the law found in the Australian Migration Act 1958 (Cth). However, this claim did not
mean that the agreement was not enforceable nor that the award given to the plaintiff should not
be enforced based on that Act.
It could be said that considering the argument of the defence and to some extent it is contrary to
public policy, but only a section of what is considered public policy. The argument that was
provided by the defendant was that the guarantee in clause 6 of the agreement provides the
plaintiff with an incentive not to comply with the undertakings he had made to the government
on the basis of which the visa had been issued. The plaintiff was issued a 127 subclass visa and
so bound by the requirements of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) 127.218.
The argument of the defence is that the primary criteria of a subclass 127 visa, to allow himself
and his family to reside permanently in Australia, would not be met by the plaintiff if that clause
was enforced. In fact, there is no proof showing the plaintiff’s intention to either abide or not by
subclass 127.216(b) and (c) of the Migration Regulations 1994, which was made under the
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and there is also no proof showing that the plaintiff did abide by
those rules.
White J in Yang v S & L Consulting argument was based on the judgments in the following
cases: McHugh J in Nelson v Nelson [1995] HCA 25; (1995) 184 CLR 538 at 613; and

for Mr Yang’s shares in an Australian company had not been found within three years, S & L
Consulting would buy those shares.
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Fitzgerald v FJ Leonhardt Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 215 at 229–30, where White J provides that
McHugh J in Nelson v Nelson identified ‘four exceptions to the dictum of Lord Mansfield’ in
Holman v Johnson.139 Justice White summarised these exceptions as follows:
[T]he courts will not refuse relief where [1] the claimant was ignorant or mistaken … [2]
where the statutory scheme rendering a contract or arrangement illegal was enacted for the
benefit of a class of which the claimant is a member … [3] where an illegal agreement was
induced by the defendant’s fraud, oppression or undue influence … [4] where the illegal
purpose has not been carried into effect. 140

He additionally clarified that equity and legal rights should not be denied because they are
associated with unlawful purpose, but provided exceptions.141
By making this judgment, the court is trying to show that public policy is not just following
what had been previously written as a rule or principle for law and order, but ensuring that
morality and justice prevails.142 The Australian court shows that the sole reason for the
development of such rules and values is to ensure justice and moral behaviour. By enforcing the
award the Convention rules and the national public policy are respected and justice is served.
Immorality is also prevented when the defendant was engaging in the agreement and the
intention was to abide by the binding rules, which in this case were not obeyed. That was clear
in Justice White’s judgment where he stated: ‘If clause 6 were unlawful, it could be severed.
The elimination of clause 6 would not change the nature of the remaining promises in the
agreement’. This shows the respect of the court for the agreement and the need to be fulfilled by
the parties, which also shows the support of the good faith principle.
In fact, ‘immorality’ as a public policy defence was clearly addressed in Parsons & Whittemore
which was released by Southern District of New York, where Smith J stated that ‘[e]nforcement
139
140
141
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See Yang v S & L Consulting [2009] NSWSC 223, 12.
Ibid 12–13.
Baker and McKenzie, above n 137, 9.
In the same meaning of preserving the social morals, the Canadian Supreme Court has stated; ‘The
public policy defence turns on whether the foreign law is contrary to our view of public morality.’ For
more information, see Toronto Lawyers Zvulony and Company, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
Corruption Defence (29 November 2010) US Judgments Law <http://zvulony.ca/2010/articles/usjudgments-law/corruption/>.
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of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only where enforcement would violate the
forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.’ 143 In addition, morality here could be
defined as an application of the good faith principle in the trade area where judges preserve the
importance of the original bargain between the parties and respect their agreements, ensure that
there is no engaging in false or misleading advertising in that regard, and that all parties are
clear and reasonable identified as the agreement. That could be supported by the judgment of
Croft J where he stated that ‘“contrary to the public policy of that country” in art V(2)(b) means
“contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and justice” of the forum’.144
On the other hand, section 8(7)(a) of the IAA145 applies where the subject matter of the
difference between the parties to the award is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the
laws in force in the state or territory in which the court is sitting. This forms part of the
Australian law, and in any case this is contrary to public policy because ‘the applicable law for
determining arbitrability is Australian law’.146 Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards cannot,
therefore, be awarded if the court finds such an award is as a result of a dispute in which the
subject matter cannot be settled by arbitration (Arbitrability). Grounds here would be against
public policy and it is also against the Convention.
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For more information, see Federal-circuits vlex website, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co Inc,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee, v Société Générale de l’Industrie du Papier (Rakta), and Bank of
America, Defendants-Appellees, Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier (Rakta), DefendantAppellee-Appellant, 508 F 2d 969 (2d Cir, 1974) (2012) Federal-circuits vlex <http://federalcircuits.vlex.com/vid/whittemore-papier-rakta-37634820>.
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See Croft J in his judgment in Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc [2011] VSC 1 (28 January 2011).
Thus, it could be said that morality here stems from the people’s culture and social values. Also
morality could be counted as international public policy where the International Law Association
Committee on International Comercial Arbitration in the Final ILA Report on Public Policy suggested
that in recommendation (e) ‘The international public policy of any State includes: (i) fundamental
principles, pertaining to justice or morality, that the State wishes to protect even when it is not directly
concerned.’ See Mayer and Sheppard, above n 6, 251.
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It should be noted that Barrett J believed that ‘It is thus clear that it is not open to the court to impose
conditions upon s.7 stay which will detract from the integrity of the arbitration process the
Commonwealth Act mandates.’ See WesT rac Pty Ltd v Eastcoast OTR Tyres Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC
894.
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See Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett, ‘The Top Twenty Things to Change in or around Australia’s
International Arbitration Act’ in Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett (eds), International Arbitration in
Australia (Federation Press, 2010) 155. It should be noted that ‘there is a narrow understanding of
non-arbitrability in Australia.’ For more information about the arbitrability, see Matt Skinner and
Justin Simpkins, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Awards in Australia’ (2011) 77(1) Arbitration 54, 57.
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Thus, it could be said that arbitrability is an element of the public policy defence to refuse the
implementation.147 A relevant example is ACD Tridon v Tridon Australia.148 In this case the
plaintiff Tridon was a company formed in Canada and the first defendant TAPL was a company
incorporated in Australia. The fourth defendant, Tridon New Zealand Pty Ltd TNZL, was a
company incorporated in New Zealand. The plaintiff, a minority shareholder in the first
defendant, sought orders for access to corporate documents of the first defendant and its
controlled entities (including the fourth defendant). The plaintiff relied partly on statutory
remedies under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and partly on the provisions of a shareholders’
agreement, which contains an arbitration clause, between itself and the second defendant. The
plaintiff also sought to establish the right to terminate a distribution agreement between itself
and the first and fourth defendants. The plaintiff argued that the subject matter was not
arbitrable. The defendant’s claim was to stay the court proceeding because of the existence of
the arbitration clause.
In this case Austin J addressed some limitations of public policy and offered some examples. He
then addressed another case (A Best Floor Sanding Pty Ltd v Skyer Australia Pty Ltd [1999]
VSC 170) and mentioned a very important point in that case that an ‘[a]dditional ground seems
to have been that a winding up order operates to affect the rights of third parties, not merely the
rights of the parties to the arbitration clause’.149
However, the significant question was whether this proceeding should be wholly or partly
stayed because the dispute or part of it was capable of settlement by arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clauses (in the original contract).
Austin J believes that because the
[S]tatutory question was different from the questions raised in other aspects of the dispute,
it was proper to characterise the statutory claim as a separate “matter” … McLelland J
147

For more information, see Ma, above n 56, 151.
[2002] NSWSC 896.
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[2002] NSWSC 896 [191] (Austin J).
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observed that the word “matter” in s 7(2)(b) “denotes any claim for relief of a kind proper
for determination in the Court. It does not include every issue which would, or might, arise
150
for decision in the course of the determination of such a claim” .

The court held that matters arising under the Corporations Act could generally be submitted to
arbitration, which concerned the parties’ rights that stem from the contract. Also, the court gave
a wide and liberal interpretation to the arbitration clause to include some corporate disputes. The
court noted that the matters that could not be solved by arbitration will be solved under its
Rules. This shows the power of the court under the Convention and the IAA to refuse to
implement the arbitral award if the dispute cannot be resolved by arbitration (that is,
‘arbitrability’).151
Additionally, Mary Keyes believes that where third parties are involved in a dispute, a narrow
interpretation for the justification in the scope of the arbitration agreement should be adopted;
thus, the result of that agreement may be interpreted not to apply to the third party disputes, but
to give effect to the parties’ presumed intentions, efficiency, and avoiding potentially
inconsistent outcomes.152 This is due to the principle that in Australian courts the principles
applied in interpreting jurisdiction clauses are similar to those applied in the interpretation of
arbitration clauses. As a result, in Heilbrunn v Lightwood Plc Allsop J stated that ‘provisions
conferring jurisdiction ... should be interpreted liberally and without imposing limitations not
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[2002] NSWSC 896 [107 and 103] (Austin J).
See ACD Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896. Most importantly, Austin J (at 243) made a
significant distinction between the court power under section 53 of the Commercial Arbitration Act
1984 (NSW) and the powers under section 7 of the IAA in the stay of proceedings, where the court
power under section 53 of the CAA is
[t]o order that a proceeding be stayed until arbitration takes place, where the requisite conditions
are satisfied. Unlike s 7(2) of the International Arbitration Act, s 53 gives the court a discretion to
order a stay and does not purport to require that the discretion be exercised when the requisite
preconditions have been met.
Thus, if the proceedings are capable of being resolved by arbitration, the subject matter is capable of
being solved by the arbitration.
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found in the express words’. However, according to Keyes ‘as for arbitration clauses, in some
cases the courts interpret jurisdiction clauses strictly.’153
In the Transpac case, Hall J found that section 8(7) and (8) of the IAA prescribe some
circumstances where the national court can refuse to enforce a foreign award or defer the
proceedings in which the enforcement of an award is sought; and he additionally noted that
‘these two subsections are not dependent on any request coming from the party against whom
the Award is invoked.’154 In Transpac there is no evidence presented to support the existence
any of the grounds contemplated in section 8(7) and (8) of the Act, that is, there is no basis upon
which the court could find that the dispute would not be capable of being solved by arbitration,
should this dispute be ‘governed by the laws of this State’ nor that to enforce the award would
be contrary to the public policy (section 8(7)).
In addition, there is no evidence presented to provide the possibility of setting the award aside,
such as when an application being ‘on foot’ in an overseas jurisdiction.155 Therefore, in
accordance with Australia’s obligations under the Convention and section 8 of the Act, Hall J
finds that this condition ‘arbitrability’ must be applied in accordance with the national law
where there is no evidence that the subject of the dispute is unenforceable under the valid
domestic legislation.156 Thus, such condition ‘arbitrability’ must be in accordance with the
domestic law as applied by the judge.
Furthermore, Lockhart J in White Industries Ltd v Trammel, has examined the arbitration clause
in that case and noted:
[p]roceedings brought by the applicant were capable of settlement by arbitration under the
agreement between the parties, s.7(2)(b) of the Arbitration (Foreign Awards and
Agreement) Act 1974 (Cth) applied, allowing the proceedings to be stayed, and so much of
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the proceedings as was capable of being settled by arbitration, to be settled in that
157
manner.

Lockhart J explained that when the proceedings are capable of being settled by arbitration, the
award will be applicable under his jurisdiction and also the subject matter is capable of being
solved by the arbitration. In addition, when the dispute is capable of being settled by arbitration,
the award should be settled in the same matter.
Consequently, the court will refuse to apply the award if the proceedings from the beginning
were incapable of being resolved by arbitration. Therefore, the judge will stay the proceedings if
this is the case, which means he/she will refer the case to the arbitrators in the ground that
matter is capable of being resolved by arbitration.
It is clear that the number of cases regarding the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards before
the Australian courts is higher than for cases before the Saudi courts which, however, remain
very few. As few Australian cases explore matters related to the public policy in approving
foreign arbitral awards, it is useful to consider the British approach. In fact, there is an
extremely important case that has been issued by the English Court of Appeal with regard to
public policy, and this case was cited in several Australian judgments. Surprisingly, ‘the
Soleimany case appears to be the first case in which the English Court of Appeal refused to
enforce an award on the basis of public policy.’158
In the Soleimany case, the parties have chosen the Jewish law. In fact, the Arbitration Act 1996
(UK) in section 46(1)(b) did not limit the parties to the national legal system of the United
Kingdom.159 This case was about an application of an international arbitral award issued in
Israel. The original transaction between the two English Jewish parties (who originally came
from Iran) was a contract for exporting valuable Persian and other Oriental Iranian carpets, but
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the implementation of that contract includes smuggling Persian carpets out of Iran and bribery
of some Iranian officials.
In greater detail, the case involved ‘the plaintiff’, ‘Abner’, who migrated from Iran to England
as a student, but, following the arrival of his father (‘Sion’ the defendant) in England, he
returned to Iran at Sion’s request to help free a consignment of carpets that had been seized by
the Iranian customs authorities.160 To do so, Abner claims to have suffered severely at the hands
of the Iranian authorities; but while in Iran he also concluded that there were substantial profits
to be made from the export and sale of Persian carpets, but the export from Iran would (as he
has always accepted) have involved contravention of Iranian Revenue laws and export controls.
Abner’s statement is that he had arranged the purchase of the carpets in Iran, and that Sion had
undertaken to act on his behalf in selling these carpets in the West. Abner admitted that it was
the carpets belonging to Sion which had been seized by the authorities in Iran. These carpets
were seized because they were being smuggled out of Iran, as per Abner’s affidavit; and Abner,
in order to free those carpets, had to bribe the Revolutionary Guards.161
The plaintiff in this case demands the defendant pay the value of the smuggled Iranian carpets
and also to pay a compensation for the other costs that he met, but the defendant refused to do
so. Accordingly, they agreed to arbitrate this conflict in Israel according to the Israeli law in the
Beth Din (Court of the Chief Rabbi). The arbitral award issued in favour of the plaintiff and
awarded an amount equal to all the money that he paid (including the costs of smuggling the
carpets) to the plaintiff; but the defendant declined to implement that award. The plaintiff was
forced to resort to the British court because the assets and property of the defendant were
located in Britain. The court recognised that this award is properly viewed as unenforceable on
the basis that the original contract, which contains smuggling and bribery, was illegal in the
country where implantation was being sought (the United Kingdom), even if such actions as
160
161

For more information, see Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] AppLR 02/19.
It was written in the award that ‘Abner purchased quantities of carpets and exported them, illegally
(our emphasis), out of Iran.’ See Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] AppLR 02/19.
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‘smuggling and briberies’ were deemed not to affect the parties rights under the governing law
in the country of the original arbitral award, here Israeli law.162 The English Court of Appeal
considered the award contrary to public policy. Lord Justice Waller clarified the point of
conflict, which was the court’s jurisdiction to re-open the case to evaluate the illegality of the
basic transaction, when illegality was involved. The court stressed that, if there is prima facie
evidence that an award is based on an illegal contract, the enforcement judge should make
further inquiries to obtain the valid evidence. The judge should get evidence from the other
party, from the arbitrator, as to whether it was fair for the arbitrator to have reached such a
conclusion, or whether the arbitrator is competent in relation to the inquiry or whether there
collusion or bad faith had existed in order to produce the award. This according to the judges
did not mean that judges should conduct full scale trial on those matters, but (where engaging in
a full trial on the matters would lead to mischief such as delays and so on that arbitration was
designed to avoid) inquire sufficiently to decide on whether it is appropriate to give full credit to
arbitrator’s award. The judge can only embark on a more complex inquiry into the issue of
illegality if the judge decides at an early stage that he/she would do so.163
The judge’s power to decide to give full faith and credit to the arbitrators’ award or to embark
on a more elaborate enquiry into the issue of illegality shows the seriousness of such jurisdiction
because the laws and international conventions expressly prohibit consideration of the merits of
the case before the competent court.164 Therefore, any contract that is illegal under English
domestic law shall not be enforced by an English court, nor shall the courts enforce contracts
that are considered illegal by the laws of a foreign country. This rule, according to Soleimany v
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Soleimany, applies to the enforcement of arbitral awards as to the enforcement of contract in
legal proceedings.165
This case illustrates several important points regarding the use of public policy as a reason to
refuse to implement the provisions of foreign arbitral awards. These points are:
1.

The judge has no right to examine or consider the subject matter of the basis transaction
between the parties in the first instance.

2.

The judge must make sure whether it is proper to give full faith and credit to the
arbitrators’ award regarding the illegality of the basis transaction.166

3.

The judge is obliged, when he believes that there is a serious request in determining the
legality of the original deal between the parties, to consider that point.

4.

The judge is obliged to reject the implementation of a foreign arbitral award if it is illegal
according to the national law, even if the original contract is considered legitimate under
the law where it was made.167

5.

That rejection of the application should be based on violation of public policy which
cannot be included in any other defence of the refusal to implement any foreign arbitral
awards.

Finally, besides what is stated in the Convention,168 Australian courts have tried to consolidate
some of the wide terminology, such as ‘public policy’, which is under the flexibility that the
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national courts enjoy when they define and interpret this principle; it is also under their
discretion to refuse (or not to refuse) to enforce an award which violates public policy.
B.

Limits of Public Policy in the Decisions of the Competent Judicial Authority

It is true that through the court’s decisions, the limits of public policy can be determined. This
was clear in the Resort Condominiums v Bolwell case, and Corvetina Technology v Clough
Engineering Ltd, and also in the International Movie Group Inc (IMG) v Palace Entertainment
Corp Pty Ltd case.169
In Resort Condominiums v Bolwell there is an important decision by the court, which could
affect future court decisions if enforcement of the award was granted. Because of that, the court
could not enforce the award; and the basis of the ruling was that in Australia, courts have a
general discretion as an additional ground for not recognising and enforcing an award which
otherwise qualifies to be recognised under the Convention. The court based its argument on
section 8(5) of the IAA which omitted the word ‘only’ in its provision of grounds under which
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards should be recognised or enforced. Because of
that, it was argued that section 8(5) provides for residual discretion as an additional ground for
refusal of enforcement of such awards.170
This shows the level of control that the Australian courts have over the cases.171 According to
Garnett and Pryles, many academic commentators do not agree with the decision, arguing that
the Australian court does not have such residual discretion. According to them, the defences, put
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in place in Article V of the Convention and section 8(5) of the IAA, were exhaustive. It means
that they leave no room for additional grounds for rejection of enforcement of foreign awards. 172
This, compared to the situation in Saudi Arabia, is similar where the decision of the President of
the Grievances Board limits the public policy in the assets of the Shari’a.
In Corvetina Technology v Clough Engineering Ltd, the NSW Supreme Court tried to show its
limits; however, it could not decide whether the courts have a general discretion to the
expressed grounds in sections 8(5) and (7).173
In Resort Condominiums v Bolwell,174 the court also found three reasons why the enforcement
of the award that was presented was against public policy. First, the arbitrator’s orders were so
vague and sweeping, which makes the enforcement of the award impossible;175 secondly, ‘they
were not orders that a Queensland court would make’,176 which suggests that decisions made by
the arbitrators should correspond to the law of the country in which the award will be enforced
(although this seems impossible, for even at the time of decision making, the arbitrators may not
know the country in which the award will be enforced); and thirdly, the enforcement of these
orders would constitute double implementation where similar orders had already been issued by
a US court in respect of the same subject matter.177
In more detail, the Resort Case was between an Australian franchisee and a US franchisor,
where the franchisee had breached his obligations, including failing to pay royalty fees due.
Consequently, the franchisor resorted to arbitration where he was given some interim measures
of protection (until the arbitrators gave the final award). The claimant obtained similar orders
172
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from a US court, and the arbitral award was sought to be enforced in Queensland, Australia. The
defendant claimed that these were interim orders (interim measures of protection) that did not
solve or end the conflict and so the arbitral award could not be enforced in Australia under the
terms of the Convention and the IAA. The judge stated that these orders ‘are clearly of an
interlocutory and procedural nature and in no way purport to finally resolve the dispute ...’.178
Such interlocutory and procedural orders cannot be accounted as a final award where it can be
measured on the interim measure which is not also a final award. According to Nottage and
Garnett, ‘courts and commentators generally agree that most interim measures are not “final”
enough to be enforceable under the New York Convention or s.8 … such orders are not arbitral
awards, and are binding on the parties but shall not be subject to enforcement by a court.’179
That is because such interims ‘are, of course, by definition not final.’180 However, it should be
noted that the UNCITRAL Model Law in Articles 17B and 17C mentioned the implementation
of such interims. Conversely, these Articles ‘are not phrased as an option as in the revised Art 7
on writing requirements which suggests less consensus within UNCITRAL and its member
states.’ This in turn reflects the lack of final nature of such orders in the implementation where it
shall not be subject to enforcement by the national court.181
In the Resort Case the court also ‘suggested that an enforcing court in Australia has a general
discretion outside the grounds stated in the Convention not to recognise and enforce an award
that otherwise qualifies for recognition under the Convention’.182 So the judge examined the
qualifications of these interims as ‘arbitral awards’ under the Convention and then he decided
that, according to the Article I of the Convention, the decision that was meant to be enforced
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was the arbitral award, not the interim measures which was not capable of enforcement on this
basis ‘as an arbitral award’ or on the grounds of public policy.
According to Article V(1)(e), the non-final decision is not enforceable, where an English or
Australian judge has no inherent power to set aside interlocutory orders; thus, it is not the kind
of order that the arbitrator can order. Thus, the court will not enforce such orders.183
In fact, the Supreme Court of Queensland in this case did not indicate the provisions that are not
within its scope in the implementation process. According to this view, the provisions that do
not fall within the scope of the court are unknown, which affects the effectiveness of the role of
the court. This is due to the fact that the court did not refuse the implementation based on the
text of the IAA or the Convention. In fact, it refused the enforcement based on a special standard
which was created by the court itself which is not known or determinable. The court in this case
did not classify such award as an arbitration decision that is contrary to the public policy or to
any other requirement and it is not interim measure; however, it refused to implement such
award based on its new standard ‘not within its scope of implementation’.
Hence, if we assume to argue that point, that there is an arbitral award issued in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, where the arbitrators are Muslims and do not recognise or rule on an award with
interest ‘as usury’, where it is a forbidden action in Shari’a. Additionally, if we assume that the
parties or one of them was demanding the application of the interest part; however, the tribunal
has ignored this request and issued the award without any approval of the interest.
First of all, it is known that the request for interest is legitimate according to Australian law;
thus, the judge cannot ignore such a request, as it is not a judgment that the Australian courts
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can do in general, that is, ‘refusing to apply the interest’. Thus, returning to our example, does
the Supreme Court of Queensland or any Australian court have the right to refuse to implement
that Saudi arbitral award on the basis that the Australian courts are not accustomed to giving
such judgments? Or on the basis that this award is not that order which a Queensland court
would make. I believe that this argument is not strong enough to refuse and exclude the foreign
arbitral award unless there is a clear and specific violation as stipulated in the Convention and in
the IAA as well.
In fact, these orders (interim measures of protection) did not even solve a part of the conflict and
were released by an arbitrator, where by analogy Article V has given the national court the
authority to divide the application by refusing the offending part and applying the non-offending
part in an instance where part is contrary to the public policy. Thus, the application of an award
that solves one part of the conflict is not an obstacle, and it is not out of the scope of the
Convention as long as it is not mentioned in the national laws, ‘such interims cannot be
enforced’. However, these interims, if they are enforceable, should satisfy all other formal
requirements, such as the finality. Hence, it is important to examine these interims which may
be out of the Convention’s scope. The judge in this case believes that the arbitral award under
the Convention is the award dealing with differences between the parties, and not the order
which merely deals with procedural or interlocutory matters.
It is also important to describe how this term ‘interim measures’ is applied to what is contained
in the Convention. Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law states:
An interim measure is any temporary measure, whether in the form of an award or in
another form, by which, at any time prior to the issuance of the award by which the dispute
is finally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party to:(a) Maintain or restore the status
quo pending determination of the dispute; (b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain
from taking action that is likely to cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the
arbitral process itself; (c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent
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award may be satisfied; or (d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the
184
resolution of the dispute.

However, the prerequisites of ‘interim measures’ are not strictly defined in arbitration law,
except that these orders could be issued by the arbitrators if necessary in relation to the subject
matter of the conflict.185 However, such orders must only be issued after hearing the parties.186
Wang believes that interim measures are ‘an absolute necessity to protect what is at stake in the
arbitration. Regardless of whether evidence, real property, personal property, or financial assets
needs to be preserved, there must be an effective procedure for maintaining the status quo.’187
Therefore, these interim measures are orders made by the arbitrator/s before the issuance of the
final award to preserve evidence, stabilise the relation between the parties, and secure the
award’s enforcement or its costs or as interim payment.188
On the other hand, in International Movie Group Inc (IMG) v Palace Entertainment Corp Pty
Ltd uncertainty is used as a basis of argument against enforcement of a foreign award. Under the
Convention, however, uncertainty is not one of the grounds for refusal to enforce a foreign
award, while under Australian law it is a basis for refusal to enforce domestic arbitral awards.189
The courts used Australian law to make the decision, disregarding the provisions of the
Convention. Uncertainty, again, is not a defence against enforcement in section 8 of the IAA
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neither is it in Article V of the Convention; thus, any refusal should be according to these
laws.190
As shown above, the Australian courts have the power to determine the limit of public policy. In
fact, Australia has States with different statutory laws and policies and it also has the common
law. Because of that, under the public policy exception in the enforcement of a foreign award,
different courts apply different public policies in different cases. The Supreme Court of
Queensland, for example, will apply the State’s public policy in deciding cases, which might not
be the same as the Australian public policy.191 That was evident in the Resort Case, as explained
above, where the Supreme Court of Queensland stated that ‘they were not orders that a
Queensland court would make’ which shows that the court applied the public policy of the state.
Additionally, the court in this case used uncertainty as a ground to refuse the enforcement where
this defence is not included in the Convention or in the IAA. In fact, ‘uncertainty’ is a ground for
refusing domestic awards in Queensland.192 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of New
South Wales did not apply this principle regarding ‘uncertainty’ as a basis for refusing to
implement foreign arbitration because it is not a basis for refusing foreign arbitration in the
Convention nor in the IAA and also it is not a basis for rejecting the domestic arbitration in
NSW. This is also clear in International Movie Group Inc (IMG) v Palace Entertainment Corp
Pty Ltd, as described above.
In fact, the fusion of common law and equity may affect the decisions of the Australian courts
in the application of public policy. This is due to the fact that there are some principles of the lex
mercatoria, such as good faith, which resemble the principles of equity as applied in
Australia.193 Additionally, ‘[L]ike the lex mercatoria, the common law and equity “both derive
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their content from the prevailing public and moral or community values”.’

194

These play an

important role in what the Australian courts consider public policy. Indeed, common law and
equity are parts of general public policy; however, they will be influential when applying public
policy.195 This is due to the fact that the court in implementing foreign awards cannot separate
the common law and equity which forces the judge to create new principles to maintain
consistency and structure underlying of the common law and equity.
Thus, it can be said that that Australian courts enforce foreign awards using a strict approach. In
New South Wales, the weight or value given to the public policy exception is more that public
policy is considered in the context of the enforceability or validity of the award.196 Hence,
public policy in Australia is almost like public policy in the provisions of the Convention, which
refers to a nation’s public policy. In section 8(7) of the IAA, the public policy exception is used
when the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds
that ‘a) The subject-matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law of that country; or b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.’
Finally, it should be mentioned that Australian courts are based in different States as well as
there being a federal jurisdiction; however, according to the provisions in the Convention, if
enforcement of an award will be contrary to the public policy of a place, then such an award
should not be implemented. This justifies the actions of the Australian courts in refusing cases
on the basis of being contrary to public policy, which means that the court has the power to
determine that such an award is a contrary to public policy. In fact, it is very hard to determine
justice in maintaining the policies that provide law and order in a nation, state or region.
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The cases presented above raised a doubt about the fairness of the Australian courts where, for
example, uncertainty is not one of the grounds for refusal to enforce a foreign award.
The Resort Condominiums v Bolwell Case is another example where it was necessary for the
court to consider the merits of the case in order to implement the public policy principle, which
shows the higher value placed on preserving social values rather than the individual cases
themselves.197 In this case the court used its residual discretion to reject the awards where the
case was handled to argue that the award was against public policy.198 This might be viewed as
unfair, but considering other cases involving foreign arbitral awards and the use of contrary to
public policy as a defence against enforcement of an award, such a case can be considered fair
and just.
Moreover, there are three cases, in which the courts used their own residual discretion to make
judgments, and these cannot be considered as unfair judgments.199 These are: Xiaodong Yang v
S&L Consulting Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1051, China Sichuan Changhong Electric Co Ltd v
CTA International Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 397 and Transpac Capital Pte Limited v Buntoro [2008]
NSWSC 671. In all these cases, the defendants did not appear in court to challenge the awards.
In Transpac Capital Pte Limited v Buntoro case, the court, by its motion, still considered
whether (under section 8 of the IAA) the grounds applied for the refusal of enforcement of the
Singapore award.
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These cases were discussed in the literature review (1.6 Literature Review).
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This case concerns an application of foreign award pursuant to section 8 of the IAA. The
plaintiff was a Singaporean company. The foreign award was issued by the Singapore
International Arbitration Centre in 2007. The award was made against the defendant, who lived
in NSW, and two other respondents. At the hearing of this case the defendant was absent;
however, the defendant had been made aware of the date of the hearing so the judge proceeded
on an undefended basis.
The case was about the provision of USD 5 million by the plaintiff to an Indonesian company
PT Eurasiawood Industries (PTEI) (in consideration of which the plaintiff was to receive fifty
USD 100,000 bonds) under a Bond Subscription Agreement to assist in establishing a woodprocessing project in Indonesia;200 there was a further Investment Agreement with the defendant
and another which involved an irrevocable ‘put option’.201 Both agreements contained an
arbitration clause. At the expiry date of the Bond Subscription Agreement (which had ten year
term starting in 2003), PTEI was obliged to pay the plaintiff the full value of the bonds with
interest.202 The plaintiff claimed that PTEI had failed to repay the plaintiff the full value of the
bonds with interest, nor had the company (when the plaintiff attempted to exercise the put
option) purchased the bonds as required.203 In this case, Singapore law was the governing law
for the arbitration process. On both issues (as regards the bond and investment agreements) the
arbitrator ruled in favour of the plaintiff and issued a binding award. It was this award that the
plaintiff sought to have implemented in Australia.
In this case it is clear that the judge has the power to examine the breach of the public policy
without the need for a separate request by any of the parties, where the judge came to a
conclusion that ‘there is no evidence supporting the existence of any of the grounds

200

Transpac Capital PTE Limited v Buntoro [2008] NSWSC 671[10]–[12].
Ibid [16]
202
Ibid [13], [21]. The interest rate was 1% per annum compounding [13].
203
Ibid [22].
201

324

contemplated in ss. 8(7) and 8(8) of the Act’.204 This case illustrates the power of the judge in
the investigation and consideration of the public policy defence by himself, even if there is no
request for that from any of the parties.
In China Sichuan Changhong Electric Co Ltd v CTA International Pty Ltd,205 the court made its
judgment based on whether the defendant had been properly notified; hence, the court found
that the decision went in favour of the plaintiff. The Xiaodong Yang v S&L Consulting Pty Ltd
case was also considered on the basis of the plaintiff’s evidence meeting the criteria in section 8
of the IAA and proper information given to the defendant about the application of the
enforcement. Leave to enforce was granted on the basis that there was no reason not to grant
such an award.
In all these cases, the courts used their own residual discretion, as it can be referred to, to make
decisions regarding enforcement of foreign awards. The issue of ‘residual discretion’ is not
considered wrong here, but in the cases where the courts indicated violation of public policy, the
decisions are considered wrong by some academics.206 This may indicate that Australian courts
aim at justice and morality although some of their decisions may seem not to go by the
provisions of the Convention. The information provided above also emphasises what courts
consider as public policy. It is their domestic policy which protects the reason for its
establishment or development, that is, justice and morality.
Therefore, the reasons for court’s rejection of enforcement of the award in Australia are as
follows:
1.

Existence of Fraud: as in Yang v S & L Consulting, where the defendant perpetrated fraud
in the formation of the agreement since they knew that the Minister’s decision to cancel
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According to Garnett and Pryles, ‘By relying on a ground of refusal not mentioned in the Convention,
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170, 906.
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the plaintiff’s visa was not determined by their actions. Additionally, the primary criteria
of a subclass 127 visa holder would not be met by the plaintiff if that clause was
enforced. The defendant of the case could not be aided for the reason stated above where
the judgment by White J stated: ‘If clause 6 [was] unlawful [this clause] could be severed.
The elimination of clause 6 would not change the nature of the remaining promises in the
agreement’.207 This may indicate that when forming the agreement the defendant had no
intention of abiding by its provisions or contracting rules. Because of that, they went
against public policy by committing fraud against the plaintiff.208
2.

To ensure Justice and Morality for the Public: Generally, the role of the court is to
achieve justice between the parties while maintaining the values of the society. Regarding
the enforcement or refusal of international arbitration, the court shall make sure the
parties to the arbitration agreement have received a just treatment, which allows them to
raise any objection (especially the public policy defence) in the enforcement proceedings,
even if the public policy issue was discussed and dismissed by the arbitrators. The court
aims to protect society; and as each country has public policy that reflects its society, it is
thus necessary for the court to apply its own public policy to achieve this goal. This does
not mean automatic compliance between states of foreign arbitral awards but it does
ensure just treatment in line with that country’s policy. It is clear that with changing
times, human actions have to be evaluated to ensure justice or moral behaviour. This will
not be obtained unless the judge has been given the right to examine each case separately
to determine a just outcome, which makes him/her always obliged to apply the national
public policy.
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3. Non-Arbitrability: Arbitral awards are not enforced if the subject matter or the award is not
arbitrable according to the laws of Australia. These reasons for the rejection of the
enforcement of foreign awards should not ignore any of the following points:
a.

Court residual discretion as a reason is not mentioned in the New York Convention or the
IAA; however, some court decisions show such discretion where the court has refused to
implement a foreign award because that award was so vague and sweeping making the
enforcement of the award impossible. Thus, it can be said that the enforceability of the
award is one of the most important factors that can affect the application of the arbitral
awards.

b.

Uncertainty has been used as a basis for arguments against enforcement of a convention
award, while uncertainty is, as mentioned before, a basis for non-enforcement of domestic
arbitral awards under Australian law. Thus, uncertainty as a defence against the
enforcement is not included under section 8 of the IAA or Article V of the Convention. On
the other hand, ‘an arbitral award, irrespective of the [Australian] State or Territory in
which it was made, is to be recognised in this State as binding.’ 209 Accordingly, the court
can exercise its own ordinary powers in that regard.210

Finally, there are other principles that may relate to the public policy defence related to the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, which have been cited and recognised by some court
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judgments according to the domestic Commercial Acts which also can be accounted as general
principles in the Australian judiciary system.211 These principles can be discussed as follows:
i.

The Arbitral Award Should Be Based on Valid Reasons and These Reasons Not Violate
the Law

Section 31(3) of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW) states that ‘the award must state
the reasons upon which it is based ...’.212
Therefore, the existence of the reasons in the arbitral award is very important factor in knowing
the legal method that has been applied by the arbitrator to reach his final decision. That is
because an axiom of justice is that there are substantial grounds for the judgment. In fact, the
presence of these reasons gives a sense of justice; the judgment must be based on logical
reasons to satisfy the parties to the conflict. Otherwise, the parties have the right to appeal
against the judgment and this appeal focuses on the reasons expressed by the judge. This makes
the existence of these reasons necessary for the protection of justice in the society where people
has the right to know the real reasons for a judgment against them. This in turn makes the
existence of these reasons, one of the principles of public policy. But whether a judge must
examine this reasoning is another thing altogether, and if he or she does so, there is the issue of
the weight given to any such error (its degree of significance or relevance to the arbitration).
In Uganda Telecom Limited v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd,213 the defendant claimed (as ground (g)
in the challenge to implementation) that the arbitrator in the award used ‘an erroneous reasoning
process involving mistakes of fact and law.’ However, Foster J stressed:
Section 8(5) of the Act does not permit a party to a foreign award to resist enforcement of
that award on such a ground [erroneous reasoning involving errors of fact and law]. Nor is
211
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it against public policy for a foreign award to be enforced by this Court without examining
214
the correctness of the reasoning or the result reflected in the award .

This could mean that as long as the foreign award is final and satisfies the formal requirements
with the existence of the award reasons, rather than the nature of those reasons, then
enforcement was able to proceed.
The whole rationale of the Act, and thus the public policy of Australia, is to enforce such
awards wherever possible in order to uphold contractual arrangements entered into in the
course of international trade, in order to support certainty and finality in international
215
dispute resolution and in order to meet the other objects specified in s 2D of the Act.

Foster J maintained the principle of the ability of the Court to exercise discretion in such matters
(at [1331]) approvingly cites Corvetina Technology Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd (2004) 183
FLR 317 at [18] where McDougall J states:
The very point of provisions such as s 8(7)(b) is the right of the Court to apply its own
standards of public policy in respect of the award. In some cases the inquiry that is required
will be limited and will not involve detailed examination of factual issues. In other cases,
the inquiry may involve detailed examination of factual issues. But I do not think that it can
be said that the court should forfeit the exercise of the discretion,

The exercise of discretion in this 2011 case appears to be the key and determines the degree to
which examination is required and the weight given any fault in the reasons provided. But it
should be noted that this is unrelated to the earlier question of ‘residual discretion’ regarding the
grounds upon which an awards may be refused.
In one noted case, that of BHP Billiton Ltd v Oil Basins Ltd, the issue of whether inadequate
reasons constitute an error on the face of the interim award was examined (as was that of
whether this comprised judicial ‘technical’ misconduct — in the sense of inadequacy rather than
moral failing). Hargrave J cites a number of cases to support his view that the presence of
reasons alone is insufficient; their quality must also be taken into account (with several cases
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Ibid [126] (emphasis added). He also quoted the court in para 306 of Karaha Bodas (Karaha Bodas
Co, LLC v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara 364 F 3d 274 (5th Cir 2004)):
‘Erroneous legal reasoning or misapplication of law is generally not a violation of public policy wthin
the meaning of the New York Convention’: at [133].
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cited among them Waterways Authority v Fitzgibbon 2005 HCA 57 and Hunter v Transport
Commission [2005] VSCA 1]). The case demonstrates the importance of the existence of valid
reasons and valid reasoning. Decided in the Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J stated that if
the reasons given by arbitrators for making the interim award are ‘manifestly inadequate’, this
constitutes ‘an error of law on the face of the interim award’. A failure to examine materials
submitted by one of the parties to the arbitration and upon which they party relied fails to satisfy
not only the ‘fairness’ criteria but also marks a failure to satisfactorily fulfil the role of
arbitrator. Such technical misconduct in the arbitral process then entails the refusal of the
decision.216 (In this instance the interim award was set aside and fresh arbitration begun with a
differently constituted panel.) The case did, however, highlight the need for valid reasons and
reasoning (and its record), and adequate consideration of materials submitted to arbitration, and
thus panel member responsibility (see further below).
ii.

Examine and Respond to All Substantive Defences

In the case concerning BHP, the plaintiff sought to challenge the award because the arbitrators’
‘failure to deal with to deal with substantial and serious submissions and evidence relied upon
by BHP in the arbitration’.217 This shows the need to consider any substantive defences that
have been made by all parties in order to secure a final legal arbitral award. Once again, the
Court could refuse to implement the foreign award in such a case on the basis of violation of
principles of natural justice (‘fairness’) where all parties’ submissions are properly examined
and responded to, which is a right for all parties to any dispute. Failure to do so is a misuse of
the power of the arbitrators who, under the law where the award was issued have a great duty.
The ‘fairness’ principle is also evidenced in the requirement for legal notice as this aims to
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ensure the presence of all parties before the arbitrator to defend themselves. In such a case, the
presence of the parties with the lack of response to all substantive defences may equate with
non-attendance or failure to provide the necessary defences.
In fact we cannot say for sure that the court will adopt such defences where these are just
assumptions. Thus, to ensure the court’s position on such points, we need to examine actual
cases before the court where the court will be obliged to give a legal opinion about such points,
or there will be amendments to the IAA that make such conditions in force in the
implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards.

5.5
5.5.1

Conclusion
Findings and Analysis

The Saudi Arbitration System does not explicitly mention the term ‘public policy’ as the IAA
did, but refers to Shari’a. However, Saudi public policy is more than the violation of Shari’a
law. Saudi Arabia is signatory to the Riyadh Convention which considers public policy as
inclusive of Islamic Shari’a, and the public order or morality (rules of conduct, morals). This
regulation demands non-violation of the social order by the arbitral award. In practice, however,
the cases reviewed show that a breach of public policy is considered the violation of Shari’a and
the violation of legal regulations relating to the arbitration, that is ‘the mandatory norms of
public policy’. Public policy also demands non-violation of formal requirements and the Shari’s
provisions.
However, there is no absolute certainty in some Saudi court rulings. This is due to the fact that
public policy in some court rulings relating to Shari’a is very wide in reference to the violation
of Shari’a in general without any further specifications. In other rulings, this term became more
specific by referring to the fact that the violation related to a particular asset of Shari’a.
Observed practice in the Saudi courts is the giving of general comments on rulings. No specific
details are provided to defend the rulings. This is evident in a ruling that used Article II of the
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Arabic Convention 1952 and another which copied the text of Article 3(d) without any
explanation or comment.
Also it is observed that violation of Islamic law means violation of provisions from the Sunnah
and Qur’ān and Ijma’a in some cases. There should be direct texts from these, indicating any
violations of Islamic law. The competence of judges in Sub-Circuits is also questionable, as can
be seen from the fact that most of the cases that were reviewed were later reversed by the AuditCircuits (Appeal Courts) with explanations of what should have been done. Most of these cases
are related to the public policy principle where the court used a direct texts from Sunnah and the
Qurā’n), and consideration of the merits of the case is not required.
What is understood is that the Audit-Circuits have the final say. In some cases, rulings were
made giving no specific comments on the reasons for decisions made; the texts were general
and only indicated that the implementation of a foreign judgment or a foreign award was not
against Shari’a provisions.
In fact, there is a lack of evidence in some of the decisions issued by the Audit-Circuits (that is,
direct texts from the Qurā’n and Sunnah) as a reason for reversing a sub-circuit’s ruling. In
some cases, where there is controversy about an issue, the Sub-Circuits seemed to just decide
based on such an issue being contrary to public policy. The Audit Circuit, however, reversed
such rulings based on lack of evidence [that is, no conclusive evidence or express provision in
the Qur’ān or Sunnah], indicating that controversial issues are not against public policy unless
determined so by the Audit-Circuit. An example is Ruling No 189 / T / 4 of 1427 AH 2007. The
problem remains that the Sub-Circuit judges are not informed on what to do in such cases and
their decisions have to be reviewed by the Audit-Circuit.
Public policy is not specified. In the consideration of public policy as limited to the assets of
Shari’a, there are issues that are still controversial and unresolved by scholars in regard to
public policy, that are excluded from public policy. Islamic provisions that are not Shari’a
assets are also not included in the concept of public policy. Another example of the general
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description of public policy is the consideration of certain legal mandatory norms as under
public policy by the Grievances Board, but not specified as legal regulations that can be used as
a public policy defence. It is a general judicial principle which does not exist in any convention
related to the enforcement of foreign arbitration or in the Saudi Arbitration System.
There is controversy that exists in the conceptual meaning of Ribā. This affects application and
interpretation of cases where different types or concepts of Ribā are involved. Gharer is a fraud
and such are forbidden just as it is indicated in the Convention that enforcement will be refused
if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption.
In Australia: The public policy exception is guided by regulations from the Convention.
Enforcement is refused if the award is contrary to public policy, just like it is in Saudi Arabia. In
Saudi Arabia, public policy is limited to the Shari’a assets and certain legal peremptory norms.
In Australia, public policy as a defence against enforcement of foreign awards is rather more
like, in the name of acting according to the legal requirement of a country, nation or region,
preventing the recurrence of immorality. Such a statement refers to morality in the broadest
sense — a breach would mean not conforming to accepted practice or to the most basic notions
of morality, such as where there is a breach of the rules of natural justice (such as a lack of
fairness to the parties), or where the making of the award was ‘induced or affected by fraud or
corruption’. Public policy is making the right judgment to ensure Convention rules and the
national public policy are respected and justice is served. In the long run justice and moral
behaviour is achieved in the society. The courts have the discretion to determine what public
policy is and how to handle the cases: ‘the court [is] to be master of its own processes and to
apply its own public policy’. Moreover, with changing times, environment and human activities,
reasons behind human actions have to be determined in order to ensure justice or moral
behaviour.
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It is important to note that each judge is obliged to apply the national public policy and this will
be possible by considering any stage of the arbitration proceedings to make sure there is no
violation of the public policy (yet without considering the matter of the case).
The courts determine the breach of public policy. Fraud and corruption are forbidden and are
determined by the courts. This is similar to the Saudi Arabian conditions. There is no agreement
on what level of further inquiries is acceptable, and in what circumstances, or if they should be
made to establish if enforcement of an award is contrary to public policy due to corruption or
fraud, when there are claims of existence of fraud or corruption. Much is left to judicial
discretion in this regard, as can be seen from earlier in this chapter.
Cases are dealt with based on rules and regulations guiding foreign arbitral award
implementation, ensuring public order and morality, and previous rulings that are relevant to the
cases handled are used as references (precedents).
Arbitrability is a common cause of refusal to implement foreign arbitral award in both countries.
A lack of arbitrability is considered against public policy and the Convention. This is also
similar to the Saudi Arabian conditions of implementation which consider arbitrability as public
policy.
In Australian courts the principles applied in interpreting jurisdiction clauses are similar to those
applied in the interpretation of arbitration clauses.
Australian courts have exercised a general discretion as an additional ground for not recognising
and enforcing an award which otherwise qualifies to be recognised under the Convention. This
is quite similar to the case of Saudi Arabia where the Audit-Circuits have general discretion to
determine what public policy is and what it is not.
‘Uncertainty’ is used as a basis of argument against enforcement of a foreign award. Under the
Convention, however, uncertainty is not one of the grounds for refusal to enforce a foreign
award, although under Australian law it is a basis for refusal to enforce domestic arbitral
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awards. This is an example of the use of judicial discretion to determine what public policy is
and to decide on what foreign arbitral award should be enforced or not. It is also an example of
the influence of domestic law in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
This could be related to the Saudi decision on what is against public policy. The Sub-Circuits’
decisions overturned by the Audit Courts are a perfect example. Especially in the areas where
there are controversies on whether to consider a certain contract, or act as against public policy.
The limits of public policy are determined by the Australian courts and this is the same practice
in Saudi Arabia except that Saudi Arabia has a different legal structure. It is the Audit Circuits
that determine the limits of public policy. Public policy is also limited to domestic law in
Australia. This is also the case in Saudi Arabia.

5.5.2

Applying the Three Criteria

In Saudi Arabia: Under the old Grievances Board System it was clear that the efficiency of the
court’s role was affected by the appeal system, where the case has to be returned from the
Audit-Circuit to Sub-Circuits. The review of the Saudi court system that concluded in the
new Saudi Grievances Board System being decreed was a step in the right direction and rulings
now do not go back again from the High Court to the Appeal Court. Whilst it is an additional
layer in terms of levels of court structure (see Figures 3 and 4 earlier in the thesis), it is not an
additional layer in terms of activity. Rather it is a final layer where expertise can be expected to
be relied upon. This is an important step in achieving efficiency in the role of the court in the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
Regarding public policy, there is disparity in some rulings about the public policy principle. The
courts in several rulings used general terms such as ‘not violating the Shari’a law’. Thus, they
did not provide any specific details or examplar texts to support their rulings. These types of
decisions may discourage arbitration based on justice to the parties. Additionally, ambiguity in
the meaning of the term ‘public policy’ will discourage arbitration because ambiguity will affect
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the efficiency and justice to the parties where the parties do not know with any degree of
certainty the reason for the refusal or the enforcement when the ruling comes in general terms.
Additionally, issues that are still controversial and unresolved by scholars in regard to public
policy are also confusing and can discourage arbitration by parties for fear of injustice and
inefficiency where such issues are not limited or specified.
The competency of the judges in Sub-Circuits is also questioned. This affects arbitration in
terms of the efficiency of the courts in handling such cases and even affects justice to the
parties, in cases where one selects Saudi Arabia as the country in which to enforce an award.
Consequently, public policy is more than a violation of Shari’a as morals are also considered
when determining if an award should be implemented. Hence, the scope of public policy is very
wide in Saudi Arabia. However, this is not discouraging arbitration, since it is understood that
the term ‘public policy’ means more than maintaining social order. It is important to mention
that for greater efficiency in the judge’s role, severability is important. Severability of particular
sections of an arbitration clause or agreement or in regard to the underlying contract can help
speed arbitration. Here some parts of the arbitration may be contrary to the public policy can be
severed and not implemented, while sections that are not contrary to public policy can be
implemented. Such an approach serves the implementation process and achieves justice where
the court will enforce the non-offending part.
Finally, it could be said that in the Saudi case, justice is also achieved, but efficiency is lacking.
The Sub-Circuits competency is questionable and any party wishing to resort to arbitration will
worry about the future rulings of the Audit-Circuits on their award, given the number of awards
that are overturned on appeal to that court. However, this has been changed by the
implementation of the new system as has been explained above, which will contribute to raising
the standard of the court’s efficiency.
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In Australia: Like Saudi Arabia but less severe in the generalisation of what is considered
public policy, nevertheless this could be a hindering factor in regard to resorting to arbitration
where in both countries public policy as a term is not precisely defined.
On the other hand, the Australian courts having general discretion is more advantageous than
disadvantageous in arbitration because evidence show that they handle their cases justly. It
could be said that the commitment of the Australian courts to the texts of the Convention (which
is part of the IAA) contributes to determining the meaning of public policy by identifying the
defences that can be used to reject the implementation based on this principle.

5.5.3

Discussion

Several observations should be made before starting to compare the situation in both countries
by the standards of comparison used in this research. First, there are significantly more
Australian cases than Saudi ones, which increase the ability to understand the implementation
process in Australia and to be able to observe the Australian experience in the implementation
of foreign arbitral awards. Second, the adoption by the Australian Parliament of the Convention
within the IAA where it is annexed to the framework of a national law is a great step in
understanding and facilitating the implementation of foreign arbitral awards, compared to the
situation in Saudi Arabia. Third, the Saudi courts have to consider several laws and conventions
regarding the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards, because currently
there is no special law to implement the provisions of foreign arbitral awards (unlike Australia,
which has its International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth)).
In addition, judges in Australian courts are assisted in their duties by the rapid publication and
wide availability of proceedings of court cases (with their reasons for decisions stated). This
dissemination of information helps educate the members of the judiciary as to the most recent
decisions and reasoning adopted. This practice is necessitated by the use of ‘precedents’, which
is common to all common law systems, though differences are observable between jurisdictions.
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It is clear that the Convention did not add much to the implementation of the provisions of
foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia except that it expanded the scope of countries that were
linked with the Kingdom in an international convention, which excludes the application of the
reciprocity principle in approving any foreign award issued in a signatory country.
Thus, the Saudi courts rely on the international and regional conventions and also on what is
stated in the decisions of the President of the Grievances Board. From the cases of Saudi Arabia
analysed, this implementation system of the Saudi legal system (the use of international and
regional conventions, and decisions stated by the Grievances Board) could be the source of
errors observed in these cases. The courts made some errors in the application of the appropriate
convention or interpreted in different ways the same legal principle.
One major issue identified in both countries is the definition of public policy. Neither is able to
define public policy as a term; and thus they could not avoid the use of the open-ended words
that cannot be developed as a criterion applicable to all cases. Actually, there are different
situations, considerations and settings influencing what should be defined as public policy. It is
considered to reflect the fundamental moral, economic, legal, religious, social and political
standards of every community or state. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the court defines violation
of public policy as violation of Shari’a, and also violation of legal regulations relating to the
arbitration system as violation of public policy. This shows that public policy is not defined as a
term and is influenced by several factors, some of which have been described above.
It is clear through the examination of these cases that the Saudi courts have attempted to apply
and respect the international conventions as much as possible while preserving and clinging to
the application of Shari’a, but they could not determine specifically what can be considered as
Islamic public policy. On the other hand it is clear that Australian courts tried to comply with
the Convention as a basis to determine what could fall under public policy except when
uncertainty is involved as a public policy element.
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Another issue that has been observed in both countries is the use of the public policy defence. In
both countries, the basic principle that has been used by Australian and Saudi courts in the
application of public policy defence is the domestic public policy and the violation of any
national law, while the international laws or conventions (ones under discussion in this thesis)
act as guidance to maintain law and order or other purposes for which these conventions were
implemented. The Convention, for example, was implemented to help speed up resolution of
international disputes. The basic role of expediting case resolution is achieved through obtaining
signatory countries, but national laws ultimately guide the resolution of such cases. Australian
courts recognise public policy in the moral values and national public policy, which represent
the national laws and natural justice principles. Nearly the same meaning is applied by the Saudi
courts where public policy is defined by the assets of Shari’a which also define the scope of
national public policy and the principles of natural justice in the court’s view.
The difference in implementation of foreign arbitral awards may arise due to the differences that
the two countries have in the origin of their laws, that is, the fact that Australian law is adapted
from the British Common Law while the Saudi law has origins in Islamic, Egyptian and Middle
Eastern laws. It is clear that there is a difference in the binding nature of the arbitral awards or
decisions where it is binding on parties involved in arbitration in the Western world, while
under Shari’a it is still not clear whether acceptance of arbitration is a lawfully binding
decision. The binding nature is guided by the Qur’ān and the Sunnah although some Middle
East states support international standards. In the Eastern countries in addition to the laws and
international conventions, the parties can bring claims relating to contractual nature of
arbitration. For example, parties can either raise the violation of Shari’a concerning the
susceptibility of the dispute to arbitration or conciliation, or in terms of whether it is proved that
the contract (contract of the main transaction) is within the Gharer contracts, where there is
ambiguity or ‘uncertainty’ in the responsibility of the parties.
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In Saudi Arabia, the definition of public policy determines which foreign arbitrations are to be
implemented. The definition of public policy includes more than the Shari’a. Public morals are
also considered when determining if an award should be implemented. Considering efficiency
in Saudi Arabia, it can be said that the implementation conditions lead to the achievement of the
freedom and encouragement for the use of arbitration in Saudi Arabia.
One problem is the misunderstanding of what Saudi Arabia considers public policy, and what
others may expect it to consider as public policy. What the country considers public policy
should not be an issue when it comes to implementing foreign arbitral awards since these define
the moral values of the country and maintain order. Different countries have different cultures
and beliefs and these contribute to their daily economic and social activities. They, therefore,
determine what laws are implemented to achieve public policy.
Saudi Arabia has controversies just like other countries that are signatory to the Convention. In
one decision, Ruling No 235 / T/ 2 of 1415 AH (1995), there was controversy as to whether the
foreign judgment should be implemented or not because one court indicated that such a
judgment was contrary to public policy while the higher court argued that there was no such
evidence. ‘Evidence’ is considered to be a direct text from the Qur’ān or the Sunnah or an
Ijma’a between Muslim scholars. Thus, if the implementation of an award decides what Shari’a
decides, it is not contrary to the law.
Noticeably, implementation is also flexible and this is an advantage to the parties who would
like to resort to arbitration. As much as some parts of the arbitration may be contrary to public
policy, sections that are not contrary to public policy can be implemented. One example given is
the implementation of a foreign arbitral award in Ruling No 269 / ES / 4 of 1431 AH 2010, in
which annual interest was required to be paid on profit. This interest or Ribā is against Shari’a,
but the whole compensation or profit (as structured in accordance with Shari’a dictates) and that
the plaintiff should have received is not against Shari’a and that refusal to implement the Ribā
part was a clear implementation of what Article V of the Convention is designed for. Because of
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that, implementation of the award was undertaken but the part involving interest was excluded.
This could be a disadvantage which may discourage the resort to arbitration by some, but then
with any understanding of the scope of the public policy of a country, such matters should not
be an issue.
The above explanation shows how effective the laws involved in implementing foreign arbitral
awards are, except for some areas of possible disadvantage. The Saudi Arabian Grievances
Board has limited Islamic public policy to the assets of Shari’a (that is, involvement in or
having agreements involving prohibited contracts, having contracts with Ribā, but if the
contract is valid, the usury part will not be implemented, nor will a Gharer contract). All these
provisions, actions and the knowledge of these limitations may encourage arbitration and affect
positively its implementation and so the use of Islamic public policy is effective in the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards.
Violation of legal regulations relating to ‘mandatory norms of public policy’ is also considered
against the public policy. Saudi Arabia has regulations that guide implementation of foreign
arbitral awards, such as: those concerning courts with authority to carry out such jurisdictions;
arbitrability; requirements of an arbitral award for it to be implemented; and legal status. Going
against any of these is considered going against public policy. This does not discourage
arbitration at all; instead, it encourages it through its just system where the clarity of the texts, or
at least the general principles of the public policy, help people to understand the arbitration
system in Saudi Arabia, which could encourage arbitration.
There are negative perceptions about Saudi Arabia being a country that discourages
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. These negative perceptions are as a result of a lack of
thorough research, a lack of understanding of the Saudi Arabian legal system and laws, and a
lack of translations of Saudi laws and regulations in English for non-Arabic speakers.
Additionally, a lack of publicly available published decisions causes misunderstandings, even
among many researchers.

341

Some of the perceptions are that Saudi Arabian laws favour Saudi Arabian investors; that the
Saudi government reserves the right to refuse enforcement of an award; that awards rendered by
default against a Saudi party are automatically unenforceable; and that Saudi Arabia does not
provide the freedoms expected in its implementation of the foreign arbitral award provisions
through international laws. These claims being available to someone who does not understand
the Saudi Arabian legal system and laws may be regarded as reducing the chances of resorting
to arbitration in Saudi Arabia. If one’s interests could be removed because of the laws of a
country relating to arbitration, the investor or businessman, may not wish to do business in that
country, for fear of loss of wealth. This is understandable, and discourages the resort to
arbitration, but more should be understood about the laws that guide taking of such interests
before general conclusions are made about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia discouraging
arbitration. The country has domestic laws and it has to abide by the laws. It is important to first
understand the scope of Islamic public policy, which depends on the Islamic assets, social
morality and consensus (Ijma’a) among scholars. Just like any other country, Saudi Arabia has
its own national scope of public policy; it is just that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a
different culture from that of Western countries, and it is clear that the Kingdom has Shari’a as
a basic guide to the courts, compared to Australia, which has Australian laws guiding their
courts. Shari’a prohibits interest on profits, while other country’s laws do not prohibit the
imposition of interest on a loan or similar nor earning of such money over and above the capital
on a business deal. Businesses sometimes make decisions in ignorance of the acceptable
alternatives or avoid investing altogether. Acting according to the prohibitions in Saudi Arabia
is in accordance with Shari’a, does not need to discourage arbitration. In fact, Saudi laws have
encourage arbitration (as in the Commercial Court System 1350 AH (1930) and the Arbitration
System 1983). Additionally, Shari’a has traditionally encouraged arbitration on many matters.
There is evidence showing that Saudi courts do not refuse to implement foreign arbitral awards
as long as the arbitrator is competent and the awards are not contrary to Shari’a and public
morality. Additionally, court will apply the part that corresponds to the arbitration agreement,
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while the other part, which is exceeded, will be refused. Evidence of this kind is found in Ruling
No 33 / T / 4 of 1414 AH 1994. According to Article 3(d) ‘competent judicial authority: shall not
refuse to implement the provision except in the following circumstances: (c) If the verdict was
contrary to public policy or public morals in the requested state of implementation ...’
The merits of the case must not be considered except in cases where the public policy of the
state is affected. In Saudi Arabia, the general rule is that the Board retries the entire case on its
merits only in order to ensure that the award does not violate Shari’a. As a result, any retrial of
cases, to determine if Saudi public policy has been violated, is considered just.
Based on the sample of cases that have been used in this research, there is no cases which show
that the Saudi courts had considered the merits of the case. The evidence is provided, however,
in Ruling No 157 / T / 4 of 1427AH 2007 where the Audit-Circuit states that ‘the court had no
right to consider the merit of the case or answer any substantive defence as long as that foreign
rule did not violate the Islamic law.’ It is also evident in the cases that justice was achieved in
the cases handled (Ruling No 13 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005 and Ruling No 102 / T / 4 of 1424 AH
2004 among others), where the courts preserved Shari’a, which ensures public policy, and any
award that is contrary to the nation’s public policy should not be implemented.
It is true that Saudi Arabia needs a special law for the implementation of foreign arbitral awards,
as Australia has in its International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). This will facilitate the work of
judges where they can refer to only one law not as is the case now where a judge must refer to
more than five international and regional agreements as well as two decisions of the President of
the Grievances Board. It might also help identify some of the Islamic principles applicable in
the international area and thus further facilitate the judge’s works by saving time and effort and
also provide more clarity for foreign investors. These factors in the Saudi legal system seem to
discourage arbitration because they prolong processes and procedures.
The courts are just, for the scope of public policy allows debate on contestable issues to produce
evidence to prove the illegality or not in cases. An example is Ruling No 189 / T / 4 of 1427 AH
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2007, where the judge believed that music songs were prohibited in Islam, and so he refused to
implement a foreign provision on this basis. The Audit-Circuit revoked this ruling and the
reason for doing that was that ‘the prohibition of songs is not in accordance to an explicit text in
the holy Qur’ān or Sunnah or in accordance with Ijma’a between the Muslim scholars.’ Thus,
the judgment that something is contrary to public policy should be in accordance with the
existence of an explicit text in the Qur’ān or Sunnah or in accordance with Ijma’a.
Saudi Arabia also has legal principles that prevent implementation of illegal contracts and other
contracts that violate the Shari’a. Examples are the prohibition of usury (Ribā) and Gharer
contracts. The prohibition of Gharer prevents exploitation and manipulation of any of the
parties involved in the contract and also ensures the rights of those with logical and legitimate
grounds.
In Australia, from the cases presented, public policy is shown to be acting according to the law
by ensuring awards’ arbitrability as well as ensuring justice by preventing fraud or corruption
within the process and applying the principle of natural justice. The courts’ main objective is to
preserve social morality and justice; thus, in a case where a defendant argues that the plaintiff’s
case is contrary to public policy and it should not be implemented, the court will determine the
plaintiff’s fault or role in that claim. Justice to parties maintains the public policy argued about.
An example of the case is Yang v S & L Consulting [2009] NSWSC 223.
Controversially, Australian courts decided many cases based on section 8(5) being understood
as indicating the existence of residual discretion as an additional ground for refusal by the courts
of enforcement of such awards based on their being contrary to public policy.
This, however, could not be accepted by the current amended IAA 2010, where section 8(5) of
the IAA defences that were previously considered non-exhaustive by the Australian courts, are
now exhaustive according to the amended IAA 2010.
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It is clear that solving the cases by the courts is done according to the law and no laws are
violated (except for areas of controversy in previous years, such as the rare case where the law
had been violated and therefore implementation refused, or in another case, a new court process
begun). Because of that clarity, and transparency implementation of foreign arbitral awards in
the country are considered just and this, together with the resulting general degree of
predictability and reliability, encourage international foreign arbitration. This has been increased
since the 2010 amendment to the IAA, which clarified that only grounds listed in the New York
Convention could be used to refuse recognition of an arbitral award (substantially reducing if
not eliminating the uncertainty generated by the existence of ‘residual discretion’ utilised in the
Queensland Resort Condominiums Case).
Australian courts limit the scope of public policy; however, according to the undefined and
general term of ‘public policy’ they may still have that residual discretion to make decisions on
what they consider public policy. In one case, the judge decided to make more investigations
about the case without any request from the parties involved in the arbitration (that is, Resort
Condominiums International Inc v Bolwell [1995] 1 QR 406). The outcomes of that case
produce a positive and a negative perception. The negative perception is that the judge decides
what public policy is when dealing with a case. The use of court discretion and existence of
uncertainty as the basis of refusal to enforce a foreign arbitral award in two different cases is not
taken lightly by some scholars. Court discretion is one important factor that shows the power of
the courts to make decisions regarding what is public policy to the nation.
The positive perception is that it gives an indication of the Australian courts aiming at justice
and morality, although some of their decisions may seem not to go by the provisions of the
Convention, such as the Resort case where the court relies on uncertainty as a ground to refuse
the implementation while uncertainty is not a ground of refusal in the Convention. In fact,
uncertainty is a ground for refusing domestic awards.
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Justice is observed in many cases handled by the Australian courts. According to the
Convention, only legal arbitral awards should be implemented. There is a case where the judge
refused to implement an award under the terms of the Convention because the awards were
interim orders ‘measures of protection’ and so are not subject to enforcement by a court as
explained above (that is, Resort Condominiums v Bolwell [1995] 1 QR 406). According to the
Convention, it is the arbitral award that should be enforced and not an interim award which is
not final. Enforcement of such an interim would be contrary to public policy. The policy here is
from the Convention.
It can be said that the scope of public policy is limited by national public policy and this is
determined by the judges. So many cases may seem unjust based on the argument of being
against national public policy yet considered not against international public policy. The main
misunderstanding again here is the use of domestic laws to determine violation of public policy.
An example is in the use of uncertainty as a basis for refusal to implement a foreign arbitral
award, considering implementing such an award to be contrary to public policy. In Australian
laws, as mentioned previously, uncertainty is used to refuse implementation of domestic arbitral
awards. An example case is International Movie Group Inc (IMG) v Palace Entertainment Corp
Pty Ltd [1995] 128 FLR 458.
Although the scope of public policy is determined by the judges, most of the cases decided
aimed at justice and morality. This is evidence that there is justice in individual cases. There is
one case where one might think justice was not achieved. In earlier cases, such as Resort
Condominiums v Bolwell, the court was able to refuse to implement an award as contrary to
public policy by exercise of judicial discretion acting beyond the grounds listed in the
Convention (articles 8(5)–(8)). The court found something important that could affect future
court decisions if the foreign award was implemented. It is very true that previous court
decisions are used to handle future cases to ensure justice, on this, the court was right; but from
the point of the view of the plaintiff, this could be an injustice to the company. If one assumes
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that there is a contravention of public policy, the judge is obliged to consider the merits of the
dispute; however, this consideration is driving arbitration out of its scope and making the resort
to arbitration meaningless for the parties, but it was necessary to examine the public policy
principle by the judge which shows the value of preserving the social values more than the
individual cases. The basis of making the ruling could be unjust, although it is the judge’s
general discretion to decide to enforce an award or not is based on the legal rules applicable in
this regard.
In deciding on what public policy is, the Australian courts can decide on the merits of the case,
as in the case of Resort Condominiums v Bolwell to identify whether something is contrary to
public policy. This may be considered unjust. In this case, however, there are three other
reasons why the enforcement of the award was contrary to public policy and so was not
implemented. A summary of the reasons for Australian courts’ rejection of enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards also prove that these cases are handled justly. These reasons are: to
ensure ‘arbitrability’, to refuse to enforce when there is existence of influence or fraud, and to
ensure justice and morality for the public.
Similarities: in both countries the national law guides the definition and scope of public policy.
This affects the implementation of foreign arbitral awards in both countries differently since
both countries have different national laws and a different legal basis. It is an advantage because
both countries maintain moral, legal and social values, but a disadvantage to arbitration if the
parties involved do not understand the principles of laws in other countries. A problem arises
though, if local ‘public policy’ is what is considered by the courts as public policy as is
provided in the Convention, then cases that are not arbitrable in both countries or in any
signatory country cannot find a place to be handled. This means that there is need to define
public policy and draw its border in the Convention to have a clear meaning for signatory
countries.
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The cases handled show that in both countries, there is a wide conception of ‘public policy’ as a
defence against implementation of foreign arbitral awards. Saudi Arabia has concepts like the
assets of the Shari’a law, morals, social values, while Australia includes concepts like
uncertainty, ‘fairness’ and court discretion. Therefore, it is very hard to give a final judgment
about which judicial system is more efficient or gives a wider conception of this defence where
each system has given wide concepts (or, in the case of Australia, did until the 2010
amendments narrowed the interpretation of the acceptable the grounds and have rendered the
IAA even more amenable to implementation of foreign arbitral awards in line with the amended
New York Convention).
However, it is clear that the adoption of the Convention within the IAA and also the existence of
the IAA as a special law to implement foreign arbitral awards in Australia, are factors that give
preference to Australian legislation in terms of clarity and speed of knowledge of the limits and
scope of public policy, where the IAA has tried to determine the public policy in the existence of
fraud, corruption or breach of natural justice.
But on the Saudi side, one can notice that the Saudi Arbitration System did not mention any of
these, and rulings by the Saudi Grievances Board are guided by two decisions that have been
issued by its President which contain wide terms, such as ‘violation of Shari’a’ (that is, Ruling
No 95 / T / 4 of 1427AH 2007 and Ruling No 269 / ES / 4 of 1431 AH 2010). Despite the fact
that there are attempts by the Saudi courts to identify and limit that violation of Shari’a to the
assets of Shari’a, this mystery is still unsolved and the limit of violation of Shari’a is still
undefined. Therefore, it can be said that efficiency will not, by itself, provide fairness in an
unclear system.
Both countries consider what is against the national laws as against public policy. This was
clear in Ruling No 236 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006 and also in Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining
Inc [2011] VSC 1. Finally, the two nations similarly consider the maintenance of order in the
society as a something all aim for. Australia develops policies to guide public policy, while
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Saudi Arabia has Shari’a and scholars to debate on consensus issues and to ensure public policy
which also includes social morality.
In both countries, it is the courts that determine or define what public policy is and decide on the
‘contrary to public’ issue of an award. The composition of the courts and the laws guiding the
courts, however, differ. Saudi Arabia is guided by Shari’a, public morality and Muslim scholars
on matters concerning public policy, while Australia is fully guided by Australian laws,
interpreted by the judges. In both countries, they aim to preserve justice and morality but some
of their court decisions are not direct implementations of the Convention, where they in some
cases, are applying national principles. Therefore, it could be said that laws and also courts,
through the exercise of that right, in both countries have given the judge the freedom to
determine what public policy is and also the right to intervene to consider the subject matter of
the case in order to determine the extent of the infringement of public policy.
Differences: One difference is in what the two countries consider to be public policy.
Therefore, it could be said that the scope of public policy in Australia lies within the courts
guided by the national laws while the scope of public policy in Saudi Arabia is limited by
Shari’a. The Convention is implemented through the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth)
(as amended in 2010) in Australia, while in Saudi Arabia, there is no specific Act through which
the Convention is implemented, although the country is a party to it. That is due to the
difference in the legal system between the two countries as in Saudi Arabia, according to Article
70 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance, any international convention after ratification is
treated at the level of law or as a national law.
The publication and public authority of judicial decisions in Australia foster a greater
understanding of the role of the Australian judicial system in implementing foreign arbitral
awards in general and to explore the limits of public policy in particular. The absence of
publication of Saudi judicial cases, by contrast, has helped to increase uncertainty about the role
of the judiciary in the interpretation of public policy. Additionally, judges on the Grievances
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Board lack the necessary legal education in international trade law, conventions and norms, and
also lack of professional training. In fact, while all of the Grievances Board judges have a
degree in Shari’a, nearly all of them did not have any special degree in international commercial
law which shows the importance of the training programs for judges.218 Improving the laws and
professional training for the judges, and reforming the Saudi Arabian courts will improve
efficiency of the courts. It should, in particular, reduce the number of appeals, and the number
of successful appeals where a decision by a lower court is overturned and further action then
having to be undertaken before the courts.
It can be considered that there was justice in almost all the cases and injustice in very few,
although injustice in this case may be due to the different scope of what each country considers
public policy, influenced by their national laws and legal principles. Some parties did not have
their claims satisfied because of the public policies of respective countries in which the award
was to be enforced.
It could be said that social values and public policy is well maintained. This is because in both
countries, the domestic laws maintain order and ensure justice and preserve the most basic
notions of social morality, which in turn preserves the social values. As indicated in the criteria,
laws that ensure both elements are achieved are those that are ‘better and more worthy of being
followed through [their] maintenance of public and private rights, whilst facilitating and
encouraging people to resort to arbitration.’
Finally, a low level of accuracy reduces the parties’ confidence in the judicial process where it
makes the provisions of the courts unpredictable and prolongs the proceedings of the litigation
(and as earlier noted: ‘justice prolonged may involve justice denied’). Nevertheless a higher
level of accuracy (as indicated by fewer cases being overturned upon review) and therefore a
more reliable projection of prospective outcome leads to a greater dependence on arbitration as
218

For example, Saudi judges do not need to complete a law degree but a certificate of one of the
faculties of Shari’a in Saudi Arabia (Article 37(d) of Saudi Judicial System 2007).
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lengthy proceedings contribute to a reluctance to resort to arbitration as it undermines one of its
chief goals, that is, speediness.
To sum up, the balance between these three criteria (efficiency, justice for the parties in the
individual cases, and maintenance of societal values) could be established by saying that the
Australian courts have given greater value to the freedom of parties, but did not ignore the
discretion of the judge in determining the meaning of public policy. In addition, the availability
of the direct legal texts (such as the IAA) helps to increase the efficiency of the court role in
Australia. Regarding the societal values, it could be said that Australian courts aim to maintain
public policy, where it is clear that the courts maintain social values and morality over
individual rights.

351

6
6.1

CONCLUSION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

This research has reached several important findings, and a number of recommendations will be
made on the basis of those findings. These cover several areas, including the impact of Shari’a
on the role of the Saudi judges in enforcing foreign arbitral awards, the effect of international
norms (which have an impact that cannot be overlooked), and the ambiguity of the principle of
public policy, which is a threat to the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral
awards as it gives the national courts the opportunity to expand their residual discretion in
rejecting the implementation of foreign arbitral awards.

6.1.1

General Observations

All cases presented in this thesis were against private parties. In addition, it was clear that Saudi
courts implement foreign arbitral awards, and that it is the difference in culture, laws, and
practice that lead to different negative perceptions about the country’s arbitration system.
In fact, the legal basis and also the judicial system in Saudi Arabia and Australia are different
and this in turn is reflected in the approach to the implementation of the provisions of foreign
arbitral awards. Therefore, it is true that religion, culture and international norms have a
significant effect on the enforcement process. In both countries it could be said that public
policy was the most used defence. It is also true that the Convention is the most important
agreement regarding the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards and both
countries are signatory to this convention.
Additionally, the adoption of the Convention within the IAA facilitates the application of any
foreign arbitration in Australia. This agreement is applied significantly in all the decisions of the
State Supreme and Federal Courts of Australia. In contrast, this agreement did not add much to
the Saudi courts except by expanding the application of the principle of reciprocity so that the
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signature by any State on this agreement is sufficient to demonstrate adherence to the principle
of reciprocity.
Australia has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law while Saudi Arabia is signatory to the Riyadh
Convention. The UNCITRAL Model Law and the Riyadh Convention are not similar in their
provisions but similar in their aims; for example, both provide provisions on grounds of refusal
to implement a foreign arbitral award. Both have specific formal requirements for an award to
be recognised and both have provisions on awards not under arbitration or non-arbitrable,
among their many other provisions. There are distinctive interpretations or applications of these
conventions in regard to formal requirements, judicial authority, the principle of reciprocity, and
public policy.

A. Formal Requirements
The national laws have adopted the formal requirements of international conventions through
stating the terms of the international formal requirements in their laws.
From the research analysis, Saudi Arabia’s formal requirements that have been implemented by
the Grievances Board were considered to be in two groups, namely the conditions or
requirements set out in international conventions and national laws, and the conditions in the
Decision of the President of the Grievances Board (currently, Decision No 116 of 1428 AH
2007). In all these conditions, there is no clear reference to the Convention and even to the
application or interpretation of the Convention.
Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the Convention and, according to this convention, there are formal
conditions that should be met by signatory states. But Saudi Arabia does not show any
interpretation of the Convention in any of its requirements or procedures. It just states its formal
requirements at national and international levels and those given by the President of Saudi
Grievances Board. This is unlike in Australia where the provisions of the Convention are clearly
stated and implemented in the IAA. The formal requirements as described in Article IV of the
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Convention are reflected in section 9 of the IAA. Thus, it can be said that the formal
requirements of implementing foreign arbitral awards in Australia are provided by the
Convention and the IAA.
On the other hand, it important to highlight the modernisation of arbitration which creates new
situations that requires new conditions. For example, arbitration through the use of the internet
or any electronic means lacks the physical presence of the parties and others before the
arbitrator/s, which may be accounted as a failure to fulfil some of the formal conditions that are
to be met under the Convention. Consequently, it is better for national laws (Saudi and
Australian) to adopt special provisions in their arbitration laws to enforce any electronic arbitral
award and to go beyond any formal requirements.
But this may require the creation of new conditions, such as requiring the issuance of the
arbitral award by an international institution in which governments and business people have a
high degree of confidence in its ability to carry out this process accurately and professionally
(that is, the issuance of the award by an international arbitration centres (ICC)). Additionally,
there should be a requirement for an electronic signature that would work in parallel with a
special legal regime for registered electronic signatures. Such steps must take into account the
rules of arbitration in general and the anti-crime information system as a preventive measure
that imposes the necessary legal protection of data and electronic records and signatures.
B. Judge’s Authority
Analysis of the literature and cases of Australia and Saudi Arabia reveals that, in both countries,
the legal nature of arbitration affects the work of the judge. In Australian rulings, arbitration was
found to be of a mandatory nature while in Saudi Arabia the nature of arbitration is not
addressed in the Saudi Grievances Board’s rulings as mandatory nor whether they are binding
or not. However, there is real support for implementation. Additionally, there is no clear
definition of arbitration and the rulings reveal a view of arbitration as quasi-judicial in nature
and not ‘fully’ a judicial work. These differences over the legal nature, however, are no more
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than theoretical differences which will not affect the legal force of arbitration when a special
law exists, which recognises arbitration as a means of settling disputes.
Additionally, in Australia the judge’s power to refuse to implement a foreign arbitral award is
limited by the requirements in section 8 (3A) of the IAA. From an examination of the IAA and
the Convention, it could be concluded that the power of the judge is to make sure that the formal
requirements are met without going into the merits of the case. However, judges have
discretionary powers that they can use to make decisions on a refusal to implement foreign
arbitral awards, particularly in regard to the public policy defence (and under the definition it is
given). Thus, while courts in both countries are generally not to consider the merits of the case,
the judge himself retains the right to examine the arbitral award for any violation of public
policy that might render it invalid or partly or wholly unable to be implemented. Finally, the
role of the judges is affected by the court system. For example, under some circumstances in
Saudi Arabia decisions made by the Sub-Circuit have to be reviewed by the Audit-Circuit courts
‘mandatory revision’ even if the losing party did not appeal.

C. Principle of Reciprocity
Both Australia and Saudi Arabia consider signatory status of the Convention as proof of
reciprocity and both have no defined rules or requirements on how to assess reciprocity. Saudi
Arabia, however, has many judgments where reciprocity has had to be demonstrated before the
Saudi Arabia became a signatory to the Convention. This is in contrast to Australia where there
are no such judgments. This is due to the fact that Australia joined this most relevant, important
and widely accepted convention on the matter in early 1970s, while Saudi Arabia joined this
convention in the mid-1990s. This convention has 146 states members who substitute signatory
status for any other proof of reciprocity requirement. Australia has entered no reservations to the
Convention. Saudi Arabia also appears to have ratified the Convention without entering a formal
reservation as to the supremacy of the tenets of Islam (the Qur’ān and more) in relation to the
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text of the Convention, instead relying on the inclusion of the ‘public policy’ provisions in the
Convention.1
D. Public Policy
It is impossible to define the public policy as a defence in the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral award as such a policy is related to several factors, such as religion, culture,
national and international norms. However, in Saudi Arabia, public policy is considered Shari’a
and more. An award is enforceable if it does not violate the Shari’a assets (which include, for
many, explicit texts of the Qur’ān, or Sunnah, and the existence of Ijma’a (a consensus of
Muslim scholars)). Considering the provisions of the international treaties, especially the Riyadh
Convention, it is agreed that arbitration should be recognised and implemented, unless ‘the
ruling of the arbitrators is contrary to the provisions of Islamic law or public policy or morality
of the contracting party.’ In this case, Shari’a, public policy and morality (Aladab) are all
considered public policy, contributing to the idea that public policy is social order. Islamic
public policy is also considered to contain procedural and substantive features, and outline
contracts forbidden by Shari’a. These features come from the prohibition of Gharer contracts,
Ribā and the use of supporting scriptural sources. This shows the significant impact of Shari’a
on the role of the Saudi courts. Therefore, the concept of public policy has some specific limits
that are not to be breached, such as in regard to Ribā.
Moreover, Islamic legal schools are also allowed to interpret and generate the method of
identifying what is permitted and what is not under the Gharer or forbidden contracts. This
means that what is permitted and what is not forms part of public policy. Thus, public policy,
under arbitration, in the Saudi Grievances Board decisions is considered as violations of legal
1

See UNCITRAl website on status of the signatories to the Convention, <http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html>. See also Hatam Abbas Ghazzawi
and Co: Saudi Legal, Saudi Arabian Law Overview: 19 Dispute Resolution (2011)
<http://www.saudilegal.com/saudilaw/19_law.html>. The only reservation that has been made by Saudi
Arabia was regarding the reciprocity principle as explained earlier. See UN website on the Treaty
Collection,
Status
(2012)
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en#EndDec>.
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regulations, of public policy’s peremptory norms, and of Shari’a. The scope of Shari’a in this
regard is limited to the assets of Shari’a, which were identified by the Grievances Board in
definitive texts in the Qur’ān and Sunnah, and also in the consensus Ijma’a. This excludes the
issues that remain the subject of controversy among Muslim scholars from the category of
public policy.
In Australia (unlike Saudi Arabia), public policy is determined by the judges although guided by
laws. The judges use the international convention provisions and the national law to determine
what is against public policy. Cases analysed show that public policy is social order, morality
and law. The judges work towards maintaining the law and order, and preserving the role of the
court in ensuring justice and morality. It should be noted that judges are given discretion to
determine what public policy is while handling a specific case.
The case analysis shows that, when considering a case, public policy is not just following laws,
but determining whether the effect of the court’s decision would serve to maintain social order,
morality and the role of the courts.

E. Understanding the System of Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia
There is a significant level of misunderstanding of the Saudi courts’ role in implementing
foreign arbitration. From their observation of the way in which cases have been handled by
Saudi courts, many western researchers (such as Carbonneau, Gravelle and Wakim) consider
that the Saudi Arbitration System 1983 does not support foreign arbitration, mainly due to their
incomplete or clear interpretation of the Saudi laws that govern arbitration.2 Wakim, for
example, noted that ‘Saudi Arabia has been described as “traditionally hostile” to the
recognition and enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards, finding such awards contrary to
Saudi Arabian law and public policy.’ This, as proven, is not true at all, arbitration is a legal

2

See the discussion in section 1.6.2 Implementation in Saudi Arabia (B) Previous Studies.
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means and a valid option in Saudi Arabia to solve any commercial disputes; however, investors,
researchers and practitioners must consider the significant impact of Shari’a on the arbitration
process in Saudi Arabia, where Shari’a governs the arbitration process in general, and must be
especially mindful of its impact in the stages of the implementation of foreign arbitral award.
For example, the principle of public policy is dominated by the Islamic character more than by
the legal requirements that are contained in Saudi Arbitration System.
As a result, studies involving foreign arbitration in Saudi Arabia have to clarify the lack of
understanding and lack of legal texts. This lack of understanding can be reduced through the
support for more research, the publication of the court’s decisions and an increased effort in
translating the Saudi laws into English and other languages.
F. Understanding Shari’a
Given the great geopolitical and economic significance of the Middle East, lawyers outside the
region’s borders must obtain an insight into the area’s sources of law. Shari’a is one of the three
major legal systems, and it is remarkable that there has been little examination of its footing in
the Middle East. In the face of economic globalisation, and particularly the increased trade
among those of the various law jurisdictions and their participation in business not just in each
other’s areas but with each other, Shari’a is no longer a field reserved for Middle East
specialists, Arabic researchers, and comparative law experts. Therefore, it is helpful to add to
those materials available in the field of arbitration in Shari’a so these can be studied by Western
scholars. What supports the importance of studying Islamic laws and their impact on the Saudi
legal system in general is the power of their impact on the arbitration system, especially with
regard to the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards.

G. Importance of Culture and International Norms
Diversity and culture is important and has to be respected. Nations cannot be forced to abide by
international rules that contravene their cultural norms. Policy makers and nations signatory to
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the Convention should come to an agreement on the basis of using public policy. The suggestion
of adding ‘international public policy’ in addition to national public policy in the Convention
(such as the UNCITRAL Model Law) is strongly supported as giving any country the right to
choose the suitable position and give them the right to make reservations so as to be able to
choose to implement one of these public policy standards or be able to use either of them,
depending upon the circumstances, and as determined by the domestic laws. Policy makers
should also encourage the sharing of their laws with each other to reduce the instances of lack of
understanding of a nation’s laws and subsequent problems regarding implementation of foreign
arbitral awards on contracts that have been formulated in ignorance of the laws applying in the
country in which the arbitral award may be expected to be implemented (for example, Saudi
Arabia). Furthermore, the international norms, which stem from international transactions
between traders, represent the ‘international culture’ in this regard. International commercial
norms can be defined as a global understanding between the merchants about the best behaviour
in a particular matter in the field of international trade. These norms must be taken into account
in any studies related to the role of national courts in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.

6.2

Recommended Amendments

There are several recommendations that this research has reached in different areas regarding
the implementation of foreign arbitral awards. These comprise recommendations in regard to
the need for a new comprehensive law in Saudi Arabia; the need to amend a decision by the
President of the Saudi Grievances Board, to reduce delays in proceedings, clarify definitions
(including that of ‘public policy’), and consider issues relating to reciprocity and competent
courts. These are covered in greater detail below.

6.2.1

The Need for a New Comprehensive Law in Saudi Arabia

It is true that in regard to the implementation of foreign arbitral awards, Saudi judges are
confronted by several applicable international conventions and the national Saudi Arbitration
System 1983 sand two decisions released by the President of the Grievances Board. This shows
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the need for enacting a special law for the enforcement of foreign arbitration in Saudi Arabia
along the lines of the International Arbitration Act 1974 of Australia, where such enactment
helps to raise the efficiency of judiciary and the law and facilitates the judges’ work.
Unfortunately, the new law that has been released recently after the completion of this research
concerns the domestic arbitration more than the foreign or international arbitration.3 In fact, it
could be said that the focus of this law concerns the role of the arbitrator more than the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards. Additionally, this law did not clearly exclude the
decision of the Grievances Board which was released ‘especially’ to implement foreign arbitral
awards and foreign judgments. This could prolong the previous problem where the Saudi judges
are confronted by several pieces of legislation relating to the implementation of foreign arbitral
awards, which will negatively affect judicial efficiency in the international arbitration. This may
show the need for a special law concerning the enforcement of foreign arbitration in Saudi
Arabia along the lines of the International Arbitration Act 1974 of Australia. This will help to
increase the efficiency of judiciary and the law in regard to the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards.

6.2.2

Constitutional Violation by Paragraph No 5 in the Decision No 116 of 11/7/1428
AH (2007) of the President of the Saudi Grievances Board

The Saudi lawmaker shall delete the requirement that exists in Decision No 116 of the President
of the Grievances Board which excludes the award that has been issued against any government
department from consideration by the Grievances Board. This condition (paragraph 5 in
Decision No 116 of the President of the Grievances Board) is contrary to Article 13(d) of
chapter III of the Grievances Board System where the Grievances Board is the competent court
in considering any dispute to which the Saudi Government is a party.

3

It was issued by the Royal Decree No M /34 of 24/5/1433 (AH 16/4/2012) Umm al-Qura Gazette No
4413, 18/07/1433 (AH 8/6/2012).
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6.2.3

Solution for the Court’s Delay

The best action would be for both countries to try to develop a judicial system that links the
appeal to a single level which can be more effective and eliminate the time consuming appeal
process being repeated. This will attract those in the international trade area to invest within
these countries since arbitration is very important feature in resolving any future issues.

6.2.4

Partial Reciprocity

For Australia partial reciprocity seems to be reinstated by section 8 of the IAA, even though this
is not something that Australia made a reservation to when it acceded to the Convention. This
could be considered against the reservations of the Convention and its spirit. Indeed, Australia
has done well not to include the ‘reciprocity’ reservation; however, the existence of section
8(4)(b) in the IAA could hamper the implementation of the arbitration, and thus it would be
better if it were reviewed.

6.2.5

Article VII in the New York Convention

Article VII of the Convention may violate the res judicata of the judicial decisions with respect
to private international law as explained above. Hence, the recommendation is to review this
vague and unclear article.

6.2.6

Competent Courts

The determination of the competent court, the one that is most able to understand the needs of
international trade, is part of the process of facilitating and supporting arbitration. There is,
therefore, an urgent need to assign the task of implementing the provisions of foreign arbitration
to the competent court that has jurisdiction in the consideration of trade issues (that is, the
Commercial Court in Saudi Arabia) in order to understand the needs of international trade and
facilitate the acceptance of the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitral awards
quickly and easily.
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Therefore, it is better to refer the consideration of the implementation of the provisions of
foreign arbitration to the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court in Saudi Arabia. That is due to
their understanding and in fact their specialisation in trade disputes (national and international);
unlike the role of the Grievances Board which is an administrative Court. If such modification is
not possible at this stage for any reason, the judges in the Grievances Board have to have some
training sessions to understand the requirements of international trade agreements and to learn
to implement the proper convention.
In Australia, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of each State over the arbitration awards was
perceived as a disadvantage, given that the limited number of international arbitration cases
before the state courts made it difficult for the judges to develop an appropriate level of
knowledge of international arbitration. Additionally, parties by resorting to different state courts
can slow down the implementation. However, it is not possible to give the Federal Court an
exclusive jurisdiction for many reasons explained earlier.4 Thus, the recommended approach is
to have a specialist list and to distribute a Practice Note within the Supreme Courts and also the
Federal Court. This would without doubt help to improve the efficiency of the court’s role in the
implementation.

6.2.7

Public Policy (Definition)

Public policy extends beyond causes of illegality. It is contained in arbitrability as a public
policy defence and also it is a principle of law, where Croft J stated in his judgment (Altain
Khuder v IMC) that Sir Anthony Mason had said:
In order to ensure the attainment of that object without excessive intervention on the part of
courts of enforcement, the provisions of art V, notably art V(2)(b) relating to public policy
have been given a narrow construction. It has been generally accepted that the expression
‘contrary to the public policy of that country’ in art V(2)(b) means ‘contrary to the
5
fundamental conceptions of morality and justice’ of the forum.

4
5

See section 2.2.2 Competent Court of Australia (ii. Supreme Court of NSW).
See Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc [2011] VSC 1, 53.
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Determining what constitutes public policy and whether an arbitral award should be enforced or
not are under the jurisdiction of the national courts. Thus, it is very useful for the national courts
to consider how courts of other countries have applied public policy to achieve the greatest
support for arbitration. This requires the publishing of all decisions that will be issued in regard
with the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. This also depends on the
availability of analytical comparative studies between different countries.
Most importantly, the national courts should point out the reasons for refusing the
implementation in detail, including their method and the grounds for refusing recognition or
enforcement and not just limit themselves to a mere reference to Article V(2)(b) of the
Convention or to their own law or case law in refusing the recognition or enforcement of foreign
arbitral award. Such a trend will help to achieve more coherent practice and will develop the
principles and rules of the public policy defence which in turn will narrow the limits of that
principle.6
6.2.8

Scope of Public Policy

Unfortunately there is no clear standard that can help to measure the scope and the extent of the
public policy. This supports the trend that advocates the necessity of adding ‘international
public policy’ to the texts of the Convention on par with what exists in the UNCITRAL Model
Law.
Kutty argues that ‘public policy’ in the Convention is ‘international public policy’. This is
contrary to the provision in article V(2)(b) of the Convention which states that contrary to public
policy means contrary to the public policy of the country in which the award is to be
implemented. Public policy, therefore, is just the nation’s public policy. If international public
policy is to be used, cases where arbitrations are against a specific nation’s public policy will be
implemented. This will affect the justice system of the nation and the citizens may not trust their
6

For more explanation, see Pierre Mayer and Audley Sheppard, ‘Final ILA Report on Public Policy as a
Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ (2003) 19(2) Arbitration International 249.
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judicial system. ‘International public policy’ as defined by Kutty, however, reduces the level of
refusal to implement foreign arbitral awards on the basis of contrary to public policy.
Finally, there are some future studies recommended, which include Islamic arbitration; the
application of interim measures under the national laws and the possibility of enacting these
within the Convention, such as in the UNCITRAL Model Law; the implementation of foreign
arbitration before the enactment of the Arbitration System 1983 in Saudi Arabia to clarify the
implementation in that period of time as a historical study to show the development of the law
and judicial efficiency; and finally there should be some studies and surveys targeting the
companies and foreign investors to know what attracts them to resorting to arbitration with
Eastern parties in order to know the barriers and obstacles need to be overcome in the national
laws.
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Appendix:

General points regarding the formal requirements:
Regarding the documentation required to be submitted at the request for implementation in the
Kingdom, as previously mentioned (in regard to conventions and national laws), the Grievances
Board in its judgments has decided many general provisions, which can be explained as follows:
1.

Most of the provisions came with general terms in regard to the formal requirements,
such as Ruling No 164 / T/ 4 of 1424 AH 2004,1 where the foreign judgment was issued
by the Court of Cassation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In this case, the
defendant had to pay JD 325,242 as compensation for their failure to fulfil obligations in
the contract between the parties. The Audit-Circuit stated that ‘there is nothing that
requires attention...’,2 which means there are no contraventions to such requirements. A
ruling on another case (Ruling No 166 / T / 4 of 1428 AH 2008) provides additional
evidence. The case involved a request for implementation of a foreign judgment in which
a Kuwaiti national (the wife) had been awarded a claim against her former husband (a
Saudi national) for a monthly amount to cover her expenses, including the rent for the
house where she lived, and also the salary of a servant (all of which expenses she was
paying).3

1

2
3

It should be noted that this is a family case and as explained before the Saudi Grievances Board is
dealing with the foreign judgments and foreign arbitral award in the same manner; thus, such case will
show the court’s trend in applying the formal requirements.
See Ruling No 164 / T/ 4 of 1424 AH 2004.
This is a case filed by a woman requesting the implementation of foreign judgment issued by the
Court of First Instance in Kuwait - Department of Personal Status against her ex-husband. This
judgment was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Kuwait. This judgment compels the defendant to
pay KWD 270 monthly as an expense for his two daughters and a maid with a servant fare home and
nursery and feeding. The Forty-Second Sub- Circuit in the Grievances Board approved this provision
on the basis of the availability of all the conditions necessary for its implementation on the territory of
the Kingdom. The defendant provided some of the substantive arguments where the Audit-Circuit
confirms the absence of authority to engage in the merits of the case with the validity of the execution
of the availability of all the formal requirements.
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The Audit-Circuit stated that, ‘the provision [ruling] has met the necessary conditions for
its implementation [in] the territory of the Kingdom’4 which means there is no violation
of any formal or substantive condition. In another ruling the Sub-Circuit stated that, ‘the
provision did not meet the conditions required for implementation’.5 These rulings did not
address or name these requirements, but rather expressed them in general terms, as if the
checking of these formal requirements is routine.
In a more detailed provision in regard to the formal requirements, the Fourth AuditCircuit in Ruling No 100 / T/ 4 of 1425 AH 20056 copied, in detail, Articles 30(b) and
43(c) of the Riyadh Convention on Judicial Cooperation without any comments or
analysis,7 where the case was about the obligation of presenting any documents showing
proof of the legal notice; however, it should be noted that the original decision was issued
in Egypt which is the only Arab state (and one of only two Arab League members) that
did not sign the Riyadh Convention, thus the Court has erred in relation to citing the
correct convention. Thus, it would have been better for the Audit-Circuit to refer to the
application requirements in the implementation of the provisions of the 1952 Arab
Convention of which Egypt is a signatory.
Such correction has been done by the same circuit (Fourth Audit-Circuit) in a later ruling,

4

5

6

7

See Ruling No 166 / T / 4 of 1428 AH 2008; also, Ruling No 28 / T / 4 of 1428 AH 2008 reporting that
the provision did not include what prevents the implementation in the Kingdom.
Ruling No 192 / ES / 4 of 1429 AH 2009. This case is an application of a foreign arbitral provision.
The plaintiff was an Egyptian woman who was seeking to enforce a provision made by Abdeen
District Court in Cairo, Egypt. It was in favour of her against her ex-husband (Saudi) to get the nape
of dowry after their divorce. It is also stated in Ruling No 121 / T/ 4 of 1426 AH 2006, where the
Circuit stated that there was general non-compliance with the formal requirements. Moreover, Ruling
No 157 / T/ 4 of 1427 AH 2007 provided that the competent Circuit has to issue its decision after the
completion of documents and proceedings and hearing of the statements of the parties to the dispute.
This case (Ruling No 100 / T/ 4 of 1425 AH 2005) was an application for foreign judgment by an
Egyptian women against her ex-husband (Saudi). She requested the execution of a decision issued by
the District Court of Giza in Cairo, Egypt. This provision was in regard to the proof of descent and
financial provision for her son.
It should be noted that Article 30 in the Riyadh Convention has stated the causes/bases of refusal to
recognise any foreign arbitral award.
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where it corrects the orientation of the Sub-Circuit in regard to the application of the
correct convention in Ruling No 137 / T / 4 of 1427 AH 2007 which states that ‘the Circuit
into its causes of [the] previous ruling had been based on Riyadh Convention on Judicial
Cooperation and although it was not clear that the Arab Republic of Egypt was among
the signatory states’8 So it is clear that the Audit-Circuit is obliged to correct the SubCircuits in any mistake that could occur in any judgment.
2.

With regard to the first formal requirement about the obligation to submit the original
ruling/award, it is necessary and logical to consider the implementation of that provision.
The Seventeenth Sub-Circuit refused to implement a foreign award because the plaintiff
did not meet the formal requirements and, most importantly, he did not provide the
original award, although he provided a copy which has no executive force.9 This decision
was supported by the Fourth Audit-Circuit in the Ruling No 231 / T / 4 of 1426 AH
2006.10
Also, in a relatively recent decision (Ruling No 151 / ES / 4 of 1429 AH 2009) in relation

8

9

10

That has been done in reverse in Ruling No 40 / T / 4 of 1428 AH 2008, where the Sub-Circuit has
cited the 1952 Arab Convention in the implementation of the rule issued in the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan which is a signatory to the Riyadh Convention. But it is worth paying attention to the fact that
the Fourth Audit Circuit reported that observation but did not abolish the rule and stated that: ‘[t]he
conditions to be met at the request of the implementation of the rule issued in one of the Arab
countries that signed the Convention on Riyadh is the same conditions set forth in the 1952
Convention.’ And the Circuit has requested the Prosecutor to fulfil these requirements without any
need to return the case to the Sub-Circuit and agreed about what has been done in this regard.
Additionally, it has supported the implementation of that foreign rule on the availability of all the
conditions. Also, in Ruling No 121 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006 which was issued in the Republic of
Yemen, the Nineteenth Sub-Circuit issued a decision that refused execution of the award as it violated
the provisions of the Arab Convention with regard to legal notice. It should be noted that Yemen is
one of the countries that have signed the Riyadh Convention. However, the Audit-Circuit endorsed
this provision without any reference to the error in the application of the Convention. This may be a
kind of indulgence and facilitation for the rapid implementation of foreign awards, but greater care
must be taken to ensure that such decisions are made in full accordance with the law, citing the
appropriate convention in each instance.
In this context, Ruling No 71 / T / 3 of 1412 AH 1992 acknowledged that the award must complete and
all the documents before the court to be eligible for consideration.
This judgment is an application for a foreign judgment issued by the South Court of Cairo in Egypt. It
concerns a proof of the child’s parentage and his right to the inheritance of his Saudi father. The
Audit-Circuit has stated that the ruling violates Article 34 of the Riyadh Convention as it did not
satisfy the need to supply the required documents, and most importantly, the plaintiff had just
provided a copy of the award, which has no executive force.
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to an application of a foreign judgment which was released by the Court of North Cairo
‘First Instance’ Chamber No Sixteen, the Audit-Circuit refused to implement this foreign
provision because of the non-submission of required documents. Therefore, the
implementation of foreign arbitral awards cannot occur in the absence of any or all of the
required documents, as is it missing its legal origin, and that is what is stated by the
Ruling No 23 / T / 2 of 1413 AH 1993,11 where the plaintiff did not prove that the
defendant had received a legal notice for the arbitration process or even prove that the
defendant knew of the arbitral award, which had been given against him.
However, someone could argue that the court’s refusal to implement the award on the
basis of documents being missing is a denial of natural justice. Additionally, such a denial
of justice is a substantive rather than formal requirement. In fact, national laws (Saudi and
Australian) and international conventions put such conditions as a formal requirement so
that the court will refer to the missing documents as failing to meet a formal requirement
and not refer to the denial of justice. Hence this requirement is formal more than
substantive. Therefore, it could be said that in such a case it is difficult to raise the issue
of a denial of justice where such an action is a direct application of a formal legal text
contained in domestic laws and international conventions. Also, the party requesting the
implementation was given the opportunity to raise the case before the competent court,
but he/she did not provide the required documents where the requirement is that he/she
must submit all proof of a valid arbitration; therefore, the defendant cannot raise the
denial of justice where the failure was on his or her part.
3.

It is also a necessity to complete all the formal aspects, including the presence of
ratifications required by the ministries of foreign affairs of the foreign country and in

11

That was also supported by Ruling No 71 / T / 2 of 1413 AH 1993.
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Saudi Arabia. This was evident in Ruling No 103 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005 where the
ratification of that provision is a prerequisite for accepting the case and the proceedings.12
4.

Proof of notice to both parties to implement the award. Because failure to meet this
requirement means the defendant did not defend himself properly and that is a reason to
refuse the implementation of foreign award. In fact, there are many court rulings that
revolve about the correct notification. 13 For example, Ruling No 192 / ES / 4 of 1429 AH
200914 has recognised one of the ways of giving this notice by revoking the ruling of the
Fifth Sub-Circuit, where the Appeal Court Estinaf accepted diplomatic means (through
the Ministry of Affairs) as a method to declare the parties.15 Additionally, the Second
Audit-Circuit has ruled in Ruling No 71 / T / 2 of 1413 AH 1993 that proof of the
declaration is necessary and required in order to start a case. Therefore, failure to meet
this requirement means that the defendant was deprived of an opportunity to make his

12

13

14
15

This case was a request to implement a foreign judgment released by the District Court of Columbia
in the United States for the benefit of the plaintiff who presented a testimony from the District Court,
affirming the possibility of implementing any foreign rule, including the judgments of the courts of
Saudi Arabia on the basis of reciprocity according to law. The Audit-Circuit demanded that the SubCircuit confirm the ratifications of the US Foreign Department and the Saudi embassy in Washington,
as well as the ratifications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Saudi Arabia. These ratifications were
very important to verify this testimony. Again, Saudi Arabia (as well as the United States) is a
signatory country to the New York Convention, so there is no need for such certificate if the verdict
presented was an arbitration award, but because the ruling sought to be implemented is a judgment
released by a foreign court, the plaintiff shall prove the reciprocity. This could illustrate that the Court
is strict on the ratifications and the presentation of all required documents.
According to the case samples obtained for the purposes of this research, this defence that has been
most used before the Grievances Board with respect to the implementation of the provisions of
arbitration is the defence of proper notice. For more information, see provisions: Ruling No 180 / T / 4
of 1425 AH 2005; Ruling No 171 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005; Ruling No 172 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005;
Ruling No 75 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006; Ruling No 32 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006 and, finally, Ruling No
153 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006.
Ruling No 192 / ES / 4 of 1429 AH 2009.
In another ruling, the court refused the implementation of a foreign judgment for failure to satisfy the
requirement of the correct declaration according to the 1952 Arab Convention (Ruling No 100 / T / 4
of 1426 AH 2006). It should be noted that this judgment was issued in the territory of the Syrian Arab
Republic, which is one of the States signatory to the Riyadh Convention; however, the Sub-Circuit
implemented the provisions of the 1952 Arab Convention and, at the same time, ignored the Riyadh
Convention. Unfortunately, the Audit-Circuit has supported this judgment without any reference to the
need for a correction of the Convention applied. In fact, all requirements in these conventions are very
nearly the same, but the application of the proper convention is very important in order to meet the
legitimacy of the provision by applying the proper law.
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defence; thus, it is a mandatory requirement and cannot be avoided or otherwise
substituted for.16
Therefore, the declaration of the provision alone is not enough nor can it be substituted
for by a declaration of the dates of meetings because litigation without a declaration
cannot be considered as a legal litigation as the defendant was unable to make his
defence.
5.

With regard to methods of declaration or legal notice, the Fourth Audit-Circuit has
annulled the ruling of the Forty-Second Sub-Circuit, because the declaration provision
was not true and it referred to Article 20 of the GCC Convention, which details the
methods of the declaration of the provisions. Additionally, the Audit-Circuit has made
this Article 20 of GCC Convention the basis for recognising the correct declaration.17

6.

There are some judgments from the sample that was obtained for this study that
enumerate and merely mention the basis of these formal requirements. These rulings can
be discussed as follows:

16

17

In this case, the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant was notified of the litigation process; thus,
the Second Audit-Circuit confirmed that Article 5 of the 1952 Arab Convention required the plaintiff
to present a certificate to prove the notification of the defendant of the start of the litigation process if
the verdict was made in absentia. In addition, the Audit-Circuit confirmed that the litigation does not
take place without such a certificate and any failure to prove the declaration (the existence of the legal
notice) results in the defendant being unable to present his case, which is considered as breaching
justice, so courts are not permitted to start the case without such a certificate. There is no exemption
from this requirement and the court cannot accept a substitute document in this instance. Also,
presenting the declaration of the final judgment is not a substitute for the declaration of starting the
case. It should be noted that the court has referred to ‘justice’, which here refers to natural justice, to
confirm the gravity of the event of acceptance of the case without a sufficient notification certificate.
Also, as we can say that there is no logical way to judge without such certificate. Additionally, the
court did not only refer to Article 5 of the Arab Convention, but also stressed that it is a breach of
natural justice, which make natural justice a legal source in cases before the Saudi Grievances Board.
This principle was also stressed in Ruling No 251 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006.
See Ruling No 47 / T / 4 in 1427 AH 2007. It should be noted that Article 20 provides the method of
declarations for the citizens of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Countries, which stipulates that all
documents ‘judicial and non-judicial’ relating to issues of civil, commercial, administrative and
personal status issues, which are meant to be declared or announced to persons residing in a Member
State, shall be sent directly from the body or the competent judicial officer to the court or the
competent authority where that person is. Therefore, the incorrect or non-declaration means no
possibility for the implementation of that award within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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i.

Ruling No 36 / T / 4 of 1425 AH 2005 covers nearly all of the formal requirements
and the necessity of the proof of the legal notice or ‘declaration’. This ruling
endorsed the ruling of the Eighteenth Sub-Circuit.18 This case in regard to the
expenses of construction projects was decided in favour of the plaintiff who
claimed the implementation of the rule of arbitral award between the parties, which
award was issued in Egypt and has been upheld by the Court of Giza (Egypt). The
defendant was obliged to pay the amount of SAR 8,129,357.85 and a further
amount of SAR 247,592.59 as expenses for arbitration and lawyers, in all an
amount that can be estimated to be the equivalent of GBP 90,000. The defendant
claimed that the case was still in appeal before the Cassation Court in Cairo; thus, it
was not final and could not be enforced in Saudi Arabia according to the Arab
Convention of 1952. However, the Sub-Circuit has accepted the implementation of
this award and the Audit-Circuit has supported the implementation of this arbitral
award relying on many causes where the arbitral award has fulfilled the conditions
for the implementation which have been set out in Article V of the Arab
Convention, which addresses the formal requirements such as presenting the
original award, proof of notice and the proof of executive force. Thus, this ruling is
final and shall be enforced within Saudi Arabia.
Additionally, the judge confirms that the parties have been properly notified and
there is no reason to block the implementation of that award. Also, there is no
obstacle identified in the implementation of Article III of the Arab Convention that
can stop that implementation. This shows that the formal requirements must be met
and also the executive power of the award should be included, which means that

18

This is also stated in Ruling No 33 / T / 4 of 1427 AH 2007, where the foreign provision has complied
with all of the formal requirements with the existence of the correct declaration. Also in the same
context, see Ruling No 95 / T / 4 of 1427 AH 2007.
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the award became final and enforceable as required by that convention.
ii.

Ruling No 152 / T / 4 of 1426 AH 2006, the case was to implement a foreign
judgment issued by the Court of First Instance in Kuwait, which became final after
the support of the Appeal Court in the same court. The Twenty-Fifth Sub-Circuit
issued its rule in implementing this provision for several reasons, these being:
[T]he provision to be implemented has met the conditions stipulated in the GCC
[Gulf Cooperation Council] Convention … and the provision is final and
enforceable, where the defendant had declared for the hearings and the judgment,
and also that declaration is certified by the concerned authorities and it did not
violate any Islamic or legal principle.

The Audit-Circuit supported the implementation of that ruling relying on the above
reasons. Therefore, it can be said that this ruling has also met all formal and
substantive requirements, which indicates the need for these conditions to be
fulfilled otherwise the arbitral award would be incapable of being performed.
iii.

Ruling No 102 / T / 4 of 1424 AH 200419 states, in the application of Article 32 of
the Riyadh Convention that the court’s role is to investigate whether these formal
conditions have been fulfilled or not, without examining the subject matter of the
case. This implies that the judicial role in the implementation of foreign awards is
limited to investigating whether the formal conditions have been met, in addition to
the award not having violated the provisions regarding public policy. This ruling

19

This ruling, as explained before, was issued by the Court of ‘Personal Status’ in Kuwait, which was
supported by the Kuwaiti Court of Appeal. The case was a request from a Kuwaiti woman (wife)
against her Saudi husband for a monthly allowance for her expenses and for their house and servant
(all of which she was paying). In Islam the husband is obliged to spend his income on his wife and his
home. In this case, the defendant claimed that she was not living in the house so she did not deserve
such payment, but she claimed that he did not ask her to return home after they separated, so the
husband is obliged during the period of marriage to pay the expenses of the wife and of their house. (It
should be noted that there is a debate among Muslim jurists as to a woman’s right to continued
payment of an amount for expenses in the event she leaves the marital home.) Thus, the Audit-Circuit
has stated that this is not a principle or a legal basis as it remains a controversial issue where there is
no explicit text in that regard; so according to the Audit-Circuit, she deserves to be paid.
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defines the authority of the national judge as being to check that the formal
conditions required by the laws or regulations and conventions have been met.20
However, it should be noted that this decision was issued in the state of Kuwait and
the judge has applied the rule of Riyadh Convention as Kuwait is a signatory state
and ratified it in 1983. It would, however, be better to implement the GCC
Convention, because it is a private convention between the Gulf States and it is the
proper convention in this regard where Kuwait is one of the GCC countries.
However, this does not affect the implementation of foreign arbitral awards
because there is no difference in the principles established in those agreements,
apart from a slight difference in some formal requirements as detailed in chapter 4.
But it is better to ensure that such decision is made in full accordance with the law
by citing the appropriate convention.

20

In a previous ruling (Ruling No 235 / T / 2 of 1415 AH 1995, as earlier explained) was an application
for a foreign judgment that had been issued by the Shari’a Court in Dubai. The Audit-Circuit
identified its role as only ensuring that the formal requirements had been met, without dwelling on the
merits of the case, except if the award includes a breach of public policy (as determined by the
national laws and international agreements). This ruling stressed that ‘... considering that the
submission of these documents is essential and [prerequisite] … which must be met … before the
consideration of the implementation.’
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